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I 
(i) 
,E 
Note on Transliteration 
When an Arabic name'or word has an accepted form in English, 
I have normally used it. Other Arabic names and words, I have tried' 
to transcribe' them' according to the system of the Oriental Library of 
Durham. 'I have allowed myself certain alternatives as the omission 
of the initial hamza and the () for (iS) when in the end of the word 
or accompanied by (Y). I have made no distinction between W and 
In spite of a considerable effort, it was difficult to be quite 
accurate. This could be explained by Lawrence's argumentI and the many 
difficulties involved in the Arabic vowelling system. 
2 I hope that the 
reader of this work will tolerate such a shortcoming; tö assist him I 
have given, in the bibliography, a 'translation of Arabic'works. 
. ý, <. 1 
1. T. E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom, (London, 1963), p. 19 
2. 'A. Wardi, 'Lima$ät Ijtimä'iyah min Tärikh al 'Iraq al 1iadith, Vol. 4, 
(Baghdad, 1974), pp. 3-5 
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Abstract 
This work is an attempt to place the events in Iraq in 1920 in their broad 
historical context. It attempts to trace the factors and forces beheind the 
uprising, and the effect it had on the subsequent socio-political development 
of Iraq. Socio-economic transformation, 'western 'encroachment and Turkish 
centralisation of the Ottoman Empire were reasons for the gradual dissolution 
of stagnant conditions, for the growth of national integration and for stimulat- 
ing mass interest in politics, leading to Arab nationalist awareness among the 
Iraqi intelligentsia and some tribal leaders. 
The British occupation served to accelerate the growth of this awareness. It 
suppressed the distinction between Islam and nationalism; it handicapped the 
formation of national institutions and administration; it attempted to arrest the 
structural changes in the tribally organised rural society and embarked on a 
policy which was both impractical and provocative.. 
Strenuous efforts on the part of the militant Iraqi nationalists succeeded in 
bringing about a nationalist-shi'i-tribal alliance which was the backbone of the 
1920 revolt. Although militarily defeated, the rising ruined the obsolete policies 
of the British civil commissioner and their prospects. The British, being eager 
to reduce their commitments and yet to retain a predominant influence in Iraq, 
devised a päolitical formula which satisfied the moderate nationalists and the 
conservatives who were apprehensive of the more radical political forms which the 
nationalist movement was assuming. 
This work contends that the uprising was a genuine but primitivelmovement. 
Socially it represented the intelligentsia, the unpropertied sheikhs and the 
leaders of tribal subdivisions who resented the claims, supported by the admin- 
istration, of the absentee landlords and patriarchal sheikhs. It precipitated 
the British design for the birth of an Iraqi state. 
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CHAPTER I 
THE SOCIO-ECONCKIC CONDITIONS 
INTRODUCTION 
Modern Iraq is the historical outcome of the political, economic and social 
unification process of the three Ottoman Wilayets: Mosul, Baghdad and Basrah. 
Such a process was solidified by the policies of the British Government after 
the First World War and the rise of the independence movement which together 
led to the formation of the provisional Iraqi government in 1920. 
This process started only in the latter half of the 19th century. Before 
that , Iraq was under conditions which hindered the growth of a national aware- 
ness and arrested any significant socio-economic or intellectual changes. 
The Mongol invasion (1258) had marked. the beginning of a new era in Iraq, an 
era of backwardness and alien-domination. The most far-reaching harm that was 
inflicted on Iraq was the destruction of its irrigation system. 
1 
The bulk of the country, the vast, fertile and alluvial plain which lay 
between the two rivers was dependent on the irrigation of the two rivers (Tigris 
and Euphrates). The rainfall in this zone was both inadequate and untimely. 
This could not be remedied by a simple system of flood irrigation, simply because 
the flood season was also untimely. 
2 
Furthermore the two rivers carry a high 
percentage of sediment3 which, without careful supervision, would often lead 
to blockage of the small rivers. This had led to the desertion of cultivation, 
encouragement of nomadism and sharp conflicts over the remaining cultivated land. 
Hence acondition of socio-economic deterioration, inter-tribal wars, towns and 
commercial decline was to 
'prevailin 
Iraq. 
4 
Under such conditions the growth of a- 
national awareness was hardly likely. 
For a successful cultivation the irrigation zone needed a well-kept system 
1. W. B. Fisher, The Middle Bast, (London, 1966), pp. 381-2. - 
2. It was too late for the shitwi (winter products) and too early for the 
ifi (summer products). W. Wilicocks, Irrigation of Mesopotamia, Vol. 1, 
2nd ed., (London, 1917), p. xii. 
3. A. Susa, Faiyidanät Baghdad fi al Tärikh, vol. i, (Baghdad, 1963), pp. 147-8. 
4. *MA. al Douri, Mugadema li Tärikh al 'Arab al Iq'tisädi, (Beirut, 1969), 
pp. 89-90. 
a 
of perennial irrigation. = This would require dams to store the spring 
flood. It would also need some', drainage canals to prevent the salination which 
constantly threatened the soi1. 
' 
Such a system needed above all a stable and 
devoted government which was competent - tokeep , up 
the irrigation works. 
Such a government by. no means existed in Iraq, at least up to the second 
half of the 19th century. Even afterwards, the reforms which were carried out 
were modest and ill-managed. Accordingly, the, situation -continued stagnant. 
The backwardness was not'confined to one aspect of : life, but was rather 
entrenched in every single corner-of Iraqis society. 
The decline of the population was terrifying. 'Irrigation from the Didjla 
/'Tigris] and rain cultivation inAhe north undoubtedly supported (in medieval 
times) a population perhaps three times more numerous than that of today, i. e. 
after a century of rapid growth'. 
2 The decline was due to the recurrenceýof the 
plague, 
3 
wars and. ill-equipped health services. 
Cultivation, apart from the rainfall zone, was restricted to the vicinity 
of the main towns, particularly in the areas of Shat al 'Arab, Diyäla and Karbalä'. 
Its conditions were very primitive and its production was=limited. 
4 
Rarely 
did production exceed local needs and provide a surplus for. export.. s.... -.. 
Thus -, Iraqi i trade was, virtually, a transit trade with Iraq playing the, role 
of a commercial station with *: no. indigenous produce to be exported. The tran- 
sit trade itself. was suffocated by the insecurity of trade routes. 
5-, 
The modest industry of Iraq was falling to the minimum. In 1910 the industrial 
6 
situation of Iraq was described as primitive and in a state of decadence. The 
only available education was to learn the Qurän by heart under the guidance 
of a n'. ri'. The first modern school was to ppen in Baghdad as late 
1. W. Wilicocks, op. cit., p. xii. 
2. C. Issawi, The Economic History of the Middle East 1800-1914, (Chicago, 
1966), p. 130. 
3. For instance, when plague attacked Baghdad'in 1831 its population was 150,000. 
When the plague was over, Baghdad was left with a population of only 30,000. 
The Encyclopedia of Islam, Voll, (London, 1913), p. 568. 
4. S. Haider, Land problems of Iraq, unpublished Ph. D. thesis, (London Univ. ", 
1942), p. 224., 
5. S. H. al 'Umari (trans. ), Ribl; t Niebuher, (Baghdad, 1954), pp. 67-9. 
6. Adriano Lanzoni, 'La Mesopotamia economical, Bolletino dells Societa 
Geografica Italiana, (Rome), XLVII (1910), cited by Issawi, op. cit., p. 181 
-3". 
as the period of Däoud Pasha (1817-32). 
1 
The study of that period of Iraqi history is beyond the scope of this 
work, 
2 but one could say in short security was low, justice rare, exaction 
cruel, and policy foolish. 
3 
If one accepts Hegel*s notion of history, namely 
history means mants process of changing his environment and that where there 
is no change there is no history, 
4 
then one is quite justified in arguing that 
Iraq of that period was of an 'unhistorical history*. One does not need Wittfogei' 
'hydraulic Eastern Despotism", 5 nor Marx's 'Asiatic mode of production*6 to be- 
come aware of the striking examples of arrested structural change. Longrigg's 
book provides ample evidence of how Iraqi socio-economic, cultural 
and political life remained stagnant and without any significant or radical 
changes. 
In the given circumstances, two powers were able to bring about some 
changes and revive the country; that was the government. or the people. How- 
ever, neither was able to introduce such measures which could. provide the 
preliminary conditions for deliverance from stagnation. Both., the rulers and 
the ruled, were reluctant and unmotivated to strive for such an end. 
The Turkish government conceived Iraq as a mere buffer province on the 
frontier of the Empire with Shi'i Persia. Baghdad was considered as a place 
of exile, and the walis sent to govern it were men who had lost favour.? They 
were expected to raise money from the province and send a certain sum to Istanbul. 
1. G. Kirk, A Short History of the Middle East, (London, 1964), p. 105. 
2. For instance see: (i) F. Rosen, Oriental Memories of a German Diplomatist, 
(New York, 1930); (ii) The Report of Sir Gerard Lowther on "The General 
Conditions of Baghdad, Basrah and Mosul, 19089. Published in G. P. Gooch 
and H. Temperley (eds. ), British Documents on the Origins of War, 1898-1914, 
Vol. V, (H. M. S. O., 1928); (iii) C. J. Rich# Narrative of a'Journey to the 
Site of Babylonia in 1811, (London, 1839). 
3. S. H. Longrigg, Four Centuries of Modern Iraq, (Oxford, 1925), p. 281. 
4. G. W. F. Hegel, The Philosophy of History, (New York., 1956), pp. 105-6. 
5. K. Wittfogel, Oriental Despotism, (London, 1963). 
6. Karl Marx, Pre-Capitalist Economic Formation, (London, 1964). ' 
7. Between 1879 and 1905,10 Walfis ruled Baghdad. For the same period of 
time, 17 Walis were assigned Basrah. Between 1900 and 1914, Barrah saw 
30 Turkish rulers. 
*A. Q. Bash *Aiyän, Tärikh al Barrah al Kabir. (Basrah, Manuscripts, n. d. ), 
Vol. 6, pp. 12-9 
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The tenure of Iraq office was deliberately kept short so that the governors 
would not consolidate'their power and be tempted to seek independence. 
Z 
Before Midhat Pasha, reforms had hardly touched Iraq, and even his sincere 
attempts were often unsuccessful and- produced, results contrary. to his good 
intentions. 
2 His endeavour to modernise the administration by applying the 
Ottoman Administrative system had resulted in:. 
'A numerous class of regular officials, the Effendis, stepped into 
the place of the. old arbitrary pashas,,, literate. but. not. otherwise 
educated, backward but decorous in social habit, uniformed in a 
travesty of European dress, exact and"over-refined in the letter of 
officialdom, completely remote from a spirit of public service, 
identifying the"body-public with their own class, 'contemptuous of 
tribe and cultivator, persistent speakers of Turkish among Arabs 
and, finally, almost universally corruptxand'venal - such were the 
public servants in whose sole hands lay the functions of governmentst. 
The Iraqi mass population was in its turn unable to motivate any radical 
changes. Some of the influential effendi class, landholders and Mujtahids were 
in fact, opposing any reforms, simply because they had vested interests in the 
old order and any changes might threaten their privileges. The bulk of the 
masses feared any innovation because they were the victims of, a combination 
of prejudice, religious fanaticism and ignorance. Thus, change-was opposed 
for fear of departure from Islam.. 
Furthermore, the people of Iraq lacked a sense of unity and were quite 
,. separated and unable 
to fight collectively for any, reforms. The loyalty of_ 
the individual was addressed to the religious group, the tribe or the city more 
than to Iraq as a fatherland. The concept of homeland or nationality, Iraqi or 
Arab, was ambiguous and ill-defined. Such a national concept, if it had existed, 
was restricted to narrow circles of groups or individuals. 
Ethnically speaking, Iraq was divided into several groups. The Arabs were 
the majority, forming about 70 per cent of the populace, the Kurds about 15 per 
cent, the Persians, Turkoman, Turks, Armenians, -Yazidis, Sabians and Circassians 
1. A. Jwaideh, 'Midhat Pasha and the Land System of Iraq', St. Anthony's Papers 
(16), Middle Eastern Affairs (3), (London, 1963), p. 111. 
2. A. Blunt, Bedouins of the Euphrates, Vol. 1, (London, 1879), 'pp. 195-6. 
3. S. H. Longrigg, Iraq 1900-1950, (London, 1953), p. 281. 
-S- 
formed together the remaining three per cent, as shown in the following table: 
l 
TABLE 1 
Arabs 1,650,000 Persians 70,000 Jews 60,000 
Kurds 3809000 
Syrian 
Ckriatians 609000 Circassian 89000 
Turks & 111,000 Armenians 57,000 Sabians 2,000 
Turkomans 
Yazidis 21,000 Chabaks 10,000 
Miscellaneous 10,000 
As far as religion was concerned, the dominant belief was Islam which 
represented about 90 per cent of the total population. The Jews were a strong 
minority living in the cities, mainly in Baghdad and Basrah. 1 Their strength 
was due to their financial skill and the high education which some of them were 
able to get mainly through their own'schools or by sending their children to 
Europe. The Christians were also' concentrated in the big towns of Mosul, ' 
Baghdad and Basrah, but, unlike the Jews, they formed some agrarian communities, 
especially in the province of Mosul. They also had their own schools and, 
comparatively speaking, received an advanced education. The Jews and Christians 
were looked on as 'second class citizens' and were deprived of many rights. 
It was only in 1856 that a decree was promulgated declaring the equality in 
treatment for all minorities in the Ottoman territories. Knowing the Turkish 
administration and the prevailing conditions, one is justified in being dubious 
of the effectiveness of such a decree. 
The Iraqi Moslems did not enjoy a strong unity for they, in their turn, 
were divided into Sunnah and Shi'ah. For historical reasons, Iraq became 
the centre of Shi*i activities. Thus the Iraqi Shi'ah were subjected to a 
prolonged persecution at the hands of the Sunni rulers. The conflict between 
the Sunnah and the Shi'ah assumed an alarming character when ismä*il al Safawi, 
(2) 
Shah of Persia, was converted to, the'Shi*i'faith (in the early 16th century). 
Henceforward the religious strife between Sunni and Shi*i Iraqis was to take 
a more violent form with each side being aided by a foreign power, namely the 
1. Admiralty War Staff, Intelligence Division, Handbook of Mesopotamia, Vol. 
lg 1916, p. 66. 
2. B. Browne, A literary History of Persia, Vol. IV, (Cambridge, 1953), p. 260. 
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Turks and Persians. 
I 
However, it should be pointed out that, in certain 
periods, there were some attempts at reconiliation between the two sects. 
2 
Nevertheless, the essence of that period was the bloodshed and religious strife 
between Iragi. Shi'ah and Sunnah. This historical fact represented a serious 
barrier to the national unity of the Iraqi Arabs. 
Socially, the Iraqi population was divided into three major groups: the 
nomadic tribes, the rural population (including semi-nomadic and settled tribes) 
and the townspeople. 
The Arab nomads inhabited the desert in the west and south-west of Iraq. 
The main tribes were the Shammar in the north and al Jazira, the 'Anizah in the 
Shämiyah and al Dulaim in the south-west of Iraq. 
Economically, they were dependent on the camel and Ghazu (looting raids 
on the trade caravans, neighbouring tribes or cities). They were not a highly 
productive element in the Iraqi society but formed'a -great impediment- 
to the growth of inland trade, a threat to security and a prominent 
challenge to any central government. 
In regard to the rural population, the social unit differed according to 
the system of irrigation and cultivation. In the north, in the rain-fed zone, 
the social unit was the village. But in the south, which was the Arab 
populated area and the irrigation zone, the social unit was the tribe and the 
sense of belonging was tribal. A tribe usually possessed a large area of 
land called dira which included the cultivated and uncultivated land in add- 
ition to the land covered by water (marshes). The dira system gave the tribe 
the right to cultivate any part of the drra in accordance with its fertility 
and irrigation. 
3 
The dira was considered as the property or the tribe as a 
whole and not as the private property of the sheikh or that clan to which he 
1. For instance see: S. al Husrip Al Beläd al 'Arabiya'wa al Dawla a 'Uthmäniya, 
(Cairo, 1948), p. 40. Also, B. Creasy, History of the Ottoman Turks, (Beirut, 
1961), pp. 131-2,256. 
2. J. Mahbuba, Mädi al Najaf wa lla¢eruha, Vol. 1, (Najaf, 1958), p. 225. 
3. H. Jawäd, Mugadema fi Takwin al "Iräg al Ijtimä'i, (Baghdad, 1946), p. 44. 
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belonged. Thus, there was a strong sense of unity among each tribe, which 
consequently handicapped the growth of a national consciousness. The 
Turkish authorities provided the tribes with nothing but persistent tax. 
demands. Due to the government*s weakness in extending its authority beyond 
the walls of the towns, the tribe looked for services and protection among 
themselves rather than from an incompetent government. Experience taught them 
that when weak they were exposed to the might of the government or-even to 
other tribes. Therefore, the only alternative for them was to build their own 
fortifications and to solidify their ranks in order to defend themselves against 
each other as well as against the government. They tended to fortify their 
positions by unifying themselves into larger groups or confederations. The beat known 
of these confederations was that of the Muntafig, which occupied the southern 
part of the country, that is from Qurnah to Samäwah and along the Gharäf. river. 
The unifying force and the leadership was vested in the famous Sa*dun family, 
who originally came from Najid. The major towns in'this area were Shatrah and 
Näsiriyah. 
The Middle Euphrates or the I illah-Diwäniyah district, that is the area 
stretching from Samäwah up to Musaiyib, was held by the Khazä'il confederation's 
sheikhs who were the virtual rulers of the Middle Euphrates. The units of the 
Khazä*il were scattered in the area between Kifil, Diwäniyah and Samäwah. This 
area was inhabited by other tribes and confederations, not less known for their 
fighting qualities. Among them was al Fatla which was settled around the two 
rivers; Mushkhäb and Shämiyah; another section of the Fatla inhabited the area 
along the Hindiyah. The Bani Hassan tribe inhabited the area between Karbalä' 
and Kufah. The Zubaiyid confederation, which comprised the'mighty tribe of 
albu"Sultän, the Mu'amara and Juhayah tribes, was settled between the Tigris 
and Euphrates. - The *Afaj and Daghärah tribes inhabited the area around the 
Daghärah river. 
The Middle Euphrates area was exceptionally characterised by its strong 
tribal cohesion. Tribalism was deeply rooted owing to objective and historical 
I 
-8- 
conditions which prevailed in that area. Its eastern half, richly watered by 
the Daghärah river, produced a powerful tribal cohesion in order to defend its 
wealth against the government. Its western half was facing the desert and was 
endangered by the nomadic Ghazu. So, the tribes had no alternative but to 
solidify their organisation and enhance their tribalism. Two factors which 
were introduced in the 1860s and 1870s - the river steamers and 
äu sanads, which played. a major, role'in weakening the tribal organisation 
elsewhere in Iraq, were very ineffective in-the Middle Euphrates as we are 
going to see in the coming pages. 
Along the Tigris from Qurnah to Baghdad was the area of IAmärah which 
formed a rich land bordering Persia and was inhabited by albu-Muhammad, Bani 
Lämq Rabi*ah and Shammar Tugah. 
From Musaiyib to Rumadi and along the Euphrates lived Zuba', Bani Tamim 
and al Janäbiyin.. Further to the north lived al Dulaim. Along the Tigris from 
Baghdad to Mosul lived the 'Abid and Shancnar Jarbah; around the Diyäla river 
and north to Baghdad lived Bani Tamim and al 'Izza. 
1 
The economic structure of the settled tribes was the collective ownership 
of the land or dira. They used to divide its produce in an equal way between 
every clan or section of the tribe according to the number of their individuals. 
The sheikh was not considered as a landholder or tax collector. However, he 
used to receive a higher portion of the produce, but that was merely to cover 
his charges for keeping a Mudif (guest house) which was devoted to the use and 
the vanity of. the whole tribe. The sheikh had also to spend some money on his 
hoshiyah or ib än (bodyguard) to protect his prestige. 
At the head of each tribe was a prominent and acknowledged member of the 
ruling house. The sheikh was usually assisted by a tribal council to solve the 
problems facing the tribe as a collective bodygand a judicial council to solve 
the inter-tribal problems according to the unwritten law of tribal customs and 
tradition. 
The tribal system based on a deep-rooted economic structure (collective 
1. On Iraqi tribes see 'A. al 'Azzäwi, 'Ashä'r a1'Iräq, 4 vols., (Baghdad, 
1937-1956). 
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ownership and subsistence economy) and preserved by the prevailing objective 
conditions (corrupt and weak government and lack of security) had produced 
certain values and social relations among its members who were bound together 
by ties of blood, prejudice and the unwritten tribal code of law and morality. 
The tribe was the major social unity or group to which the loyalty of the indi- 
viduals was addressed. * Such a system hindered the growth of national conscious- 
ness'and was a barrier to the growth-of a unified Iraqi market and a permanent 
challenge to any central authority in Iraq. Yet another division was the 
*:.. sharp distinction between the townfolk and the Arabs, ... 
the balance has to be held between the shrewd educated townsmen who 
in days of misrule trusted to his wits for his fortune, and the 
intelligent but uneducated Arab who relies on his power of defiance... ' 
The Turkish government, alarmed by these threats to its authority, reacted 
with two policies intended to * counteract the strength of the tribal system. 
'Divide and rule' was the favourite Turkish tactic; direct military campaigns 
aimed at the subjection of the tribes by force was the other. This policy took 
the following forms: 
1. Agitating one tribe against the other, either by confiscating the land from 
"4 
one tribe and allotting it to another or by taking sides in the inter-tribal 
wars. (Shibli Pasha, the Mutagirif of Diwäniyah took the land from the Khazä'il 
and gave it to al Fatla (part of this land was the rich Mushkhab). This action 
led to fierce fighting between the two tribes and their allies. The Turks sided 
with al Fatla and moved troops to intimidate the Khazä'il. 
(i) 
Ironically enough, 
after a short period, al Ibrahim was encouraged to refuse to pay revenue to al 
Fatla for a land which belonged to the latter. This, in its turn, led to new 
clashes and fights. 
(. 2 )). 
2. Raising jealousy and rivalry among the one tribe by replacing the recognised 
sheikh by another, either of the same family or from a different one. 
3. To alienate the sheikh from his tribe, the Turks started a policy of appoint- 
ing some of the sheikhs as official governors of their units. This resulted in 
turning the sheikh from a leader of his tribe into a tax collector and a 
1. W. 'Atiyah, Tärikh al Diwäniyah, (Najaf, 1954), pp. 61-6 
2. 'A. Sfi. Al Yisiri, Al Butula fi'fhawrat al 'Ashrtn, (Najaf, 1967), pp. 61-4. 
- 10 - 
government representative. 
' 
4. The Turks did not refrain from using sheer military force to subjugate the 
tribes. The Middle Euphrates alone saw at least fifteen military campaigns 
waged against several tribes in the period between 1850-1915.2 
This short-sighted policy brought to Iraq nothing but destruction. Iraq 
was turned into a battlefield for the inter-tribal wars on land or water and 
was torn by the tribal-governmental clashes which caused a great deal of harm 
to the country. The flow of blood was profuse but the results were shallow. 
The tribal system was not an evil accident; it was the outcome of concrete 
historical and objective conditions. Only by preparing the ground economically and' 
administratively, could an effective detraibalisation, policy be worked out. The 
outcome of Turkish policy was in most respects a miserable failure. It is un- 
deniable that they succeeded in weakening this tribe or that sheikh, but the 
overall effects of their policy did not result in breaking down the tribal system 
as such. The tribesmen, faced with such ruthlessness, found in many cases their 
only refuge in their tribal organisation. It could be argued that before Midhat 
Pasha's introduction of the äu system, the Turkish policy was unwittingly 
strengthening the tribal organisation. 
Anyhow, the wheel of history was turning. Aseries of events were in oper- 
ation inside and around Iraq which sowed the seeds of change. The period of 
Däoud Pasha (1817-1832), witnessed the establishment of the first factories pro-. 
ducing military equipment and clothes, the first water pump3 and the first 
printing press. 
4 Däoud also put an end to 'feudal' influence of the Bäbäns in 
Sulimäniyah and of the al Jalili in Mosul who were a serious threat,. to any form of 
centralised Government. 
5 After the third Turkish occupation in 1831, the de- 
tribalisation policy of the Turks was accelerated with less failures, due to 
1. S. H. Longrigg, Iraq .. op. cit., p. 292 
2. F. M. al Fir'on, Al Uagä'q al Näsia'a ft al Thawra-al 'Irägiya sanat 1920, 
Vol. 1, (Baghdad, 1952), pp. 27-8. 
3. S. Fäig, Tärikh Baghdad, Arabic translation by M. K. Nourris, (Baghdad, 
1962), p. 61 
4. G. Kirk, op. cit., p. 105 
5. 'A. R. al. Bazzaz, , Al 'Iraq min al Ihtiläl heta al Istigläl, 3rd. ed., (Baghdad, 1967), pp. 27-8 
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the new military methods and the introduction of artillery against the tribes. 
Midhat Pasha, the Wali of Baghdad (1869-1)72), applied a series of reforms which 
had a profound effect on Iraq, the most outstanding of which was the äu system. 
In 1870, Midhat enforced a certain degree of centralised unity in the country by 
reforming the administrative system. In 1868 Iraq was connected by cable lines 
to the neighbouring countries including India, 
' 
and in 1878 Turkish post offices 
started to operate. 
2 In 1864 river steamers started to sail on the Tigris; five 
years later the Suez Canal was opened. All these factors paved the way for new 
changes in Iraq. But the most important of them were the growth of foreign trade 
and the täpu system of land registration. 
1. The Growth of Iraqi trade and related aspects 
Before the second half of the 19th century Iraqi trade was very 
limited. In its volume it was no more than equivalent to one hundred 
thousand Iraqi dinars. It was mainly of foreign origin. Except for dates and a 
few wool materials, Iraq had no local products to be exported. 
3 
Thus-co --rcial 
activity was largely a transit trade with Iraq being a mere commercial station. 
4 
Furthermore Iraqi trade was confined to the neighbouring countries rather than 
5 
with Europe- 
However, in the second half of the 19th century there occurred a rapid 
expansion of Iraqi export trade. 
6 
This was accompanied by a noticeable growth 
in the export of the Iraqi indigenous products. 
7 
The rapid growth of Iraqi trade was organically linked to the series of 
changes which Iraq was undergoing at the beginning of the last century, namely 
1. S. H. Longrigg, Four Centuries ..., op, cit., pp. 296-297. 
2. Ibid. 
3. J. B. Rousseau, Description de pachalik de Baghdad, (Paris, 1809), pp. 117-22. 
Cited by C. Issawi, op. cit., p. 136. 
4. Ibid. 
5. H. A. R. Gibb and H. Bowen, Islamic Society and the West, Vol. 1, Islamic 
Society in-the Eighteenth Century, Part 1, '(London, 1957), p. 304 
6.1864-1871 Iraqi exported amounted to 147 thousands I. D. During 1888-1895 
it increased to 1,272,000 I. D. and in 1912-1913 it totalled 2,960 I. D. 
M. S. Hassan, Foreign Trade in the Economic Development of Iraq; 1869-1939, 
Ph. D. thesis, (Oxford Univ. 1958), table 1, p. 42. 
7. C. 0.696/3. Customs Administration Report for the Year 1920, p. l. 
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the subjection of the tribal leaders to godernment authority, the. detribalisation 
policy of Ottoman authorities, the unification of the Iraqi wilayats around 
the Baghdad axis in the 1830s,, the application of the Ottoman Wilayat system 
in Iraq in 1870, the economic and administrative reforms of Midhat Pasha, 
especially the introduction of the ai system which generated radical changes 
in the system of land ownership. 
The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 had a strong impact on the Iraqi 
economy. By reducing the costs and the duration of the journey it encouraged 
a large leap in Iraqi trade. 
Iraqi trade was also encouraged by a series of changes in the Ottoman 
trade policy. Before 1838 Turkey was imposing high cu*toms duties which hindered 
foreign trade. In 1838 this policy was changed through several conventions im- 
posed by Britain and other European countries. According to these conventions 
import duties of 5 per cent and export duties of 12 per cent were to be levied. 
In 1861 the 1838 conventions were replaced by new ones raising import duties 
from 5 per cent to 8 per cent, lowering export duties'from 12 per cent to 8 per 
cent and making the latter subject to an annual reduction of1 per cent, 
beginning in 1869.1 Between 1900 and 1911 the British Government firmly opposed 
2 
any Turkish attempt at the increase of import duty. In July 1907 Turkey was 
allowed to raise its import duties to 11 per cent and in 1914 the import duty 
was raised to 15 per cent. During the First World War, the import duty was again 
raised to 30 per cent, but because of the British occupation this was not enforced 
in Iraq. 
3 
The British started a completely new policy. 
Another factor which had contributed to the expansion of trade and to the 
major economic and social development in Iraq was the introduction of river 
steamers and river communications. 
The first two steamers (Baghdäd and Basra) arrived in 1857. In spite of 
the public having a half-interest, the two Walas would not accept private freight. 
4 
1. S. Himadeh, The Economic System of Iraq, (Beirut, 1938), cited by Issawi, 
op. cit., pp. 188-189. 
2. E. Earle, Turkey, the Great Powers and the Baghdad Railway; a Study in 
Imperialism, (New York, 1924), pp. 226-9. 
3. M. S. Hassan, op. cit., pp. 343-344. (Arabic) 
4. S: H: Lorigrigg, Four Centuries .... op. cit., p. 294. 
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The boats were-used for transport of troops and postal services only. In 1867, 
Nämig Pasha added three more ships (Mosul, Ri§äfa and Furät) to the fleet and 
organised the service on a commercial basis under the name of 'Oman Ottoman 
Administration'. He also built a repair shop. 
' 
In April 1861 another navigation company was founded in London under the 
name Me Euphrates and Tigris Steamship Navigation Company' by H. B. Lynch. 
2 
The Lynch family had, in 1831, established a commercial house in Baghdad. 
The British Company started with a modest capital of £15,000.3. 
_ 
In pate 
of political opposition by some walis and Iraqis and economic competition 
from the Oman Ottoman Company, the British service gained ground. Apart 
from having bigger and better boats, it was subsidized by the Indian 
government and was further assisted by having a virtual monopoly of carrying 
the imports from India and Great Britain when they arrived at Basrah and 
of handling the export trade of British firms in Iraq. 
4 
The British company, aided by the British authorities and the objective 
conditions prevailing in Iraq, paved the way for its commercial hegemony and the 
penetration of British economic interests and influence in Iraq. its capital 
was increased to £100,000 just before the First World War and it Jumped to £300,000 
in 1919. 4 
As early as 1868, Commander Lynch asserted that the trade between India 
and the ports or the Persian Gulf and the Euphrates had increased in an extra- 
ordinary degree since the expedition first drew attention to these countries. 
6 
In March 1914, there was a merging of the Lynch interests with those of 
Lord Inchape, who already controlled the Peninsular and. Oriental, British India 
1. H. Shiha, La Province de Baghdad, (Cairo, 1908). Cited by S. Haider, op. 
cit., p. 265.. 
2. H. L. Hoskins, British Routes to India, (New York, 1928), p. 424. 
3. 'The. Story of the Euphrates Company*, The Near East and India, XLI (1935). 
Cited by Issawi, op. cit., p. 148 
4. S. Haider, op. cit., p. 266. 
5. *The Story of the Euphrates Company*, cited by Issawi, op. cit., pp. 148-53. 
6. F. R. Chesney, Narrative of the Euphrates Expedition, (London, 1868), p. 357. 
Also, H. Hoskins, opi . cit., p. 426. 
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and other steam navigation and industrial enterprises in the East. 'This merger 
led to a new agreement with Turkey which further safeguarded the British interest'. 
' 
However, this growing British financial penetration was 
received with Iraqi resentment. It was reported that the notables of Baghdad 
had assembled in late 1909 and raised a petition against the renewal of the 
company*s farmän. They even offered to pay full expenses for the abolition of 
such rights to the British company. 
2 
The steamboats. greatly reduced both the length of the journey 
and the freight rates, and facilitated the rapidly growing volume of foreign 
trade. Sailing time up stream from Basrah to Baghdad was reduced to 4-5 days, 
compared to 40-60 days by local craft or sailing ship. 
3 
In 1866 the cost of 
transport on the Tigris was 150 piastres per a här (2,690 pounds) but on the 
Euphrates, where steamboats could not be employed, the average cost was 200 
piastres. 
4 
The impact of river transport was not restricted by the expansion of trade. 
It played a decisive role in the process of tribal settlement. It eased the 
subjection of'the tribes by sheer military force, by enabling the troops to use 
the new river communications, and, furthermore, it encouraged the tribes to 
depend on agriculture by providing them with a profitable outlet.,, 
for their agrarian produce. Knowing that at that time the Euphrates, for several 
reasons, was not used for navigation, it is not surprising then to notice that 
the Tigris tribes were subjugated long before those of the Euphrates. The river 
steamers helped effectively in breaking down the tribal links based on sub- 
sistance economy by producing the profit factor thus shifting the Iraqi economy 
into a market one. Its absence from the Euphrates led to the continuation of 
the tribal system in that area. 
1. B. Earle, op. cit., pp. 258-60. 
2. $adä Bäbil, Voi. 1, No. 20,31st December 1909. 
3. H. L. Hoskins, op. cit., p. 427. 
4. S. Haider, op. cit., p. 267. 
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But this was not a one-sided influence. The settlement of the tribes and 
the growth of trade, in their turn, had a favourable impact on river boats. It 
is obvious that the development in modern river communication, by the foreign 
companies became possible simply because it was profitable. 
' 
That could be 
explained by two factors: the increase in the European demand for Iraqi food 
stuffs and raw materials, and the availability of land and manpower in Iraq 
which enabled it to produce and export the requisite materials. 
The importance of The Euphrates and Tigris Navigation Co. ''lies also in 
the fact that it was the first embodiment of British economic interest which 
had penetrated Iraq and competed successfully with the other company, although 
it was protected by the official authorities ruling Iraq. 
The shift in Iraqi trade direction: The growth of Iraqi export trade was 
accompanied by a radical shift in its direction. The Middle East was no longer 
the predominant receiver of Iraqi exports. Britain and its Empire were gradually 
but steadily replacing the Middle East markets. By the end, of the last century 
and beginning of the current one, most of Iraqi sea-borne exports were heading 
towards Europe., while only a small and rather decreasing amount was exported 
to other countries including the Ottoman Empire. In contrast to Iraqi overland 
trade, its sea-borne trade played a dynamic role in Iraqi economic development. 
The Iraqi overland trade was directed North through Mosul to Turkey, west to 
Syria, especially Aleppo, east to Iran and also from Baghdad to Damascus, through 
the western desert, from Zubair, Najaf, and Sug el Shiyukh to the bedouin tribes 
in the Arabian desert. The export trade using these land routes was not only 
low in its value but also decreasing gradually. 
The improvement in sea and river navigation,. especially-after the opening 
of the Suez Canal, the growth of the European and local commercial companies 
and the increase in European demand for Iraqi food stuffs and raw materials were 
all factors which had helped in diverting the Iraqi trade from the Middle East 
to Europe. 
2 
1. H. Shiha, op. cit., cited by M. S. Vassan, op. cit., p. 412. 
2. Such a trend was clearly shown in M. S. Ifassan's work, op. cit., pp. 128-i31. 
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Of the total Iraqi exports during the period 1909-11 the percentage 
distribution to the world market was as follows: 
l 
United Kingdom 30 Belgium 1.6 
India 18 United States 7 
France 14 Other countries 22.6 
Germany 7 
Ghanimah wrote that in 1909 33.4 per cent of Iraq's exprts were going to 
Britain and 58.8 per cent of its imports were coming from Britain .2 
Thus the British, who started their first commercial relations with Basrah 
in 1635 with a very small investment by the East India Company, 
3 
were, in 1763 
to open a branch of this company in Basrah which became the principal British 
station in the Gulf area. 
4 And since that date the British commercial interest. 
was ever growing in Iraq; while Turkish economic links were dropping to the 
minimum. ' 
5 
The Wmponents of Iraqi Trade: The statistics of Iraqi export components show 
an absolute and relative increase in exporting agricultural goods and that 
agrarian products were gradually taking the lead as the main Iraqi exports. 
Iraq"s chief exports were dates, wheat, barley (agricultural goods), wool, skins, 
and live animals (animal products). In 1878 agricultural exports formed 49 per 
I 
cent of Iraq*s total exports, while pastoral exports were 51 per cent. In 
1912-1913, agricultural goods represented 80 per cent of the. total export while 
pastoral exports dwindled to only 20 per cent. 
6 
This shows us that the growth of agriculture (due to tribal settlement) and 
expansion of trade had a mutual and favourable impact on each other. It again 
indicates that agricultural products were no longer aimed at the narrow needs of 
the tribe, but they were produced to satisfy the needs of the market. 
k 
1. M. S. Nassan, op. cit., p. 134 
2. Y. Ghanimah, Tijäret al *Iräg Qadimen wa Hadithen, (Baghdad, 1922), p. 100. 
3. Lorimer, Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Vol. 1, Historical Part 1B. (Gregg 
International Publishers Ltd., 1970), p. 1188. 
4. Ibid., p. 1232 
5. S. Haider, op.. cit., Extract from Appendix XI, p. 703 and Appendix XII, p. 704. 
6. M. S. Hassan, OP. cit., Extracts from table 5, p. 61. 
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The Expansion of Import Trade: The growth of exports provided-the country with 
the hard currency and financial-ability which helped the expansion of import 
trade. This was encouraged also by the reduction in costs and prices of imported 
goods owing to the opening of the Suez Canal, the improvement of Basrah port and 
the establishment of river communications. 
In this trade one could notice an absolute and relative increase in the 
importing of productive goods (especially irrigation pumps) and an absolute 
increase but relative decline in the consumer goods. 
1 
This indicates that the 
growth of trade helped and was accompanied by improving agricultural conditions 
for a higher rate of production. 
One also notices the ever increasing proportion of Iraq's imports coming 
from Britain and its Empire. By 1920 the total share of the British Empire 
from the Iraqi imports was around 75 per cent. 
2 
The Socio-Political Impact of the Iraqi Trade: The impacts and results of the 
Iraqi trade expansion and shift of direction could be summed up by the following 
points: 
1. Customs duties were the second main source in Iraqis public revenue and 
formed 20-25 per cent of it. With the growth of Iraq*s foreign trade, the duties 
which were levied brought much higher revenue to the state, in spite of the fact 
that the duties were reduced. 
3 
2. The increasing exchange of trade with Britain and the British Empire had 
linked the Iraqi economy to the British, developing British economic interests 
which had translated themselves into political ones. 
3. The control of Iraqi trade by-British firms had generated two attitudes among 
the Iraqi mercantile class, namely, those who integrated themselves within the 
general framework of British financial control became socially and politically 
1. In 1864-65 total Iraqi imports were- £318,900, of which 63.9 per cent were 
consumer goods and 24.9 per cent productive imports. In 1912-1913, Iraqi 
imports jumped to £3,467,600, of which 55.6 per cent were consumer goods 
and 38.6 per cent productive goods. 
Ibid., table 25, p. 251. 
2. Ibid., pp. 253-261; also C. 0.696/3,, Customs Reports, op. cit., pp. 1-28. 
3. Y. Sarkis, Mabi)eth 'Irägiya, (Baghdad, 1948), pp. 126-207. 
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supporters of the British political hegemony over Iraq. The others who suffered 
from the British strong commercial competition became one of the main sources of 
discontent and political agitation against British authority. 
4. The most important effect of Iraq's foreign trade was on the economic 
structure of the society, its social components and the land system. The vast 
expansion of Iraqi foreign trade had played an important role in transferring 
its economy from natural or subsistence economy, that is to say, from animal 
and agrarian production for the sake of self-consumption to the commercial prod- 
uction for the sake of the market and profit. In short, from subsistence to 
market economy. ' This, in its turn, paved the way for the transformation of the 
land system, from the communal and tribal system of ownership into new forms of 
land ownership (mainly private). It also helped in decreasing the number of the 
Bedu and increasing the number of the shepherds. Also it facilitated the growth in the 
number of settled peasants. It encouraged the expansion in commercializing 
agriculture (i. e. cultivation for the sake of local market and exportation). 
It hastened the downfall of the tribal system of land ownership and the advent 
of private land ownership. It is obvious that these results were organically 
linked to each other, each, in its turn, helping and opening the door for the 
other. 
All those factors were to pave the way for the rise of a national awareness. 
The development of a profit economy was to link the cultivating tribes with the 
towns. A process which was enhanced by the progress of river communications 
and the governmental attempts at centralization measures. Events and develop- 
ments in parts of Iraq were assuming more relevance to other parts, however remote 
they might have been. The decay of subsistence economy and its twin tribal 
isolation was a sign that a new era was gradually replacing the old one. 
Two points, of relevance to this work,.. accompanied this process. 
The socio-economic developments were not. very profound. Thus their- 
political product represented in the rise of political. and national awareness 
was, in its turn, of a modest character. It remained in an embryonic, perhaps 
primitive, form. 
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Such a socio-political development was, since its birth, linked to the 
growing interests of the British Empire both in the area and in Iraq. The 
growth of Arab nationalism in Iraq was, thus, in constant interaction, of both 
negative and positive character, with British imperialism. . 
2. The Settlement of the Tribes and the Population Movement 
The growth of trade, the expansion of agriculture, the improvement in 
security, the introduction of land äu system and river transport, were factors 
of profound importance to Iraqi society and their direct effect was to encourage 
the settlement of the tribes.. Indeed, that was taking place in a, clear pattern. 
The purely nomadic tribes of Iraq had formed in 1867 about 35 per cent of the 
total population. 
' By 1930 Sir Henry Dawson asserted that their number was re- 
duced to only 7 per cent. 
2 The movements in the composition of population tend 
to show the general trend of the socio-economic activity of a given society. An 
examination of the Iraqi population movements would show us clearly the changes 
in the socio-economic structure of Iraq. Table IV in Dr. Hassan's article is 
a good illustration of these changes. 
3 
TABLE Changes in the Nomadic-Urban composition of Population 1867-1930 
(thousands) 
Date Nomadic per cent Rural per cent. Urban per cent Total 
of total of total of total 
1867 450 35 525 41 310 24 1,280 
1890 433 25 963 50 430 25 1,826 
1905 393 17 1,324 59 533 24 2,250 
1919 2,848 
1930 234 7 2,246 68 ., " 808 25 
3,288 
This indicates that Iraq was developing into a rural society, rather than nomadic 
or urban. 
The changes in the structure of Iraqi population have been linked to the 
economic development mentioned in relation to the growth of Iraqi trade: 
1. Baghdad, Consular Trade Report. Sir A. B. Campbell 'Estimation of Iraqi 
population in'1867', cited and ammended by M. S. Vassan, p. cit., p. 52- 
2. H. Dowson, inquiry into Land tenure and other related questions in Iraq, 
(London, 1931), p. 12. 
3. M. S. Hassan, 'Growth and Structure of Iraq's Population 1867-1947', 
Bulletin of the Oxford University Institute of Statistics, XX, 1958. 
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'The introduction of European sea and river transport ushered in 
the decline of tribal population and the fall of the "medieval" 
Middle Eastern caravan trade. This contributed to the rise of the 
rural population, and the expansion of Iraq-European-cum-Indian 
export trade. While this increase in foreign trade added to the 
commercial part of the urban population the consequent rise in 
the European imports destroyed the local handicraft industries 
and thus helped to keep the urban population relatively constant 
till the early 19309.1 
In the first period of the economic development and population movements, 
the shift from nomadic population into rural was tending more to the practice 
of pastoral than agricultural, i. e. the nomads were becoming rural, but as stock- 
breeders more than cultivators. Thus, in the south of Iraq, the tribal life 
1 continued, because pastoral was more secure and profitable than agriculture. 
2 
However, this phenomenon did not last for very long; the fortification of 
government authority and the establishment of relative security had deprived 
the shepherds of their former ability to evade taxes on their animalse'(kuda). 
The European demand for Iraqi products was-shifting from wool to food 
stuffs. So was the introduction of. the ttapu system and the gradual 
growth of privately owned agrarian land. All were factors in removing the ad- 
vantage of stock breeding over agriculture, and so. the door was open for a new 
shift, in the structure of population - this time from stock-breeding to cultivation. 
3. The Land Problem 
After a series of ruthless but unsuccessful campaigns against the Iraqi 
tribes, 3 Midhat Pasha was the first Turkish official to recognise his mistaken 
policy4 and that the land system was the major factor in determining the tribal- 
government relation. In 1870 he tried to apply in Iraq the Ottoman Land Code 
of 1858. To examine the motives, practice and consequences of his policy, one 
needs to be aware of the historical background of the land system so is, to examine 
the new changes against it: 
1. C. Issawi, op. cit., p. 160 
2. D. Warriner, Land Reform and Development in the Middle Bast, (London, 1957), 
p. 117. 
3. Sädiq al Damalouji, what Pasha, (Baghdad, 1953), pp. 33-36. Also, W. al 'Atiyah, Tarikh al Diwaniyah,. (Najaf, 1954), pp. 51-53; also Y. K. al Hilli, 
Tarikh al Hillah, Vol. 1, (Najaf, 1965), p. 140. 
4. S. Fäiq, T irikh al Muntafig, trans. to Arabic by M. Kh. al Nigri, (Baghdad, 
1961), pp. -. 
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'On their occupation of Iraq, the Ottomans abolished the military. 
fiefs of the Mongols and substituted the Royal Domains Arazi 
Miriyyah. Hence most of the lands of Iraq became of this category. 
Real estates, the owners of which could produce valid title deeds, 
Hujjah Shariyyah, to testify., the fact they were Kharajiyyah or 
Ushriyyah land, were however left in the hands of their owners as 
Mulk. Similarly religious endowments were recognised as Wagf. The 
remainder was either divided into fiefs or farmed out or was re- 
tained by the tribes and hereditary chieftains under the local system 
of tenure. Hence Iraq during this period (1525-1831) reflected both 
the civil and military feudal system while at the same time retaining 
the Islamic institution of private ownership (Mulk) religious endow- 
ments (Wagf) as'well as tribal tenure". ' 
The system of land ownership-in-regard to"the tribal lands was ambiguous and 
produced sharp disputes between the Turks and the tribes. According to the Islamic 
regulations, which were enforced in Iraq after the Islamic, conquest, the land was 
considered mulk (or privately owned). and was divided-into two categories: 
Kharäjiyah. (or-tribute paying) and *Ushriyah (tithe paying). But for one reason 
or another, "the Turks had passed nearly all the land into the-category of Miri 
2 
(state owned land). So in theory., the government was claiming ownership over these 
lands, -but in-practice it was far from being able. to make its claim effective. 
The tribes categorically denied such_a claim., Their possession of the lands 
was not based on grants or written documents; they had possessed these lands 
either-by sheer force and conquest or by settling on and cultivating them when 
they were still unoccupied. The land in the irrigation zone, which consisted of, 
for the greater part, central and southern Iraq, was held under a system of 
corporate ownership. The individual Fellab gras cultivating his land by virtue 
of his membership of the tribe. The ownership of the dira rested on the'. 
capacity of the tribe as a whole to defend it, and the dira was considered to 
belong jointly to all the membersof the tribe. Although the sheikh used to 
get a larger portion of the produce or revenues he had to spend Lt on the welfare 
of the tribe. 
The cultivated land was divided into units of farming called gi'a, which 
were supervised by subtribal chiefs or Serkä1$. The Job of the Serkäl was to 
1. S. Haider, op. cit., p. 171. 
2. A. Jwaideh, op. cit., p. 118. 
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look after the plot by fixing the dates of sowing and harvesting, maintaining the 
irrigation works, dividing the iq f*ä into smaller units and providing the money 
and seeds. The plot in its turn was divided into smaller units called Faddän 
on which a group of farmers used to work and this group usually consisted of 
4-8 men called Jaug. These men divided between themselves the labour of culti- 
vation but harvested collectively and shared the crop. 
1 
The government, in spite of its claim on the land, was never able to practice 
the right of ownership. The government was unable to choose the tenants or control 
the regime of cultivation and only in favourable conditions did it hope to obtain 
its legal share in rent or tax. The government had no alternative but to recog- 
nise the realities of tribal practice, *but at no time were these customs 
codified into written law or explicitly recognised as the law of the land; it 
was as if the government was jealously preserving'the prerogatives of ownership 
until such time as it might be able to make its claim effective*. 
2 
Midhat Pasha started applying the Ottoman Land Code in Iraq to strengthen 
his detribatisation policy. . Under the provision of the code, 
it would be 
possible to allocate the mini land to the actual cultivator of it, and thus to 
give him a vested interest in the land. Midhat, by adopting such a policy, 
intended that this would transfer the semi-nomadic tribes into a permanent 
settlement based on cultivation and by that they would be more amenable to 
government control. By making land ownership depend Qn, a written document,. , 
Midhat aimed at the abolition of the inter-tribal wars over disputed lands 
and the replacement of the sheikh as a land granting authority by the authority 
of the state. By this means Midhat envisaged that he would make, the tribesmen 
directly responsible to the state and by-pass the sheikh, which, in its turn, 
would be a considerable blow to the tribal system. By distributing the land 
among its cultivators, Midhat aimed to abolish the collective, tribal ownership 
and replace it with individual and private ownership, which, Midhat thought, 
would shatter the tribal system by hitting its I. 1AchillA heel'. All that 
would lead to the prosperity of the people, greater revenue for the state, 
1. C. Issawi, off. cit., p, 163. 
2. A. Jwaideh, op. cit., pp. 118-119. 
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security and order and, above all, would break down the tribal; system and 
quicken the disintegration process among the tribes. 
' 
The fundamental aim of the Ottoman Land Code as it was applied in Iraq 
'can be summarised as the universal alienation of the ta$arruf of cultivated 
state land to small cultivators, by either confirming precriptive rights to 
the land and regulating them where they exist or, as in the case of, sale of 
land by auction and revival of dead land, by creating them where they do not 
exist*. 
2 
The Ottoman Land Code recognised five categories of land inIraq:. 
1. Mulk, 3 being land in which the absolute-rights of private ownership were 
recognised and the owner had an absolute freehold on the land. 
2. Miri or Arä¢i Amiriyah, 
4 (state-owned land). This was divided into two 
kinds; one was pure mini in which no"act of alienation had ever taken place. 
The other was a state land of which the Government had by a deed known as tä u 
Sanad, given rights of occupancy to a private person on certain general conditions. 
Such land was commonly known as äu land. os, more rarely, was referred to as 
Mulk. 5 In this land, the right of ta aý rruf (usufruct) was given to the person 
holding the Sanad, but the rag_ aba (final ownership or servitude) remained vested 
in the state. 
3. Wagf6 (religious endowments). 
4. Metrukah, 
7a land which was left for the use of all people, whilst its owner- 
ship belonged to the state. 
5. Mawät, a land which was deserted and unused. 
8 
6. There was a sixth kind of. land at the time of the British occupation of Iraq 
1. Ali Haider Madhat, The Life of Madhat Pasha, (London, 1903), p. 50. 
2. S. Haider, op. cit., p. 508. 
3. "Sh. Nägir, QaWänin al Ar¢ wa al Amläk ghair al Mangula, (Baghdad, 1942), p. 8. 
4. Ibid., p. 19. 
5. F. 0.371/4150/5395. Revenue Circular, Baghdad, 29th May 1919, p. l. 
6. *Sh.. Na ir, op. cit., p. 40. 
7. Ibid. 
8º Ibid. ` 
kkký 
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and that was Aradi Sanniyah, or Mudawwarah, or lands formerly comprising the 
domains of the Crown and afterwards were transferred to the general revenue. 
' 
According to the Ottoman Land Code, the authorities were prepared to recog- 
nise a. prescriptive right to the ownership of land but only to those who could 
prove hag garär which included not only continual personal occupation of the land, 
but also its cultivation2 for a minimum period of ten years. Such conditions 
could'hardly be met by the tribesmen. According to the collective nature of 
the tribal ownership, no land was cultivated by one tribesman for such a long 
time. Further more, although the area of the dira was, broadly speaking, fixed, 
the iq t*a and faddan shifted constantly because of the salination, exhaustion of 
soil, frequent floods, shifting rivers or silted up canals. 
Since the recognition of established rights was out of the question as far 
as the tribesmen were concerned, the creation of such rights was necessary in 
order to meet the situation. Midhat Pasha, being aware of the problem, offered 
the tribesmen at pu sanad by the payment of badal mithel or purchase price 
which was also' called Muta ala (a fee paid in advance). 
The Code was clear in defining the rights and obligations of the t_äpu holder 
(Melläk), who acquired legal possession of the land, while the final ownership 
rested with the government. The law stipulated further that the tenure of miri 
land was conditional on their cultivation, and that should it be left for three 
or more years, all claims to it would be lost. 
3 
The attempt was ambitious. Had it been carried out properly, Iraq would 
have acquired a genuine social and progressive revolution with far-reaching and 
favourable potentialities. But the'Iragi tribalism and Ottoman administration 
were far removed from providing such an attempt with the fundamental conditions for 
realising success. 
The Turkish administration, being underpaid, inexperienced and lacking a 
1. Revenue Circular, op. cit., p. l. 
2. S. Haider, op. cit., p. 508, Article 2 of the Instruction concerning t; Pu 
administration in the Vilayets. 
3. S. Fisher, Ottoman Land Code, (London, 1919). Art. 9; p. 6; also art. 68, 
p. 24., The exceptions from this rule were: (1) resting the soil; (2) flood; 
(3) imprisonment (of war). 
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proper. survey of landt-was. unable to, achieve the desired ends. 
1 
*Sanads were 
s ometimesissued for lands which overlapped, sometimes duplicated in-respect of 
identical properties, and sometimes issued for great areas of land for which 
the government had neither the right nor the intention to grant tenancies. 
This resulted in considerable loss of revenue and was contrary to the govern- 
ment's policy, . 
laid down both in the law and in directives to T; Pu officials, 
that lands should be allocated to the actual cultivators'. 
2 
," 
, 
The major aim of Midhat Pasha's policy, namely the allotment of land to 
small farmers and, the changing , of 
tribesmen. into owners of their land, was 
completely evaded. It was beyond . the, capacity of the 
individual tribesman. to, 
provide, sufficient money (Mu'ajjalah) to obtain a täpu sanad. On the other 
hand, the Ottoman Land Code prevented communal_ownership, 
3 thus depriving. the 
tribe, as a collective body, from purchasing the land. The tribesmen were 
reluctant to purchase sanads because they thought it would bring taxation on 
them and they suspected that the obtaining of sanads would subject'them to 
conscription. Above all, the tribesmen did not see any reason to purchase a,. - 
land of which they were already in full.. and actual possession, and which had 
been gained and retained by force. 
The hesitation and reluctance of the tribesmen to obtain the tipu sanads 
left the way open to the high ranking administrators, city merchants and some 
clever sheikhs to purchase the lands, and get hold, of the sanad... Those-people, 
having the advantage of possessing, the needed. cash and the understanding of the. 
importance of what was happening,,. did not miss a. chance of getting hold of the 
sanads.. The growth of foreign trade and the ever-expanding demand. on Iraqi 
products, motivated the race-for purchasing agrarian lands among the non- 
cultivating city merchants and administration officials. 
This procedure marked the beginning of a new-problem of the absentee- 
landlords who were living mainly inýtowns and demanding a revenue Melläkiyah 
for their land which was cultivated, by the tribesmen. It goes without saying 
1. 'A. Fayyad, Mushkilät al Arädi ft Lewä'al. Muntaflg, (Baghdad, 1956), p-47- 
2. A. Jwaideh, op. cit., p. 125. 
3. S. Fisher, op. cit., Art. 8, p. 6, the very limited exceptions were mentidned 
in art. 130, p. 41. 
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that the peasants bitterly resented such a deterioration in their status and 
furiously resisted-the new social changes. They bluntly refused to recognise 
the rights of the absentee-landlords and declined to pay them their claimed 
melläkiyah. 
The change in the social relations of production had generated two different 
political attitudes. The absentee-landlords and the äu holders felt that the 
government was their main ally against a permanent revolution of the peasants. 
Being incapable of collecting their melläkiyah from the tribesmen, they had to 
lean and depend on the might of the government to do the job on their behalf. 
On, the other hand the frustrated tribesmen, who rejected becoming mere lessees, 
found themselves in the opposite trench to the government, who supported their 
bitter enemies, the abstentee landlords and the täpu sanad holders. 'Hence the 
tape system first introduced as a protection to the peasant began to be used as 
method for his oppression'. 
1 
In certain tribal areas, mainly Muntafig, the tribal sheikhs took advantage 
of the tapu system and obtained the sanads. The Sa'dun, influenced by the shrewd 
advice of their Sheikh Ni§ir Pasha, 
2 himself persuaded by Midhat Pasha, 
3 
purchased 
large estates. A radical change occurred in the area due to the shift in the 
social relations of production, The Sa'dun, by becoming land-holders, profoundly 
altered their position visa-via the tribes; that is from sheikh-tribesman 
relation to landholder-tenant relation. That marked not only the beginning of 
the Muntafig confederation disintegration, but also of a long and bitter struggle 
between the tribesmen and the Sa*dun. °t... A. Jwaideh deduced: 
*And in these conditions it was only by means of their collective 
strength as members of a tribe that the cultivators were able to 
protect themselves against government officials and tapu holders 
alike. In consequence, both cultivators and government came more 
and more to be dependent on the good offices of the tribal ahaikha 
as the wielders of the only effective authority which remained: the 
tribesmen grew more than ever conscious of the tribe as a unity and 
1. S. Haider, op. cit., p. 532. 
2. 'Ali al Shargi, Dhikkra al Sa'dun, (Baghdad, 1929), pp. 45-6. 
3. S. Haider, op. cit., pp. 566-7. Jwaideh and Haider differ in explaining 
the. motives of Miiddhat Paaha in granting the lands to the Sa'dun. Jwaideh 
is very dubious that Midhat was in fact responsible for such an act. 
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'of their lands as a1 tribal home or dira, held collectively 
by the whole tribe'. 
This deduction represents half the truth. It is very true that the tribe 
had grown stronger in its unity, but that was only temporary. The downfall of 
the tribal confederation was a heavy blow to the tribal system as a whole. The 
tribal`sheikh cannot be considered as the only remaining effective authority 
when, in fact, he was facing the dilemma of either revolting against an 
increasingly powerful government or losing his popularity among'his tribees. 
Although the results of Midhat's land reforms were foreign to his intentions,. it 
had at least achieved one of its aims, namely to accelerate the disintegration 
of tribal society, not by turning the tribesman into the independent and private 
owner of the land, as was its principle aim, but rather by alienating the tribes- 
man from his land altogether and rendering him a mere tenant. It is true that 
in the first period the tribesman, resenting the new changes, tended to solidify 
the 'tribal organisation, but, in the long run, the land äu system sawed the 
seeds of tribal disintegration. 
Anyhow, it seems that in 1880 and 1882 the jäpu system was suspended by 
two iräda or decrees. 
2 
Thus the Turks left a very complicated situation for 
their British successors, where their methods of tackling it would decide the 
future events and socio-economic structure of Iraq. 
To sum up, Iraqi land conditions as they faced the British were 'Settled 
agriculture and extended cultivation have tended to disintegrate the tribes 
and to weaken the influence of the Shaikhs. To restore and continue the power 
of the tribal chiefs while opening up the country and stimulating agriculture 
is not the least interesting of the problems in land administration that /Iraq) 
3 represents'. This vital and central question will be discussed in due course. 
1. A. Jwaideh, op. cit., p. 130 
2. E. Dowson, op. cit., p. 21; M. S. Uassan, op. cit., p. 190; 
A. Jwaideh, op. cit., in pages 125-6 disputed that such decrees 
were issued. However the two decrees did not involve the North of Iraq. 
3. F. 0.371/2406/139231. Admin. Report of the Revenue Board, 'Baghdad, March 
22nd - December 31st 1917, p. 5 
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CHAP-TER: IIý. 
THE-HISTORICAL AND INTELLECTUAL ROOTS OF ARAB-NATIONALISM 
In, 1920 there occurredýan Iraqi. armed. risingwhich contributed to the , 
subsequent independence of, that, country., and which was duly encouraged by, 
both nationalists-and, -'ulemä', facts which are well. known and need, not be 
elaborated upon. Also fairly well: known is. that in 1920 some sort of Islamist- 
nationalist alliance had taken place and the movement assumed a nationalist- 
religious inclination in which Arab nationalism was interlinked with jihäd, fetwa 
and other forms of Islamic slogans. 
However, such facts raise many unanswered questions. Could such a movement 
be considered, politically and intellectually, as a nationalist one? In other 
words, did the Iraqi Arabs possess the hallmarks of a nation so as to produce a 
nationalist movement? Furthermore, to what extent can nationalism be attributed 
to a movement which was so religiously inclined? And if so, what are the roots 
and sources of such an intellectual combination and structure? 
This whole work is, of course, dedicated to an attempt to answer those 
questions. However it is in this chapter that the intellectual aspects of the 
problem will be emphasized. In the first place I will examine the question 
concerning the*'existence' of an Iraqi Arab nation. The discussion will then 
centre on the relation between Islam and Arab nationalism. In contrast to many 
other opinions, it will be suggested that the two are not identical in spite of 
the admitted and profound influence of Islam on the national evolution of the 
Arabs. The conflict between the two was first hinted at by Arab Christians. It 
then formed an acute-Intellectual crisis.. for.. the Moslem Arab. intelligentsia. 
Some thinkers produced an outlook which combined Islam and nationalism, or to 
be more precise, tried to reconcile Islam to modern intellectual trends. 
Politically speaking, it proved to be a superb formula in the sense that it 
was appealing to the Moslem public and represented a sharp weapon against 
Western; political encroachment. But from an intellectual angle it was a 
shaky attempt which did not contain the element of endurance. By its very 
khhl 
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nature it was a temporary formula, suited only for a transitional period. 
". M : Nevertheless, - Western occupation was. to end. the growing conflict, between 
Islam--and Arab nationalism, and to introduce, into this selective and incompat-- 
ible combination afresh and strong validity. The formula provedýto be the . 
intellectual cornerstone for the anti-Western resistance, and the. meeting point 
for nationalists and Islamists alike. To such a. combination the Iraqi-inde- 
pendence movement of 1920 was-heavily indebted. 
I On the Concept of an Arab Nation: It has been suggested that Arab nationalism 
was the-outcome of the early 20th century conditions and that its rise was 
generated by two major elements: Western influence and Arab reaction to the 
turkification of the Ottoman Empire. 
different points of view. 
This concept was challenged from two 
Some writers denied the Arabs any national character and overlooked the 
national features which have been possessed by the Arabs. 
2 An Israeli writer 
claims that 'the state of Iraq was an artificial creations and that at the end 
of the Ottoman period "no such thing as Iraqi nationalism existed'. 
3 Another 
Israeli writes 'there is no "Iraqi nation", nor is there a tradition of co- 
operation to cement the various communities". 
4 
Kedouriefsimplified Gibb's 
notions (or Reflan'g) and argued: 
"The will of those young officers willed an Arab nation, and 
ethnography, geographyýor history were of consequence only as 
they offered sustenance to their imagination'. 
5 
In contrast to that, enthusiastic Arab nationalists produced a rosy pic- 
ture of historical solid Arab unity and harmonious cohesion. They believed 
in the '. eternal' and,, unified existence of the Arab nation. 
6 In 1919, King 
1. G. Antonius, The Arab Awakening, (London, 1955), p. 13 and after; H. Sharabi, 
Nationalism and Revolution in the Arab World, (Princeton, 1966), pp. 7-8; 
A. Säsgh, Tatuwur al Mafijum al Qawmy 'und al 'Arab, (Beirut, 1961). 
2. D. Lloyd George, Memories of the Peace Conference, (New Haven, 1939), Vol. II, 
pp. 659,666,669-70; G. Bell, Amurath to Amurath, (London, 1911), p. 161 
3. E. Be! eri,, Army Officers in Arab Politics and Society, ' (Jerusalem, ' 1961), p. 326 
4. U. Dann, Iraq Under Qassem, (Jerusalem, 1969), p. 1. 
5. E. Kedouri9, The Ghatham House Version, (London, 1970), p. 214 
6. S. Shawkat, Hädhihi Ihdäfuna, (Baghdad, 1939), p. 30; 'A. 'A. al Douri, 
Al Judhur al Tarikhiya lil Qawmiya al Arabiya, (Beirut, 1960), pp-7-12 
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Faisal, ýclaimed that. 'we were Arabs even before the time of Moses,, Muhammad, 
' Jesus, and Abraham'.. In 1920, he advocated the cause<of Arab nationalism at.., 
the Peace Conference in Paris. 
in the world as homogenous as' 
that., 'Iraq lacks the most, impo 
racial and religious unity'. 
3 
Faisal declared that ! there tare few nations 
the Arabs. 2 Nevertheless, in 1933 Faisal wrote 
rtant. factor of-social life: the intellectual,,,; 
-After a long-elaboration., oti 
the elements of. 
disunity in Iraq, Faisal deduced:. - 
'In this regard I say. -with great regret that up to now there is 
no Iraqi people (Sha'b) but social groups empty of any national 
(Wa ani a) thought 
The obvious gap between the two arguments can only be explained by recog- 
nizing that both statements contain some elements of truth. It is because 
these elements were either exaggerated or over-simplified that both statements 
were in the final analysis neither accurate nor helpful in comprehending a 
complex historical process. 
Some other thinkers tried to draw a distinction in terms of reference 
5 
Hourani gave this endeavour its balanced structure. He distinguished between 
Arab 'nationalism' as a 
l. ý 
political movement *which only became articulated ... 
during the present century' and Arab 'racial' feeling which the Arabs 'have 
always been exceptionally conscious oft as far back in history as we can see 
them'. 
6 
Did an Iraqi Arab nation exist in the concrete conditions of Iraq during 
1918 to 1921? Nationalism is the emergence of a group of people as a self- 
conscious entity, demanding the collective expression in institutional and 
1. S. al Husri, Yaum Maysaloun, (Beirut, n. d. ), p. 207 
2. Faisal-'s Memo, to the P. C., dated 29.1.1920. Cited by D. Lloyd George, 
Memories'of the Peace Conference, op. cit., p. 674 
3. Ibid. 
4. Faisal's secret Memo., dated Baghdad, March 1933. In 'A. Jawdat, Mudhekerät, " (Beirut, 1967), pp. 356.60. . - 
5. H. Z. Nusibeh; 'Al Qawmiya al 'Arabiya, (Beirut, 1962),, pp. 39,61; E. Murqus, 'l 
Mawdu'ät ela Mu tamir Ishtiriki 'Arabi, (Damascus, 1963), pp. 3-4,7-9 
6. A. Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, (London, '1962), p. 260 
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political form. A nation is recognized by-various hallmarks of which language, 
history, territory, wills socio-economic unity are the melt usual. The process 
of a nation, as the word 'emergence' denotes, is dynamic and not static. In as 
far as Iraq is concerned, the writer is inclined to adopt the term nationalitaire 
rather than nationalism, narod, nationalite or Volkerschaft rather than nation. 
' 
This is to emphasise the opinion that the Iraqi Arabs had by 1918-1921 outgrown 
tribalism, but did not acquire the full conditions of nationalism or the hall- 
marks of a nation in the European sense of the word. 
2 
II. .: Islam and 
'Arab Nationalism': Islam represented a. profound element. in.. 
the process. of. Arab national development. It unified the Arabs,. politically, 
and took the place of their previous tribal. 'Asabiya. It was: under its banners 
that the process of 'arabization! *., of. the Fertile Crescent, -the 
Nile Valley and 
North Africa was accelerated. Islam gave the Arabs an. ideological justification 
for expansion, the formation of an Empire and a developed civilization and 
subsequently a proud sense of history. During the dark-ages which engulfed, 
the Arabs, the unified Arabic language. of the. Quran had, culturally speaking, 
played an outstanding role in safeguarding Arab ` national` entity. In short Islam 
enhanced Arab national evolution. Thus Islam as ,a 
culture, reinforced by history 
and language, became an organic and essential part of Arab national structure. 
Up to this point, most Arab thinkers, ChristiansAby no`means excluded, have 
been in agreement. 
3 
However, it was from-this assumption that there sprang two 
lextreme'-views. The first claimed that Islam was in fact an Arab national 
religion'. The second argued that Islam was a new unifying force which replaced 
nationalism and erased all differences between Arabs and non-Arab Moslems. `ý, In 
the final analysis both views shared a common ground. Both failed to draw'-any 
1. The words are Russian, French and German. They were used by different writers 
to indicate different meanings. I am using them in Maxim Rodinson's method 
(i) al Märkisiya wa al Umma, pp. 9,33, and (ii) Hawl al Nadiriya al Märkisiya, 
fi al Umma, (Beirut, 1971) 
2. See the balanced conclusion of S. Longrigg and R. Stoakes, Iraq, (New York, 
1958), pp. 21-2. 
3. For instance: S. al Hugri, Ira' wa Mublderät fi al Wataniya wa al Qawmiya, 
(Cairo, 1944), pp. 11,20; Q. Zuraiq, Al W a'i al Qawmy, Beirut, 193 
pp. 37-8 
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serious distinction between Islam and Arab nationalism. Both views represent 
a, serious«challenge to the assumption adopted in this work, namely that there 
is a distinction between 'political Islams and Arab nationalism, and that the 
Iraqi independence movement was the outcome of an alliance, rather than unity, 
between nationalists and Islamists. 
The most notable. exponent, of such a trend1 was al Bazzäz. 
2 He and some 
other Arab writers did not restrict their efforts to prove the 'Arabism* of 
Islam by the overall interaction. between Arabs and Islam. 
3 
They suggested that 
Islam, through its major sources of Qurän and al Hadith, had indicated its Arab 
nationalist character. Such claims were justified by quoting these two sources 
whenever, they used words. like; gawm or umma or *arabi. Other most prominent Arab 
thinkers like Zein4 and al Douri5 followed Bazzäz in his attempt. If this is 
true, then no distinction could be drawn between Arab nationalism and Islam. 
Furthermore, every Arab Moslem, by virtue of his religion, must be considered 
an Arab nationalist. 
A careful reading of the. Qurän, could reveal that such an argument is both 
oversimplified and selective in its quotations. 
6 
For words awm or umma are 
1. For instance see the works of A. U. al Bägouri; M. al Ghazäli; M. al Dawälibi; 
M. 'A. al'Arabi; M. al Kharboutli(l); 'A. R. Fuda, listed in bibliography. 
2. *A. R. al Bazzaz, Islam and Arab Nationalisms, in S. Haim (ed), Arab Nationalism, 
(California; 1962). 
3. For instance see: S. al Uu; ri, Mubä¢erät fi Nishu'al Fikra al Qawmiya, (Cairo, 
1951), p. 194; B. Lewis, The Arabs ..., op. cit., pp. 52-3; N. Ziadeh, 
'Arabism', 
in E. Kedourie(ed), Nationalism in Asia and Africa, (London, 1971), p. 195, 
H. Z. Auseibeh, op. cit., (Arabic), p. 50 
4. Z. N. - Zein, Nishul., pp. 136-7. 
5. al Douri, ... Qawmiya ..., op, cit., pp. 
12-4. 
6 Owing to the seriousness of such a claim, I have listed all (? ) the guränic 
verses in which words of such nature are mentioned: 
Surat Verse Surat Verse 
al Bagarah 128-99 134-59-143 al Shu'rä' 194 
al 'Amrän 104,110 a1. Name1 84j 103 
al Mäi'da 66 al Rasas 23 
al An'äm 389 429 66 altAnkabout 18 
al A'räf 34,, 389 159 'A Fater 239 42 
160,164,181 , al Zumar 28 , 
al Tawbbah 91,102,121,128 Ghäfer 5 
Yunis` 19,47,49 Fujilat 2p 410 44 
Hud 8p 48,118 al Shurra 5t 8 
Yusif° -2,12 al Zakhraf' 3, 22-23 
al Ra'd 30,37 33p 44 
contd. 
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used in the context of the Islamic Umma in general or to a small group of people 
(the first pioneers of Islam). In addition to that, the Arab nationalists are. 
evading an important historical and linguistic fact and that is the development 
which these words had undergone in their meanings. In fact in Surat al an*äm 
of which BazzNz quoted its 66th verse, one finds that in its 38th verse the 
word umma is used to refer-to-human beings; and animals alike. The Arab nation- 
alists also ignored other Quränic verses in which the supra-rIational outlook of 
Islam was clearly indicated as in, 
_for 
instance We have sent thee in mercy for 
mankind'. 
l 
Furthermore, the concept of Islamic nationalism could be challenged from a 
historical point of view. 
2 Thus from both an ideological and historical, point 
of view it is difficult to accept the notion that Islam was an Arab national 
religion or the counter claim that Islam had erased all national differences. 
However'it is true that the Arabs, up to 18303 did not show many signs of 
national resentment towards their; Ottoman rulers. The writer suggests that 
such an attitude ought to be understood against the background of certain 
historical factors. 
, ,,, 
The Ottoman invasion of the Arab countries did. not substitute an Arab rule 
by an Ottoman one. It merely replaced an 'alien' domination which was already 
6 cpntd. 
Ibrahim 4 " 
äl. Dukhän 58 
al Ija jer 35 ; a1 Jthiyah 28 
al Nahei 36,84,89, 92-93,. 105 al 4g 3f 12,18 
Taha 113 al Fatao 11,16 
ä1 Anbiyä' 92 al-Hujur; t 14 
-" al Nu j 34,67 al Jum' a2 
al Mu'minnun, -43,44,52 
1. Surat al Anbi]ra' verse 107. Also see Al 'Umrän verse 103, al Anfäl verses 
62-62, al A'raf verse 158, a l Furgän verse 1 etc. The Prophet in his fare- 
well speech (al Wadi')-said 'there is no difference between an Arab and 
non-Arab-but only in piety'. 
2. On al Shu*ubiyah see the wor ks-of Iß. 9. al 'Aziz, 'A. 'A. alDouri'(4), 'A. H. 
al Fakiki, H. A. R. Gibb (4); M. B. 'Sharif. Listed in bibliography. 
3. I am referring to the Wahhabis and Muhammad 'Ali. On the first see 
T. a1; Tawi1, Al Fikar al Din ni al Islimi"fi al 'Alem-al Arabi, (Cairo, n. d. ), 
p. 290; Z. N. Zein, The Emerg ence of Arab Nationalism, (Beirut, 1966), p. 40. 
On the second see H. Buiwer, The Life of Palmerston, 3rd-ed. 'Vol. II, (London, 
1871), pp. 145,267,269; H. Temperley, England and the Near East: The 
Crimea, (London, 1934), p. 41 6; E. Ashley, The Life of H. J. T., Viscount 
Palmerston, 2nd ed., Vol. II, 
' 
(London, 1876), p. 26; 'A. A. S. Nawar, 
Tar kh al Iräg al }Jadith, (Cairo, 1968), pp. 195-9. 
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in existence. 
' 
In the early days of the Ottomans, the Arabs were given 'a rather 
dignified treatment. 
2 
The ottoman Islamic Empire was a decentralized one up to 
the late 18th century when it became centralized. 
3 
It has been argued that Arab 
'national' bonds were breaking and giving way to the re-emergence of tribal and 
family links and domination. 
4 
This could be explained by the suggestion that 
the econömy of. the area was deteriorating from an economy of commodity to a 
subsistence economy5 and thus encouraged the disintegration of the society into 
much smaller groups. It has been suggested that the Ottomans conceived them- 
selves as Moslems first and foremost and so was the Empire in its totality (wars, 
posts, etc. ). 
6 
The emerging distinction between Islam and Arabism not only became apparent 
during the years which preceded the First World War, but it also formed* and 
represented an acute 'intellectual and conscious crisis' to Arab thinkers. 
Islam was, for centuries, the cornerstone of the Arab culture and rarely a 
conflict was envisaged between pride in arabism and faith in Islam. However, 
the comfortable dichotomy could not remain for long. 
The ideological conflict between Islam and Arab nationalism was evident 
but only in its embryonic form during the period which immediately preceded 
the British occupation. Arab 'nationalist' writers of that time (Christians 
excluded), demanded Arab rights by pleading that Arabs were better guardians 
of Islam than. Turks. Thus it is highly probable that thinkers and politicians 
of that period might very well have visualized themselves as both Moslems and 
1. Näji *Aloush, Tetawrät al Ijaraka al *Arabiya mundh *Asr al Nahda*, Dirasät 
'Arabiya, No. 1, November 1965, Beirut, p. 57 
2. Gibb and Bowen, op. cit., Vol. 1, part 1, p. 160 
3. Dr. Muhammad Anis, Al Dawla al 'Uthmaniya wa al Sharg al Arabi 1514-1914, 
(Cairo, n. d. ), pp. 117-28 
4. Philip Hitti, Lebanon in History, trd. in Arabic by Dr. Anis Furiiah, 
(Beirut,. 1956), p. 344;. Also, Sydney Fisher, The Middle East: A History, 
(New York, 1959), p. 254. 
5. E. Murcus, Naqd al Piker al Qawmi, (Beirut, 1966), p. 452 
6. 'A., Gharäiybah, Mugedama li Tärikh al 'Arab al Uadith, (Damascus, 1960), 
Vo1.1, pp. 88-9. Also Gibb & Bowen, op. cit., Voll. Part 1, p. 159 
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Arab nationalists. The British occupation had enhanced such a notion and 
obliterated the previously rising conflict between Islamists and nationalists. 
III, The Political and Intellectual Revival: The decay of the Ottoman Empire 
produced three' disparate phenomena in Arab life: encouragement and escalation 
of European penetration; attempts at internal regeneration; and, increase of 
organized rebellions. ' On the other hand, the Turkish attempt at the reconstruction 
of the Empire`was-'not'only'ill-timed'but was also accompanied by meaaures at 
centralization and' conspicuously characterized by a Turkish nationalist tendency. 
This was to'provide a"further raisond*etre`to provoke Arab nationalist 
consciousness. 
Western incursion had the effect of*exposing to the Arabs that the Ottomans 
had failed in the task of defending the Moslem homeland against foreign invaders. 
l 
The new rulers''were, religiously and culturally, different from the Arabs. The 
imperialist character of'the new invaders was"only one side of the coin. The 
other'side was` represented by their culture and -advanced civilization. To an 
elite of Arabs 'the imperialist West was also the educative West, and, in large 
measure the frame öf reference*. 
2 
However, Arab conceptual tools were by'that time so deficient that they 
were unable to 'defy the new, culture or to. assimilate it. This challenge stim- 
ulated, among-an elite of Arabs, a comprehensive re-examination, of their 
intellectual'heritage'in an attempt at regenerating their entire mental outlook. 
Such a problem of cultural communication was furthermore complicated by 
the powerful and prodigious presence of Islam. Islam was by no means a passing 
belief. The Moslem intelligentsia and masses like held a profound attachment 
to'Islam. In it, they visualized their threaten ed I entity, and found their 
cultural and historical roots. 'For`them'Islam'was the last remaining source 
1. T. Barru, Al Qawntiya al 'Arabiya, (Damascus, 1965), pp-10-12 
2. J. Berque, *The Arabs and Social. Science in the last Hundred Yearst, Middle 
East Forum, Vol. XLIII, No. 1,1967, p. 153 
3. Hishanm Sharibi, 'Political and Intellectual. Attitudes of, the Young Arab 
Generation', The Arab Middle East and Muslim Africa,. ed. Tiber_Kerekes, 
(Washington, 1961), p. 60 
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of pride and consolation in their desperate confrontation with the ever advancing 
West. In a way Islam provided the Arab with a much needed 'spirit in the spirit- 
less world'. Such an objective and perhaps even a romantic and tragic attachment 
to Islam did not, one assumes, possess the minds or hearts of the Christian Arab 
intellectual elite. 
All these factors interacted not only to give birth to an Arab renaissance 
intellectual movement, but also to cause its split into two distinct sections; 
that is'of 'modernization'ýand 'westernization'. The westernization school not 
only admired Europe, ' but it also proceeded from the European heritage and was 
inspired by it. The modernization school made Islam its starting point and 
its interest in European culture-was selective and modified. 
The relations between the representatives of the two trends were of an 
interesting character. Although in disagreement over several issues, their 
links, friendship and understanding, were of-a profound nature. Both found 
themselves as a minority of intellectual elite looking for new values within 
a society which was hostile to. any attempted innovations. Shibli Shumall 
wrote to Rashid Rid; (both were leaders in the Ottoman decentralization Party) 
summing up their points of agreement and dispute: 
'You conceive Muhammad as the prophet and glorify him. I see 
him as a man and glorify him more. You and I, although in 
regard of belief (religion and religious principle) are in 
complete contrast. Yet, the bond between us is the tolerant 
and open mind and the sincerity of our ideas ... '. 
l 
In the realm of abstract thinking, Shumaii might have been right in his 
optimism, but in the field of active politics the consequences of such conflict 
was of a more far reaching implication than what Shumaii might have envisaged. 
(i) The Failure of the Westernization Trend in Iraq! It is evident that Arab 
Christians were the early pioneers of Arab nationalism. 
2 
However, the influence 
of their ideas and concepts was negligible in Iraq except in the case of Zahäwi 
1. al Manär, Vol. XI, (Cairo, 3 March'1908), p. 10 
2. S. al Kazin, Yusif Beg Karam ßi al Manfa, (Beirut, 1950), pp. 346-62; 
'A. K. Gharäiybah, Suriya fi al gern al Tisa' eher, (Cairo, 1962)1 pp. 
215-21; F. garouf and N. A. Färis (eds), Al Fiker al 'Arabi fi MV'et 
Sanna, (A. U. B., 1967), pp. 59-60,87,476-7. 
- 37 - 
and al Karmali. 
1 
Several reasons''were behind `this lack'of impact. Religious 
factors, cultural links with the West, the- massacres' of 1845=1960 ad hostility 
towards the Ottomans, had contributed to the form änd essence of the Christian 
intellectual endeavours. Toynbee, who pointed out that 'The'Arabio speaking 
Christian minority's reception of Western civilization was spontaneous', 
explained that in terms of religious and commercial links. 
2 
Hourani's evaluation 
introduces a similar explanation, and while ejphasising the importance of 'foreign 
protection', Hourani mentions that trade was passing 'into the hands of oriental 
Christians and Jews' who became 'middlemen in the trade with Europe'. 
3 
This combination of factors made the Christian intellectual outlook 
of a more daring nature in defying the traditional beliefs, and in responding 
to the new trends of the west, especially in regard to nationalism as a sub- 
stitute for religion, in adopting a secularist outlook and in taking a sympathetic 
Attitude towards the west. On the other hand, it was precisely these factors 
and their intellectual product which, not being shared by the Moslem majority,, 
dthe Christian movement of the 
4 deprived popular response at which it was aiming. 
More often than not the Arab Christians gave the impression of failing 
to show a deep resentment towards western incursions or a genuine interest in 
preserving Moslem unity. 
6 
Such an attitude might have been pardonable, but it 
definitely was not appealing to the Arab Moslems who, in fact, resented the 
Western intrusion more than the Ottoman domination. Rus. fi, who himself was 
a secular Iraqi Arab nationalist,? told Jädirji that he was antagonized by the 
1. Infra, pp. 48, footnote 3; = 52-3 
2. A. Toynbee, 'Aspects of Arab History', The Listener, 5 September 1968, 
Vol. 80, No. 2058w p. 294 
3. A. Hourani, op. cit., pp. 40,57; 95 
4. 'A. Toynbee, -'Aspects ... ', op. cit., p. 294 
5. - A. Hourani, op. cit., pp. 252,278-9 
6. Not-to ignore that Farao Antun (1874-1922) had asserted that his loyalty 
and that of his fellow Christians. had been always addressed to the East, 
Ibn Riishid wa Falsafatuhu, (Cairo, 1903), pp. 169,179,205. 
7. Infra, pp. 52,56 
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ideas of Beirut's Christians and provoked to write his poemI (Mä Hadkedha ... 
). 2 
Tawfiq al Suwaidi (an Iraq Arab nationalist who attended the 'Paris Conference') 
criticized the Arab Christians' attitude of anti-Ottoman separationism. 
3 
Sharabi suggested a demographic reason behind the failure of Iraqi Christians 
to perform an intellectual role similar to that of their Syrian counterparts: 
'In areas where /Christians/ constituted small minorities 
amid a Muslim majority they tended to withdraw from partici- 
pation in public and political life ... The Christian minorities 
in Iraq ... owing to their structural diversity, small size, 
and social isolation, tended to lead a closed-in and parochial 4 
existence with little contact with their Muslim environment'. 
Thus it. is not surprising that the secular form of nationalism did not' 
influence the Iraqis at that time. However there was another form of intellectual 
revival and 'Arab nationalism' which proved more suitable to the Iraqi intelli- 
gentsia of that period. 
(ii) The Islamic Reformers' Impact: In the first place, it is evident that 
those thinkers exercised a strong impact on the emerging Iraqi' intelligentsia. 
56 
Not only because their ideas and works were widely circulated in Iraq, but also 
because their preaching was to divide the Iraqi intellectuals into adherents 
and opponents. Men of letters such as al Zahäwi (1863-1936), al Shahristäni, " 
al Rusäfi (1875-1945), al Kädimi (1876-1935), al Habubi (d. 1915) and al Shabibi 
(1887-1966) were to accept and advocate some of the ideas emanating from Egypt 
and Paris (al 'Urwa al Wuthqa). Thus they have created 
a new school of thinking 
1. Kämil al Jidirji Papers. ° 4.., { 
2. M. al Rusfti, Diwan al Ru§afi, 3rd ed. (Cairoo, 1947)9 pp. 394-7. 
ý+; i11. ß 
ýýý ý tim ý ý, ý? ti"ý+.. ý. ý ý ýiýJ'ý ili 
ýý ýJý 
% 
3. T. al Suwaidi, Mudhekkerät, (Beirut, 1969), pp. 26-31 
4. H. Sharabi, Arab Intellectuals and the West: The Formative Years 1875-1914, 
(London, 1970), pp. 113-5 
5. Afghäni (1838-1897), 'Abduh (1849-1905), Ridi (1865-1935), al Kawäkibi 
(1849-1902) 
6. For instance see: A. A. Sa'd, al Shi'r wa al Shü'rä' fi al 'Ira , (Beirut, 
1956), pp. 7,97-8; M. D. Is"' el, Milämeb al 'A ur, Qida, 1967), pp. 
13-14 
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which"was`to'be'challenged by'other writers-and-even persecuted, by the 
conservative religious establishment.,,. -This whole process was-to lead to 
an open controversy. 
' 
The ideas of the reformers could"be'classified into, two: sectionsi 
political and philosophical'. From'a political point of'view',, the reformers'- 
were aiming to arouse religious' feelings' asTan`effective"way'to combat Western 
imperialism. 2, They did not hesitate'in condemning" sectarianismýand'called for 
the burial of'the'tminor`, insignificant, and outdated' differences between'Shi'i 
and Sunni sects. They went as°far asladvocating unity between Moslems, Christians 
and Jews. After ' years, äfý-sectarianand communal division ofArab-societies, 
3 
the early pioneers attempted'a°re-division`of: the society on bases`of intellect- 
ual trends, political inclinations and nationalism-ratherthan"any of the past 
0, 
values. 
In spite of their declared appreciation of Western culture, the reformers 
uttered. a passionate protest against=Western'imperialism and, its growing, pene- 
tration. 
4 Apart from the national aspect`of such an`attitude, it'was'to"stim- 
ulate an anti-Western Arab'national'movement which had greatly influenced the 
Iraqis. The impact"of, 'theý reformers explains'an aspect of{the-anti-Western 
tendency of the Iragi'movement. °`It"also casts a light on the comparative ease 
with which -the"Iraqi` nationalists' and 'progressive' Islamists were able to 
join efforts. . _.. ,aw.. e.. ,_ . e. r _ .. w. _. _, 
Moreover the reformers were ardent advocates of constitutionalism. They 
wanted to see a constitutional, strong and just ruler, fand if he betrayed 
1. For instance see:. Dr. 'A. Wardi, R. Bati (1,2 and 3), M. N. al Wä'i4, 'A. 
M. a1`Qa§1b, H. 'A. Kamil al Din, listed in bibliography. 
2. N. R. Keddie,, An Islamic Response to Imperialism ..., (Berkeley, 1968), 
p. 97; D. M. Vallace, Egypt and the Egyptian Question, (London, ` 1883), p. 103. 
3. M. al Makhzumi, Kha irät Jamal al Din, (Beirut, 1931), p. 82; M. R. Rid;, 
TIrikh ... Mubammad Abduh. (Cairo, 1947), Vol. 1 p. 8191 A. M. Iiamädeh, M. Abduh, (Cairo, n. d. ), pp. 124-40; 'A. al Nadtm, Sulafat al Nadim, (Cairo, 
1897), Vol. 2, -p. 78; *A. R. `al Kawäkibi, Tabä'i'al Istibd d, ( airo, n. d. ), 
nn. 107-8 
4. N. R. Keddie, Religion and Rebellion 
1891-1892, (London, 1966), pp. 15-27 
Vol. 1, p. 13, Vol. 2, pp. 14,68,138, 
The Tobacco Protest of 
al Withqa, (Beirut, 1910), 
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the constitution ... it is either his head should remain without a crown 
or his crown without a head'. 
1 
They explained European progress to 'then 
absence of individualistic rule*2 and argued that when sicence and knowledge 
enlighten a nation fit will first have to rid itself from absolute rule'. 
3 
Moreover, Islamic reformers, with varied degrees of emphasis, were with- 
out exception glorifying the Arab role and potential in preserving Islam, 
descrediting the Turks and expressing dismay at Turkish treatment of the- 
Arabs. 4 It was but logical that such-an approach was to tpave the way* for 
the rise of an Arab national awareness. 
5 
From a philosophical point of view, the modernists' opinions of Islam 
and the contemporary world were of far reaching implications. It is sig- 
nificant that none of them escaped the formidible accusation of being religiously 
sceptical and even atheists. 
6 
In Iraq, with its tradition of violence, , 
accusation of that sort meant a threat to the modernists' lives. On the 13th 
October 1908, Thuniyän, Rusäfi and Zahäwi escaped death at the hands of a 
furious mob because they were defending the constitution. 
7 In 1910, Zahäwi 
fled Baghdad for several months so that 'people' might forget an article by 
8 
him advocating women's rights.. Such accusations would cast serious doubts 
on the reformers' ability to influence other Moslems, including some'Ulemäp 
who would not have been 'deceived' by 'infidels'. 
1. J. D. al Afghäni, A1'Amal al Kämila, (ed. ) by M. 1Amarah, (Cairo, 1963), 
pp. 477-9 
2. Ibid., pp. 428-9 
3. Ibid.; Al Uukuma al Istibdädiya, al Manär, Vol. 3,1900 
4. Makhzumis op. cit., pp. 104-5,153; M. 
'Abduh, al Isläm wa al Radd'ala. 
Muntagidieh, (Cairo, 1947), p. 26; *A. R. al Kawakibi, Umm al Qurra, (Aleppo, 
1959), pp. 169-71,218-22,227-34,238-43. 
5. Afghäni, Al W aDda al Islämiya, (Cairo, 1933), p. 10; M. R. Rids, Tärikh ..., 
op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 307; S. al Husri, Mä Hiya al Qawmiya, (Beirut, 1959), 
pp. 225-6 
6. N. R. Keddie, Islamic ..., op. cit., p. 92; S. Haim o cit. 11" E 
Kedourie, Afghani and Abduh 
r, 
(London, 1966); E. Kedourie, 'Further light 
on Afghani*, Middle Eastern Studies Vol. 1, No. 2, January 1965, pp. 187-202; 
M. A. Khalaf Allah, Abd Allah al Nadim wa Mudhekkerätuhu al Siyäsiya, 
(Cairo, 1956), p. 52 
7. 'A. D. al A*dami,, Mukhta. 2ir Tärikh Baghdäd, (Baghdad, 1926), pp. 249-50 
8. A. H. al Rishudi, Al Zahäwi, (Beirut, 1966), pp. 113-4 
- 
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'Islam' had; '+in the 'late Ottoman period, degenerated into anon-thinking, 
anti-rationa1, "sectarian 'and-'submissive 'doctrine which justified 'the 'denomin it 
ationalistic'and despotic character of the Ottoman power. ` The reformers 
appeared in a society whose mental outlook was dominated"by certain-'conservative' 
aspects'of"Islam: They advocated a constitutional rule among people who be- 
lieved 1nnthe''acknowledgment of the existing power, ... whatever"it be'. 
2 
They were calling'for knowledge in a society whose religious establishment 
used to warn that *Satan to impress you, rehearses the excellence of knowledge*. 
3 
They were advocating political activities in a society which was under the 
assumption that 'not merely political decisions but all outward forms of social 
life were beyond the ability of man to control*. 
4 
They preached social justice 
and political struggle in a community which was systematically indoctrinated 
that Islam called to 'live in poverty', to 'ignore life', 
5 
and that he was 
doomed to hell-fire any learned person whose 'sole purpose in pursuing knowledge 
is to enjoy the luxuries of this life and to achieve power and position among 
its people'. 
6 
ý,. s. ý ., ý... 
Thus it is not an exaggeration to suggest that the Islamic reformers were 
advocating nothing less than an intellectual revolution. They who maintained 
tagdim al tagal 'ala Qähir al shara"" (the priority of reason over the apparent 
shara') and 'al na4er al 'Agli li tabgi l al imän', (the rational examination 
to acquire faith); 
7 
were in fact negating all that the official ottoman Islam 
stood for. Nevertheless, Islamic reformers were well within accepted tradition 
which existed in Islam and in the Shi'i sect in particular. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
S. 
6. 
7 
M. W. Watte Muslim Intellectuals: A Study of, al Ghazali, - (Edinburgh, 1963), 
p. vii 
M. Halpern, The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North 
Africa, (Princeton, 1965), p. 17 
M. W. Watt, The Faith and Practice of Al Ghazali, (London, 1958), p. 87 
M. W. Watt, Muslim Intellectual: A Study of al Ghazali, (Edinburgh, 1963), 
p. 179. Also I. Mehdewi, Abp Uamid al Ghazali, Dirräsa Jadida fi Hiyätihi 
wa Irä'ihi, al Adib No. '10 & 11, October and November 1968 (originally 
an outline for a Ph. D. thesis). 
Dr. Z. Mubärik, al Ghazäli wa al Ikhläg, (Cairo, n. d. ), pp-. 81,83 
Abu Hamid äl Ghazali, Book of Knowledge, (Eng. trans. by Dr. N. A. Faris), 
(Lahore, 1962), p. 162 
Muhammad 'Abduh, al Isläm Din al 'Alm wa al Madaniya, (Cairo, n. d. ), pp-95-6 
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It is true that Afghani admitted that 'So long-as humanity exists,, the 
struggle will-not cease between dogma, and, free investigation, between religion 
and philosophy!. However, it is equally true that Afghäni and Abduh saw in 
'genuine Islam$ a solution=of this conflict. 
2,, In other words, and as Hourani 
brilliantly put it: 
'He /Äfghani% accepted the. final identification of philosophy_-, _,, 
and prophecy, that what the prophet received through inspir- 
ation was the same as, what the philosopher could attain by the 
use of knowledge*. 
3 
Houranits argument shows how heavily were the new reformers dependent 
on earlier trends which had existed in 'Islam. 
4 In fact it'has been pointed 
out that Afghänfwas highly influenced by ibn Rushd5 (Averroes) who attempted 
a reconciliation between philosophy and religion. Furthermore, what Hourani 
is attributing'to Afgh; ni is very similar to statements uttered by the 
Mu*tazilite who argued that 'the truthfulness of the prophecy is to be judged 
by the rational thinking, without which there would be no use of the Qurän 
or the Sunnah*6 or their claim that the Prophet had 'reasoned the rational 
*agliyat aspects of Isläm; otherwise he would not have been able to assimilate 
the revelation'.? 
Thus one could argue that the reformers were, on the one hand, serious 
thinkers who challenged the prevailing notions of Islam. On the other hand, 
those reformers were well within the general framework of Islam and its tolerance. 
In other words, they rejected both unthinking traditionalism and blind imitation 
of the West. They revived certain Islamic values vitally needed for life in 
1. N. D. Keddie, op. cit., p. 187 
2. Ibid., pp. 107,130-74; M. Abduh, Al Islam wa al Na§räniya, (Cairo, 1947), 
pp. 107,130-40. 
3. A. Hourani, -op. cit., p. 123 
4. On Avicenna. influence on Afghani see: _A.., 
Hourani, op. cit., p. 108; on 
Avicenna and Averroes influence see: N. Keddie, op. cit., pp. 9,38,46-7, 
50-2,62,92. 
5. Dr. 'A. Wardi, Limabit Ijtimä'iyä min-Tirikh al 'Iraq al Vadith, Vol. 3, 
(Baghdad, 1972), p. 316 
6. Dr. M. Fakhri, Dirasat fi al ': ikr al 'Arabi, (Beirut, 1970), p. 77; Also 
I. al Mehdewi, o cit., Part 2,: p. 54 
7. Ibid 
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the modern world, such as activism, the freer use of human reason, and political 
and military strength. By seeking these values within the Islamic tradition 
instead of openly borrowing from the West, the reformers were able to: (i) attain 
an inf&uence of believing Moslems which was not shared by those who simply 
appropriated Western ideas, 
' (ii) make the much needed new Western values 
2 
more acceptable, and(iii) bridge the gap between Shiti and Sunni Moslems. 
Nevertheless, by virtue of their own approach, the reformers had estab- 
lished a"difficult predicament. Their notion of Islam was subjected to a 
subjective and selective attitude of emphasizing the rational aspects of told 
Islam' and, thus, had left much to be clarified. From a political point of 
view, they created a difficult dilemma. They glorified the Arabs and exposed 
the despotic and stagnant Ottoman rule. Yet they called for the: preservation 
of the Empire. 
3 
Such a dilemma was to torture the intelligentsia who accepted 
(or shared) their logic. The Iraqi intellectuals could by no means, escape such 
a quandary. 
This political dichotomy explains two things: when the decisive moment 
came in 1914, the Arab intellectuals were not prepared to draw a common line-, 
of political action. Instead they fell into political splits and intellectual 
confusion. However, when the British occupation had obliterated the conflict 
between Islam and Arabism, it was easy for the Iraqi nationalists and Islamists 
to close their ranks in confronting the new challenge. 
Rashid Ridg who influenced the Iraqis through his al Manär and Decentral- 
ization party4 and who, during his visit to Baghdad (1912), was considered as 
the pioneer of Arab nationalism, 
5 
was a clear manifestation of such a predic- 
ament. In 1897, he explicitly argued that four future depends on rejecting 
Europe's principle of nationalityt. 
6 In 1900 he warned against fragmentation 
1. N. R. Keddie, op. cit., p. 3. 
2. M. Rhadduri, Political Trends...., op. cit., pp. 64-5 
3. M. R. Rid g, Tärikh ., op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 912 
4. Infra, pp-76 
5. ICh. M. Ismillel, Qalam Wazier, (Baghdad, 1970), pp. 44-5 
6. A. Manär, Vol. 1,1897, p. 67 
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of the Moslems into races and`nations. 
1' 
In 1904 Ridä denied-'that the Caliphate 
should be-an Arab and argued. *We. want unity with, the Turks'but. on the'basis 
? 
of : justice and. equality*. -However, -in. 1900-and in'an, article entitledr, 'Arabs 
and, Turks*, he'openly came in-'favour of"the-Arab. character, culture, methods 
of-rule and even military conquest. 
3 
'Rids bitterly criticized-Turkish treatment 
of, the-Arabs. 
4ý. 
Nevertheless, he"condemned the-Arabnationalists; in Egypt and 
the Turkish nationalists alike; both were endangering-Islamic unity. 
5 
Ridä-explained that-his-aim was the modernization'of the Moslems and not 
the establishment of a unified Islamic state 'which was impossible to be 
realized#. 
6 
For him, it was essential to strengthen the 'Arabs' by modern 
science and the achievement of 'some sort of Arab unity to withstand Western 
attack*. 
7 
On the subjective level, Ridä kept being faithful to his beliefs and 
attempt to reconcile the incompatibles. However, by virtue of his approach 
and calls for religious reforms, modernization and Arabism, Rids was, object- 
ively, undermining the Empire. Subsequent historical development was to 
demolish the wishful destinies which Ridä had striven for. The Ottoman Empire 
was getting more Turkish and less Islamic, more impotent and less powerful. 
Thus, the writings of Rida were, accordingly, assuming more aggressiveness 
towards the Turks and carrying a stronger Arab nationalist accent. As early 
as 1908, Rids expressed his fears concerning the Turkish nationalist tendencies 
of the "Young Turk'. 
8 
By 1913 most of al Manär pages were devoted toa bitter 
attack atainst the 'Unionists' and their racial and antagonistic policies 
towards the Arabs. 
9 
1. Ibid., Vo1.31 1900; p. 124 
2. Ibid., Vol. 6,1904, p. 955 
3. Ibid.., Vol. 3, '1900, ' pp. 169-72 
4. Ibid., p. 193 
S. Ibid., pp. 193-8 
6. Ibid., p. 339 
7. I bid.., pp. 12134, _,:... 
8. Al Manär, Vol. II, 1908, pp. 10,836-841,842-859 
9. Ibid., 
_Vol. 
16,1913, pp. 6,55-62,107.130.136.140.145.231.471.55C 
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Ridä's dilemma reached its--clima, with the outbreak of World War I. On 
the one hand, and as a leading member of, the Decentralization Party, he, was 
engaged in an anti-ottoman attempt and accepting-aid from the British in the 
hope of achieving an independent Arab government. 
' 
On the other hand, and 
once it became clear that it was the Arabs rather than the, British. who were 
the pawns of the game, Rid; advised Sharif Hussein to terminate his alliance 
with the British and to strive for Arab unity rather than indulging in anti- 
Ottoman activities. He warned Hussein and other Arab leaders-against British r-°'ý 
plans and designs. 
2 
(iii) The Political Rift Among Arab Nationalists: The embroyonic growth of 
the ideas of nationalism among Arabs took place during the late period of 
the last century and the early part of this century. It is of historical 
significance to observe thatat that time the Turkish domination (which once 
engulfed all Arab countries)3 was relinquished from Egypt, Sudan and North 
Africa and was replaced by-the control of European Powers. Turkish authority 
over the Levant and Iraq continued to a later period until it was finally 
liquidated during the War. This historical fact gave birth to an important 
rift among Arab nationalist movement(s). In the.. Levantit was Turkish oppression 
that accompanied the steady growth of the ideas of nationalism among Syrian 
(greater Syria) intellectuals. Thus it is hardly surprising that the nation- 
alism of Syria was to be stamped by the following forms:, (a) profound pan- 
Arab sentiment and outlook; (b) faint Islamic' colour; (c) strong Christian 
Arab influence; (d) a guarded attitude of optimism toward the Western Powers. 
An attitude which ranged from mild resentment to open political flirtation. 
It is hardly surprising that the national movement of Egypt whose growth 
was crystalizing under conditions of British rather than Turkish occupation, 
was to be shaped in a form of an anti-British, pro-Ottoman and a cautious 
1. Sh. Arsalän, Saiyd .... Rashid RiQä ..., (Damascus, 1937), pp. 152-6 
2. Ibid., pp. 314-7. 
3. only Morocco remained out of this domination. 
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apprehension toward 'Arab pationalism'. 
1 
Such was the attitude of'several 
generations of Egyptian nationalist leaders who successively directed the 
trend of the national movement; 
2 
Ahmed *Uräbi3 (the leader of the 1881 up- 
rising), Mustafa Kämil4 (1874-1908), Muhammad Farid5 (d. 1919) and a large 
06 
number of Egypt's public opinion leaders. 
6 
Thus it was natural that when the 
revolt of Hijaz was declared in 1916, Egypt*s nationalists assumed a hostile 
attitude towards this venture. 
7 
They expressed a consistent desire in upholding 
the Caliphate institution, and saw 'the Arab Revolution' as an English 'conspiracy 
'8 
and subsequently resented the idea of 'Arab nationalism*. 
9 
One could fairly conclude that Arab resentment of the West in general was 
deeply rooted. To suggest that Arab animosity towards' Britain was but a 
Product of the post-1918 period, as it is commonly believed in the Eastern 
(Mashra9) part of Arab countries, 
10 is simplyta'one-sided and' consequently 
an erroneous outlook which excludes the Iraqi and African'Arabs11 from being 
1. 'Arab nationalism' is used here in the sense of Arab separation from the 
Ottoman Empire. '. 
2. Jamal *Abd al Ni§er, al thäq al Watani,, (Cairo,, 1964), pp. 21-22 
3. Ahmed 'Urabi dismissed his 'Arab' tendencies and wrote 'An Arab state ... 
is a betrayal of Islam and a violation of the teachings of Allah and his 
Messenger'. Siti' al Husri, Mä Hiy al Qawmiya, op. cit., p. 203 
4. He said 'although the Egyptians know only one homeland, and that is Egypt, 
it is surely natural that they should support the Caliphatastate ... *. 
'Abd al Rahman al Rafa*i, Mu*tafa Kämil; Zäi'th al {araka al Wataniya, 
(Cairo, 1939), p. 93. Extract from a speech in Alexandria, 1900. 
5. See his book: Tärikh al Dawla al 'Alia al 'Othmaniya, (Cairo, 1894). 
In his memoirs he wrote 'there would be no salvation for Egypt from British 
occupation but only through Ottoman sovereignty'. 
'Mudhekerät Muýammad Farid', published in al Kätib No. 104, Year 9, (Cairo, 
1969). Extract from his memoirs on 10th April 1892,22nd February 1894 
and May 1897. 
6. A. Säigh, al Fikra al 'Arabiya it Mi§ir, (Beirut, 1959), Chapters 3 and 4. 
7.. Dr. Muiammad Ijussein, al Itijähät al W a%aniya fi al Adb al Mu'ägir, Vol. II 
(Cairo, 1956), pp. 1-20,39. 
8. Säti'al Husri, Arg' wa Abadrth fi al'Qawmiya a1 'Ärabiyä, (Beirut, 1956), 
pp"18,143 
9. Säti'al Husri, Muha¢erät fi Neshu' al Fikra al Qawmiya, (Cairo, 1951), pp. 224-5 
10. Dr. H. Nuseibeh, op. cit., pp. 88-9 
U. 'Aläl al Fäsi, Al Uarak; t al Istigläliya fi al Mighreb al 'Arabi, (Cairo, 1948) 
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part of Arab history. 'It'is'ä narrow'-notion which'reduces Arab history to 
the history of the Hashimites and the'1916'uprising., " 
In consequence, ' the Iraqi nationalist movement was faced, since its early' 
days, 'with two dissimilar influences. One ' emanating' from Cairo, warning against 
Britain's designs and'its Arab allies; the other from Syria (and Hijaz) de- 
tnanding an end to Turkish domination, even at the price'of accepting'Britain's 
Allignment. The Syrian outlook was further enhanced because' of British7-Liberal 
Policy in Syria. 
The Iraqi ' nationalist-movement differed from'the Egyptian and Syrian'in 
several points, two of which are of direct relevance to the argument: '' First: 
it emerged in a'"relatively'`later period (1909-1920) from that of the Levant or 
Egypt. In cönsequence the crystallization`of"this'rather latecomer'was to' 
undergo the dual suppression of'both Turkish and British`administrations'° 
successively. ` This fact was to characterize the Iraqi nationalist movement 
by two rather contradictory features. On the one'hand, 'Iraq's nationalists 
spared no means to demonstrate' their resentment of'Briiish occupation, on 
the other hand, the Iraqi nationalists accepted and 
desired the leadership 
of the Hashitnites. 
The Intellectual Atmosphe=e'in'Iraq: `The rising Iraqi intelligentsia was 
deeply influenced by the ideas emanating from Egypt and the Levant. However, 
the Iraqi intellectual contribution'to'the'dialogue was very limited. The 
conditions surrounding Iraq had deprived it of the necessary-premises of a 
profound intellectual revival. -. 
Iraq did not enjoy political and intellectual liberties as those of Egypt. 
Suppression was evident and the free exchange of ideas was rarely permissible. 
l 
Modern high education in Iraq lagged far behind that of Egypt and Syria. Be- 
tween 1872 and, 1912 the total number of Iraqi students in Istanbul was 1,400, 
of whom no less than 1,200 were graduates as officers who served in the ottoman 
1. M. Fahmi, Al Zahäwi, (Cairo, n. d. ), pp. 10-4; A. Fayyad, 'A1 Thawra al 
*Irägiva afKu (Baghdad, 1963), pp. 40-51. 
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Army. ' During the same period of time the number of Iraqi students in the 
American University of Beirut did not exceed 70.2 Apart from a few Christians, 
Prominent among them at Karmali, 
3 
the bulk of them were not inclined to exercise 
an intellectual role similar to their Syrian counterparts. Nevertheless, if 
the Iraqis were not able to perform a fundamental contribution, they were 
influenced by the rising trends and their writings were to show that impact. 
The Iraqi Arab Shi'ah were the first to accept and advocate the ideas of 
Modernization and nationalism. Being Arabs they resented their identification 
With Persia or with their Ottoman oppressors. Being, on the other hand, Shi'ah 
they resented the sectarian and despotic rule of the Ottomans but could not 
denounce Islam or accept westernization. It was logical for them to strive 
for a constitutional era and an Arab national entity. Their response to the 
reformist and nationalist ideas was spontaneous. Kedourie pointed out that: 
'They LArab nationalists/ no doubt represented themselves as 
enlightened liberals free from religious fanaticism, anxious 
for the welfare of Islam as a whole and for the freedom of 
all Muslims from Christian domination. This line of argument 
would appeal to the Shia divines touched as they were by the 
teachings of the'influential Jamal al Din al Afghani, himself 
a Shi'a,, who had preached a Sunni-Shi'a reunion for the sake of 
the political regeneration of Islam'. 
4 
The closeness of the reformists' ideas to that of the intellectual 
tradition of the Shi'ah was also indicated by Hourani and Keddie. 
5 I have 
tried to show the similarities between the Mu'tazilites and the modernists' 
vision of Islam. 
6 
In this respect it is relevant to remember the 'known fact 
1. A. W. al Qaysi, The Impact of Modernization on Iraqi Society During the 
Ottoman Era: A Study of Intellectual Development in Iraq 1869-1917. 
Unpublished Ph. d. Thesis (University of Michigan, 1958), p. 67 
2. Ibid., p. 87 
3. Instäs Märy al Karmali (1866-1947). Educated in Beirut and France, wrote 
several articles in Egyptian periodicals, published Lughat al 'Arab (1911- 
1914), in which he glorified the Arab language and history, was arrested 
in 1914. -Shabibi considered him as one of the early pioneers of Arab 
nationalism. In 1918 and after he edited al 'Arab advocating Arab nation- 
alism and cooperation with the British; K. 'Awad, I. M. al Karmali, (Baghdad, 
1960); J. Jabouri, Al Karmali al Khälid, (Baghdad, 1947). 
4. E. Kedourie, England and the Middle East, (London, 1956), p. 190. Kedourie 
seems to imply that the nationalists were other than Shi'ah. In fact all 
nationalists who were in contact with the 'divines' were themselves Shi'ah. 
5. A. Hourani, op. cit., p. 108; N. R. Keddie, op. cit. `, pp. 9,39,46-7,50-1,62,92. 
6. Supra, p. 42 
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that the Shi'ah inherited . th e Mattazilites in the sense of dependence on 
reason and logic". 
1 
The new vision of Islam, as advocated by the modernists, 
was appealing to the Iraqi Shitah. It was largely drawn from their own. trad- 
itions and met their practical needs of a society based on equality and arabism. 
Al Bair considers the Iraqi poetical movement, which took place during 
the late 19th Century and the early years of-the 20th, to be a revival of the 
rational traditions which flourished during al Ma'mun era. 
2 
Bair hails that 
tradition as the most glorious in Arab intellectual history and claims that 
those who revived it in Iraq were all of-'purely Arab origins'. 
3 
He considers 
Ibrähim al Tbätbä'i (d. 1905). as the first Iraqi poet who advocated 'Arab 
nationalism'. 4 In fact such 'credit' goes to al Jamil5 and al Akhrass (Shiti). 
Nevertheless, it is evident that the Iraqi Shi'ah were the pioneers of 
Arab national resentment of Turkish domination. 
6 
The influence, of the Shi'i 
faith in resenting the Turks and demanding an Arab , 
rule was clearly shown by 
two poets. Hayder al Hilli (d. 1887) compared theTurkish rule to the one that 
had slaughtered al Hussein.? He also compared the Hashimites of Mecca with 
the rise of the promised Mahdi. 
8 
Tbatbä'i begged the Mahdi to, rise and 
1" A. F. 'Al Nafeesi, The Role of the Shi'ah in the Political Development of 
Modern Iraq 1914-1921, Unpublished Ph. D. thesis (Cambridge University, 
1972), p. 109 
2. M. M. al Ba§ir, Nah¢at al 'Iraq al Adabiya, (Baghdad, 1947), pp. 8-9,15-69 
330. Bair himself is an Arab nationalist and a Shi'i intellectual who 
played a remarkable political role during 1919-1922. 
3. Ibid., p. 10 
4. Ibid., pp. 141-61. The poem was' written in 1899; see "his Diwän, (Saida, 
n. d. ), pp. 97-102. ., iin 
S. 'Abd al Ghani al Jamii (1780-1963), a Sunni talim, popular leader and a poet. 
i 
In 1832, he led an uprising in Baghdad. il It was suggested that his movement 
was encouraged by Ibrähim Pasha in Syria. 
iii It seems that he was the first 
Iraqi to consider the Turks as foreigners and to call for an Arab rising. 
iv 
i) M. al Allusi, Gharä'ib al Aghtirib, (Baghdad, 1327-1910), p. 211 and after. 
ii) 'A. -al 'Azzäwi, Tärikh al 'Iraq ..., op. cit., Vol. 7, pp. 14-6 
iii), 'A. 'A. Nawär, Tärikh ..., op. cit., pp. 196-8 iv) Majmu'at 'A. Gh. al Akrass, (Baghdad, n. d. ), pp. 23-9,45-55,123-4 
6. I concluded that from two major works:: Y. Izzedien, Al Shi'r al 'Ir; gi 
fi al Qern al Täs'i 'Asher, (Baghdad, 1959); I. al Wa ili, Al Shi'r al 
Siyasi al 'Iraqi fi al Qern al Tas'i 'Asher, (Baghdad, 1961). 
7. S. H. al Hilli, Al Durr al Yatim, (Bombay, n. d. ), pp. 366,394 
8. ' Ibid. , pp. 183-6 
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predicted that he will emerge from Mecca. 
' 
tAbd al Ghafär al Akhrass was a close friend of al Jamii and influenced 
by his movement. He wrote several poems which left no doubt as to his Arab 
national inclinations. 
2 
Sälih al Qazwini (d. 1883) accused the Turks of treach- 
erous oppression, 
3 
and his son Rädi (d. 1870) complained of his alienation in 
Persia and explicitly preferred the 'Iraqi Arabs' over the Turks. 
4 
*Abd al 
Muttalib al Hilli criticized Abd al Hamid and the Persian Shah and hailed al 
Khurässäni for his constitutionalist and anti-Western attitudes. In 1910, 
he supported Tälib of Basrah and advocated his cause among the Fetla leaders'., 0 
When the Italians invaded Libya he displayed enthusiastic Arab feelings. 
5 
Nevertheless, he protested against the British occupation of Iraq and deserted 
public life and poetry. 
6 A similar attitude of constitutionalism, Arabism, 
and anti-Westernism was preached by Ja'far al Hilli7 and abu al Mahäsin al 
Muhsin. 8 -All of those poets were Arab Shi'ah. Their predicament resembles 
the conflict which had captured all the reformers who tried to reconcile the 
incompatibles. 
The reformers' impact on the Iraqi elite is evident. Al 'Urwa was widely 
read in Iraq and 'each of its issues caused great excitement'. 
9 Al Khälisi10 
1. I. al Tbarbä'i, op. cit., p. 97 
2. Most of his 'nationalist' poems were written between 1846 and 1851; his 
collection, op. cit., pp. 29-31,88-90,102-7. He wrote 'Our Arab ideas are 
valuable, but they were cheapened by the non Arabs'. Ibid., p. 102 
a I... tVP, [ý1. ý. ºý Vý --, 4.: J -1. ß,, t 
l: S 
tel: ý'1 .Jý, s 
3. S. al Qazwtui; Al Diwän, (Baghdad, Manuscripts), pp. lll-2. 
4. Ibid., p. 179 
5. 'A. al Khagäni. Shu'rä' al Hillah., Vol. 3, ' (Najaf, 1951-1953), pp. 196-230 
6. M. al Basir, o . icit. j pp. 326-8,342,344-5 
7. In 1895, al Iailli (d. 1899) called on the Hashimites to lead an Arab rising, 
he praised al Shiräzi for his opposition to Western incursion. In 1896-7, 
al Hilli condoned the Yemen rising. J. al Hilli, Si}}er Bäbil, (§aida, 
n. d. ), pp. 217-8,358,9,422. 
8. A. M. al Mu4sin (b. 1878). A constitutionalist who resented Turkish treatment 
of the Arabs but accused Arab nationalists of inviting Western occupation. 
M. al Basir, OP. cit., pp. 356-60,364. 
9. $A. M. Shamis, Safir Allah, (Cairo, 1969), p. 65 
10. M. al Khäligi, Kitäb fi Sabil Allah (Manuscripts) and an interview with 
Sheikh Hadi al Kh lisi, (January 1970). 
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and al Sadr1 were among the first to be influenced by the ideas of reforms 
and Arabism. Both were Arab Shi'ah and 'Alim of Kädimain and were to exercise 
an important intellectual and political influence on the Iraqi independence 
movement. 'During his 'stay in Iraq (1891), Afghani established direct contacts 
With two prominent Iraqis; 'Abd al Muhsin al Kädimi and al Habubi. 
2 
Kädimi (1870-1935) was to become one of the three greatest Iraqi poets. 
Because of his 'conversion' to Afghäni's notions, he had to escape to Iran 
and then to Egypt3'(1899) where he was patronized and influenced by 'Abduh. 
4 
Kädimi attacked the"Ottoman oppression, welcomed the constitution, 
5 
glorified 
the Arabs and demanded their unity a rid independence. 
6 
Nevertheless he was to 
defend the`Ottoman State whenit was threatened by the West (during the Balkan 
and Libyan wars) and'warned against western designs.? For a short while he 
supported the. Hijaz movement but turned against it at learning its alliance 
with the "British. 
$ 
Habubi (d. 1915) was a Shi'i 'Alim and apoet who became a reformer and 
advocated scientific knowledge and Shi'i-Sunni unity. 
9 After his death, his 
Shi'i followers"were divided into two schools; the Arab nationalists like al 
Shabibi brothers, 
1° 
al Shargi, 
11 and abu Timan12 and the Islamic reformers. 
13 
Prominent among thesecond group was Hibet al Din al Shahristgni. He published 
1. 'A. 'Ali, Zatim al Thawra al 'Irägiya,., (Baghdad, 1950),. pp. 19-26 r 
2. Infra, p-p. 
, aw 3. R. Bati, Diwän"al K30imi, Vol. 2, (Cairo, 1948), pp. 3-6 
4. R. al Kädimi. and H. al Jadirji, Al Dädimi, in`Y. Izzidien (ed. ), Shur 
al 'Iräq4fi al Qern al 'Ashrin, (Baghdad, 1969), p. 34 
S. Al Kadimi, 'Diwan ..., on. cit., pp. 126-9 
6. Kidimi and Jädirji, op. cit., pp. 40,52-5 
7. Kadimi, Diwän,, Vol. 1, (Damascus, n. d. ), pp. 99-121 
8. Kädimi and Jädirji, op. cit., p. 40 
9. A. Fayyad, op. cit., p. 84 , 
10. M. R. al Shabibi, Mudhekkerät, (Manuscript, n. d. ). 
il;, Amal al Sharqi, Notes on her father. 
12. K. al Jädirji Papers. 
13. o..,. y V- al Jazä'ri,. Bahr,, al 'Ulum, a1 Jawähir. 
rý a 
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a 'I_lm (the Science) periodical in which he argued that there was no coflict 
between Islam and science. 
l 
In Najaf, he opened a library for the public to 
$ llow their acquaintance with the new trends spreading in Egypt and Syria. 
2 
He wrote a book in which he tried to reconcile Islam to the contemporary science 
anä methods of thinking and reasoning. Needless to say that this attempt was 
also based on reviving the rational aspects of the tradition. Sharistäni was 
3 
izl contact with al Zahäwi4-and his, ideas. caused his conflict, with the conservative 
circles in Najaf. 5 He played an, active role, -in-the 1920 movement whose aim he 
defined as 'the establishment of an Arab kingdom!. -- 
s 
The Iraqi intellectual movement reached a new era of maturity'and originality 
with the rise of Ma'ruf al Rusäfi (1875-1945) and Jamil Sadqi al Zahäwi (1863-1936). 
In 1905, Zahawi assisted by Rusäii, published a book in which he attempted the 
refutation of the Wahabi principles., He pointed out that their main opinions 
are the attribution of anthro-pomorphic qualities to God, the superiority. of the 
Quran to all rational knowledge and the rejection of I tihäd, I ma and 9i äs. 
Zahäwi opposed this and argued that the exercise of the mind was needed to 
prove the existence of the Creator and the necessity of prophecy. 
7 
He stressed 
that 'If a conflict. occurred between reason and traditional teaching, the tradition 
should be; explained to conform to reason'. Zahawi argued that such a conclusion 
aas logical when it is remembered that 'the transmitted knowledge would not be 
accepted as sacred but for the use of the intellect'. 
8 
Rusäßi. expressed his opinion that religion was not the outcome of supernatural 
revelation but an innovation of brilliant thinkers. 
9 
Both Poets revealed their 
1. Al 'Ilm, No. 1 (1910), pp. 4,7,22, No. 2 and 3, (1910), pp. 128,132 
2. M. Mahbuba, Mädi al Najaf wa $aderuha, Vol. l, '(Saida, 1934), p. 120 
3. H. D. al Shahristgni, Al Hayy'a wa al Islam, (Najaf, 1911) 
4. Y. Izzedien, Pi al Adab al 'Arabi al i}adith, (Baghdad, 1967), p. 62 
S. A. Wardi, Dirasa fi r'abi'at al-Mujtama' al 'Iraqi, (Baghdad, 1965), p. 252 
6. 'A. R., al Hassani, Al Thawra al 'Irägiya al Kubra, (gaida, 1965), pp. 230-1 
7. J. S. al Zah-awi, Al Fajr al $ädig, (Cairo, 1323-1905), pp. 27=8,32; 3 
8. Ibid., pp. 32-3 ?,: at y 
JiV.. ýLN v1i 4t 
r 
9. M. al ' RusaZi, Diwan ..., o2. cit., pp. 187-8. (My Negative Truth)i . 
e..;.., ivy it ,- L- ; ý. ir{i trt y L: 14 . 1J, 
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doubts as to some essential Islamic` doctrines like the resurrection and the 
eternity of the soul. 
l 
Rusäfi told Jädirji that he did not publish some of 
his writings fearing accusation of atheism. 
2 
Nevertheless, Rusäii stated in his will his belief 'in Allah and his 
Apostle Muhammad'. 
3 
Furthermore, Rusäfi defended Islam and wrote: 
'They unjustifiably claim that Islam is a barrier against progress. 
If that was so, then how did the early Moslems achieve progress'. 4ý 
It is clear that the two Poets had evisaged an ', Islam' which differed from the 
i 
dominant 'one' prevailing at their time. Their notion found justißiöatiön in 
drawing from an Islamic past as to bridge the gap with the European present. 
Both Poets assumed a positive attitude towards scientific thinkers outside 
the fold of Islam. ' Zahäwi praised Renan, Buchner5 and Darwin and argued that 
they were more entitled to heaven than many"Moslems who claim to be religious. 
6 
Rusäfi hailed'the 'liberal-group composed of Christians, Jews and Moslems' who 
smashed the 'counter revolution' of 1909. Rusäfi called on Moslems and 
Christians to unite and'achieve glory for the 'fatherland' which he defined as 
Arab rather than Iraqi or Ottoman. ' He argued that'unity should be our religion 
and'that if religion was to divide us, then it would be better to denounce it. 
8 
In 1898, -Zahawi attacked Abd al Hamid and wrote: 
1. Ibid., and (Tessä'ul Inquiry);,. J. S. al Zahäwi, Al Kalim al Manjum,. (Beirut, 
1328-1910), pp. 116-7 Iyatuha al Samä'; Zahiwi, Al Lubäb, (Baghdad, 1928), p. 326 
2. K. al Jädirji Papers, Interview withal Rusäfi,, the book was on the Prophet 
Muhammad. 
3. A. B. Tabana Ma'ruf al Rugifi, (Cairo, 1947), pp. 64-5 
4. Rusäfi, Diwan ..., op. cit., pp. 128-30. Al Islam " r. 1; 3 Wem' Z,. & I'yt. ý 
ý., ý": ý1 ýpýt cr "ý. L'ýj\ c:.. ºsü c:. fiCi, p ýý V Výtiý.. 
5. F. L. Buchner (1824-1899), wrote a book in 1855 in which he advocated a 
materialistic view of thertuniverse and an explanation of Drawinism which 
was translated by Sh. Shumail. 
6. Zahäwi Al Kalim ... op. cit. 118-9. 
iß 
7. Rtisäfi, Diwan ..., op. cit., pp. 374-7 
""y 8. Ibid., pp. 131-4 
'e1L1: vif cýtýý., pý i, ýýºl1. f. "L t, _:. ^_ýl 
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'Does the shadow of God on earth command what God and his 
honoured Prophet forbade, 
that he impoverishes the rich, banishes the ipnocent, 
imprisons without a reason, rapes and kills'. 
Nevertheless, Zahawi, in 1905 argued that the Caliphate should be retained 
by the Ottomans as the only way to preserve Moslem unity. 
2 
Rusäfl's poems 
did not escape similar 'conflicts'. To dispel the confusion, it is helpful 
to remember that the two poets, 'like the majority of Iraqi nationalists at 
that time, called for an Arab autonomy within a reformed Ottoman"state'. 
3 
It was logical that both Poets were to render an enthusiastic welcome to 
the declaration of the Constitution and to support the Committee of Union and 
Progress. 4 It was suggested that they had joined the C. U. P. branch in Baghdad. 
5 
However, Rusafi denied that, 
s 
although he became the editor of the Arabic 
section of Baghdad which was the mouthpiece of the C. U. P. in Iraq.? 
However the state of amity between the Iraqi intelligentsia and the C. U. P. 
was of a short duration. When the failure of the C. U. P. to move towards 'an 
Arab autonomy within a reformed Ottoman state' became apparent, the reaction 
of Zahawi and Rusäfi was different. Zahäwi decided to turn his back to Islam 
both in its political and ideological manifestions and to embrace the west in 
all its contents. Zahäwi 'became sceptical of everything except /his/ existence 
and death'8 and considered atheism as a 'purely personal question'. 
9 
His 
belief in Arab nationalism was firm and clear. 'Without Arab unity' Zahäwi 
argued, the Arabs 'will not be able to exist for long'. 
10 
His nationalism 
1. Zahawi, Al Kalim ..., op. cit., pp., 6-9 
Jrý%-j c,:... c-u% týsW ýOß. F, 1 ct "t c 
Li 
' 
2. Zahawi, Al Far...., op. cit., pp"7-8n 
3. M. R. 'al`Shabibi, Mugadema, in A. Tabana, op. cit., pp. 10-11 
4. Rusafi, Diwan ..., op, cit., pp. 380-1; Zahawi, Al Kaliur .. ", pp. 51-8 
5. R: Bati, Al $alafa fi al 'Iraq, (Cairo, 1955), p. 22 .. ý., 
6. K. al Jädirji Papers. 
7. R. Bati, Al Adab al 'Agri fi al 'Iräq, (Cairo, 1923), p. 70 .., d 
8. Zahäwi, Ruba'yät al Zahäwi, (Beirut, 1924),, p. 160,, 
9. Zahäwi, Al Awshäl, (Baghdad, 1934), p"6 
10. Zahäwi, Al Thumala, (Baghdad, 1933), pp. 42-3 
. ,. N.. ý z 
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was secular: 'All Arabs, whether Moslems, Christians or'Jews form'. one 
nation'. , Zahäwi opposed-nationalism which sought glory in the past, 'Arab 
nationalism', he argued, 'should build a new glory in a new life'. 
' 
Zahäwi was deeply impressed by the advanced West. He attributed the 
Western culture to science, democracy and equality, freedom of thought and 
emancipation of women. 
2 
His enthusiasm towards Western culture might explain 
his political pro-British stance. In 1914, he was 'obliged' to sign a document 
supporting the Turks against his free will. 
3 
In 1918 Zahäwi wrote: 
'Oh Arab be wise and desert the Turks ... 
Support the English, they are men of justice and honest 
in their deeds and words'. 4 
He did not hide his pleasure at the return of Sir Percy Cox whom he publicly 
welcomed in a well known poem. 
5 
Many writers have accused Zahäwi of opportunism and of selling out because 
of this poem. However, none has perceived that such an attitudes was inherent 
in his philosophy of westernization and was associated with the attitude taken 
by many Arab nationalists of that period. Furthermore, a'thorough reading 
of the poem indicates that Zahäwi was not, as has often been implied, a mere 
'British stooge'. He welcomed Cox as an'alternative to Wilson; he requested 
Cox to fulfil his promise of an Arab government, and left no doubt that his 
support of the British was based on the hope that they would bestow on Iraq 
the fruits of their culture. 'Ali al Sharqi, an Iraqi Arab nationalist, who 
was influenced by Habubi and afterwards by Shumail7 was also reluctant to 
support the rising. 
8 
1. Ibid., p. 67 
rý 
2. Zahawi, Diwan, (Cairo, 1924), p. 231r Al Kalim ... ' op. cit., pp. 9, -14-3; 
Al Lubab, op. cit., p. 67 
3. M. S. al Daftari Papers 
4. Al Arab, 15th February 1918. f., -#. Yr 
5. Zahäwi, Diwan, op. cit., pp. 320,145-6,110 
t. 4: r&6 %.. ; 
6. Y. Izzidien, Al Zahäwi al Shä'ir al Qalaq, (Baghdad, 1962), p. 27; H. Näji, 
. 
Al Zahawi, (Cairo, 1962), p. 37; 'A. R. al Hilläli, Al Zahäwi biyn al thawra wa al Sukut, (Baghdad, 1964), p. 53 
7. Amal al Sharqi notes on her father dated 11.5.74. 
8. Y. Izzidien, Al Shi'r al'Irägi al Uadith, (Baghdad, 1960), p. 165 
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However, such attitudes were the exception rather than the rule. The 
growing animosity between the Turkish rule and the Iraqi intelligentsia, which 
could have clarified the distinction between Islam and nationalism, was inter- 
rupted by Western incursion. It was clear that the majority of Iraqi intellect- 
uals feared Western encroachment'*more, than the Turkish rule. The Italian 
invasion of Libya and the British campaign -in-Iraq' were` a` turning point. in 
Iraqi intellectual development., "They'produced aprofound reaction of'Arab 
nationalism which, 'at that time, 'was attached'to Islam and anti-Westernism. 
Iraqi poets of that period were to go as far as'denouncing the'western culture- 
itself which was, viewed as an', "expansionist'and destructive instrument hostile,,, 
to Arabs'and Moslems alike. "-Izzidien, study"of that period gives ample-evidence 
of 'such an 'intellectual trend. 
1 
'`ý`, '-A-1.1 ý '? 
Rusäfi"was'the most notable exponent of such a trend. ' As earlyias 1909; 
heaprotested against the policies of the'C. U. P., and warned that the Arabs - 
'will obtain their right by-the sword' . 
2, He supported the Arab societies3 
and demanded Arab rights. 
4 Rusäfi's'concept of Arab nationalism was secular 
and 'progressive'. He argued that it was meaningless to'look backýat 
the 
Arabs' past. The point, 'he'asserted, was to reform"the"present and to, 
build, " 
a new future 
5 based on science and` knowledge. 
6' 
Nevertheless, Rusäfi disapproved of the 'Arab Conference' because it was 
held in Paris'and described those who attended it"as 'lambs appealing to a wolf 
for help'.? He-pointed-out that'his'disappointment with the 'Arab movement' was 
originated when he became aware that some'nationslists were seeking 
forein 
support. 
8 
In 1914, Rusäfi called for a"Jihad to'defend the`'fatherland'and 
1. Ibid., pp. 48-136 
00 . 2. ' Rusäf i, Diwan ..., op. cit., pp. 389-91 
x 
"-JU7- -ali 
j% e3 
3. Ibid., pp. 391-3 
4. M. 'All, Adab al Rugäfi, (Cairo, 1947), pp. 117-9 
5. Rusäfi, op. cit., pp. 34-6 L)'ß t 
6. Ibid., pp. 65-8 
tl\. _.. ýý3t 
7. Ibid., pp. 364-7 ... 
ýV 
B. K. al Jädirji Papers 
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to liberate Egypt and Aden. 
l 
The actual destinies differed from the wishful 
desires. Baghdad fell to the British and Rusäfi in a futile but sentimental 
e 
defiance to reality addressed the Turks and-'wrote 
'I am still faithful to you in'spite of the cuts'youZleft in 
my, heart. , Today I complain to you about you ... ,. 
Rusäßi found in Yäsin al, Häshimi (the leader of the 'militant' wing among 
Iragi. nationalist officers) 
,a 
new hero. When Yäsin was arrested by the 
British (1920), Rusäfi hailed him in a very, strongly worded poem. 
3 
Thus it is clear that the modernization school , was appealing 
to the, rising 
Iraqi intelligentsia. The combination of Arab nationalism, Islam, constitution- 
alism and anti-West proved to be the intellectual cornerstone of the Iraqi 
independence movement. Perhaps it was an irony that the failure of Arab nation- 
alism to distinguish itself completely from Islam was to the advantage of the 
independence movement. Such a failure was behind the ease in which the nation- 
alists and the Islamists were to conclude their anti-British alliance. 
However, it is important to mention that such ideas were (up to 1919) 
confined to the small circles of the intelligentsia and lacked influence on 
the masses. It was the Administration's policy (1918-1920) which allowed such 
ideas to penetrate the public and the tribes and thus to assume a striking 
political force. 
In fact a careful study of the Iraqi intelligentsia would reveal that 
during 1917-1918, many Iraqi intellectuals were to relax their anti-British 
attitude. The Turkish atrocities, coupled with the liberal Maude's declaration, 
had had their effect. On the 4th July 1917 and onward the British published 
al'Arab newspaper in Baghdad. It was edited by Philby (followed by G. Bell) 
1. Rusäfi, op. cit., pp. 481-3 ->qj 
ot 
2. Ibid., pp"410-11 V-% 
týL. 
L w1.. 'ß... ý. iJ- ýº ý.. ý Cy. ýý'. /ýTý' iý ý1: 
Rusäfi, op. cit.,; p. 451 
lp Zia; 
.0A 
icl. Lr ti. 
1: 14 L. Zoýj I \,.; a, Z)--, I 
ZkL% Ze 5-p. -, ý % Z, I 
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and al Karmali, Zahäwi, Dujayli, 'Uzry and al Basir were among its prominent 
writers. 
l 
The Shabibi brothers (Ridä and Bägir)sided with the British up 
to late 1918.2 In spring 1917, Ronald Storrs visited many Iraqi towns and 
met a large number of Iraqi leaders. He was warmly received and reported 
a considerable Iraqi support, especially among the Shi'ah, for Hussein's 
rising. Shahristäni and Karmali suggested to him to send an Iraqi delegation 
to Hijaz. 
3 
It is my opinion that up to late 1918 the British were capable 
Of encouraging a 'moderate' n. tiunalist party, with-which they could have 
come to terms. However, Wilson's obsolete imperialism was to extinguish 
any moderation and to render the violent clash as an inevitability. 
1. R. Bati, Tärikh al $abafa ßi al 'Iräq, (Cairo, 1955) 
2. Infra, P-3419- 
3. R. Storrs, Orientations, (London, 1939), pp. 228-48 
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CHAPTERII: I. 
ARAB NATIONAL MOVEMENT IN IRAQ DURING THE OTTOMAN PERIOD 
(1908-1916) 
Iraq of the late 19th Century was not yet a fertile land for the growth 
of a national movement. 
' 
Unlike Egypt and the Levant, Iraq did not have close 
contacts with European ideas, missionaries or culture. The first mission 
(Carmelite) arrived in Basrah in 1623 and in Baghdad in 1721. They opened 
their first school in Baghdad in 1728, while they had been in Syria since 
21 1226. The Dominicans established their mission in Mosul in 1750 and opened 
their schools on a non-sectarian basis. 
3 
They brought into Mosul its first 
printing press in 1860,4 and published their first Iraqi magazine, Ikiil al 
Ward, in 1902. The Carmelites introduced their magazine, Zuharyat Baghdad in 
1905.5 Furthermore, the standard of Iraqi education was neither of a high 
level nor inspiring. The number of Iraqi students attending the available 
schools was not large, 
6 
and apart from certain rich families there were no 
students sent abroad. 
On the other hand, there were the seeds of change pushing their way through 
the Iraqi soil. The socio-economic conditions were giving way, after centuries 
of stagnation, to gradual but noticeable transformations which were bound to 
have political effects. Furthermore the Iraqi intelligentsia was not so far 
from the ideas of the Islamic reformers and Arab nationalists emanating from 
Syria and Egypt. 
1... Supra,. pp. _ 
1,6,9. 
. 
2. H. Gallances, Settlement of the Carmelites in Mesopotamia, 17th and 18th 
Centuries, (London, 1927), p. 329. 
3. S. al Säiygh, Tärikh al Muýil, Vol. 1, (Beirut, 1928), p. 323. 
4. Ibid., p. 324 
5. 'A. R. al Hassani, Tärikh al Sah fa al 'Irägiya, (Baghdad, 1957), p. 25. 
6. According to al Hilläli, the total number of Iraqi students in 1914 was 
19.499.600 girls and 7,378 boys in governmental schools. 2,163 girls 
and 8,020 boys were in Private, religious and foreign, schools. 1,338 -",. were in military schools. 
'A. R. al Hilläli, Tffrikh al Ta'. lim fi al 'Iraq fi al 'Ahd al 'Uthmini, 
(Baghdad, 1951), pp. 248-252. 
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Political"Iife 3n general and the national movement of Iraq 
in particular were growing and maturing 'rapidly largely 'owing to external 
factors, and only in part as a product of a gradual and natural development 
of the concrete and historical conditions emerging'from-'the Iragi'soil'as'such. 
Two important events'played an essential role informulating`Iragi*s political' 
life. 'The'first was the rise to power of the Committee of Union and Progress 
in`the Ottoman Empire (1908). 'The second was the British Occupation of Iraq 
(1914-1921). This work 'is*more concerned with the second event and its impact 
on the`independencefmövement. r" However, abrief account" of the first element 
is necessary"to grasp the roots of 'such a movement. '' 
Prior to the `rise of the C. U. P., 'the Ottoman Empire'was'"emphatically 
Islamic in its character andtfar'from Turkish'"nationalist in its motives. 
' 
Bernard Lewis suggests that w 'Ottoman t .: 
'; ' only acquired a 'national significance 
in the 19th Century under"the influence of European liberalism*. 
2 The Arabs 
enjoyed a favourable`'treatment}under the Ottomans-e3 "Abd al Hamid, despotic as 
he was, could be accused of anythingbüt Turkish chauvinism. In his attempt 
4 
to preserve the integrity of the Empire, ` he"allowed some Arabs to assume the 
highest` possible posts during`hii era. 
5 °`' ` 
The ottoman cönstitutionalists were provoked by 'Abd al Hamid's decision 
in 1878 to abandon the 1876 constitutiön, 'the main criticism of this system 
(i. e. his personal. rule) was that it gave. the opportunity to participate in 
political life - even nominally - to very few'. 
6. The youngtTurks (the main 
opposition`group)g who, had changed their name-to the Committee of Union and 
Progress at their conference in 1902 in Paris, staged a military uprising. in 1908. 
4 
1. M., Bayhim, Al-'Arab wa al Turk, (Beirut, 1957), p. 80. 
2. B. Lewis, `'Islamic Revival in Tu'rkey', International Affairs, Vol. 28, 
No. 1, January 1952, p. 47. 
3. H. Gibb and H., Bowen, op. cit., Vol. l, Part, 1, p. 160. 
4. G. Goach and H. Temperley, op. cit., Vol. V, pp. 7-20. " The most important 
posts were, in the hands of non Turkish elements. 
S. N. _As. Sa'id, 'Arab Independence and Unity, (Baghdad, 1943), p. 2. 
6. F. Ahmad, 'The Young Turk Revolution', The Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 3, No. 3, (London, July 1968), p. 19. 
-61- 
'Abd al Hamid capitulated and on the-23rd Julynhe. declared that Parliament.; 
would be-convened in accordance, with'the 1876: constitution.. =Onthe 13ghApril 
1909. 'Abd al Hamid had to abdicate after an<<abortive attempt' on his part to 
, challenge the C. U. P. Thus the-Unionists were-to entrench-themselves-in-power 
and the new-Caliph,. a certain Mubammad Rashad, wasf-in reality, a, powerless ruler. 
' 
The victory of the C. U. P. in declaring the constitutionabrought. about four 
new factors. oni-ithe political scene ", of the Arab World whichp in different ways, 
sparked off-the flame. of. strong Arab national tendencies. 
Firstly,, the promulgation of-the constitution was ; received-. by'a . large , 
sector-of,. the population with great; jubilation and content. Iraq. was no ex-,, 
ception from the rest of; -the-Empire-in-displaying a,, joyful"welcome at the new 
event. 
3 
Men of letters, of-progressives tendencies, 
4 
gave a warm'tribute to 
the new era. 
5 
However the-. newýregime, could not-fulfil its. promises. The reforms 
it brought about, relative.. and modest-asthey were, were unable, to erase theý. - 
backwardness-and-, corruption=of. 'the Empire. " After only: ayfew years the new era 
was to disclose its-, lack, of -tolerance and revert:: to brutal oppression. That 
initial outburst of=joy was . soon. _replaced-by" political 
frustration and dis- 
appointment. 
6 
This new'bitterness, paved: the way forz"separatist=inclinations 
and nationalist tendencies.. -. 
1. On the. Young-Turk and, xthe C. U. P. see E. E., Ramsaur, . Jr., The Young Turk 
Prelude to the Revolution of 1908, (Princeton, 1957). 
2. An eyewitness wrote: 'the whole Empire burst forth in'universal iejöicing 
... Moslems were seen, embracing Christians and Jews ... ". 
H. H. Jessup, Fifty Three Years in Syria, (New York, 1910), '"Vol. II, pp. 785-7 
3. 'A. Jawdat, Mudhekkirät, (Beirut, 1967), p. 25 
4. For instance those Iraqi writers who supported the constitution were, Jamii 
al Zahawi, 'Ma*ruf al R411fi, Rid! al Shabibiý(Shi*i from Najaf, a prominent 
Arab nationalist), his brother Bigir, *Abd al cadir al 'Ubiydi (Sunni from 
Basrah), 'Abd al Hussein al Uzri (Shi'i from Baghdad), Kädi I DujLli 
(Shi*i from-Baghdad), Ibrähim $ä1i1} Shukir and 'Abd al La. i Thuniyän 
(both Sunni from Baghdad and'Arabnationalists). 
5. TA. Kh. al Magdisi, -A1 Tiyärrät al=Adbi a fi al, 'Alarm al 'Arabi al Mu'ä$ir, 
4th ed., (Beirut, 1967), pp. 45-8. 
6. B. Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, (London, 1961), pp. 25-7; - G. Bell, 
Amurath ..., op. cit., pp. 3-5; 'A. Jawdat, op. cit., pp. 25-7; S. Faidi, 
Fi Ghimrat al Ni4ä1, (Baghdad, 1952), pp. 194-5 
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'Secondly, the'triumph of the C. U. P. provoked among certain Arab circles 
a profound resentment and dismay. This discontent was not motivated by the 
in competence-of the Unionists in fulfilling their promises, but by the very 
Q flunciation of constitutional goals. The slogan of equality and the restriction 
'Of the Sultan? s authority was received with great irritation among some Iraqis, 
' 
'-wh ID viewed the whole concept of, al Mashrutiya with alarm and apprehension. 
2 
This was the first outward sign of a deep political and intellectual split 
Zn Iraq society. Al Mashrutiya`aroused, wide public-interest and the conflicts 
it 
created were not-confined to narrow circles. In Iraq it was mainly supported 
by the Effendi group of"Arab nationalist tendencies and a group of Shi'i "ulemä' 
led by al Khurassäni. "SBoth envisaged an era of equality and freedom which 
3 
suited their aspiration:, This was the most important issue in which Arab 
rationalists and Islamic reformists were to be brought together. 
In spite of the Government support, al Mashrutiya confronted a wide oppo- 
Sition and was condemned by leading notables and religious leaders, who did not 
approve of equality-between-rich and poor, Moslems and non-Moslems. The public 
't4as divided, but in: the early stages of the conflict the majority sided with 
the 'conservative campt. 
4 Amongst the opponents of the constitution were the 
ý"a shimites. 
s In Iraq the opposition was led by an influential group of absentee 
landholders, Shi*i conservatives (al Yazdi group)6 and some Sunni notables. All 
considered the constitution-as-a, threat to their conventional outlooks and 
social privileges and saw 'the Young Turk attitude to religion and the Caliph as 
destroying almost the 
_only 
bond between Arabs and the Ottoman Government 
7 
The tconservativeFt opposition had soon gathered around al Mashwara group 
"h ich was led by Sayid 'Abd al Rahman al 
k -j&- (Nai b of Baghdad). Sa*id 
i" 
. T. al Suwaidi, MudhakkirätL, (Beruft, 
1969), p. 25. 
ý" 'A. al Wardi, Dirasa ff il Mujtama"al *Irägi, (Baghdad, 1965), pp. 138,380. 
Iraqi Jews and Christians were among the supporters. 
4. "A. D. al A*dami, Mukhta; ir TSrikh Baghdad, (Baghdad, 1926), pp. 249-51; 
M. N. D. al WI*id, Al Raw¢ al Izhar, (Mosul, 1949), pp. 388-9. 
S" 'A. Allah b. al IJussein, Mudhakkiräti, (Jerusalem, 1945), pp. 22-6. 
6" Infra., pp. 334. 
7" S. H. Longrigg, Iraq ..., op. cit., p. 43. 
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a1, Na9shabandi, and 'Alä'al Nä'ib1 were among, its new leaders. 
2 Al K$yläni,:; 
(the first Prime Minister of -Iraq)', was 'described as the; "'most venerated among r, 
all°the4Sunni religious magnates of-, Iraq, -..:, He administered the rich waqaf 
lands of¢the Qadiriyah Takhiyah! and'has-valuable private estates'. 
3 
It seems 
that the fact°of him being°a large absentee landholder, 
4 had. made him: consider 
the C. U. P. as"a°'nightmare'5'and-. turned-him into a firm supporter of, any Govern- 
ment, Turkish°, or*British-alike. 
6 
The -conflict between the'two groups, assumed-a; wide intellectual. encounter, 
political agitation' and. even street fighting. *, This generated, a considerable 
political awareness and' participation among the, -. Iraqi public and ended the 
previous mental stagnation. However,,. it-was perhapstragic that the decisive 
Arab nationalist blow to Turkish domination was to, come from-quarters of anti- 
constitutional outlook, namely Hussein of Mecca whose 'conservative' views were 
well known. 
7 
Thirdly, the most important factor in the impact of the C. U. P. on the rise 
of Arab nationalism lies in the Turkish nationalist character of the Unionists. 
which sharply contrasted/the Islamic colour of the previous era. This structural 
change in the Empire was brought about-in two ways. Despite-all Arab claims 
of major contribution to the C. U. P. 'takeover, 
8 the-fundamental fact remains 
9 
that 'the Young Turk Revolution was a patriotic movement of Muslim Turks'. 
1-. °Both brothers were to become'Arabýnationalists and-leaders-of Baghdadts 
Ahd. 
2. Others were 'Isa at Jamii, 'Abd at Rahmau al Haydiri, Kädim Pasha (of very 
wealthy absentee landholders), Mu1ammad Fail al Däghistäni (Senior military 
Officer), Mulla Najim al Wä'¢ (the Sunni Qa¢i)., 
3. P. 0.371/126993/45315. Personalities - Iraq - Arab Bureau, 1917. 
4. C. 0.696/1. Baghdad Vilyat Admin. Report, 1917, p. 160; C. O. 696/2. Admin. 
Report, 1918, Baqubah, p. 17. 
5. F. O. 882/23/MBS/19/7. Tel. No. 11669. From C. C. Baghdad, dated 29-December 1918. 
6. Infra., pp. 
7. A. Riharf, Around the Coasts of Arabia, (London, 1930), p. 20; Same author, 
Milikk*. al 'Arab, (Beirut, 1924), Vol. 1, p. 57 
8. F. McCullagh, The Fall of Abdul Hamid, (London, 1910), pp. 218-9 
". 9. B. Lewis, The Emergence ..., op. 'cit., p. 208; , 
Also G. Gooch and H, 
Temperley, op. cit., Vol. IV, p. 207. From Lowther to Grey, 
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The Arabs played a small and diminishing -role in the "movement and the regimes 
that grew out of it; Thus Arab participation in the composition'of the ottoman 
Government was to dwindle in comparison to 'Abd al Hamid's. rule. 
What'had seriously aggravatedthe problem was the undisguised Turkish 
nationalist tendencies of the Unionists and their unwise attempt at certain 
measures which provoked the Arabs andaraised: their national suspicions. 
1 
Al ,. 
Masri, 'an"outstanding Arab nationalist, 
2: 
explained how his=hopesýof forming 
an Arab-Turkish Empire resembling the union between'Austria°and,. Hungary3 ! had 
been'shattered bythe narrow, "Pan-Turkish" or "Pan Turanian" and anti-Arab 
ideas favoured by the /8. U. P. 71'. 
4 
'' Toynbee argued, that: I 
'This Chauvinistic Turkish regime /the C. U. P. %%.: produced one 
potentous effect which was the precise opposite of what it had 
intended: It set out to eurkify the whole Empire*s population 
of the Ottoman Empire. In consequence the Ottoman Empire*s 
Arabic-speaking Sunni Muslims subjects eventually became Arab- 
nationalists en masse*. 
5 
Jamal Pasha (a prominent leader of the C. U. P. Minister of the Navy and 
C. in C. in Syria during the War) openly admitted the Turkish nationalist 
inclinations of the C. U. P. and proudly declared to the Arabs: 
'Under the impression of the menace ahead /Turkish national spirit 
had gone to sleep? the Young Turks rose with a zeal beyond praise. 
They took to arms to teach the Turks national spirit and the 
'virtues associated with it. That has been the-. object of, all' 
their endeavours for the last two or three years'. 
6 
Fourthly, the victory of the Unionist and the revival of the constitution 
provided relative liberties to the press, freedom. of thought and expression 
1. For an Arab account of C. U. P. atrocities, sees A. Däghir, Al Thawra al 
*Arabiya (Cairo, 1916), pp. 90-130. 
2. M. Khadduri, *'Az! z 'Al! Al Mi§rr and the Arab Nationalist Movement*, 
St. Anthony's Papers, Np. 17, Middle Eastern Affairs, No. 4, (Londons 1965), 
pp. 140-63. 
3. Such ideas were also current among Turkish nationalist thinkers. In 1918, 
Ziya Gokaip 'The spiritual father of Turkish nationalism' proposed *a 
federation or confederation of two , independent states, Turkish Anatobia 
ahd Arabistan*, U. Heyd, Foundations of Turkish Nationalism (London, 1950), 
p. 131. 
4. P. 0.371/3396/14436. 'Interview with Aziz Ali Bey El Masri', dated 14th 
January 1918. From Arthur Hardinge to James Balfour. 
S. A. Toynbee, 'Aspects of Arab History', op. cit., p. 294. Toynbee draws the 
attention to that 'Pan-Turanianism offered a lever for breaking up the Russian 
Empire' within whose frontiers two-thirds of the Turkish-speaking peoples 
live'. A. Toynbee and K. Kirkwood, Turkey, (London, 1926), p. 57 
6. A. Djemel Pasha, Memories of a Turkish Statesman 1913-1919, (London, 1922), _p. 20( 
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and the establishment of political organizations. Prior to July 1908, 'only 
three papers were published in Iraq. 
I 
It goes without saying that any serious 
treatment of the prevalent conditions was absent from their columns. After 
the constitution and between the years 1908-1914, some 70 new papers were pub- 
lished in Iraq. 
2 
New subjects, hitherto not for public discussion, were to 
be encountered with frankness and seriousness, 'the basic problems of religion 
and nationality, of freedom and loyalty in the modern state, were discussed 
and examined*. 
3 
Some editors provoked the wrath of the Authorities and con- 
sequently their arrest and the closure of their papers. 
4 
It is clear that the C. U. P. had helped to alter the course of.. -.. 
history in the Asiatic part of the 'Arab World'. - By trying to 'turkify' the, 
Empire or, more-accurately, to 'centralise' its administration it set loose 
the separationist or national tendencies. By attempting to bring politics 
from the 'kingdom of heaven' to the world of the masses, it released political 
organisations and trends which it was unable to contain. And by putting reforms 
on the agenda, -it had cultivated hopes which in reality it could not meet. 
5 
If the roots-, of, 'Arab nationalisms were in existence long before the rise to 
Power of the C. U. P., "it is, certain that the growth of Arab nationalism was 
1. al Zawrä' in Baghdad (1896-1917), al Mugl (1885-1918), al Barrah (1889-1914). 
2. al Hassani, Tärikh ..., op. cit., pp. 50-1; G. Kirk, op. cit., p. 
122. 
3. B. tLewis, op. cit.,. p. 208. 
4. For instance: (i) al Tigäd, S. Faidi, Basrah (May to August 1909); (ii) 
Idhär al Uag, (2. Jilmirän, Basrah 
(July to August 1909); (iii) al Ati, 
'Omar Fawzi, a Sunni lawyer, supporter of Täliby Basrah (August 1911- 
December 1912); (iv) al Nahda, Muzähim al Bäjhji, Sunni lawyer, of a rich 
and influential family, a leader of, the National Club Soc. (1912) Baghdad 
(October 1913-closed after 11 issues only); (v) Bs al Nahri n. M. N. al 
Tabak jail, Sunni of an influential Baghdadi family (January 1909-March 1910); (vi) 
al Rag gib, "A. L. Thuniyän, Sunni,, Baghdad (January 1909-closed in late 
1910); (vii) al Dasturp 'A. W. TabtiVai, Shi'i, Basrah (March to September 
1912); (viii) al Rawda, 'A. H. al Uzri, Shiti, Baghdad (August 1910-August 
1911); (ix) al Risäfa, S. al A'raji, Shi'i, Baghdad (March to July 1911); 
(x) Sada Babil, DRoud Stliwah, Christian, Baghdad (November 1909-1914); 
NO Lughat al 'Arab, Instäs al Karmali, Christian, Baghdad (closed in 1914). 
After 1914, all'unofficial papers were closed and all their editors were 
under orders of arrest. 
$" All the previously mentioned factors were'coupled with the ever increasing 
weakness of the Ottoman Empire and the rise of the independence movements 
among its subordinate tnationst. In 1683, the Ottoman Empire reached its 
zenith of power. Since that date, the following countries were to gain 
independence, or to be lost by the Empire: Hungary (1699), Crimea (1784), 
Egypt (1808), Serbia (1878), Rumania (1878), Greece (1882), Bulgaria (1908), 
Bosnia (1908), Tripoli (1912), Albania (1913), etc. 
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encouraged by the, policies carried out by the C. U. P. However, ithis-growth by 
no means. crystallized to the point of demanding complete independence from 
the Ottoman Empire. Apart from the socio-economic conditions, it seems that 
unity of religion (with the Turks), fear of Western intentions, and, military 
impotence were good reasons»for making. Arab nationalists reluctant to break, 
away from the Empire. 
l i4 
The-first attempts at establishing political parties in Iraq (1908-1912) 
were characterized . 
by the, fact' that . they were, virtually extensions, of political 
organizations already in existence . in Turkey itself. 
2.. The C. U. P.., opened its 
first branch at Baghdad in, 1908. But-its membership was basically confined 
to Officials, Army Officers and some Jews. However it gained the support of 
some progressive Iraqis like al RUsäfi and al Zah3wi. 
3 
Its Basrah branch was 
more popular thanks to, Tälib's support which, however, did. not, last, for long. 
The 'conservative' opposition-to the. C. U. P. occurred in 1911 and was centred 
around the Moderate Liberal Party. It-derived its support from, the members 
of the dissolved Mashwara and was led by Mahmoud, the son, ofýaltKayläni. - 
In its early stages the Arab national opposition to the C. U. P. was gathering 
strength around the Freedom and Accord Party who opened its branches in Baghdad 
(1909) and Basrah, (1911)... However. this period of identifying Iraqi political 
organizations. with Turkish ones did not last, for long. Growing disillusionment 
paved the way for the emergence-of Iraqi groups which were attached-to Arab 
organizations. w_, . _... ý_ .. ý ... . 
Prior to 1908 there were several Arab societies, mainly in-'the ILevant, ., r 
advocating some Arab aims. Most of them were led"by Arab Christians. 
4 
1. In this regard the following phenomena might be pointed outs the Jihäd move- 
ment in-support of the Turks U) the departure of Arab officials with the 
retreating Turkish troops(ii3 and the absence of any separationist demand 
in the programmes of Arab nationalist groups. 
(iii), 
(i) Infra, pp" 1°S'S7 
(ii) T. Mushtaq, Awräq Ayämi (Beirut, 1968), p. 19; Qnd. 1060, Review of 
Civil. Administration in Mesopotamia 1914-1920,,. (H. M. S. 0.1920), pp. 1,3,3l. 
(iii) Infra, pp. &S, /. ZA "3 .- 
2. They were the C. U. P.: al Ujizb al Uurr al Mu'tadil (Moderate Liberal Party); 
and Ijizb al Hurriya wa al I'tiläf (the Freedom and Accord Party). 
3. Y.. Izzidien, Al Shi*r al *Irägi al Hadith (Baghdad, 1960), pp. 37-8. 
4. Dr. "A. K. Ghiräiybä, Suriya fi al Q ern al Täsi* *Ahhir (Cairo, 1961), pp. 
215-33. 
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The declaration of the Constitution paved the way for the establishment of, -.. - 
new groups which differed from the old ones in two major points., Firstly, 
they were initiated by, and appealed to, Arab Moslems and secondly they were 
more vigorous in their demands for Arab rights short of independence. Of 
these societies the important ones were: al Ikhä' al 'Arabi al 'Uthmäni (1908; "" 
its founder, Shafig Bey al Mua'yyd, was hanged by the Turks in 1915), al 
Qahtäniyah (1909), al 'Arabiyah al Fatät (the Young Arab, 1910), Hizb al 1ä 
Markaziya al Idäriya al 'Uthmäni, (Ottoman Decentralization Party, Cairo 1912), 
and the totally underground party al *Ahd. 
l 
Only the Decentralization 
Party and al *Ahd are directly relevent to our discussion because of 
yr. Ä - 
their activities In-Iraq. 
The Ottoman Decentralization Party called for an Arab conference to discuss 
the Arab cause and to put forward the Arab demands. The Conference was held 
in Paris during 18th-23rd June 1913 and was the first attempt of that sort. 
Iraq was represented by T awfi9 al Suwaidi and Sulaymän 'Anbir (both were students 
in Paris) and the Conference received, at least, two supporting telegrams from 
Iraq, the first sent from Sayid T älib of Basrah2 and the other from Baghdad. 
3 
Suwaidi points out the existence of three trends within the Conference, 
the reformists who were seeking equality between Turks and Arabs (mainly Arab 
Moslems), the anti-Turks (mainly Arab Christians) and the 'position-seeking' 
1. The demands of these societies varied from greaterrlocal privilege and 
wider local powers, higher proportion of appointments, recognition of the 
Arabic language as an official one to'local autonomy and decentralization. 
Moreover, none of these grouos called, openly or secretly, for independence. 
Mustafa al Shihäbi, op. cit., pp. 68-83. 
2. At Mu'tamir al 'Arabi al Awäl, issued by-the High Committee of the Decentral- 
ization Party (Cairo 1913), p. 6. In addition to his support Tilib declared 
in his telegram that 'the Arab nation, 'in all its countries, should have a 
national existence' and that 'its political and economic rights are supp- 
ressed by the Ottomans*. 
3. It was signed by some Baghdadi men of influence, e. g. 'Abd at Lätif al 
Mudalil, Bahjat Ziynal, Muzähim al Bäjahji, etc:; Tawfig al Suwaldi, 
op. cit., p. 30. 
hkh... I 
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people like 'Abd al Hamid al Zahräwi. 
l 
However, it is evident that the general 
trend of the Conference, although 'ideologically' promoting the Arab nationalist 
cause as never before, showed a persistent and sincere desire to preserve the 
unity of the Empire. 
Iskandir 'Ammoun (a Christian and one of the Decentralization Party's leaders) 
commenced his speech, which was given at the outset of the Conference, by de- 
pouncing any separationist tendencies and argued that: 
'The Arab nation (Umma) wants nothing but a change in the form of 
the Government ... we desire an Ottoman government which is to be 
neither Turkish nor Arab, a government in which all the Ottomans 
would enjoy equal rights and exert equal obligations'. 
Suwaidi's speech emphasized the existence of the Arabs as a nation and the 
desire for reforms and decentralization. 
3 
, 
"Abd al Ghani al tUraysi4 argued 
that in accordance with all theories of Nationalism the Arabs 'do form a nation 
which should have rights of insi ah (nationalism)*. Nevertheless, 'Uraysi 
stressed that 'we do not want separation as long as our rights are respected 
and preserved'. 
5 
In spite of the Conference's modesty in its demands, and despite the C. U. P. *s 
official acknowledgement of the Conference, it failed to'raise the enthusiasm 
of some prominent Arab nationalist leaders. tAziz 'Ali, for instance, opposed 
it on two counts. Firstly, he criticized the holding of the Conference in the 
capital of a foreign power, and secondly, he thought it was untimely to forward 
such demands while the ottomans were at war with the Balkan states. 
6 
Sharif 
Hussein of Mecca, from a different standpoint, sent a telegram to the Turkish 
authorities condemning the Conference and accusing its members of treason and 
'rendering services to the foreigners'. 
7 
1. Ibid., pp. 26-31. Such a view is confirmed by Shakib Arsalän"s Sirra Dhätiya 
(Autobiography), (Beirut 1969), pp. 109-110. Zahräwi paid a high price to 
prove his dedication to the Arab Cause. He was hanged in 1915 by the Turks. 
2. Al Mu'tamir al 'Arabi al Awal, op. cit., pp. 103-4 
3. T. al Suwaidi, op. cit., p. 29 
4. He was hanged by the Turks in 1916. 
5. Al Mu'tamir al 'Arabi al Awal, op. cit., pp. 42-50 
6. Ahmed Shafrg Pashas Mudhkeräti fi Nusif Qarn, Vol. 3, (Cairo), p. 82. 
7. Al Suwaidi, o_p. cit., p. 25 
hk. ý 
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The Conference was concluded by. an;, agreement with, a representative 
of the Ottoman Government in which the following demands were to be-fulfilled; 
the official language in Arabic countries should gradually become Arab,,. the 
language-of Education in Arabic areas should bes, in, Arabic, all senior officials, 
except the Walls, should be familiar with the Arabic language and be locally 
appointed; in principle there should be at least three Arab ministers-in-the 
Cabinet, five Arab Walfis and ten Arab Mutasarrifs. 
l 
The Decentralization Party who-organized the Conference, 
, 
had influenced, 
politically and ideologically, the emerging nationalist movement in Iraq which 
was represented, in embryonic form, in the National Club of Baghdad and the 
Reformist Society of Gasrah. Both had adopted the political-programme of the 
Decentralization Party and were in constant contact with its leadership in 
2 
Egypt. 
The Decentralization Party was formed in Egypt in 1912-1913 by some of the 
Syrian intellectuals who, although differing in ideological motives and political 
inclinations, were in agreement on two major points, the unity of the Ottoman 
Empire and the necessity of a decentralized administration in which the Arabs 
would be provided with full rights. The political programme of the Party, 
included : articles which reveal the 
tendencies of its aspirations:.. 
'Article I ... Every one of its vilayets (the ottoman State) is 
an inseparable part of the Sultanate which is itself indivisible 
under all circumstances. But the local administration of every 
vilayet will be on the basis of decentralization ... 
. 
Article IV. In the capital of every vilayet, there will, -be organ- 
ized a General Assembly, an Administrative Council, a Council on 
Education and a-Council on Awqaf. 
-Article XIV. -Every vilayet will have two official languages, 
Turkish and the local language of its inhabitants. 
Article, XV. Education in every vilayet will be in the language 
of. the. inhabitants of that vilayet'. 3 
In a book published. in 1907, Rafi4 al *Azm (President, of, the D. P. ) 
4 
argued 
1. S. Faidi, op. cit., pp. 129-30. Compare this with the administration's ethnic 
structure under A. T. Wilson's era. Infra, pp. 
2. S. Faidi, op. cit., pp. 98,116; M. al Bagir, OP. Cit., pp. 37-41 
3. al Manär,. Vol. 16, Pt. 3, Cairo March 8th 1913, pp. 229-231 cited by Zein, 
op. cit., pp. 97-8. 
4. The leading'Committee of the O. D. P. consisted of al *Azm, 'Ammoun (deputy 
president, äagi al *Azm (secretary), Mubib al Din al IChatib (deputy secretary) 
Rid;, Shumail and Jridini (members). 
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that the bonds of nationalism and homeland were more important than that of 
religion. 
' 
He asserted that religious differences among the Arabs should not' 
2 handicap the growth of Arab nationalism. Nevertheless, "Azm advocated an 
'Islamic League' to defend Moslems' rights against the Christian nations of 
the West. 
3 
He believed that the Caliphate should be entrusted with the Turks' 
and warned against transferring it to the Arabs. 
4 
The views of Rashid Rida 
and al *Ahd6 were not very different in that respect. Arab or Iraqi 
'independence' was not therefore then envisaged by Arab nationalists as 
an urgent aim. 
The Arab 'nationalist' opposition to the policies of the C. U. P. was rep- 
resented by several organisations which varied according to the different 
conditions surrounding them (i. e. the geographical position, the social structure, 
and the allowed degree of political opinion). ' These conditions were inevitably 
to be reflected in the political programme of each organisation. 
Mosul: Arab national consciousness was neither profound nor active. Faidi, 
in attempting to explain the weakness of the Arab nationalist movement in Mosul, 
pointed out the strength of the religious (Islamic) tendency which constituted 
an obstacle to the growth of Arab nationalism.? This may be a true statement 
but invites question since it tries to explain the feebleness of nationalism 
by reference to the religious strength, a fact which in itself needs an explan- 
ation. It is very interesting to note the shifting roles (in regard to Arab 
nationalism) of Basrah and Mosul, according to the changing historical circum- 
stances (of Turkish domination and British occupation). While one finds that 
1. R. al 'Azm, Al Jämi'ah al Islämiya wa Awrupa, (Cairo, 1907), p. 4. 
2. Ibid., p. 50 
3. "' Ibid. ,` pp. 8-9 
4. A. Säigh, Al Häshimiyun wa al Thawra al *Arabiya al Ku bra, (Beirut, 1966), p. 49 
5. Supra, `pp. `1/3_ 
S, 
6. Infra, pp. 111.3. 
7. S. 'Faidi, op. cit., p. 121 
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Basrah was virtually the main centre of 'Arab nationalist activities' during 
the Turkish era, especially after 1910, Mosul, on the other hand, was, relatively. 
speaking, much less affected by the natiönalist trend. However, during the 
British occupation, Mosul was to become an important focus of discontent and 
of Arab nationalist activities, while Basrah was to relinquish its pioneering 
role of being the 'vanguard' of Arab nationalism in Iraq. The following factors 
might cast a light on the nature of the Arab nationalist movement in Mosul (its 
weakness, strength and social structure): 
(a) the geographical proximity of Mosul to Turkey with its obvious implications 
and consequences was an element in suppressing the development of an Arab nation- 
alist movement in Mosul during the Turkish era. By contrast, that very same 
reason played a role in accelerating the growth of such a movement during the 
British rule (coupled with the remoteness of Mosul from the centre of British 
power and military strength); 
(b) the ethnic composition of the Mosul Wilyat was by no means as Arab as that 
of Basrah or Baghdad. Out of a population of just less than half a million, 
the Arabs comprised little over one third of it. 
1 
It has been argued that other 
ethnic groups were resolutely against Arab domination. 
2 However, one-should 
point out that the Arab population of Mosul was not dispersed over the Wilyat 
but rather concentrated in the city of Mosul and its suburban towns and villages; 
this factor accounted for the rise of an interesting form of political conscious. 
ness. A sharp awareness of Arabism was modified by an Islamic outlook. The 
first to stress the subjective entity and the second to accommodate the non- 
Arab moslems of the area. Being surrounded by a large non-Moslem community, the 
Arab Moslems found an assurance in adopting an 'Islamic Arabism', resenting 
Western influence and looking towards Syria and even Turkey. 
1. C. 0.696/3. Mosul Administration Report 1920, p. 25. According to Lieut-Col. 
L. P. Nadler,. P. O. of Mosul, the population was composed of: 
170,663 Arabs 241,655 non-Arab races 
179,820 Kurds 232,578 non-Kurdish races 
321,893 Moslems 90,506 non Moslems 
2. P. 0.371/4147/146/144; quoting the P. O. of Mosul (then Colonel Leachman); 
'l, All classes of Christian are now firmly in favour of direct British control. 
2. Yazidis of Sinjar... formally demanded that no Muslim should be given a 
government post in the area. 
3. Kurds ... are strongly anti-Arab'. 
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(c) "attentions should be drawn to a sociö-historical' fact which differentiated 
Mosul from the'rest of Iraq. " The Turkish" centralization policy which necessitated 
the destruction ' of 'tribal federations , 
''the abolition' of family 'rule and the ' liquid- 
ation'of 'feudal estäte*"in'Iraq took place'(ii an effective'way) during Fand 'after 
the 'days `of -Midhat Pasha ' (1869-1872). I Hawever, Mosul "represented an" exceptional 
case -inAregard'to that historical process. ''The destruction of Mosul*s family 
rule and its subjugation to the Turkish'central-aüthöritq'took place in a much 
earlier'phase "änd'with"decisive and positive 'results"'Thewe althy family"of al 
Jalili ruled"Mös6l'from`-1730 after gaining'the`Ottöman' consent because of"their 
active role `in defending Mosul against the invasion of Nadir Shah, of Persia 
(1726)1 `Al Jalili"lost popularity be°cause-of their economic exploitation and 
monopoly2 - and 'a 'populär uprising'°led by °the-"al ''Umara famdily'öusted, them' in z 
1826. `Nevertheless; " al'Jalilis were'reinstated'in Mosul thanks to direct Ottoman 
intervention. 3 H&iever, in 1828, Qässim""al`fUmari' led'a' new and `successful up- 
rising; ""he'`exiled Yahyä`al Jalili'to Aleppo and appointed himself as W ali of 
Mosul with the täcit''approval of the then powerless Ottomans. 
4 In 1830, Yahya 
al Jalili, 'aided'by Sheikh Safouk^of Shammar"Jarba'and'encouraged'by Ibrähim 
Pasha of Egypt (then in control of Syria) `invaded Mosul 
and re-established 
his authority. 
5 
This was`a'"turning point in the history of Mosul. The-Turks, 
although -originally 'in favour 'ofai were moved by their fear of the 
Egyptian "menace to oust the'Jälili rule once "and for all, and by 1833 Mosul' 
was totally under Turkish control. 
6 It` was the'Egyptian threät which had, `to 
' 'large "extent, motivated-the Turks into liquidäting the° family rule in Mosul, 
to impose conscription (for the first time in the history of`Ottoman'-Iraq) and 
7 
y presence. to establish a"strong`militar 
1. S. al Säiygh, Tärikh ., op. cit., pp. 274-5,282-8. 
2. Dr. *Abd"al *Aziz S. Nawär, Däoud. Pasha Wäli of Baghdäd. 1817-1831,. (Cairo, 
1968), p. 147. Originally an M. A.: thesis 1956 to 'Ain Shims, Univ. U. A. R. 
3. 'Abbäs al tAzäwi, Tärikh al 'Iraq biyn Ihtilläliyn, Vol. 6, (Baghdad 1955), p. 299 
4. Ibid. 
5. Dr. 'Abd al 'Aziz S. Näwar, Tärikh ..., op. cit., pp. 83-4. 
6. 'Abbäs al "Azäwi, Tärikh ..., op. citi Vo1.7, (Baghdad, 1956), '"p. 26 
7. Dr. Nawär, *Tärikh ..., op. cit., pp. 85-6, 
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-; 'Thus the absence of politically powerful families had deprived the nation- 
a list. movement. in Mosul of a paternal leader who was almost,. in those given 
historical-conditions,, a necessity for the development. of, any political organ- 
ization) On the other hand, this same factor had contributed. largely, towards 
the radical nature (social and, political) of the movement in Mosul.; -. Whereas 
the-leadership-of-the national, movement in, Basrah was dominated"by wealthy ele- 
mentsýand+that, of Baghdad, by persons=of the upper middle class, - ,, 
the leadership of the national, movement in Mosul was made up of individuals of 
the lower"middle-class, of humble-origin and-even sometimes from an. impoverished 
social ý, background; 
(d) -the.. socio-economic, structure of Mosul, and.. its political. implications: 
Without going into much detail, there are some important remarks which are of 
direct. concern to the Arab, national movement. in Iraq: ý-}V-ý:,.. 
Ci) It has been stated that Mosul has been for a long time a centre and commercial 
station for°Mosu1*s and Iraq's trade directed to the north (Turkey), and the west 
2 
Thus, it is understandable that the, commercial (Syria,. Aleppo and Damascus). 
classes of Mosul had a special-interest. in preserving political links with 
Turkey aid Syria.. Even'when Iraqi-trade generally, including that of Mosul', was 
shifting away from the Middle East markets to those of Europe and the British 
Empire (from 1884), "the, Turkish and Syrian markets continued to be major consumers 
of the Mosul trade. 
3r":: 
This economic factor might explain the radical shift in ,, 
the political-attitude of Mosul*s politicians from one of, submissiveness. toward: 
the-Turks to one of, violent resistance . to 
the British. This same factor casts 
a light-on the political shift, in the attitude ; of some small merchants4from ,. 
being outside the national movement during the Turkish era to assuming an active 
role in it during the British period. 
1., al Kayläni of Baghdad patronized the 'conservative' opposition, al Suwaidi 
backed the emerging nationalist movement and al Nagib of Basrah was the 
guardian of the political movement in his area. 
2. Dr. Muhammad S. Hassan, op. cit., p. 89. 
3. ' Ibid., p. 131. 
4. Some small' merchants were to join the nationalist movement (A1-'Ahd) in 
Mosul after the British occupation, (e. g. Ibrähim +Atär'Bishi, Mustafa al 
Jalili, Mubammad Amin al *Umari, 'Abdullah al''Umari). All of them came 
from very wealthy families but were not themselves wealthy. 
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(ii) Land system in Mosul: The suspension of land 
registration which occurred in 1880 and 1882 did not include Mosul and the 
northern parts of Iraq. 
' 
Thus theme system went on unhindered. 'Even- 
tually t_apu land in Mosul was to represent the highest proportion in all 
of Iraq. 
2, 
The injustices which accompanied the 'distribution' of land according 
to that system have already been pointed out. 
3 
However, it seems that Mosul 
stood out as a sharp example of such unfairness. 
4 The economic and political 
implication of such conditions necessitated the complete dependence of land 
holders on the government to tprotects their 'property' in the face of the 
fellähin anger. Unlike Basrah, 
5 
the landholders of Mosul derived their domin- 
ation over the land from the sheer force of the government and'its will. 
Consequently, the land holders of Mosul were in no position to practice any 
opposition to the ruling authority. The Political Officer of Mosul wrote 
in 1919: 
*I have little doubt that the poorer classes appreciate our 
administration ... With the city magnates, landowners and intellect- 
uals the case is not so clear. These classes didntt as a rule 
feel the hardship of Turkish Administration, but on the contrary 6 
were able in various direct and indirect means to benefit from it. ' 
Faidi, who visited Mosul in August 1913 on an assignment from Sayid Tä1ib 
to contact the Arab nationalists in order to harmonize action, referred to the 
limited number of those who worked for the cause. According to Faidi the Arab 
nationalists among the offers of the Turkish army stationed in Mosul were Yäsin 
al Häshimi (Chief of Staff), Mawlud Mukhlis, 'Ali Jawdat and 'Abd Allah al Dulalmi. 
Among the civilians, Faidi found Said ]Väji Thäbit, Ibrähim 'Atar Bashi (both 
were merchants of medium financial capacity), Haji Ayub 'Abd al Wahid (shopman) 
and Daoud Jalabi (medical. doctor). Faidi claims that out of those people, and 
1. Supra, p. 27, footnote 2. 
2. B. Dowson,. op. cit., p. 11. 
3. Supra, pp. 24-6 
4. G. Bell wrote '... a peasant would be offered for his land 25 per cent of' 
its value, and on his refusal to sell, he would be cast into prison on a 
trumped up charge of murder ... unless he changed his mind'. Cmd. 1061, oe. 
cit., p. 54. 
5. Infra, p. '1 a"$ 6- 
6. C. O. 696/2. Admin. Reports, Mosul, 1919, p. 7 
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others recruited°by them, 
' he was able, to form a secret society working--for-the 
Arab=nationalist cause. 
2 
However, this society was--inactive and. vanished; shortly 
after, its establishment. 
3: 
Nevertheless, 'in , 1914. and , just before the, World, War_ 
some Arab civilians formed anew society which-they called the: Secret Flag 
Society ('Alam). 4 Its, 
1leading committee. was composed of Thäbit-'Abd. al Nur 
(President, 
ran educated. Christian who joined, the-Hijaz, rebellion, afterwards), 
Maki Sharbatiw(succeeded. al, 
_Nur-in-the 
Presidency), Muhammad, Rau'f al Ghulami 
(a distinguished man-of letters) and-Rau'f. al; Shahwäni (a student who became, a 
military officer. -afterwards). 
5s. 
±The Flag Society existed up to May. 1919, whenit 
merged with alitAhd. 
6, 
During the War itýwasrin'contact with Hijaz and--secretly 
7 
'. . - 
active in agitating the Arab population and soldiers-against thesTurks.? 
The Arab oppositioneto: the C. U. P. in-; Baghdad took,. in-its embryonic form, 
the position, of demanding equality-for Arabs and Turks-rather than; claiming , 
decentralization or separation. - Furthermore, such an opposition assumed itself 
as part of the Turkish,. political structure rather than being an external force. 
Thus aýgroup=of young intellectuals8 were gathered around Bayn al Nahrain (Meso- 
Potamia) newspaper-(first., published"6th. December, 1909)fto. express their desire 
for reforms,, progress and Arab rights. They formed-Baghdad's branch of Hizb 
al Hurriya"wa al I'tiläf (Party of Freedom and Accord)which, was in reality, a 
Turkish party opposing the C. U. P. 's, policies and in. sympathy with Arab demands.. 
ý; -.. 
1. Among other names which Faidi mentioned are Maki Sharbati, "Abd., Allah Bash 
*Alim, Muhammad Räu'f al Ghulämi, etc. 
2. Fai¢i, op. cit",. pp. 121-4 
3. M. T. al 'Umara, op. cit., Vol. 3, p. 45 
4. Mu'arrikh Olistorian)('Abdral Mun'aim al Ghulämi), Safahät Matwiya min 
Tärikh al Haraka al Qewmiya, $ada al Ahrar Newspaper, No. 158* Series 4,,. 
Mosul 9th May 1952. 
5. It is interesting to observe that all of them were-from a humble social;. 
background. - 
6. 'A. Ghulämi, op. cit., No. 179, Series 25, Mosu1,10th October 1952. 
7. Ibid., No. 163, Series 9* 13th June 1952 
8. Among those young intellectuals there were Mahmud Nadim al Tabagjali, 
Kämil_al Tabagjali (both belong to a well-known family and'were journalists), 
Ibrahim Salih Shukir, Ibrahim Hulmi al 'Umar, Hamdi al Bäjahji. 
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for equality. 
1 
This-group of-young Baghdadi intellectuals was-backed by Yusif 
2t]. Suwaidi and was in-close contact with-Sayid<Tä1ib-of Basrahi who-- sponsored 
the establishment . of the. 
Basrah branch . of , 
the, same: party and who, rendered con- 
s iderable financial support and protection to the-Baghdadi group. 
2 
ý, :,, 
Howeverjýthe mounting disillusionment withýTurkish politics eventually 
convinced some, of the'young Arabs to: relinquish their ties. _with 
Turkish pol-" 
itical parties and to step up their national demands for decentralization in- 
Stead 
_ of . mere equality. 
Thus -a new "societytwasformed cin . 
late 1912. under the., 
hame. of the National Club. Society which was of. a more radical and'daring Arab 
nationalist nature... -This new. society. was also backed by Yusif al. Suwaidi and 
T lib Pasha and it was soon-linked-to-the Reform Society of: Basrah (formed by 
T1 ib Pasha on. the 28th February, 1913). In fact, the two societies of Basrah 
and Baghdad had adopted the programme; of the Ottoman; Decentralization Party and 
became disguised branches of that Party. 
3 
Among the active members of the National Club were the finest intellectuals 
Of Baghdad, at the time, some of whomýcameºfrom humble-families and others, from 
very wealthy origins but, were not by, necessity representing their families' 
Political outlook. It is interesting . to note, that,, theactive membership of; 
this Society contained some of the young Shi'i and a large=number, of Officers 
serving in the Turkish armed forces.: Among this Society9s active members were: 
Muzähim al Bäjahji, newly graduated lawyer,,. belonging to a very wealthy family, 
Sunni, President of the Society and editor of. al Nahda; Hamdi al Bäjahji, i 
Lecturer -at the College of Law; " Ibrähim Näji,. an, educated Sunni with a degree 
in Law; Ibrahim Hulmi al *Umar, a famous man of letters, SunniT Bahjat. Zaynal, 
student at the Law College, Sunni; Sheikh. Muhammad B: gir-al Shabibi,. 'One of the 
1" This Party was formed by a certain ýädig Bey'(Brigadier in the Turkish Army 
and former leader of the C. U. P. ) and other ex-members of the C. U. P. who 
were alarmed at the tyrannical behaviour of the Unionists. This party was 
strengthened when Hussein Hulmi Pasha and Mahmud Mukhtär pasha (former 
Turkish Prime Ministers) had joined its ranks. The party was very appealing 
to the Arab politicians who feared the fanatic Unionists. However this 
party did not last for long'and was suppressed by the C. U. P. 
2. Fat i, op. cit., pp. 82,98,116. 
3. M. al Basir, op. cit., pp. 37". 41 
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most enlightened Shi*i of Iraq*. man of letters; Sheikh Muliammad R i4; al Shabibi, 
a very well educated Shi'i from Najaf, man of letters, poet and political writer; 
Razug Ghanäm Chtistian Arab from Baghdad, editor of a newspaper; Mubdir al 
Fir*un, an educated tribal Sheikh of al Fatla of the Middle Euphrates. Tahsin 
al 'Askari; 'Abd al Hamid al Shälji; Yusif 'Iz al Din; tAbd al Latif 'al Falähi, 
Mahmud Aäib, Mahmud Batqubah; all of them were Sunni police officers serving in 
Baghdad. 
Yusif al Suwaidi, the head of the influential family, was the guiding spirit 
behind the nationalist movement in Baghdad. Suwaidi was born in 1854 in Baghdad 
where he received some education in Arabic and Religious studies which enabled 
him to become a judge during the Turkish days. He was described in a British 
official report dated in 1917, as: 
I... Ashraf al Ashraf. Second only to the Naqib in Baghdad. 
Descended from the Abbasid Khalif. A staunch member of the 
Arab National Party... His known connection with the liberal 
party (Freedom and Accord) made him an object of suspicion 
of the C. U. P. '. 
l 
When the pro-C. U. P. prime minister, Mahmud Shawkat Pasha, was assassinated 
in June 1913 without a conspicuous motive, the Unionists seized the opportunity 
to put an end to the opposition and to tighten their grip on the Empire. Among 
several others, Suwaldi was imprisoned. However, in September 1913, after his 
release, Suwaidi was elected, in defiance of the Unionists, as a member of the 
Dulaim constituency to the first General Council of Baghdad Wilyat, a Council 
which was predominantly anti-Unionist. In August 1914, Suwaidi's son Thäbit 
(Qäiymagäm in the Turkish Administration) was murdered on the orders of the 
Unionists because of his declared opposition to the massacre of the Armenians 
at Diyär Bakr. 2 In 1915, Suwaidi was re-arrested and brought before the Aley 
Tribunal by order of Jamal Pasha. He was exiled and'only allowed to return 
after the Armistice. 
The career of Sayid Tälib Päsha al Naqib of Basrah in Iraqi politics and 
the history of the nationalist movement during the years 1908-14 was a dis- 
tinguished one. What is more interesting is that Basrah and not Baghdad, Najaf 
1. F. O. 371/126993/45315 dated 26th June 1917 
2. Ibid 
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or Mosul, was, largely. the centre of the rising national movement. -The man and 
the town were organically, linked, and a product. of. certain historical conditions 
prevailing, at that time., _ 
Basrah was geographically; at the extreme end of. the-waning Ottoman, Empire 
ne ighbouring. two Arab Sheikhdoms (Muhammarah and Kuwait) which were under 
Britishiprotectiontgiving their Sheikhs a. certain status , and, privileges. hitherto 
not enjoyed by-them. The; British established their., consulate. and first post- 
office in Mu1}ammarah. in 
18902 and subsequently,, after the. discovery of oil and 
the formation 
; of , 
the 
. 
Anglo-Persian Oil Company, .. the British declared 
their, 
_ 
Protection over Muhammarah in 1909.2 In 1899, the, British-signed, a. treaty with 
Sheikh Mubärak which, established their influence over,. Kuwait and, enhanced the 
Privileged position , of, 
the Sheikh., The hands of, the Turks were tied, and event- 
U ally. they had, to,. recognize the situation in 1913.3 The Ottomans were bound 
under the circumstances to exert special caution in their dealing with Basrah 
so as not to provoke a British reactio9 in an area so vital to. their interests. 
4 
Furthermore, it is beyond doubt that SayidTälib_was provided with_political 
a support from Khaz*alp, Sheikh of Muhammarah, and_Mubarak, Sheikh and financial5 
of Kuwait. In fact the British made their position implicitly clear when their 
gunboat 'Alert' arrived in Basrah on the 4th May 1913vjust when the Turks were 
trying to put an end to the alarming rise of Tälibts prestige. 
6 
The, socio-economic structure of Basrah was another factor in deciding the 
distinct political role or tendency of Basrah (the Arab nationalist or perhaps 
the pro-British). The town was essentially 
,a 
commercial port and the centre 
of the greatest palm garden in the world. 
7 
Thus trade in, general and date 
1. T. Wilson, The. P ersian Gulf, (Oxford 1Q28), p. 266 
2. Persian Gulf, Handbook prepared under-the direction, of"the Historical 
Section of the F. O: i No. 76, H. M. S. O. (London 1920), p. 57 
3. Ibid, p. 54 
4. F. 0.882/13/MES/15/11, Memorandum 'The Arab Movement and-its possible =` Y 
future', Autumn 1915. 
S. F. 0.882/25/AB/17. History of Sayyid Talib and his family, dated 30th 
August 1916. 
6. Ireland, op. cit., pp. 233-4. 
_ 
73 
7.. M. H. Jamal, Sliset al 'Iraq al Tijariya, (Cairo, 1949), p. 51. 
r s. `ý 
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cultivation and export in particular were of"major effect. Basrah*s trade was 
characterized by three basic features: its yearly growth in, volume; its 
mounting dependence on the British markets; and the increasing volume of date 
ß` export. All those features were in evidence"during- the Ottoman period but 
assumed wider' proportions during the British era. 
Dates were the major item'in Iraq's export. In'1912-1913 they represented 
18 per cent, but during 1916-'1920, 'dates formed some 51 per'c'ent of the total 
Iraqi export. 'In 1883, Basrah'exported 11,603 tons of"dates, of which°10,364 
tons were assigned to'the United Kingdom. In 1919-1920 date exports amounted 
to 152,000 tons, most of which were also shipped to Britain. 
2 During 1918, 
8 asrah's'-exports'totalled 222 Lacs of'Rupees, of which 140 Lacs were the value- 
of dates älone. 'It is important to observe that 229,675 cwts. of""dates were" 
exported to the British' empire, while only 3,261'cwts. were the share of 
Other countries. 
3 '1 ., ý 
Under sucht "conditions itu was not surprising that Basrah', under Turkish 
rule, 'took unquestioned lead in the'Arab Movement'. However Basrah was to 
4 
abandon its 'leadership*, once 1t'came under British rule'. * Basrah*s 'land=owning 
and commercial classes ... feel that British 
rule'alone will help'them'. 
5 
During 
the British era 'the merchants and people of Basrah itself have groan rich, 
their trade is prospering' .6 In political terms this meant that the 
"Sherifian 
Politics' ceased to be appealing7, and'in what was reported by PercyCox 'In 
$ Gasrah 
... I found no enthusiasm for the idea'of a national'government'. 
The political and social dominance of the weäithy families of Basrah was 
a special characteristic. The same was not evident in other parts of'Iraq. ''' 
This again could be attributed to the very nature of social relationship existing 
1. M. S. Hassan, op. cit., p. 118. 
2. Ibid. l, pp. 130-1,176. ' 
Y y.. rr' rn 
3. C. 0.696/2. Admin. Reports 19189Basräh+Custöms Report for the year"ending 
31st December 1918. - 
4. S. H. Longrigg, Iraqi., op. cit., p. 45 
S. CO. 696/2. Adman Report; Basrah 1919, p. 25 
6. F. O. 371/5231/B. 13471. No. 12986,26th October 1920. 
7. C. O. 696/2. Admin. Report, Basrah 1919, pp. 25-69 59. 
8. F. O. 371/5231/E. 13471. No. 12986,26th October 1920. 
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in' ar'eas'where' dates trade-was dominant. -The- large` number of date' cultivators, 
the , difficulty' in storing them and, their decoinposing"n'atüre"were all"factors in 
'weakening the-small producers'"-position-vis 
ä-vis the wealthy traders and the 
'landholders:, '., The ' latter' group's' position'was' further enhanced" by being the " 
only available body who'could provide`the`cultivators'with'the large c'apit'al 
needed-in date production: Furtherinore; "the`Iragiýmerchants"monopolized"the' 
World"date"märket`by"'supplying-it with two-thirds"to*four-fifths of'its tötäl' 
Volume., Thus the economic'süpremacy of Bäsrahlls'merchants and landholders 
had reflected itself-ln'a recognized political and-social position which was,, 
unlike otherýparts'of Iraq, 'rarely. challenged'from-below. 
`-It was'unddr! such'favourable' historicalT'conditions that'the'sort of leader- 
-ship represented by Sayid Tälib was to"emerge: 
i 
'However' the objective circum- 
"stances had- helped, the rise of-Tälib to`"leadership; ' the man had put'his `own 
personality into'such a leadership: v Tälib"came from the al Nacjib family Of 
'8asrah whotclaimedto. be descendants of the'great'Moslem 'saint' Sayid Ahmed'" 
al Rifa'i - (Sunni).. - In °I840; -"the gal Nagib family acquired "great wealth' when 
Sayid Rajab (Tälib's father) ''managed by bribery and other means to get-various 
lands held by him as Mulhaka Wagf"registered by the tabu' Department as Ia private 
Property of himself and his `brother `Ahme'd' .2 Hamdi 
, Pasha, an exceptionally" 
honest Wali, caught wind of this transaction: and began moving to prevent the 
fraud. He also tried to put an end to the gun-running trade which was conducted 
Jointly by al Nagib and Sheikh of Kuwait. In 1899, -Tälib, scored his first 
Success by persuading Constantinople'tö dismiss Hamdi Päsha from his'job: " In 
1900, "T31ib secured the, support of Sheikh Khaza*, 1 of, Muhammarah by ordering, two 
Of his men to murder Abd Allah'Effendi Räwanduzi, -a Kurdish lawyer living in 
Basrahwho informed the Government about the illegality of Khaza'l's ownership 
of certain, date gardens in Basrah. 'Frightened by this demonstration. the 
1. See: Haifa A. A1-Nakib, A Critical Study of Saiyyid Talib Pasha Al-Nakib 
In-the Setting of His Times and Environment, On the Basis of Arabic and 
Foreign Documents (M. Phil Thesis, Leeds University, 1973). 
2. F. O. 882/25/A. B/17. 'History of Sayyid Talib and his family*. 
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Turkish authorities gave way and allowed the properties to be registered in 
Shaikh Khaza'l's name'. 
1 
In 1902 Tä1ib, assisted by the powerful support of 
the Wali and,. the. two Sheikhs, was appointed. Mutagarrif of Ahsä' but was soon 
dismissed because of his 'administrative misconduct'. 
2 An official, report des- 
cribed Tälib as ',... a regular bullyv, levying blackmail on all the rich, plunder- 
ing anyone who refused to serve him by means of professional robbers (blackguards) 
Whom he kept in his house'. 3 On the-other hand the. generosity of T31ib towards 
the poor, his supporters and the, politically victimized was 'proverbial'. 
In 1909 Tä1ib started his active political career by joining the C. U. P. in 
8asrah, cherishing the hope of ; 
becoming its recognized leader. . 
But the C. U. P.; 
 
arrested Tälib*s ambitions, and aimed at giving only an appearance of political 
Parer to the city Arabs, while reserving all. the real power for the, Walis. He 
Was elected as a deputy. In. Constantinople, after his disillusionment with the 
C. U. P. and his contact with a relatively mature Arab nationalist atmosphere, 
'1 lib deserted the C. U. P. and joined the Moderate liberal party. 
4 In a rather 
daring manner, Tilib sent ay message to Sharifi Hussein of Mecca in early 1911 
complaining about the national suppression inflicted on the Arabs by the Turks. 
Ne urged the Sharif to rise up and promised him full support. 
5 
The letter was, 
accompaniedýby, 
_a signed 
document on behalf of all (? )6 Arab deputies recognizing 
Hussein as the, Amir of Mecca=and proclaiming him as the sole religious Sultah 
(power) over. all Arab countries. 
7 
In July. 1911,.; T lib initiated the first Iraqi branch of the Freedom and 
Accord. Party. A meeting was held at Tälib*s house, in Basrah at which around 
1. Ibid. ' In fact the Turkish Wali recognized Khaza'l's 'rights' in 1910 under 
direct British intervension. 
A. T. Wilson, South West Persia: A Political Officer's Diary 1907-1914, 
(Oxford, 1941), pp. 118-9 
2. al Bagir, op. cit., pp. 39-40 
3. F. O. 882/25/A. B. 17 
4. Ibid. 
5. FaLQi, op. cit., pp. 87-8 
6. The document was not signed by 'all' Arab deputies. Two of the signatories, al 
MuVayyid and al 'Asali (deputies for Damascus) were hanged by, the Turks in 
1916. 
7. Fa idit op. cit., p. 88. A. Daghir, al Thawra al *Arabiya, _(Cairo 
1916), p. 78. 
Daghir claims that the document was sent in 1913. 
h 
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1 100 of its notables attended with a great majority being'members'of the C. U. P. 
The discussion against the C. U. P. centred on two major points, its anti-Arab 
Policies and its tendencies towards imposing a dictatorial order. ` The dis- 
cussion was concluded by deciding to form the new party on an autonomous basis 
(not organically linked to the headquarters at Constantinople) and"to send a 
collective resignation to the C. U. P. An administrative'committee was elected 
with T lib as its president and containing the most wealthy families of Basrah, 
al 'Abd al Wähid, Bäsh tAyän, al Na*mah, al $äna*, al Mindii, al Salmän. The 
declared aims of this Party were the eqüality`of -Arabs and-Turks, 'the need for 
reforms in'the Empire and a demand to end the 'oppressive policies. The aim of 
independence-or even that of decentralization was never"mentioned. ` In fact the 
official ceremony of opening the branch on the 6th August was formally attended 
by the'Wali'and other important officials. The Party published its daily al 
Bastur (the Constitution) which was edited by 'Abd al Wahäb'al Tabtabä'i and 
financed by Mahmud "Abd al Walid (the former was a young lawyer and the latter 
a wealthy merchant and landholder). 
At the beginning of 1912, Tilib, while visiting Egypt, met Lord Kitchener 
and then went up to Simla with letters of'introduction from Mr. Crow, the British 
Consul at Basrah, and saw Lord Hardinge. It appears that these meetings gave 
Tälib the impression that the British were prepared to assist his plans. 
1 
--In February 1913 Tä1ib stepped up his opposition to the Turks by forming 
the Basrah Reformist Society which was identical to the Decentralization Party 
of Cairo and*the National Club of Baghdad. 
2 The new'society adopted3 a programme 
composed of-28 articles in which it explicitly recognized the sovereignty of the 
Ottoman Empire over Iraq, but demanded that the Walis should be Iraqis and that 
the official language of the State should be Arabic. 
4 
During the same year, 
Tälib collected an enormous number of signatures on a petition sent to 
1. F. 0.882/25/A. B. 17 
2. Faidi, op. cit., p. 130; al Basir, op. cit., pp. 19,40. 
3. The new leadership of the Society remained the same as the Freedom and 
Accord Party. 
4. F. 0.192/2451 Despatch No. 51,28th August 1913. Cited by Zien, op. cit., 
p. 104. 
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Constantinople demanding urgent reforms to satisfy Arab national aspirations. 
fiurthermore he arranged a meeting with the two Sheikhs of Muhammarah and 
Kuwait to discuss the possibility of a confederation comprising the two 
Sheikhdoms and Basrah. 
1 
The Turks reacted to such attempts by dispatching a certain Farid Bey as 
Military commandant to Basrah with the task of stemming Tälib's increasing 
power. They took the further precaution of transferring the senior Arab officers 
(Rashid Kogha, Yisin al Hishimi and tAbd al Latif äl Fallähi) to positions out- 
side Iraqi territory. It appears that Farld Bey was planning the assassination 
Or arrest of Tälib with the aid of 'Ajami of Muntafig, whose tribesmen had 
Started to penetrate Basrah in large numbers. Tälib*s position became exceed- 
ingly precarious but he was not to be intimidated. By choosing offence 
aS the best means of defence, Tälib's adherents, on June 19th, assassinated the 
Commandant and mortally wounded the Mutasarrif of Muntafic, who was accompanying 
Farad Bey. 
After this assassination, Tä1ib seemed to have reached the zenith of his 
Power. The Turks were left with no option but to recognize TälibPs position 
and to satisfy his ambitions in the hope of containing his extreme demands. 
Ttlib, on the other hand, being more interested in his personal power than his 
declared programme of reforms, was to welcome the Turkish endeavour to endorse 
his privileged position. Thus in January 1914 after a period of negotiations 
with the Turks, Tälib issued a manifesto declaring that he and the Government 
'had agreed to co-ordinate their efforts as if they were one soul and one body*, 
that all differences were removed between them and that he would in future do 
all that lay in his power to promote Ottoman unity. 
2 
In May 1914 Talat (Minister 
Of Interior) informed the British Ambassador that T31ib was to be made W ali 
of Basrah. 
3 
1. M. 'A. 9. al Najär, Al Tärikh al Siyäsi li Imaret 'Arabistän, (Cairo, 1970), 
pp. 140-5. 
2. Amin Said, al Thawra al 'Arabiya al Kubra, (Cairo, 1935), Vol. 1, p. 24. 
3. F. O. 882/25/A. B. 17 
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It is"outside the scope of-this research to giveýa detailed evaluation of 
theFhistorical''significance of Tälib's struggle. However , "it, should be pointed 
°ut that 'the. man was motivated more' by burning ambition than ' idealistic 'vision. 
His' realaim was =not -an independent Iraq or Arab unity so much as the formation 
confederation or ý alliance of semi-independent Arab''rulers and Amirs 
consisting-of'the Shaikhs of MUhammarah and Kuwait,, Sayid Talib as Amir'of Basrah, 
Ibn Saud, °Ibn Rashid, the Sharif of Mecca, Imam Yahya and'Siyid Idris. There was 
to-be no'democracy about the affair at all. Each ruler was'to be autocratic in 
his 
own'sphere, -butýmatters of common interest and presumably foreign affairs of 
the, Confederation'would be settled by the autocratic rulers in council'. 
1 
In a way T lib was a separatist striving for regional power. Nevertheless, 
in attempting to do so, he had objectively rendered a great*seivice to the emer- 
gence of Arab nationalism. By putting forward Arab national demands,. by defying 
and discrediting the Turkish rule and by offering protection, 'financial`and, - , 
D Olitical support for the Arab nationalists, he had paved the way for the rise 
of the Arab national-movement. However, since. T lib was excessively-individual- 
istic and self-centred, he had, transformed this movement into a personal adventure, 
hot a mature political trend. Thus when the War broke out, the Arab nationalists 
were taken by surprise and were unable either to capture the opportunity or to 
rovide a programme for political action or demands. 
The ? separationist* tendency, of T31ib, was by no means restricted to or 
Invented by him. It was, virtually, an inclination prevailing among the dominant 
Class of merchants and landholders whose very economic interests made them pro- 
British and even separationists. It is interesting to observe that in mid-1921, 
when an Iraqi provisional government had been established and-it was clear that 
the British were preparing Iraq to become an '. independent' and united political 
entity, Basrah's influential families were very apprehensive. A petition signed 
by 
over 4,500 names was presented by an 'influential group of merchants and land-' 
Owners* to the British Authorities demanding that. *Basrah-should constitute ,a 
i" P. O. 882/13/MIS/15/11. 'The Arab Movement and its possible future*. Also, -, ' Hans Kohn, A 
-History 
of Nationalism in the East, (London 1929), p. 279 
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Special lpolitical'entity' and'preserve 'its special links with the British, '- 
although aknowledgingaone king for all of Iraq. 
l-'A 
counter-petition signed 
by theArab nationalists and demanding, complete unity with the rest of Iraq ý> 
wasrable to gather only"1,000`si, gnat üres. 
2 On'the 13th April 1921, Sir Percy 
Cox telegraphed the Foreign Office informing them of-such demands which were . -~ 
Presented to him'by Ahmed $ana* Pasha (a wealthy merchants supporter of Tälib 
3 afld then' Minister-of Commerce). It was thanks 'to SirýPercy{Cox*s opposition 
that 4such , an attempt was to die `in -its cradle. In fact, Ta1ib himself' openly 
Suggested to`Captain Clayton that 'it might benecessary to separate Basrah 
From Baghdad 'and Mosul*': 4 
The Decline of Arab Nationalist Activities inside Iraq 1914-1918 
When'the War brokýout, Arab nationalists were caught-by surprise: {+oýThey 
Were to face a choice ofOeither supporting the Ententenor siding with the Porte. 
The Hashimites decided to back Britain'on certain conditions. " Another group of 
Arab nationalists, of Islamic reformist tendencies, relativelyýsmall'but-influen- 
tial, 'apprehended°the peril, connected with an Anglo-French occupation, and 
decided to back Turkey. 
5 
1" F. 0.371/6352/9842 
Z" Ibid.,, 
- 
F. 0.371/6350/4953 
4. Sir A. T. Wilson. Papers, British Museum,. Serial No. 52457, Vol. III. 
Memorandum from Capt. I. N. Clayton, dated 22nd August 1920 to A. T. Wilson 
on an interview with, TllibPasha. -. 
Clayton went on to explain Tälib*s 
attitude, 'This may be intended merely to show his loyalty to us being 
prepared to go to any lengths to remain with us, or it may be prompted by 
some uncertainty as to his influence in the two northern Vilayets, and a 
desire to secure for, himself at least Basrah*. 
5" For instance, Shakib Arsalän (1869-1946). A writer and active politician. 
Friend of *Abduh -':. ; and Ridi. Believed in a combination, of Arab nationalism, 
and Islamism. He argued that Arab independence was his life-long dream but 
the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire would bring about the subjugation 
of the Arabs-by France and Britain.. See his Limadha Ta*kher al Musimun 
wa Tagadam Ghiyrahum, (Cairo, 3rd ed.. 1939), pp. 78-95. Also, Sirrah 
Dhättiyah, (Beirut, 1969), pp. 69-70,110-111. Also MuIammad Kur i (d. 1953) 
Writer, historian and Islamic reformer. Defended the Arabs against the Turks 
and demanded their independence. 'During, the war sided with the Turks and 
his daily al Sharaq was to publish the secret text of the Sykes-Picot 
agreement, (Damascus, 20th November 1917). See his Mudhekerät, vol. l, 
(Damascus, 1948),, pp. 117 and after;. 
{ also. 
J. D.,, ah Alusi, Muhammad Kurd Ali, 
(Baghdad, 1966), pp. 13,41, '52,56-9,92-4' 
hh, 
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However, the majority of--Arab nationalists were'confused and unable to" 
a ssume.. a blunt attitude. In short: for Arab nationalists to eliminate this 
alternative or the other was an open question, the outcome of which could have 
been decided by the 'persuasive' ability of. either side (Turkishror=British). 
The general: reaction of.. the Iraqi public' towards the British "invasion, ", in 
its early days, was-. one of apprehension and resentment. Tihäd was called by 
Moslem. 'Ulemä', Arab officials deserted their posts and retreated'with the 
regressing. Turks, and, Arab officers maintained§theirloyaltyý to their'Turkish 
seniors. Nevertheless, before, -. two years had elapsed, cracks were; to appear in 
the Turco-Arab. bloc.;. The'defeats at the front, 'the-Turks' chauvinist policy, 
the_spread. of_famine and=anti-War-feelings, the hanging'of-Arab nationalists in 
Syria, the Hijaz uprising, "the Najaf and Karbalä' risings'and`the massacre of 
Hillah were all elements in dispelling the illusions of Turco-Arab solidarity 
and factors which encouraged the nationalists to approach the British. 
1 
The British responses to Arab nationalists' attempts were different. In 
11ijaz and Syria, British policy, after 1916, was friendly and encouraging. 
2 
In contrast to that, the British, in Iraq, ignored any aid which might have 
been rendered to them by the Iraqi nationalists. In Lawrence's words: 
'Unfortunately Britain was bursting then with confidence in an 
easy and early victory: - the smashing of Turkey was called a 
promenade. So the Indian Government was adverse to any pledges 
to the Arab nationalists ... '. 
3 
Such a different, British attitude was another factor in deepening the 
"' division in the Arab nationalist-movement. - Those nationalists'who were in 
Syria and Hijaz were bound to assume a line favourable to Britain. 'Those in " 
Iraq were suspicious of Britain's intentions. sThe, British attitude in Iraq 
Was, 
-furthermore, responsible 
for the decline of-the-nationalist movement during 
1914-191-8. 
1. Brig-General'F. J. Moberley, 'The Campaign in Mesopotamia 1914-1918, (London, 
1923-1926), Vol. 1`, p. 133. 
2.. E. Monroe, Britain*s Moment in the Middle East 1914-1956, (London, 1965), 
p. 27. Her quotation of Sykes' Papers, Sledmore No. 10 Kitchenerts letter 
to Hussein, November 1914. 
3. T. E. Lawrence, Seven, Pillars of Widdom, (Middlesex, 1963), p. 58 
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The qualities of Sayid Tälib'made him the'can candidate par excellence-for*the 
aE r' '-ý leadership of an Arab pro-British uprising. " In-'October 1914, "Tälib`made'advances 
to the British, through the Sheikh of Muhämmarah, 4 and he offered'in`return for 
recognition as local chief, to initiate an: Aräb revolt 'against the Turks' in 
8asrah. l The British considered Tälib*s'conditions'as an 'exaggerated demand*2 
and on, the 24th October 1914 the Government'of India instructed its Political 
Resident in the Persian Gulf (then Sir Percy Cox) to 'advise TMlib that in case 
°f war flaring up between Britain and Turkey, he -; Iib7 should remain in Basrah 
and co-ordinate action with Ibn Sa*ud'arid the Sheikhs of Kuwait and Muhammarah 
in. safeguarding British interests in Basrah. 
3 
In return for this, the telegram 
% went on,, the British will, grant him, the following privileges: 
ke 
. *1. That his date gardens should be immune from taxation. 
. 
2. That, we would protect him against reprisals by the Turks. 
3. That we would maintain all hereditar privileges of 
himself and the Naqib /his father_7. *4 
Whatever T lib's conditions were for his services `to the British, it is 
evident that even his minimum demands were rejected'by the Government of India 
Which, in its reply, totally ignored his political requests. However, "Tälib, 
being too ambitious to be tempted by the British lack of 'generosity', alarmed 
by the persistent pressing of Anwar's *invitationst"to'Constantinople and 
being confused as to the outcome of the hostilities, 'decided to solve his 
burning dilemma by opting out of it altogether. " Thus he'left'for Kuwait andý`- 
the British victoriously entered Basrah. Tälib wrote'to Cox (then Chief' Political 
Officer 'in the Indian Expeditionary' Force) offering his surrender and requesting 
his own exile to India. On the 19th January'1915, Tälib left Barrah for Bombay. 
The early British declarations to the"Iragis, ''in contrast to General 
1. Cmd. 1061, Review of the Civil Administration ... ' op. cit., p. 2. There is 
an exaggerated version of Ta1ib's conditions in Pach 's book, op. cit., 
pp. 188-190, in which it is claimed that T lib demanded the non-occupation 
of Basrah by British troops and the acceptance of Iraq as an independent 
State. H. Al-Nakib, op. cit., pp. 69-70, accepts Faidi's version. 
2. F. 0.882/25/17, August 30,1916 
3. F. 0.371/2144/75511, Telegram from S. of I. G. in the Foreign and political 
Department, Simla. 
4. Ibid. Also, Qnd. 1061, op. cit., p. 2. 
k6- 
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? iavde*s proclamation to theýBaghdadis, which. was. given in different historical 
-Conditions (19th March. 1917), had completely. avoided making, any-political 
promises or giving any indications as to their-future political-destiny.,; The 
early_, declarationsdid not go, beyond generalities; of the following sort:.,, - 
,. - 
$..., The British Government has, no quarrel. with the-Arab inhab- 
itants on the river bank; and so long as they show themselves 
friendly, and do not harbour. Turkish troops or go about armed they 
have nothing to fear and neither they nor their property will be 
molested'. 1 _ -, 
-1 - 
'- 
'In conclusion you-, are; at, full, liberty to, pursue. your--vocations. 
as normal and your business as beforel. 2 
HOWever, the Viceroy of India was more particular in his speech given to the 
8r itish Community at Basrah, in which he stated: 
... and in the settlement that must come after this great war, 
your may rest assured that steps will be-taken-to protect you 
and your interests*. 3 
However, the victorious march did not go on unchecked. The winter of 1915 
116 witnessed two grim military setbacks for British troops. British Divisions, 
during the last week of December 1915 and the first fortnight of the new year, 
had to evacuate Gallipoli (Galibolu) Peninsula (which dominated the Dardanelles) 
and dribbled into Egypt. Such an evacuation was to General Maxwell (Commander 
British Forces in Egypt) a renewal of the threat to Egypt and the Suez Canal. 
the Iraqi front, the British troops, after a rash advance to Ctesiphon (Salmän 
1'ak)ýmet with harsh Turkish resistance which obliged them to retreat to Kut and 
get,. entrenched in-it. That. was the start of the Kut muddle in which the British 
*ere faced with an Iron-like-military siege by Khalil Pasha and his troops. From 
becember to April all British endeavours to break the siege failed. Consequently 
General Townshend's resistance faded away, and on the 29th April 1916 he un- 
Conditionally surrendered himself and his 13,309 men". 
* 4 
i" F. 0.371/5153/3540, British Proclamations in Iraq, No. 4, Signed by P. Cox, 
Resident, Persian Gulf, dated 5th November 1914.. 
2. Ibid. No. 5. Signed by P. Cox, dated 22nd November 1914. 
3. Ibid. No. -6. Speech of H. E. the Viceroy of India, dated 6th February 1915. 
4. ° On the Kut siege, see the works of A. J. Barker, C. H. Barber, E. Candler, 
W. Robertson, C. V. B. Townshend, listed in, the bibliography. 
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Britain was no longer =bursting with confidence'. 
' 
The direction of the 
War at that time was justifying a more liberal and convincing approach toward 
the Arabs. McMahon, after a prolonged discussion, concluded his correspondence 
With Hussein, on the 30th January 1916, committing Britain to serious 'concessions' 
to meet Arab demands. The War Office sent Lawrence to Basrah, in March 1916, 
, on what was described as 9 ... a mission that must rank as one of the strangest 
in British military history'; 
2 that is, to offer an amount of one million 
Pounds (it was raised to 2 millions) as a bribe to Khalil Pasha, Lawrence was 
also to investigate in Basrah the potentialities of an Arab movement. 
3 
The 
Iraqi nationalists were ready for such an approach. They were outraged at the 
Mass hangings at Beirut and Damascus and the atrocities at Uillah, and were 
much encouraged by the successful uprisings of Najaf and Karbalä'. In short, 
and according to Lawrence, *the conditions were ideal for an Arab Movement*, 
4 
In fact, a very important meeting, comprising the notables of the town, 
Was held in the Nagib*s house at Baghdad, in late 1915, to discuss the situation. 
A significant resolution was adopted. tAbd al Latif Thuniyän proposed to send 
a message of support to the British, offering them help. All those attending5 
agreed to such a proposal, including Yus'ff al Suwa-idi. Paradoxically, the 
sole dissenting voice was that of 'Abd al Rahman al Nagib (al Kayläni), who 
argued that he had served the Turks too long to turn against them. 
6 Further- 
more, it had been suggested that al Nagib was suspected of having given infor- 
oration of the meeting to the Ottoman Authorities. 
7 
1. David Lloyd George, War Memoires, 6 Vols. (London 1933-1936), Vol. 1, p. 529. 
By the end of 1916 the War position was so alarming that Sir 
William 
Robertson (Field-Marshall, Chief of Imperial General Staff, 1915-1919) 
reported to Lloyd George that 'At present time we are practically committing 
suicide*. Ibid., Vol. II, p. 1037. 
2. P. Knightly and C. Simpson, The Secret Lives of Lawrence of Arabia, 
(London, 1969), p. 45. 
3. Ibid., pp. 45-9. 
4. T. E. Lawrence, op. cit., p. 59. 
5. Musa Kädem al Bäjahji, Jamil Zäda 'Abd al Rahman, Yusif'Suwaidi, Yusif 
Bäjahji, 'Abd al Rahman al Nagib, 'Abd al Latif Thuniyän, Rashid al Hashimi. 
6. F. 0.371/2771/125694; also F. O. 371/4150/5394; also P. 0.371/126993/45315 
7. P. 0.371/126993/45315. Such a 'suggestion' is not evident. However, shortly 
after the meeting, the Turks attempted to arrest Thuniyan and al Häshimi 
but they escaped. Suwaidi was arrested, tried and sentenced to eath, but 
on the intervention of Mubammad Pä411 Pasha al Däghistäni, Suwaldi's life 
was saved, but he was exiled to Anätolia. 
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However,, Lawrence's first inglorious, task failed, due to the integrity 
of Khalil Pasha.., His second charge misfired because his efforts-were let 
down by the *ignorance'1 of the British Officials, in Iraq who, foiled, his, 
authorized plans, 'the India Government was adverse to any pledge to the 
Arab nationalists'. 
2 
According to Faidi, it seems, that Lawrence,. during his, stay in Basrah, 
met him twice on the 7th April 1916, to discuss the conditions of the Arab 
movement in Iraq. 
3 
Lawrence's argument was based on the assumption that if 
the Iraqi Arabs rebelled against the Turks, Britain would guarantee them 
freedom and independence. He argued that neither the British Government nor 
the British public had any imperialistic designs toward Iraq. Lawrence, so 
... a',. e .- 
I' 
.. ". fi . i. yea , 
claims Faidi, offered him all available assistance and resources if he would 
accept the leadership of the proposed insurrection. Faith confided to Lawrence 
that if he was to accept the leadership, a certain social background was 
essential which hei he rather humbly confessed, did not possess. Faidi's 
other negative motive was, so he asserts, his profound suspicion of Britain*s 
secret ambitions, coupled with his affirmed belief that no alliance should 
. 
be concluded with the British at the expense of the Turks, no matter how deep., 
the conflict between Arab national aspiration'and Turkish short-sighted 
oppression. 
4 
Had the British been genuinely serious about inflaming an Arab rising 
then it seems that the most probable champion for such an insurrection would 
have been Sayid Talib, rather than 'jackals' like Faldi or Ahmed Pasha al Sän'a. 
It appears that Tälib's exile and his burning ambitions had broken his political 
pride. On'the 15th August 1916, Tälib raised a rather humiliating petition to 
Lord Chelmsford (Viceroy of India) offering his services. He apologized for 
his unhelpful attitude during the early days of the War, and attributed his 
1. Knighty and Simpson, op. cit., p. 50; also Lawrence, op. cit., pp. 58-60. 
2. Lawrence, op. cit., pp. 58-60. 
3. S. Faidi, op. cit., pp. 206-266. 
4. Lawrence's curiosity was mainly directed toward al 'Ahd and men like Yäsin 
al Häshimi, Aziz'1Ali and Rashid Ri¢ä (the most reluctant Arab nationalists 
to cooperate with the British). 
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decision 'to respect for the treaty concluded between the Turks and himself. 
However, *this treaty-had been 'terminated by the Turks who charged him with 
high treason (a1 Mug allam Newspaper, Cairo, 12.7.1916, p. 5, para. 3). Tä1ib 
Concluded his letter byýsaying: 
*I shall most willingly place myself at the disposal of the 
British Government and render 'it all assistance I can ... Now 
I am not only a friend but an ally willing to place myselfl 
and my resources for any service in the cause of Britain'. 
Simla'-telegraphed'Bäsrah'informing them of Tälib's offer. 
2 The authorities 
in Basrah were, apparently, not interested and the application was'transferred 
to Cairo. 
3 
The High`Commissioner'in Egypt replied to Simla''Services of Sayid 
T alib cannot it is, regretted'be usefully employed'. 
4 
'' M Furthermore, in early '1917, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff. ' 
impressed by'Arab military` successes near the Egyptian front', telegraphed 
General Maude (Lieut-General, 'Commander 'of British force in Mesopotamia'from 
August 1916 to 11th March 1918) suggesting the deployment of the Arab military 
effort to the Euphrates lines to pressurise the Turks. 
s'"Maude opposed such a 
Proposal; and argued that if the Arabs were allowed tobe armed one day ''they 
Were quite likely to-take up arms against us the'next*. 
6 
He was'clearly' 
convinced that the Arabs, if armed 'will always represent potential dangers'. 
7 
All these successive-attitudes were neither accidental nor`the product 
Of mere 'ignorance', but, by and large, a part'of policy carried out by the 
Indian authorities who had arranged-the campaign militarily and politically. 
However, it is rather . 
important to point out that such a scheme was not identi- 
cal with intended British policy. 
$ It is sufficient to mention the harsh over- 
1. P. 0.371/2783/220355 dated 15th August 1916. 
2. Ibid., same file; from S. to the G. of'I. in, the F. & P. Dept. 'Sim1a` 
to the P. R. in the P. G. Basrah. Dated 24th August 1916. l 
3. Ibid., Also, Faidi, op. cit., p. 217. Lawrence told Faidi that the 
Authorities prefer Sayid T%lib not to`return. 
4. F. 0.371/2783/220355, dated 11th September 1916. 
S. F. J. Moberley, op. cit.,, Vo1. IV, p. 21., _,. 
b. Ibid., p. 10 
7. Ibid., p. 11. 
8. It was only on the 18th July 1916 that the W. O. assumed complete control 
of the Mesopotamia Campaign. D. Lloyd George, War ..., op. cit., Vol. II, 
p. 806 
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a 11 account of Britain's Prime Minister toward the conduct of the Mesopotamian` 
campaign. Lloyd George wrote: 
'The fact revealed by this Commission's report' casts a baleful 
light upon the mismanagement, stupidity, criminal neglect and 
amazing incompetence of the military authorities who were 
responsible for the organization of the expedition'. 2 
Such a British attitude in Iraq 
3 
was to participate in the suppression 
°f the nationalist movement. 
4 
The fledgling Iraqi nationalist movement was 
seriously weakened by several blows during the period 1914-1918. The Turks, 
in their turn, were by no means confident of the Iraqi Arabs. 
5 
They embarked 
on a series of repressive political measures directed against the active 
Iraqi nationalists. 
6 
Any movement, especially in its early stages, had a 
3Pecial need for leadership; with the exile of Tälib and al Suwaidi and the 
fragmentation of young nationalists, such a leadership was virtually eliminated. 
Furthermore, the war which had engulfed Iraq with uncertainty, agony, martial 
law and dual repression, was another factor behind the absence of a unified 
nationalist programme or action inside Iraq during the years 1914-1918. 
Such a situation nourished a rather inaccurate impression among British 
administrators. They believed that the Iraqis were satisfied with British 
rule, and that all the disturbances which occurred afterwards were the respons- 
ibility of the English Press, the Anglo-French declaration, Wilson's fourteen 
Points. 7 Such an account, although not altogether unjustified, tends to ignore 
1. See Cmd. 8610, 'Report of the Commission appointed by Act of Parliament 
to enquire into the operations of War in Mesopotamia, together with a 
separate report by Commander J. Wedgwood, DSO, MP, and Appendices. 
(H. M. S. O. 1917). 
2. David Lloyd George, War Memoires, op. cit., Vo1. II, p. 808. 
3*. P. Graires, The Life of Sir Percy Cox, (London, 1941), p. 193. 
4. The Jeportation of Tälib and Nuri al Said, the suppression of the Press 
and the news of theHijaz movement and the decline to allow Iraqi officers 
to stay in Iraq 1914-1918 or to return to Iraq 1918-1920. 
5. Moberley, op. cit., Vol.!, Appendix VI, Summary of a pamphllet by the ottoman 
Staff Bimbashi; Muhammad Amin, The Turco-British Campaign in Mesopotamia 
and Our Mistakes, pp. 352-355. 
6. For instance the following Iraqi nationalists were under orders for arrest: 
al Uzri, al Dujiyli, Shukir, Thuniyän, al Bäjahji, al 'Omar, al Tabagjali, 
al A"raji, Siliwh, al Karmali and al Häshimi. Some of them escaped to 
Basrah and others were actually arrested. 
7. B. Thomas, op. cit., p. 68. 
hh, 
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the above-mentioned factors. It also ignores the fact that British Administration 
C lid not extend into the Shi"ah. towns (Karbalä' and Najaf). and the areas of the 
Middle Euphrates, until after 1918. Furthermore, it underestimates the amount 
of 'national' resentment which the Iraqis had shown'towards alien rule (e. g. 
the Jihad movement 1914-1916, 'the mass desertion of Iraqi administrators, the 
Najaf disturbances, 1919, which were anti-British activities, the Najaf, Karbala' 
and Hillah uprisings of 1916, which were anti-Turk activities). It also'turns 
a blind eye to the activities of the nationalist Iraqi officers abroad (Hijaz 
and Syria). 
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CHAPTERIV 
THE POLITICAL ACTIVITIES OF THE SHI'AH IN IRAQ 
Once the writer became acquainted with the recent work of Dr. Nafeesi, 
l 
this 
part could be cut short. However, the important role played by Iraqi 
sh i'ah both Mujtahids and intellectuals raises at least two questions. The 
intensive Shi'i involvement in the Iraqi independence movement and the un- 
parallel Shi'i-Sunni unity of 1919-1921 demand an explanation. In this chapter 
the writer will attempt to trace the historical roots which originated such a 
process. As to the actual involvement and unity they will be examined in due 
Course. 2 
(a) The Political essence of the Shi*i faith and tradition: Apart from certain 
religious rituals and beliefs, the basic doctrine in Shi'i thought is the belief 
in the Imamate. It is around this doctrine that the dividing line centres be- 
tween the Shi*ah'and other Moslem sects. 
3 
The Shi*ah are of the opinion that 
the Imamate have been a religious necessity and should have been confined to 
*Ali and his sons from Fätima. 
This very doctrine reveals the political essence of the Shi'i faith. In 
the background of the Shi*i mentality the barrier between politics and religion 
does not exist. Hourani wrote: 
'... Shi'ism ... began as a political movement in the seventh and 
eighth centuries ... The Shiites believe that only Mohammed and 
his 
successors, the Imam, had the infallible per of interpreting the 
word of God aright and guiding the community; obedience to the 
Imam was the root of virtue ... 9.4 
It was an organic part of their faith to refuse and resist any Su1t n Jä*r 
(despot ruler). Most of the Caliphs were considered as usurpers. This in- 
flicted upon the Shi*ah a ceaseless repression and persecution. By virtue of 
that their political awareness was to be sharpened and their ranks were more 
1. A; p. Nafeesi, The Role of the Shi*ah in the Political Development of Modern 
Iraq (1914-1921 , Ph. D. thesis (Cambridge University, 1972). 
2. Infra, pp. 3IS-111- 
3. M. H. K. al Chit; ', Agl al Shi*ah wa Aügwlih al, 9th ed., (Beirut, u. d. ), pp. 
107-113. 
4. A. Hourani, 'Arabic Culture*, The Atlantic Monthly, October, 1956, p. 126 
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solid and united. The Shi'i faith was also to assume a militant, perhaps 
r adicalq character. And by virtue of that they were to represent the grievances 
and hopes of the underprivileged Moslems. 
' 
In short, they represented a per- 
manent and a professional opposition to the ruling Moslems. On the other hand 
the Shi'ah developed the concept of Taqiya (religious dissimulation) which allowed 
them to dispensate 'from the requirements of religion under compulsion or threat 
of injury*. 
Within the framework of such a faith, history, and tradition, the evasion 
of politics was an improbability. Furthermore there were other factors which 
decided the profound and effective involvement of the Shi'i mujtahid in politics 
namely, al Ijtihäd and his financial and status dependence'on the public will. 
A good Moslem is supposed to adhere to the teachings of, the Qurin and 
the Sunnah. If these fail him, then he is to follow I ma' and I tihäd. 
3 
With the lapse of time and growing complications-. of life, the importance 
of al I'tý ihäd increased with the need for solutions to the new problems 
Facing Moslems in. a changing world. For a variety of reasons, the Sunni 
'U1emä' decided to stop al I tihäd. The Shi*ah continued to depend on 
it as their major religious instructor. 
£. .. i 
The outcome was to enhance the position of the mu tahids by allowing 
them to ' continue' ruling the conduct of their followers: It was argued that: 
'In Shitite Islam there are still absolute Mujtahids. This is 
because they are regarded as the spokesmen of the Hidden Imam. 
4 
l" M. J. Maghniya, Al Shi*ah wa al Häkimun, (Beirut, 1961), p. 21. 
ý 
2" Al Nafeesi', op. cit., p. 35 
3" Al Ijmj$, is the consensus of the Moslem "uiemä', in a certain era, on a 
unified rule hulas of a religious or legal case Qa4iya. Al I tihäd is the 
interpretation the 'ulemä' of a certain religious order in the Quran 
and its implication on a case unmentioned in the Qurän or al Sunnah. The 
four forms of I tihäd weres according to their religious power: al i äs 
al Istihsän, al Istislah and al Istishäh. 
4. In time, the Shi'ah were divided into several schools or sects. The Iraqi 
Shi*ah belonged to al Ja'feriya or al Ithna *Ashiriya. They believe in the 
12 Imams, the descendant of 'Ali, the last of those, Imams was, supposed to have gone underground, in fear of the Abbasid Caliph, and has not yet 
appeared. So there is no other imam after him and with the awaited Mahdi (the Hidden Imam), the Shi*ah believe that they will acquire political power 
and a promised era of justice and freedom will emerge too. 
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'This position is thus quite different from that of the''ulema' 
among Sunnites'. 1 
This very fact gave the Shi'i Mujtahids a very influential position. 
1 °r instance, tobacco and smoking were not mentioned in the 
Qu rän. Thus the Shi'ah were not prohibited from smoking. In 1890, Näsir al 
Shah of Persia, gave the tobacco monopoly to a British company. This 
c Oncession raised a great protest in Persia and the 'ulemä' started to inter- 
ýene. B. G. Browne described the development of the problem: 
'At the beginning of December 1891, a letter arrived from the 
mujtahid of Samarra, Hajji Mirza Hasan of Shiraz, enjoining on 
the people the complete abandonment of tobacco until the concession 
should be repealed ... Suddenly, with perfect accord ... all the 
tobacco merchants have closed their shops, all the galya'ns (water 
pipes) have been'put aside, and°no one smokes any longer; neither 
in the city or in the Shah's entourage, or even in the women's 
apartments. What discipline, what obedience, when it is a question 
of submission to the councils or rather the orders of any influential 
mulla or of a mujtahid of some celebrity". 2 
Similar fetwas were to prove of vital importance to the rise of the Iraqi, 
independence 
movement. °, I -- 
Another factor contributed to'the, influential position of the Shi'ah .- 
III ! Qt ahid, namely, the profound interaction between him and his followers. An 
interaction 
whrch manifested itself in terms of deciding the mu tahid's religious 
pos it ion and finance. 
The importance, of a Shi*i mu tahid° and his promotion was mainly decided 
by the size of his followers and derived from the extent of his fame. To be- 
Come a mujtahid one'had to stay at Najaf studying at the hands of a great 
mu tahid for any period up to 25-years. -If he proved himself through his pious 
'sture, solitude, behaviour and religious understanding then he was awarded the 
Jäza ft al ijtihäd or certificate in I tihäd, which provided him with the 
Capability of giving the Fetwa. 
3 
The Encyclopaedia of Islam (London,, 1913), Vol. II, pp. 248-9. Also Vol. IV 
pp. 350-358. 
2" B. G. Browne, The Persian Revolution of 1905-1909, (Cambridge, 1910), p. 51 
3" Others who 'did not reach this high position mainly by failing the exam were 
called Mulla or Mu'min (believer), or Muttadaiyn (Opious man) or Mugalid (imitator)., Those men were fit to receive charity and to settle minor Shara' 
cases, but not to decide ukum. Some others became Wakil (agent) or Mu'tamdd (representative). Those represented the mujtahid and acted on their behal . C. O. 696/1. Administration Reports, Na a and d Shamiyah, 1918, p. 105 
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To become a senior mujtahid of a recognised status,, -the mujtahid has to 
gather round himself learned men and to send them out to various parts of the 
world to preach his fame. His influence gathers in volume like a snowball, 
until, finally, he is recognised by universal acclamation as one of the great 
mujtahids. 
1 
The highest stratumin(the Shi'ah religious hierarchy is the chief mujtahid. 
This position is again not gained by appointment or certificate (as the Sunnis) 
but rather by sheer popularity and prestige. It is worth mentioning here that 
some of the mujtahids have gained part of their prestige through involvement in 
politics by supporting the popular case. 
2 Also by not opposing the people's 
habits or feelings even when their own convictions ran counter to those feelings 
3 
A study of the financial resources of the Shi*ah clergy and institutions 
will not fail to indicate how heavily they were dependent on popular donations 
rather than official contribution. The major official resource came from the 
Persian government who considered itself as the protector of the Shi'i faith. 
The Ottoman contribution was very humble indeed. 
4 
The third official channel 
was from India through the Oudh Bequest. 
5 
The bulk of the Shi"i finance came from popular donations represented in 
Zakat, Hag Jiddi, Radd Madalem, Haq al Wagiya, Nithur and countless numbers of 
gifts, charities and pilgrims. 
6 
This indicates that Shi'i mujtahids were, 
1. Ibid. 
2. Ibid., pp. 67-68,106-7 
3. Dr. 'Ali al Wardi, Dirasa fi Tabi'at al Mujtama' al 'Irägi, (Baghdad, 1965), 
p,. 230 
4. Ibid., pp. 129-30. 
5. Infra, pp. /04'. S. 
6. Zakät is a religious duty to pay one-tenth of the profit to the 'ulemä' for 
its distribution to the poor. Hag Jiddi (right of my grandfather) formed 
one-fifth of the profit and paid to the Sayids (descendants of Mu(iammad). 
One-third of any inheritance was to be paid to the mujtahids (Hag al Wa§iya). 
Those who were paid by the government were expected to pay a portion of 
that income to the mujtahids (Radd Ma¢alem). This could be explained by 
the Shi'i belief that the government gained its money by illegal methods. 
Also it indicated that working for the government was religiously illegal 
( arräm). It was estimated that no less than 120,000 pilgrims have 
poured into Najaf and Karbala' at every important occasion,. 
T. Lyell, The Ins and Outs of Mesopotamia, (London, 1923), pp. 43-55. 
Also al Wardi, op. cit., pp. 229-30,246-7,252-3. 
1 
61 
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unlike their Sunni. counterparts, largely, dependent on the public.... -;.., 
Judging by this profound interaction between the mujtahids and the Shi! ah 
masses, it is reasonable-then to see how difficult it was for the mujtahids to., 
keep aloof. from. politics, especially when the political, issue in question was 
of. deep, interest to the, wider population. - In such circumstances their inter- 
ference in politics became almost inevitable. They had to face a mounting and 
Persistant pressure, to take sides. over. political issues, and , they,, were, 
quite unable. to, resist such demands. . . 
Wingate the Political Officer of Najaf 
and Shämiyah, wrote:, 
"..., and the. great Mujtahid, -whose 
power is based on popularity, is 
compelled to acquiesce and to put his name to a pronouncement which 
may have serious effects'. 
1 
(b) The historical development of the Shi'i-Sunni relationship: Up to the 
very late 19th Century the Iraqi community was torn by perpetual strife be- 
tween its major-components. The conflict assumed an alarming turn when, in the 
early 16th Century,, the Shah of Persia was converted to the Shi*i faith. Hence 
forward the religious strife was to bear more significance when the two sides 
began to identify themselves with a foreign power, namely Turkey and Persia. 
2 
It goes without saying that conditions of such a character prevented the advent 
of an Iraqi Arab awareness or indeed any consciousness related to national or 
homeland concepts. Nevertheless in 1920, Iraqi Sunnah and Shi*ah were to dis- 
Play an unprecedented and strong unity. 
-. ý_-,. 
1. C. O. 696/. Admin. Reports, 1918, op.. cit. , p. 66... t 
2. Salim I forced the Sunni 'ulemä' of his era to supply him with a., fetwa 
allowing the 'extermination' of the Shi*ah. (i) It was claimed, that upon 
his occupation of Iraq he had slaughtered some 40,000 Shi*i. 
(ii) In 1508, 
Ismati1 al Safawi of Persia occupied Iraq and killed a great number of 
- Sunni notables and destroyed all sacred tombs of Abu Hanifa and al Kiyfani. 
He was received with a 'tremendous welcom 'viýy the Shi'ah. 
(iii) In 1624, 
Shah 'Abbas repeated a similar procedure. 
ý 
In 1638, Muräd IV re- 
occupied Baghdad and poured his revenge upon some 50,000 Persian'änd Iraqi 
Shi*i. (v) 
(i) $. al IJuý ri, op. cit., p. 40 
(ii) E. -Creasy, op. cit., pp. 131-2 
(iii) M. Maghniyah, Duwal al Shi'ah fi al Tärlkh, (Beirut, n. d. ), pp. 127-9 
(iv) *A. al *Azzawi, Tirlkh al *Iräg biyn Ii}tilältn, Vol. 4, (Baghdad, 1949), 
p. 177 
(v) E. Creasy, op. cit., p. 256. 
- 99 -- 
Behind that'there lay ahistorical process. Apart from the socio-economic 
development; - therewere some intellectual changes taking place'and encouraging' 
the growth of such a unity. This was-generated by the rise of the constitutional 
movements' in Turkey-and Persia alike, the growing apprehension of the Western` 
Christian penetration and the'°influence'of the Islamic reformers' ideas. 
It was in August`1906 that "a constitution was proclaimed'in Persia. 
l 
This 
Provoked 'a prolonged struggle in Persia between the constitutionalists and 
their opposers which`was'reflected'in'Iraq'itself. - The'constitutionalists`were 
well aware that'they'stood little chance'of success were they unable to'öbtain 
the influence of 'some' leading mu tahids öf `their'side. ' "µ'Pinaily'they triumphed 
owing-to"the definite commitment'of Akhund Khurassani to'their party*. 
2 
In his 
fetwa; al Khurässäni (the Chief Mujtahid) stated that to defy'the constitution 
was to, defy the regulations of Islam itself. 
3 
. 
He was. *supported in'his fetwa 
by'several other mu tahids'of whom were Shiräzi and al Igfahäni. 
4«' In July 
1909, ` the-anti-constitution'Shah`was ousted5 and replaced by a more sympathetic 
one`. `' The 'constitutionalist" "Ulemäl of Najaf-'supported the-move and held 
.a 
great celebration. 
6 
When the second Ottoman'constitution"was declared, `al'- 
IChurässäni, on behalf of the 'progressive' mu tahids sent a telegram to 'Abd 
? 
al'{iamid demanding the recognition of'the constitution'as a religious' necessity. 
On both occasions al Tazdi declined to'offerJhis support. 
It is worth noticing that here are four new events: the rise of Najaf "to 
its full` height as a storm-centre of'political activities'; the 
emergence of' 
the Shi'ah 'Ulemä' as. a decisive'and crucial instrument"of, political practice 
and agitation; the beginning of two distinct trends among the *Ulemä' themselves, 
1. E. G. Browne, op. cit., pp. 98,132 
2. C. O. 696/1. Admin. Report, 19181, p. 67 
3. M. 'A. Kamäl al Dinp Al T_atw 
vat Fikri ft al *Iräq, 
4. Ibid., p. 24 
" 
5. B. G. Browne, op. cit., pp. 133-70 
6. J. Mahbubah, op. cit., p. 24 
... 
7. M. *A. Kamä1 al Din, op. cit., p. 27 
8.. Infra ý p". 
33 y" 
x. _ .ý 
(Baghdad, 1920), p. 23. 
hh, 
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that is the liberal or progressive in contrast to the conservative school; and 
fourthly, the involvement of the *Ulemä' and their political Fetwas which created 
a radically new atmosphere in the country. The open debates and frank discussions 
in the mosques and schools at Najaf and elsewhere generated a common consciousness 
in Iraq. Gone were the days when absolute and despotic rule was identified with 
Islam and with this political awareness started actively to replace the political 
apathy. 
Furthermore, the constitutionalist movement or al Mashrutiya originated a 
Wide controversy in Iraq. The debate was not confined to the narrow circles of 
the intelligentsia. A wider section of the population showed interest and was 
divided on the issue. 
' 
Iraqi Sunnah were, in their turn, to take sides and 
suffer a split in their ranks. The rise of al Mashrutiyah tended to suppress 
the sectarian conflict by introducing a new dividing line. Iraqi constitution- 
4 lists, both Shi*i and Sunni, were to find a common cause to defend. ' This 
throws a light on the fact that by 1910 the newly formed political groups were 
to transcend the sectarian structure and to include, in their ranks, both ShiIah 
and Sunnah alike. 
2 In Najaf the conflict between supporters of Yazdi (anti- 
Constitution) and those of Khurässäni was at its height. The äimä am was 
then Näji al Suwaidi who was an Arab nationalist and Sunni. 
3 It was significant 
that he was to throw his lot to the constitutionalists' side and render them 
his official assistance. 
4 
In December 1911, Khurässäni died. He was succeeded by the 'conservative' 
41 Yazdi as chief Mujtahid. Between 1912 to 1920 the prominent Mu tahids in 
Iraq were al Shiräzi of Sämarä' (-later moved to Karbalä' ), al Igfahäni of Najaf, 
a1 adr and al Khälisi of Kadimain. 
Sayid Yazdi was described in a British Administration report as being: 
1. 'A. al Wardi, Lamhat Ijtimä"iya min Tärikh at Träg at Hadith, Vol. 3, 
(Baghdad, 1972), pp., 115-27,161-70. 
2" Supra, pp. -7(p. 7 
3. Infra, p. lco, footnote, 3 
4. #A. al W ardi, L. amhät ..., op. cit.,, p. 119 
S. C. O. 696/1. Admin. Reports, Najaf and Shamiyah, 1918, p. 105 
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'He is at heart pro-British and very anti-Turk. 
Since the deposition of Muhamad 'Ali Shah, when verbally, though 
not in writing, he expressed disapprobation of the constitution-"-` 
alists, he has never taken any part in politics, and has even 
ceased entirely to correspond with the. Persian Government. Any 
attempt to make him do this foredoomed to failure. - 
He does not 
even answer requests for advice sent to him by the Persian Govern- 
ment, and undoubtedly, at heart is a hater of the constitutionalist, 
and a staunch royalist. 
His remarks to Colonel-Stokes were characteristic when, on.,,. 
the letter saying that he was in Persia at the time'of the 
constitution, he replied "Yes,. when Persiabegan to. go back". ' -, _ .A 
The other. important mujtahid was Mirza Muhammad Tagi al Shirazi of Samarrä'; 
at the time of-al; Yazdi he was, his sole rival and enjoyed as many, followers as 
at Yazdi,, but his prestige was not equal to that offal Yazdi owing to the fact,.. 
that the, latter was, a Sayid. -But , however, a1 Yazdi would not give-a decision, 
against that of a, man like al Shiräzi: 
2 Shiräzi was aniaged man, and, -prior 
"to 1918, _he 
did not-take an-active part in politics.... But, he did not-hes- 
itate on several occasions-to make his political stand. very clear., He was- 
Considered 'progressive' and, a, strong supporter of the constitutionalist move- 
ment in Persia and, Turkey. µ After 1918, encouraged by the nationalists and his 
son, he came openly into active politics and was a major factor in, the rise of 
the anti-British movement, especially after becoming dhief>mujtahid. This will 
be left to the coming chapters. 
The second most important mujtahid in Najaf"and. the fourth. in the Shi'ahrs 
world was Sheikh al Shari'a, al-Isfahini. He took an active part. in the Jihad. 
declared, against the British when they invaded Iraq, but came to good-terms with 
them afterwards. A strong constitutionalist supporter, he had early contacts 
With the British through . being one . of the Oudh. - Bequest distributors. 
3. 
He became chief mujtahid just in the midst of the uprising and played an 
impartant role in these-events. 
Fear of Western penetration was another factor in narrowing the gap between 
the Iraqi Shi'ah and, Sunnah. The first indication was shown by the elder Shiräzi 
1. Ibid. -- 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid. 
kh, 
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and other Mujtahids" protest against the tobacco concession. 
' 
By that the 
Nujtahids were risking the, hitherto much needed, Persian Government's support. 
In late 1911, Khurässäni called for a Jihäd against the Russian invasion of 
Persia. In April 1912, his call was supported by al Khälisi, al Sadr and al 
Shiräzi. Yazdi abstained. 
2 
In late 1911, all Iraqi 'ulemä', including al Yazdi, proclaimed a Jihad 
against the Italian invasion of Libya. All over Iraq committees were formed 
for that purpose and the Shi'ah were among the most active. 
3 
The Shi'i con- 
tribution to the Libyan Jihad was indicative that they were in fact advocating 
the defence of a Sunni land and the ottoman integrity. On that occasion a Najafi 
Paper wrote 'whenever our enemies increase their oppression, we shall strengthen 
our unity*. 
4 However, the most significant chain of this process occurred in 
1914, when the Shi'i Mujtahids declared Jihäd and organized troops for the de- 
fence of Iraq against the British. By that they had disclosed their preference 
for a Sunni dominant Iraq rather than a British one. 
The ideas of the Islamic reformers played an important role in this uni- 
fication process. They advocated a non-sectarian Islam, the unity of Shi*ah 
and Sunnah and pointed out the perils involved in Western penetration of Islam. 
However, it was more than a general intellectual influence. Afghäni was in 
Gasrah during the tobacco issue. He wrote a religious and an emotional letter 
to Shiräzi urging his intervention. The letter contained a vigorous attack on 
the Persian Shah. It was widely published in Iraq and reported to have had a 
strong impact in Najaf. 
5 
1. See N. R. Keddie, Religion and Rebellion in Iran: the Tobacco Protest of 
1891-1892, (london, 1966). 
2. *Al at Wardip Lam, 41t ..., op. cit., pp. 123-5. 
3. I. at Wä'ili, Al Shi*r at 'Irägi wa Ijarb Trablus, (Baghdad, 1964). 
Al Fetla tribal leader offered to join the fighting. T älib led the 
Basrah committee. Ruisäfi, Ridä and Bäc3ir at Shabibi, it Shargi and 
at HIM were most active. 
($ 4. Al *Ilem. Vo1.2, No. 7,23rd November 1911. Najaf. 
5. M. a Amins Jamäl at Din at Af häni, (Najaf, un. d: ), 'p. 25. The text of 
the letter in M. R. Rids, Tar kh ..., op. cit., pp. 56-62 
- 103 - 
Afghani's animositysto the' Persian Shah was to influence"some'Shi*i- 
! a2Ztahids to; question their alliance with therPersian-Government. 
'"'During--, 
h is, stay in Iraqi (in, 1891), Afghäni-visited Najaf, 'Karbalä', Kädimain, " Baghdad 
and Basrah. -He "established contacts , vpreached his ideas and influenced some-, 
prominent Iraqis of whom al Habubi; al Sh&hristäni and'al Kädimi werekthe most 
1 mportant. 2 e-In'Constantinople he formed a; committee propogating-Shi'i=Sunni 
unity. 3 He wrote several letters to-the Shi'i mu tahids; 'quoting examples from 
Islamic history and beliefs, urging their unity with the Sunnah for the defence 
of the ottoman Empire. This, according to Afghäni, was the best method of defend- 
ing Islam against Western intentions. 
4 Afghäni's efforts were to achieve certain 
5 Positive results in both Persia and Iraq. 
6 It is interesting that Iraqi 
Shi'i fetwa against the British invasion (1914) was based on the principle of 
`bifä' 'an Ahl al Thughur. 
7 
It was precisely the same principle which Afghäni 
as early as 1891 was advocating. 
In 1906, 'Ali al Bazirkan, an educated young Shi'i propagated the idea of 
a school to teach the Shi'ah modern sciences and languages. He was accused of 
Kufe In 1908, he gained the support of al Habubi, the reformist mu tahid 
who embarked on a wide campaign to convince the Shi'ah. Eventually the 
Community decided to finance the school and the Wali authorized a committee 
tO open it in 1909. It is significant that Bäzirkän and Habubi's argument 
Was based on the necessity of modern science to the Shi'i youth and the import- 
' 
ance of detaching loyalty from Persia and establishing an Iraqi Shi'i-Sunni 
Unit Ye 
8 
1" 
s P. `Sykes, A History of-Persia, -, (London, 1958), Vol. 2, pp. 398-9. ", ' 
Z" 'A. M. al 9asäb, Dhikra-al-Afghäni fi al 'Iräg2- (Baghdadg--1945)j p. 85; -also, 
H. 'A. -Mahfoüd, Iräqiyat al Kajimi, (Baghdad, 1960), p. 76 
3" B. Browne, The Persian ..., op. cit., p. 415 sr= 
4. M. al Makhzumi, op. cit., pp. 34-6 
" B. Browne, op. cit., p. 107. 
6. 'A. al Wardi., _Lamhat ... , op. cit ., pp. 
304-6 
ý" The Shi'i Imäm Zein, al 'Abdin, advocated this principle to defend the 
Islamic state against al Kufär. 
$. 'A. al Bäzirkän, op. cit., pp. 45-S0 
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'A11' those factors were to bridge a'gap between Shi'ah and`-Sunnah.. and' to 
a11ow'the eadvent of a new solidarity. The 'progressive' elements of the two 
sects found in the Mashrutiya cause and in the reformed'°Islam, a common vision. 
The, 'subsequent Sunni-disillusionment'with, the C. U. P. and', the 'Shi'i-frustration- 
With the'Shah 'tended for eradicate the previous identification witht Persia and 
Turkey. Resentment of-Western influence strengthened the emerging unity and 
had a role in deciding the future Shi'i=British relationship. 
(c) The Shi'i-British relationship up to 1918: (1) The Oudh Bequest; the 
first direct and'important contact between the Shi'ah Ulemä' and the British 
Authorities was established through the Oudh Bequest. The origins of this 
bequest'went back: to 1825.1 Previous. to 1910, the,, methods'of Oudh Bequest dis- 
tribution were as follows: it was divided equally between mujtahids of the 
two towns at the amount of Rs. 5,085 for each of them on a monthly basis. The 
British Resident at Baghdad had the free right to select the mu tahids in the 
two towns (Najaf and°Karbalä') who got the money directly, from him. -- Theý-dis- 
tribution of the money was completely left to the will, of the mu tahids. ---- 
Usually a-mujtahid recipient received money from the Bequest for life. 
2 
. 
In 1903-and at Karbalä', the following mujtahids were in receipt of the 
Bequest: Mubammad Bä9ir, 
3 
Häshim, al Qazwlni, Hussein Mäzandari, Ja'far Tabtäbyi, 
'A1i' Yazdi, ' and Sibta Uussein. `At Najaf they were: "! Mu$ammad Ba1}r at 'Ulum, 
4 
'Ali Nahävandi, ' Muhammad Hassan,, 'Abd Allah Mazand; ri, -e-'Abd al {jassan, Muhammad 
Hindi and-Kädim Khuränani. 
5 
` In 1906, the following mujtahids were, added-to 
the Karbalä' distributors: Muhammad al Käshäni,, 'Ali Tangabuni, Muoamsnad Bäcjir 
Behbehäni, Quill. Bäc}ir, Hussein qumi. And in Najaf the-additional distributors 
1. Lorimer, op. cit., p. 1854 
C. O. 696/2. Admin R eport`Shamiyah, 1919. Note by the A. P. O. Agha Hamid 
Khan, p. 32. 
3. Sayid Bägir was the original distributor at Kärbalä', 'his'-monthly'ällowance 
was Rs. 1,500. __.. . ý.. _ 
4. Sayid Bahr al 'Ulum was the original distributor at Najaf, his allowance 
was Rs. 1,500 each month. Others were in receipt of Rs. 5,000. 
S. Lorimer, op. cit., pp. 1613". 4. 
hhh, 
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Were: Fath Allah Shari*a, Abu Qässim Ishgavari, Mulla 'Ali Khonsari, Abu Turäb 
and Sheikh Mehdi. SnY 
-, The-British-thought that this system was not working properly.. It seems 
they had some doubts about the way the money was , distributed. 
2 So-, in 1910 the 
British Resident in. Baghdad changed the system and imposed new methods. The 
main- change rfrom., the =previous rules was that:,.,, : t ., 
'The Mujtahid Distributor is, required, to, disburse halfrof. the money 
received, through a committee composed of'himself and his colleagues, 
and an equal-number., of members (Residency Members) representing the 
British Resident under the presidency of one of the latter'. 3 
In the mentioned note by Agha Hamid Khan, he gave the names of the Mujtahid 
Distributors in 1918: 
pr 
'(i) Six Mujtahid Distributors ... -their names as follows: 
Shaikh al- Shariat /äl. Isfahani7 .,. - 
Hassan Sahib al Jawahir 
Saiyid Ja'far, Bahar'al 'Ulam 
Haji Muhamad Agha Hindi 
} Shaikh-Mahdi-Asadullah 4 
Shaikh Mahdi Kashmiri'. 
By going to the 'Prominent Personalities in Najaf and'Shamiyah's it was 
interesting to find that five of the above six were described as 'very pro- 
British'. What was more interesting and rather suprising was that all of 
those five men were described as 'of no influencer. 
As much as the British had gained friends through this Bequest affair 
as much they created resentment, at least through envy and a notion of un- 
justified British bias in their process of selecting the Mujtahid Distributors. 
(ii) The Jihad: The second factor which influenced the Shi*i-British relations 
before 1917 was the Jihad. When the British started their invasion of Iraq 
on 6th November 1914, the Turkish authorities unleashed a religious campaign 
to win the support of 'Ulemä' for the Ottoman cause. The war was presented 
to the *Ulemä' as an Islamic war against the käfir (infidel). They were re- 
quested to declare Fetwa for the Jihad (holy war) against the invaders. 
1. Ibid.,, p. 1616 
2. T. Lyell, op. cit., p. 46 
3. C. O. 696/2. Admin. Report Shamiyah 1919, p. 32 
4. C. O. 696/2. 'Admin. Report, Shamiyah 1919, p. 32 
S. C. 0.696/1. Admin. Report, Najaf and Shamiyah, 1918, pp. 106-7 
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Those who declared the Jihäd were Sayid Muhammad Sa'id al Habubi, Sheikh 
*Abd al Karim al Jazäi'ri, Sayid 'Abd al Razzäg al Hallu, Sheikh Jawad $ähib 
a1 Jawähir and many others. Sheikh al Shari'a al ISfahani followed them in 
declaring the Jihäd. 
1 It is not very surprising to notice that al Yazdi was 
absent from the Jihad movement. 
2 
The tribes were reluctant to respond to the Jihad call owing to the hatred 
Which they always bore to the Turks. 
3 
But al Habubi, who was the most active 
in the Jihad movement, went to the Middle Euphrates and started persuading the 
tribal leaders. 4 The Turks also made some friendly gestures by releasing some 
°f al Far'un from prison and returning to them their confiscated land in the 
Mishkhäb. s Anyhow, the strength of the Fetwa and the consistent efforts of 
the Shi'i 'Ulemä', in particular that of al Habubi, have borne their fruits and 
the troops of Jihad proceeded to Shu'ibah to assist the Turks. Some of the 
'Uleihä' joined the troops and stayed with them at the time of the 
fighting. The main tribal leaders 6f . the Jihad movement were: 
6 
*Ajami al Sa'dun, Sayid Nur al Yäsiri, 'Abd al Wahid al Haji Sikar, Sayid 'Alwän 
a1 Sayid 'Abbas, Sayid Hädi Mukuter, Sayid Muhsin abu T abikh, Sayid Hädi Zuwain, 
Mubdir al Far'un, Sha'län Abu al Jun and Ghuthieth al Harjän. 
It is worth noticing here that all of those leaders were of the Middle 
EUphrates, 
which clearly indicates the weight of the Shi'ah 'Ulemä' Fetwas on 
them. Furthermore, all of them were to become the leaders of the 1920 uprising. 
On the other hand it is fair to say that their Jihäd did not signify deep loyalty 
to the Turks; those were the people who gave so much trouble to the Turks before 
the Jihäd and in fact they were very reluctant to fight for them if not for the 
influence 
of their clergy. 
7 
A. Sh. al Yäsiri, op. cit., p. 69 
ý" Mahbubah, op. cit., p. 246 
3" A. Fir*on, op. cit., pp. 36-38 
4" Al Yäsiri, "op. cit,., p. 72 
S" Ibid., pp. 69-70 
6- Ibid., pp. 72-75 
ý" Al Fir*on, op. cit., pp. 36-38 
.. ý- 
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The results'of'the Jihäd movement were, '-'militarily speaking, of no import- 
an ce whatever, büt'its` political significance is'worth a quick look. , It had 
shown once again' the influential strength''of the 'Ulem; ' and their capacity. to 
motivate'the Iraqi tribes especially'of, the Mid-Euphrates. "'The Jihad had'shown 
also the strength of the"religious factor which' gathered the Shitah with, their 
uni Turkish opponents to defend the country 'against the Christian invaders. 
The'other political' consequence of the Jihad was that in a way it had 
Committed söme'of the 'Ulemä', at least morally, to an anti-British stand 
which, consequently, they had to carry on. Also it had poisoned the Mid-Euphrates 
tribes' relations with 'the 'British to a great extent'. "In a way, 'it -could be said 
that the seeds"of the 1920'üprising were planted by'the Jihad movement'of 1915. 
Moreover, the'Jihäd movement revealed the strong'impact which the Shi'i°- 
'Ulemä' held over the tribesmen. The'latter were in fact reluctant -to side- r- 
"'ith their Turkish-'oppress'or if it was not the Fetwa of their religious-leaders. 
Sheikh'Badr a'l'Rumaid'(leader of`Bani Mälek)'told Aomed Awrag (one of the-Turkish 
commanders) *Yoü'are thetraitors of Islam''and your treatment of the-, Arabs shows 
that'... If it was not for the Fetwa of our *Ulemä', we would not be on your side*. 
(iii)''Situatiön in Najaf'on the eve of'British occupation: The population of 
Najaf, apart from the 'Ulemä' and their-train of students and dependents, was 
2 divided into+two tribal factions, 'the Zughurt'and the Shumurt. The population 
of the town was about 40,000'and'was divided into four quarters-with a leader 
for each quarter. The'quarters were'al°Buräq, al Mushräq- ai"Huwaish, and"al: 
*Amaräh. The leaders'of those quarters were'Kädim Subbi, "I ji, Sa'ad ibn, Häji 
1ci, Sayid Mahdi ibn Sayid Salmän`and Häji''Atiyah Abu Kulal"respectively. 
1 Ji Rädi was of the Shumurt and'the`rest-were of the Zughurt. 
3 
All of those' 
leaders were of humble origins; Subbi was a--coffee maker, Häji Sa"ad was a 
butcher. 4 Abu Kulal pursued before the war the career of a smuggler. 
5 
Sayid 
Mahdi was the son of the recognised' leader of the Zughurt'. Y '', °' '; 
1. Al Fir*on, op. cit., pp. 40-1" 
2. J. Mabbubah, op. cit., p. 240 
3. al Bäzerkän, op. cit.,. p. 57 .; 
4. F. 0.882/27P Arab Bureau Papers, p. 115 
S. Ibid. It should be noted that smuggling in their conditions was not a 
dishonourable career. 
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fi After the defeat of. the Turks in Shu'ibah, the, leaders of,, Najaf were not 
slow,. in recognising the weakness of the Turks and: their impotence in sending 
any troops to Najaf-if a rising should-occur. The fourth leader, Abu Kulal,, 
started. to plan atakeover of the, town and prepared for that, bylending-their, 
Previous, strife"and, clashes..,, The-Najafis had'no'love at all for their crude- 
ý" and ruthless. Turkish, gaimmagam andq ýconsequentlyqrthey were in favour of-, 
ejecting, the Ottoman administration., 
The Turks-made a, diastrous. mistake-by sending a-military force to Najaf 
entrusted with tracing the army deserters. 
2 That was the spark, for a popular 
rising.,. Häji Sa'ad with. his men (some of them army defectors) succeeded in 
entering the, town and. in keepingthe. Turks at bay, for 24 hours, by which time 
help, had come from outside and the whole town had risen and-joined the insurgents. 
With 10,000 rifles against them-and their food and water cut offqýthe Turks stood 
little chance and capitulated three days later., They were disarmed and allowed 
to depart to Kifl. 
3., 
'It was also reported that al. Yazdi -'has not, actually de- t: ,; 
Glared a Jihad against. the Turks, but is said to have given encouragement to, the 
tribal rising'.. 
The Turks were very reluctant to retaliate owing-to the sacred status of 
Najaf. They simply reliquished all their influence and position in Najaf and 
accepted the situation. Thus Najaf 
enjoyed complete local autonomy under, the 
rule of the four leaders and was completely-free from any outside influence or 
s6 centralised state, authority., This period of enjoyment (or suffering) came to 
an end in August 1917, when the first British'Government agents were appointed. 
., A, 
few months after the Najaf uprising, -Karbalä', the second 
holy city in the 
Shiti world, impressed and agitated by events, in Najag revolted against the Turks 
l" J. Mahbuhah, op. cit., pp. 246-247 
s- , 
Z" Al Yäsiri, op. cit., p. 86. 
3" C. 0.696/l, Admin. Report, op, cit.,, p. 68;. also al Yasiri, p. 86; also 
Fir*on, p. 41; also Ma! buhah, pp. 246-247., 
4" P. 0.882/26/Arab Bulletin 41, dated February 6th 1917. 
S., Ibid. 
6 The British and Arab sources contradict each other very sharply on this 
point., 
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in June 1915. The Turks, handicapped by their military weakness'and'the' 
Sacredness of the town, did not use repressive violence, but tried to solve- 
the problem peacefully. They gave concessions and agreed to reduce their power 
and influence in Karbalä'. But in May 1916 the Kamunah family led a new revolt 
'to finish what had remained of the Turkish influence. Thus, Karbalä' was ad- 
Ministered by the Kamunah family completely free from any authority of whatever 
government. Karbalä' then had its period of self-rule until the British, in 
the middle of, 1917, sent their agents to administer Karbal3'. 
1 
It was as early as June 1916 that some Shiti notables had established 
contacts with the invading British force. A messenger brought Sir Percy Cox 
a circular letter signed by 200 principal men of Karbala' and endorsed by the 
*U1emä'. The document protested against Turkish 'bombardment of the sacred 
shrines, the massacre of innocent people, and the violation of women by a so- 
called Moslem 90vernment*. 
2 
The messenger urged the Chief Political Officer 
that if the British would send up some gunboats as far as Batlah (a place roughly 
Midway between Näsiriyah and Samäwah), Sheikh "Ali Kamunah (the leader of Karbalä') 
'40uld bring men down and escort the boats to S amäwah and Najaf. 'He says there 
are now in the Holy Cities 70,000 people all of one mind and ready to join the 
British against the Turks and assist them in the capture of Baghdad'. 
3 
In early 1917, Häji *Atiyah abu Kulal (the leader of the Najaf rising) 
sent a letter to the British Authorities in Nasiriyah informing them that the 
Number of the tribal confederation gathering in revolt against the Turks amounted 
to 25,000. Häji 'Atiyah was inviting the British 'to advance on the Euphrates, 
and join his tribal forces". 
4 
It is interesting that although the Military 
Authorities wished to exploit such opportunities, 
5 Six Percy Cox declined to 
commit himself and was only prepared to send 'gifts of money'. 
6 
i" Fir'on, op. cit., p. 41, and al Yäsiri, op. cit., p. 87 
ý" F. O. 882/25/Arab Bulletin, No. 7,30th June 1916 
3" Ibid., Arab Bulletin, No. 13,1st August 1916 
4" F. 0.882/26/Arab Bulletin, No. 41, February 1917 
s" Ibid. 
6" S. Longrigg, Iraq ... 9 op. cit., p. 85 
r` `- 
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Nevertheless a delegation of Najaf notables and m. ujtahids sent the Civil 
Commissioner-in Baghdad a telegram rendering, their. 'congratulations' for the 
Victories-of. -the Allies. 
1 
Next day they received Wilson's reply assuring them 
that Britain would-'fulfill its promises to its Arab allies'. 
2 
Thus the Iraqi Shi*ah were, in contrast to many claims, far from assuming 
a unified attitude towards the British arrival. A group of Mujtahids was firmly 
Opposed -to the invasion and . gave its support to the. Turks. . This group was 
Composed-of ljabubi (d. 1915), 0Sha. hristäni, Jazä'iri, Jaw mir and Bahr al 'Ulum. 
All of them were reformists, constitionalists and remained hostile to the 
B ritish, as a matter of principle. They were to redisplay their animosity, in 
1918, during the Najaf disturbances, and again in 1920. Without underestimating 
their influence and impact it is important to observe that they did not represent 
the bulk of the Shi*i community. It was only after 1918, thanks to Wilson*s , 
Administration, that the majority of the Shi'ah were to turn anti-British. The 
Sayids of Shämiyah and Mishkhäb assumed a similar stance due to the favourable 
Turkish treatment. 
The local leaders of Najaf and Karbalä' were overtaken by their hostility 
to the Turks and offered their aid to the British. 
3 
However this support did 
not involve a desire for the extension of British rule to their areas. In fact 
such a step was fiercely resented in 1917-1918.4 Such also was the attitude. 
of al Khazä*il federation. 
It is interesting to find that the Shiti Arab nationalists were, similar; 
to their Sunni counterpart, in favour of"a positive attitude towards the British, 
more especially after 1916. Rid! al Shabibi expressed the nationalists' bitter- 
ness of Turkish contempt of the Arabs in a famous poem. 
6 
He and his brother 
1. Al 'Arab, No. 10Tf-'taghdad, 7th October 1918, telegram dated 3rd October 1918. 
2. Ibid., telegram dated 4th October 1918 
3. Supra, -pp. 104" 
4. Infra, pp. '339'-40" 
5. F. O. 882/26. Arab Bulletin, 38. December 1916. Communication dated 5th 
June 1916. Euphrates intelligence. 
6. M. R. al" Shabibi, Diwan, (Cairo, 1940), pp. 26-9 "" 
ý' J rNý 
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Bagir 'showed /themselves7 extremely friendly /äfter the Occupation? and /were? 
re comnended. by. Capt. Marshal /Ä. P. 0.7 as correspondents for our vernacular 
Paper Al Arab'. 
' 
However, in early 1919, he surprised the British by leading 
an 'aggressive' campaign against the Administration calling for the 'absolute' 
independence of Iraq. 
2 
An, attitude of 'wait and see' was dominant among the tribal leaders of the 
Mid Euphrates. It is true that they joined the Jihäd, but that was done half- 
heartedly, under their *ulemä' pressure, and they seized the. first opportunity 
to desert the Turks. From 1915 to 1918 they showed no outward sign of hostility. 
8 ut after 1918, when Wilson imposed his administration measures upon their areas, 
they were swept into the anti-British drive. It was during the Jihäd that some 
°f their leaders had enhanced their political awareness and established contacts 
1ºith the group of reformist Mujtahids. A factor'which proved of importance in 
1919_1920. 
In 1914, the Iraqi Arab nationalitt movement was still in its formative 
Deriod. A series of socio-economic changes allowed the advent of such a 
Movement. The ideas of Islamic reformists and Arab nationalists emanating 
from Syria and Egypt were influencing a rising elite. The constitutional 
Struggle in both Persia and Turkey affected the population, linked the Shi'ah 
and Sunnah and sharpened the political awareness of the intelligentsia. Never- 
theless the nationalist movement remained within narrow circles. Its relative 
fiaturity, growth, popularity and aggressiveness were to materialize during the 
Period of British occupation, more especially after 1918. It will be suggested 
that the policies of the Civil Commissioner were, among other factors, behind 
auch a growth. 
i" F. O. 371/5243/E. 10272 
2" Ibid. 
`r 
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PART TWO 
THE ROLE OF MILITARY OFFICERS IN THE INDEPENDENCE 
MOVEMENT 1912-1920 
The period 1918 and 1920 witnessed a remarkable growth of the Iraqi inde- 
De ndence movement both in its popularity and its political maturity. This was 
due to the general atmosphere of post War conditions and to the existence of 
the British Administration in Iraq. 
By Arab nationalists I mean those who cherished the idea of an Arab Admin- 
. 
istration in an 'independent' Iraq. However, in this widely assorted group, 
distinctions must be drawn between different trends and different organisations 
among those who held these aspirations. 
In the first place, there was the nationalist movement working inside Iraq 
itself. This movement was represented by al 'Ahd and Haras" al'Isti5läl and 
led by Suwaidi, Sadr and abu Timman. However, because of the War, conditions 
Of occupation and the policies of the Civil Commissioner, there was another 
Movement which was active outside the boundaries of Iraq, but no less effective 
in Iraq's political development. This movement was that of the 
Iraqi officers. They had deserted the Turkish Army, joined the Hijaz uprising 
°fi served Faisal during his short Arab rule over Syria. This is the movement 
With which I shall deal first. 
Further distinctions must be drawn between different political trends inter- 
acting within both the movements to which I have referred. The 'independence' 
Of Iraq was a common goal to which all nationalists were dedicated. But, the 
degree of this independence and the methods of gaining it were the agbject of much 
dissension. The moderates envisaged an independent Iraq guided and protected by 
the British. Such an aim was to be achieved by British support, or at least 
that of the liberal section among British policymakers. The militants advocated 
a 'complete' or absolute independence untrammeled by. any'form of British. 
influence or 'assistance'. They believed that political violence was the only 
Means of compelling the British to accept their aims. 
Both trends were in evidence among Iraqi nationalists outside and inside 
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Iraq. The first attitude was adopted by the Baghdadi *Ahd, Tä1ib Pasha, Faidi 
Nuri and Ja'far. The other had the support of al Harass Mosul'sy'Ahd, '1 
Suwaidi, abu Tinnan and some tribal leaders. Among Iraqi Officers it was the, 
platform of al Häshimi, Shalläsh and even al Madfa*i and 'Ali Jawdat. 
Although 
. 
Nuri argued that 'in every breast' there was a determination 
that 'nothing short of a national administration of an independent character will 
be willingly. accepted', and called for the 'immediate creation of a 
national civil administration', he qualified his statement by indicating 
that such an administration, ought to be 'under the supervision of the Occupation'. 
Furthermore, Nuri stressed his belief in 'the spirit of comradeship with the, 
British' and his anxiety. 'to continue on the path of loyalty and collaboration 
with; /the'British%'. He went on to express his determination 'to put'anend to 
all the motives that may tend to renew the connection with the Turks'. 
' 
Ja*far 
condemned as 'madness' any attempt to 'alienate English sympathy' by provoking 
violence. 
2 
On the other extreme, the leader of Mosul*s 'Ahd was of the opinion 
that independence would never be achieved except by force of arms. He advocated 
an alliance with the Kemalists and the Bolsheviks. 
3 
Both views were found in 
one and the same political organization. This diversity of views had far reaching 
implications and consequences, more especially when it was translated into 
political practice. 
The conflict cannot be dissociated from a similar dispute concerning the 
political future of Iraq taking place among the British decision-makers. This 
dispute was between those who advocated direct British rule. over Iraq and those 
who saw it in Britain's interest to grant Iraq some sort of independence. headed 
by a 'frieadlyt Arab Government. This conflict took its rise from different 
approaches and emphases between the 'Indian School' and the 'Arab' school. 
4 
1. F. 0.371/5226/E. 2719. Letter from Nuri al Sai'd to Major Young. 5th April 
1920. See Appendix II. 
2. G. Bell, Private Letters and Papers, /Vyurtioi,, t&, letter dated 27th November 1920. 
3. Letter dated 30th November 1919. From Mosul 'Ahd to 'General Centre'. 
Published in Sada al Ahrär, Mosul, 3rd April 1953. 
4. B. Thomas, Alarms and Excursions in Arabia, (New York, 1931), pp. 60-1; 
Lord Birdwood, Nuri As-Said, (London, 1959), pp. 24-6. 
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11n the course of time the original source of the dispute ceased to be'of im- 
Portance. 1 Furthermore, changing conditions altered or modified the views 
°f most of the advocates of the 'Indian' vision. However, Wilson remained, 'to 
the end, a firm believer in direct rule. 
The Civil Commissioner's most cherished hope was the idea of Iraq as the 
Model of an efficiently administered British dependency or protectorate. He 
Was firmly opposed to the idea of an Arab Administration, let alone Iraqi inde- 
Pendence. He even opposed the appointment of Arab officials in his 
Administration because it 'would involve the rapid decay of authority, law and 
Order ". 2 It was argued that he had an 'implacable hostility to anything Sherif- 
ian"3 and he 'outraged nationalist feeling, under-estimated the strength; of it 
4 and wholly misunderstood it'. Wilson conceived of the nationalist activities 
as a mere external agitation emanating from four subsidised friends' in Damascus. 
5 
Such views formed a complete contrast to the opinions held by Philby, who advo- 
cated 'complete independence", 6 Young, Bell and Lawrence, who in varying degrees 
favoured co-operation with Iraqi nationalists, and even Hirtzel, who moved with 
the times and in 1919 warned Wilson that 'you are going to have an Arab state 
Whether you like it or not'. 
7 
It was thus logical for moderate nationalists 
and British Liberals to find eventually a common language and understanding, 
Which influenced political events and largely determined the outcome. 
1. It appears that the genuine dispute between those two 'schools, was more 
related to the question of Britain's strategic interests in the M. B. The 
two sides differed on their interpretations of these interests more than 
on the relatively minor issue of Iraqis independence. The Indian Admin- 
istration considered that the protection of India required the domination 
over Eastern and Southern Arabia, Aden, the Persian Gulf and Southern Iraq. 
The Arab Bureau emphasized the importance of the Suez Canal and therefore 
Egypt, Syria, the Red Sea and Hijaz. While the former school viewed b. 
Sa*ud as the major Arab ally and deeply resented the Hashimites, The latter 
view was inclined to consider the Hashimites as the most suitable family 
to lead Hijaz and Syria into a pro-British Arab revolt. 
R. Wingate, Not in the Limelight, (London, 1959), p. 63; P. Graves, The 
Life of Sir Percy Cox, (London, 1941), p. 205. 
2. F. 0.882/24/SY/19. 'No, 34436/75/19.15th November 1919. 
3. F. O. 371/5129/E. 6324. Young's comment dated 14th June 1920. 
4. G.. '$ell, Private Letters and PapersýNewcastle), 31st January 1920. 
F. 0.371/5130/E. 7219. No. R. 7392.18th June 1920. 
6. H. St. J. Philby, Journal of Central Asian Society, Vol. 7,1920, p. 114. 
7- Letter from A. Hirtzel dated 16th July 1919. Cited in J. Marlowe, op. cit., 
3.165 
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My task here is to examine the above argument, elaborating on the political 
development of the Iraqi Officers' movement. A certain emphasis will be given 
to its two trends, the moderate and the militant. Such an approach is not 
justified by its originality alone. It is put forward to provide a more com- e 
Prehensive understanding of political events in Iraq, the pattern they assumed 
and the way in which they were brought to a conclusion. 
It will be suggested that the 'illiberal' line of the Civil Commissioner 
Played into the hands of the militants and enabled them to dominate the inde- 
Xendence movement to the exclusion of the more moderate elements. This hastened 
the clash and brought about the outbreak of political violence. The rising 
thoroughly discredited the Wilsonian line. Political changes became imperative. 
However the military defeat of the uprising and British fear of the extremists 
was to turn the balance once more in favour of the more moderate elements. Thus 
the British 'liberals' who had gained the upper hand were to encourage the 
moderates to lead the attempt at establishing a new Administration in Iraq. 
A deal was concluded with the moderates and a new order was formed in Iraq, 
an order which niet some of the nationalists' demands and yet retained a pre- 
dominantly British influence. 
Some emphasis will also be given to the role of Faisal who by superb 
shrewdness managed to strike a balance between the extreme nationalists and 
the British Authorities. Such a balance, it will be suggested, was a major 
factor behind his success in obtaining the Iraqi throne. 
A detailed study of the British policy and its dynamics is outside the 
scope of this work. Nevetheless, in dealing with Arab nationalist activities, 
it will ': essential to refer, when relevant and necessary, to certain British 
attitudes. 
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CHAPTER V 
THE 'POLITICS' OF THE IRAQI OFFICERS, 1912-1918: 
BRITAIN AS AN ALLY 
A nationalist movement is often a by-product of socio-economic develop- 
went, intellectual influences and foreign domination. It has been pointed 
out in this work that, although the two former elements were evident in Iraq, 
they were not sufficiently developed to constitute suitable ground for the 
independent growth of the nationalist movement in Iraq. However, there was 
another channel by which nationalist ideas were penetrating the Iraqi mind. 
(a), The Rise ofthe Iraqi Officers as a Political and Social Group 
By the end of the 19th century, limited'expansion of schools_in Iraq had 
encouraged some ambitious studdnts to further their education as the best means 
of securing influential posts in the social structure. The well-to-do and en- 
lightened families had preferred to send their children abroad to obtain a 
higher education. The regulations of the Ottoman Army and the military 
schools provided the less wealthy students with a golden opportunity. These 
schools demanded no fees, and also paid a reasonable salary to their students, 
provided them with accommodation, and promised them a well-paid rank in the 
Ottoman army after their graduation. This opportunity was taken by some sixty 
students each year, who loft Iraq for Constantinople for military education. 
In Turkey, the Iraqi students were to become aware of their Arab entity 
and solidarity. By living in a non-Arab community which expressed certain 
Turkish nationalistic tendencies, the Iraqis were bound to feel their Arabism 
and resent Turkish superiority. Furthermore Constantinople was flooded with 
Arabs who were active in their own open societies and their underground organ- 
izations. The Iraqis were to be influenced$ join, and subsequently even lead 
these activities. 
The remarkable political success achieved by this group of Iraqi intell- 
ectuals, 
I 
mainly of military professions, cannot be explained only on the basis 
1. Those Iraqis who had the chance of learning abroad, pursuing their academic 
studies and gaining political experience, were to become the pioneers of 
the Iraqi nationalist movement and form the backbone of the Iraqi admin- istration after independence and as late as 1958. 
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0t the education they had acquired. The acquisition of political power needs, 
Zn addition to knowledge, dynamic action and proper alliances, and in this 
respect 
., this group was especially well-endowed, for the following reasons: 
1" They-formed the first, and most effective, political and nationalist 
organization in pre-independent Iraq (al 'Ahd). 
2. A large number of them joined the Hijaz uprising and occupied leading 
positions in its ranks. By that they gained military and administrative 
experience, and made contacts with the British and earned their relative 
confidence and understanding. 
3. They participated in Faisal's era of the shortly-lived independent Syria. 
In fact the Iraqi officers had the lion's share of the Arab administration, 
a fact which was consequently to play a role in shattering Wilson's 'claim' 
that the Iraqis were not mature enough to form and lead a native admin- 
istration. I 
4. During their Syrian days, 1918-1920, the Iraqi of Lcers. were (for reasons 
to be discussed later) very active in inciting a campaign against Wilson's 
administration. By virtue of that the Iraqi officers were to present 
themselves as the leading body to replace Wilson's era. 
There have been several studies on the social structure of the military 
and the intelligentsia and their motives for intervening in the politics of 
the underdeveloped countries in general2 and Arab states in particular. 
3 
However, none of. these studies have formulated a final theoretical analysis 
tor such a structure or motive. 
4 
All these works do not preclude certain 
1. G. Bell, The Private letters and Papers, Library of Newcastle University, 
dated 3Uth January 1921. 
2. For instance, see S. P. Huntington, editor, Changing Patterns of Military 
Politics, (Glencoe, 1962); S. E. Finer, The Man on Horseback: the Role of 
the Military in Politics, (London, 1962); M. Janowitz, The Military in 
the Development of New Nations, (Chicago, 1964); John J. Johnson (editor), 
The Role of the Military in Under-developed countries, (Princeton, 1967). 
Eliezer Be'eri, Army officers in Arab politics and society, (London, 1970); 
S. N. Fischer (editor), The Military in the Middle East, (Ohio, 1963). 
4. A marxist and Soviet writer admits that 'we do not yet possess any study 
of those elements of society in the underdeveloped countries which do not 
fit into the concept of "bourgeoisie" but which in many countries play a 
very large, or even leading role. I have in mind the intelligentsia and 
t}e Army'. G. Mirski, 'Creative Marxism and problems of national revol- 
ution', translated into English and published in The Mizan Newsletter, 
London, April 1964, p. 5. 
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remarks which will clarify both the reasons behind, and the scope of, the 
Iraqi officers' political action. 
The first remark which one can make concerning the Iraqi nationalists who 
had acquired their education and political training abroad, is that the over- 
whelming majority of them were, ethnically speaking, Arabs, Moslems and Sunnis, 
and socially speaking were descendant from humble backgrounds and had chosen 
military careers. 
1 
It has been suggested that out of 113 active Arab nation- 
alists in several organizations in Constantinople, only one was Egyptian, 18 
Iraqi and the rest from greater Syria. Of the 94 Syrians (51 Syrian, 22 Pale- 
stinians and 21 Lebanese) only ten were soldiers, whereas all the 18 Iraqis 
were military officers. 
2 
It is not difficult to elucidate the reasons for these common character- 
istics. The Ottoman discriminatory policy toward religious minorities explains 
the obvious absence of Jews, Christians or Shi*ah from the ranks of the armed 
forces. Being of humble social origins and military are two sides of the same 
coin. The Iraqis were, in comparison with the Syrians, poor in both their 
education and income. The military career was subjectively and objectively 
the only available option if their ambitions were to be realised. 
3 
However, on completing their studies and on being appointed as officers, 
they-would have departed from their original social base and entered a new 
social formation. Nevertheless, this new group continued to differ from other 
sections of the middle class in at least two important respects: first, its 
members were non-propertied and wholly dependent on their salaries; secondly, 
1. Of the active members of al 'Ahd, during the period prior to the War, it is 
possible to trace the following names: Yäsin a1 Häshimi, Nuri Said, Taha 
al Häshimi, Jamil Madfa'i, *Ali Jawdat, Tahsin 'Ali, Sharif Färougi, Mawlud 
Mukhlis, 'Abd al Rahman Sharif, 'Abd al Ghafar al Shalji, 'Abd al Hamid al 
Shälji, 'Abd Allah al Dulaimi, Hamdi al Bäjahji, *Abd al Ghafour al Badri, 
Muhammad Hilmi, 'Ali Rid; and Muwafag Kämil. With the exception of al Bäjahji 
all the above-mentioned shared the same characteristics of being Moslem 
Sunnis, of being from humble social backgrounds, and of being military officers. 
2. C. E. Dawn, *The Rise of Arabism in Syria', Middle East Journal, Vol. 16, 
No, 2. 
3. It has been suggested that *the officer class is recruited from the lower 
strata of society*. 
E. Be*eri, op. cit., p. 302. 
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11 
their commitment was to military culture and traditions. 
This social structure casts a lot of light on the political behaviour of 
the Iraqi officers during 1914-1921. It had an important role in motivating 
the officers to be, on the one hand, aggressively against the British admin- 
istration which, 'under Wilson's plans, deprived them of the essentials of their 
economic 
. 
life., And, od the other hand, they were ready to endorse a British- 
inspired solution which offered them paid positions in a formula of an tinde- 
Pendent' Iraq. In straightforward, perhaps even crude, terms an Iraqi ex- 
bimbashi of the Ottoman artillery declared, 'Under the Turks I was employed at 
So many liras a month; now I get nothing and the English will give me nothing. 
want an Arab Government: and a salary'. 
1 
Another example is quite indicative: . 
a significant number of, Iraqi officers declined, while being war prisoners, to 
Join , the Hijaz uprising. Their refusal was not based on political resentment, 
but exclusively on career grounds. 
2 
Furthermore, the Iraqi officers, being a non-propertied group, have enjoyed 
a. consideraole degree of social autonomy vis-a-vis other sections of society. 
When one is dealing with the wealthy families of Iraqi towns, tribal sheikhs 
and Shitah 'Ulemä', it is easy to see the profound effect, local or national, 
that the socio-economic conditions had, on their political conduct. 
3 
However, 
this was not the case with the military elite, whose political behaviour was not 
ruled by economic interaction with any other social group. Such a considerable 
social autonomy was to. be reflected in a remarkable political flexibility. This 
'freedom of action' gave the military elite an immense political advantage, 
especially in a society like Iraq which was characterized by uncrystallized 
Socio-economic conditions and ruled by a foreign power which was not reluctant 
to change its methods of domination. 
Nevertheless, this remarkable freedom of action did not amount to absolute 
1. G. Bell, Private Letters and Papers, (Newcastle), dated 24 May 1920 
2. Ibrähim al Räwi, Min al Thawra al 'Arabiya al Kubra ila al "Iräg al Hadith (Beirut, 1969), p. 20. 
3. See the previous discussion on Tälibts attitude and the forthcoming discussion 
on tribal politics. 
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independence from the forces, social or otherwise, 
' 
existing in the given con- 
ditions of the Iraqi situation of that time. It was not, in the last resort, 
the activities of the officers alone which had decided the course of Iraqi 
Political development. Without the emergence of the nationalist-tribal-Shi'i 
alliance, the officers' efforts would have been very marginal indeed. 
Furthermore, the relationship of other sections of the Iraqi society 
(namely the tribal sheikhs, the Shi*ah 'Ulemä' and the wealthy families) to 
the state was vital in determining their politics. However, such a relation- 
6 hip was, relatively speaking, of a limited scope. It was governed by two 
dimensions: none of these groups possessed the means or capabilities to achieve 
the actual domination of the state; furthermore, each of these sections' 
attitudes towards the state were decided by demands of undeniable importance, 
but 
which did not amount to a decisive character. 
a However, the case of the 
intelligentsia and military elite was radically different. 
In the first place, the military and the intellectual elite were capable 
of controlling the state, and indeed had ambitions to do so. Their awareness 
Of their education and advanced position, in comparison with other sectors of 
the society, had nurtured such a desire. Furthermore their experience in Hijaz 
and Syria where the Iraqi officers were 'running the whole military and civil 
administration' had nourished their confidence and determination to achieve 
stich an aim... 
Moreover the officers were totally dependent on the state for their employ- 
ant and career. For them t 
its creation, was by no means an academic or trivial one. It was their essential 
ad ost decisive cause. 1 
1" For a more elaborate discussion of the subject, see: T. B. Bottomore, Elites 
and Society, (London, 1966), pp. 93-111. 
For instance, the major interest of the tribes was basically the land and 
taxation system; for the absentee landlords it was the guarantee of their 
claimed revenues; for the mercantile families it was the freedom of trade. 
All these demands were in the final analysis either local (as different 
from national), soluble (within the undrastically changed frame of the 
existing administration), or both. 
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In'this respect it is necessary to point out a special attribute which was 
particular to'Iragi conditions. The Iraqi officers were serving in the Ottoman 
army which, by 1918, ceased to possess any authority over any Iraqi or Arab 
territories. Most of those officers had either deserted their ranks in the 
Ottoman army and joined the Hijaz uprising or the Syrian administration, were 
unemployed, or still serving in the Turkish army but longing to return to their 
country of origin. Thus they were trapped in an unenviable historical paradox; 
army officers without armed forces. For them the need to establish an Iraqi 
army and administration had become a task of supreme urgency. 
' 
From a cultural point of view, there was more than one factor which politi- 
cized the Iraqi, officers. They were of an Islamic tradition which did not 
emphasize the separation of military and political functions. Furthermore, most 
of the Iraqi officers were educated in the Ottoman army during the period between 
1880-1914. This army was, by that time, the centre of the C. U. P. activities 
and intrigues, which subsequently resulted in successive military coups (1908-1914).., 
The final outcome of these developments was that the real political power was 
centred in the hands of the military officers. The force of example, and 
probable actual participation undoubtedly had far-reaching consequences on the 
minds of the Iraqi officers. 
The combination of all these factors explains the intensity of 'politics' 
among Iraqi officers. When Lawrence claimed that 'seven out of every ten Meso- 
potamian-born officers' belonged to the al 
*Ahd society, 
2 
this might be considered 
as an enthusiastic account. However, no similar statement could be made about 
any of the other sectors of the Iraqi society. 
1. This remark by no means intends to disown the nationalist ideals of the 
officers. On the relationship between the officers and the state, see: 
Manfred Halpern, 'Middle Eastern Armies and the New Middle Class', in 
John H. 3ohnson (editor), op. cit., p. 279 
2. T. E. Lawrence, op. cit., p. 45. 
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(b) al *Ahd Society; the Formative Period: 1913-1914 
This Society, which played a profound role in the political history of 
Iraq, was formed in Constantinople on the 28th October 1913 by 'Aziz 'Ali al 
Masri and some other Arab officers, the majority of whom were of Iraqi origin. 
Al *Ahd stepped up Arab demands and advocated a federal state, 
' in which 
the Arabs were to form, within it, their own autonomous state. This reveals 
two important points; it shows the speed in which Arab nationalist aspirations 
were maturing, On the, gther hand, it exposes that, up to the eve of the First 
World War, the Arab nationalists did not demand complete independence or separ- 
ation from the ottoman Empire. Nevertheless the fast development from demanding 
equality to decentralization, and then to federation, reflects a 
'growing nation- 
alist consciousness. 
The programme of al *Ahd included the following interesting aims: 
21. The "Ahd is a political and underground society. 
2 
Its aim is the 
autonomous independence of the Arab biläd (country) and its, 
confederation with Constantinople on lines resembling those existing 
between Austria and Hungary. 
2. The Islamic Caliphate should continue'to be preserved by the 
Ottomans. 
J. The society render special interest towards the security of 
Constantinople and its protection from imperialist Western 
states. 
4. For six hundred years the Turks have been occupying the eastern 
garrisons against the West. The Arab nation should prepare 
itself to be the reserve per for these garrisons'. 3 
The founders of this society were mainly Iraqi officers in Constantinople 
with some few Syrian officers. However, al *Ahd was contemporary to another Arab 
1. It is interesting to observe that Jami'iat al Ikhä' al 'Arabi al 'Uthmani 
(Arab-Ottoman Brotherhood Society), which, in many ways, was the first serious 
political Arab group, had called 
for the equality of all subjects of the 
Ottoman Empire regardless of their nationality or religion, and proclaimed 
its support for the C. U. P. 
(i) The Ottoman decentralization party, which 
was formed in 1910, demanded the decentralization of the Empire in addition 
to certain political rights to be guaranteed to the Arabs. 
(i) M. al Basir, op. cit., pp. 16-17. 
2. "'Djemal Pasha ... admitted 
that the Turkish Government, in spite of all its 
efforts, had never known anything of this committee /al. 'Ahd7 but its name'. 
F. O. 882/24/SY. 19.4. Note by the Arab Bureau, Cairo, dated April 1919,. 'On 
the Committee of Covenant'. 
3. Ahmed 'Izzat al A'¢ami: al Qadiya al 'Arabiya, (Baghdad, 1931-34), 4 vols. 
Vo1.4, p. 53. 
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'ationalist society which was dominated by Syrian civilians. The Young Arab, 
al 'Arabiya al Petat, was formed on the 14th November 1909. The group was also 
an underground one, and in its aims, in as far as Arab autonomy was concerned, 
was quite similar to al 'Ahd. Its field of activities was among Arab civilians 
in Constantinople and Paris. 
' 
It is interesting to observe that this society 
was very influential among Syrians, but had a very limited impact on the Iragis. 
2 
Nevertheless, contacts between the two groups were established before and during 
the First World War. 
3 
The programme of al 'Ahd clearly reflects three important political tendencies 
which had existed among Iraqi officers during the period directly preceeding 
the First, World War: their Arab nationalist tendency; their 'Islamic' and 
Ottoman sympathies; and their resentment of Western penetration. 
'However, this brings to light the profound extent to which the Iraqi 
nationalist movement had been influenced by the impact of the non-Iraqi Arab 
nationalists. The Iraqi subjective and internal conditions, taken exclusively, 
could not have accounted for the development of an anti-Western attitude among 
the Iraqi nationalists. It is more than likely that the Ottoman federal 
inclination of al 'Ahd (as opposed to complete Arab independence) was inspired 
by al Masri, 
4 
who also played a role in al 'Ahdts original anti-Western attitude. 
5 
*Aziz ! Ali al Magri (1880-1964), was, beyond doubt, the most influential 
and outstanding personality among the 'Arab' officers of the Ottoman Army. 
6 
It 
1. Dr. Ahmed Qadri, Mudhekeräti 'an al Thawra al 'Arabiya al Kubra, (Damascus, ' 
1956), pp. 6-13. 
2. Sulimän Musa, tJam'iyat al 'Arabiya al Fetät', al 'Arabi, No. 151, (Kuwait, 
1971), p. 54. The author listed the names of 45 members of this society. 
only one was an Iraqi (Tawfig al Suwaidi). 
3. Ibid., p. 56. Also 'Izzat Darwaza, Hawl al Uaraka al "Arabiya, (Saida, 1950), 
Vol. 1, pp. 32-3. 
4. F. 0.371/3396/11436; also, Hasan Salb, The Arab Federalists of the Ottoman 
Empire, (Amsterdam, 1958), p. 234. 
5. Such a tendency was remarkably weakened during the Hijaz uprising and was 
replaced by an alliance with, the British. However, the anti-British inclin- 
ation was revived, in an intensified form, during 1918-1920. 
6. Djemal Pasha, op. cit., p. 61; T. E. Lawrence, op. cit., p. 59; Al Basir, 
op. cit., pp. 22-35; also, al R 
awi, op. cit., pp. 50,70-72,102. 
- 124 - 
seems that al Masri's life, having been spent both in Egypt and Constantinople, 
had developed in him a rather original trend which was composed of two-fold 
attitudes; an Arab-national inclination, and a firm and irreconcilable attitude 
toward British policy and interests. It was in Egypt that he grew up and 
completed his studies at a high school in Cairo, during the Cromer period (1883- 
1907). Hostility to the British, and a 'nostalgia' toward the Ottomans were 
the dominant features of the Egyptian national movement at that historical stage. 
His resentment of the British was cultivated during that time and lasted through- 
1 
out his political life$ with the exception of a temporary and limited relax- 
ation during 1914-1917.2 It is more than probable that his Ottoman federalist 
inclination was also the outcome of that stage of his life. In Constantinople, 
where al Mari embarked on a"brilllant military career, 
he, being an Arab- 
speaking person, was to be identified with the Arabs and to develop an Arab 
national outlook. 
Between 1908 and 1915, al Masri played a remarkable military and political 
role in ottoman and Arab affairs. His achievements in Yemen (1911) and in Libya 
(1912) were to enhance his influence. However he was arrested (February 1914), 
tried and expelled from Turkey in April 1914. It is most likely that his trial 
was motivated by political rather than personal reasons. 
3 
The effect of al Ma§ri"s arrest on the Arabs and the Arab movement produced 
two results:. (a) Arab public opinion was outraged at the incident which was 
taken very bitterly indeed; 
4 (b) the absence of al Mari left the Iraqi officers 
in political confusion and with_a lack of leadership at a rather decisive moment. 
Furthermore, the Turks embarked on a series of suppressive political measures 
to soften the Arab movement. Most of these actions were taken against Iraqi 
1. Anwar al Sädat, Asrar al thawra al Magriya, (Cairo, 1956), pp. 61,111,115-16. 
2. It seems that the British pressure had some part in preventing al Masrits 
execution by the Turks in 1914. Lawrence, op. cit., p. 75; R. Storrs, p. 179. 
3. That was the official view of the British Ambassador to Turkey; see 
M. Khadduri, 'Aziz 'Ali al Masri ..., op. cit., p. 151, footnote. 
4. Asa*d Däghir, op. cit., p. 108; al Bas. ir, op. cit., pp. 27-32; also 
S. Faidi, OP. cit., pp. 150-151 
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officers. 
l 
(c) The Iraqi Officers' early contacts with the British 
Thus it is hardly surprising that when the universal hostilities broke 
out, the Iraqi officers were taken by surprise and lacked both a clear outlook 
and a plan. of action. However, this was only one aspect of the problem. The 
other factor lay in the Iraqi officers' suspicions 'that when the Allies talked 
liberation, in their hearts they meant annexation*. 
2 
Thus, tas soon as it had become evident that Turkey was coming into'the 
War, "Aziz 'Ali had from his retirement in Egypt, sent a peremptory message to 
the leading members of al 'Ahd: that they were on no account to be tempted 
into hostile action against Turkey, as the fact of her becoming belligerent 
would expose her Arab provinces to'foreign conquest; until some effective 
guarantees against' European designs were obtained, it was their duty to stand 
by Turkey'. 
3 
However, it seems that the idea of co-operating with the British to obtain 
Arab independence was tempting for' at least some of the Iraqi officers. In 
September 1915, Muläzim Awal (First-lieutenant) Muhammad Sharif al Färougi4 
deserted the ottoman troops and surrendered himself to the British Authorities 
in Egypt. He claimed that his arrival was on behalf of al tAhd officers to 
conduct negotiations with the British. He was interviewed by the Intelligence 
Department of the War Office in Cairo on the 12th September 1915. Muhammad al 
Färougi gave a long statement, in which he summed up the Arab aims and principles: 
_transferred 
to the Yemen, and his brother, Yasin, to 1. Taha al Häshimi was 
Edirne. Mahmoud Adib ('Ahd) was arrested. Rashid al Khoja (Commander of 
Baghdad, C. U. P. member, but with Arab nationalist tendencies) and 'Abd al 
Latif al Falähi ('Ahd) were called to Constantinople for interrogation. 
But, while in Beirut, they were helped to escape by §abih Nasha't (Commander 
of Police, C. U. P. member, but with Arab nationalist inclinations). Nuri 
al Said and Dr. -'Abd Allah al Damalouji ('Ahd, civilian) defied a warrant 
for arrest and escaped to Basrah, where they assumed Tälib's protection. 
Nuri, being military (First Lieutenant), and because his activities were 
exposed during al Masri's trial, was sentenced to death for desertion. 
He remained in Basrah up to the British occupation. 
2. D. Lloyd George, Memoires of the Peace ..., op. cit., vol. 2, p. 669. 
3. George Antonius, ß.,, p. 155. 
4. Al Färou'1i belonged to a wealthy family in Mosul. He was a member of al 
*Ahd. Ater his escape to Egypt he was to become King Hussein*s represent- 
ative to the British in Cairo. 
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'Mesopotamia, Syria and Arabia were to form one and the same 
country ... which would be based on the following bases: 
1. the establishment of a friendly treaty with the English ... 
2. the Arab countries to be governed by the principle of 
decentralisation ... 
3. Sharif'Hussein of Mecca'to be the Caliph and Sultan of the 
new Empire to whom we have already paid allegiance ... 
4. Although the new empire we wish to establish is to be 
headed by a Caliph, its basis will be national and not 
religious. It will be an Arab not a Moslem Empire. 
5. Christian Arabs, Druses ... will have the same rights as 1 Moslems, but the Jews will be governed by a special law+. 
A few weeks later, Färougi was interviewed by the Director of the British 
Military Intelligence in Egypt. In this meeting F ärougi claimed: 
'Turkey and Germany are fully alive to the'situation and have 
'" already approached the leaders of the Young Arab Committee and, 
indeed, have gone so far as to promise them the granting of 
their demands in full. *2 
But, al Färougi went on to say, 
"The Committee, however, are strongly inclined toward England, 
whom they regard as the one power on whom they can rely ... 
We should prefer to have a promise of half from England than 
of the whole from Turkey and Germany*. 3 
The subjective motives for Färougits claims were clear enough. The man was trying 
his best to be persuasive, even at the cost of the truth. However, it remains 
that his former statement, although it might have been accepted by the British 
and influenced their subsequent policy, was in fact 'with no foundation'. 
It is clear that Färougi had impressed the British authorities in Egypt: 
the Director of their Military Intelligence wrote to the Secretary of the War 
office: 
*A favourable reply to the Arab proposals, even though it did 
not satisfy their aspirations entirely, would probably put the 
seal on their friendship. The influential leaders appear open ; '. 
to r. iason and ready to accept a considerably less ambitious scheme 
than that which they have formulated ... On the other hand, to 
reject the Arab proposals entirely or even to seek to evade the 
issue, will be to throw the Young Arab Party definitely into the 
arms of the. enemy. Their machinery will at once be employed against 
us throughout the Arab countries ... the effect of which would 
certainly be far-reaching and at the present crisis might well be 
disastrous*. 4 
1. F. O. 882/15/PNA/15/6. Intelligence Dept. W. O. Cairo, 12 September 1915, 
Statement of Captain X (Farugi) 
2. P. O. 882/13/MIS/15/13, Cairo, 11th October, 1915. 
3. Ibid. 
4. Ibid. Italics mine. 
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In a highly important telegram from Sir Mark Sykes to Sir Percy Cox 
, 
these vital issues were dealt with more elaborately: 
'They /Arab Committee? are obliged for political reasons to 
demand absolute independence, that is partly why members of 
committee among prisoners are not open about subject ... 
1 
Their real ambition is to have an independent Syria and Hedjaz. 
Vilayets of Damascus, Beirut, Aleppo, Mosul, Baghdad and 
Sanjaks of Urfa, Deir Zor, Jerusalem to form a progressive 
State under suzerainty of Sharif. However this would be qualified 
by agreement with France and Great Britain. France to have a 
monopoly of all enterprise and special educational facilities in 
region West of Euphrates as far as Darez Zor and in Palestine (sic). 
No Europeans but Frenchmen to be employed by Arab state in that 
area, but Arab state not to be obliged to employ European advisers 
unless it chooses. 
Great Britain to have some rights in Irak and Jazireh. Basra 
town and lands south to borders of Kowait and to Fao to be British, 
absolutely. Lands to the North of line Alexanderetta, Aintab, 
Urfa to be French absolutely. ' 
In a rather cynical tone, Sykes concluded his telegram by suggesting: 
'If we have a permanent monopoly of enterprise and of European 
assistance Military and Civil in Mosul, Baghdad and Basra 
provinces, and we administer Baghdad and Basra provinces for 
duration of war, I think that we need not fear the fdture. If 2 
Pan-Arabism succeeds and if does not we have given nothing away. ' 
Färougi had obviously over-extended the limits of his 'persuasive' approach 
by offering the British wide and unauthorized concessions. One says ' -, 
that, bearing in mind that on the 23rd May 1915, representatives of al 'Ahd and 
al Fetat had submitted, in Damascus, an agreed-upon plan of action to Faisal 
tdefining the conditions on which the Arab leaders would be prepared to co- 
operate with Great Britain against Turkey*. 
3 
In this protocol Arab nationalists 
demanded: 
'The recognition by Great Britain of the independence of the 
Arab countries lying within the following frontiers: 
Norti: The line Mersin-Adana to parallel 370N and thence along 
the line B irejik-Urfa-Mardin-Midiat-Jazirat (Ibn U*mar)- 
to the Persian Frontier; 
East: The Persian frontier down to the Persian Gulf; 
South: The Indian Ocean (with the exclusion of Aden, whose 
status was to be maintained); 
1. Could it not be that those prisoners were either unaware of Färougi's 
concessions, or did not approve? 
2. F. O. 882/13/MIS/15/18, dated 22nd November 1915. Italics mine. 
3. George Antonius, op. cit., p. 157 
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'West: The Red Sea and the Mediterranean Sea back to Mersin. 
The abolition of all exceptional privileges granted to 
foreigners under the Capitulations. 
The conclusion of a defensive alliance between Great Britain 
and the future independent Arab state. 
The grant of economic preference to Great Britain#. 
' 
It is against this background that one could argue that the concession 
which was given by Färougi and 
thereafter by Hussein not only departed and 
deviated from the basic and agreed-upon programme of Arab nationalists, but 
also had hindered and deformed the growth of Arab nationalism and undermined 
the Anglo-Arab relations. Here we are faced with concessions given by a supposed 
representative of a movement without the prior knowledge, not to mention agreement, 
of his ýellow comrades. The overwhelming majority of Arab nationalists were to 
expect, being unaware of the real agreements, the maximum achievements of their 
aims. The British, in their turn, had over-estimated the Oreasonableness* of 
Arab nationalists and contented themselves with the false impression that Färougi, 
Hussein or Nuri al Said were the actual representatives of Arab nationalists. 
When the moment of truth became clear, it was very difficult to avoid a strong 
clash between the embittered and frustrated Arab nationalists and the British 
presence in the Arab world. 
However, the British were, at that time, conducting their negotiations 
with the Sharif Hussein of Mecca. The successful conclusions of this dialogue, 
in addition to the lack of any political flexibility on the part of the Turks., 
2 
were major factors behind the outbreak of the Hijaz uprising in 1916. The 
general impact of this movement on the Iraqis and the attitudes taken*by the 
Iraqi nationalists towards the Hashimite rising deserves some attention. 
(d) The Iraqi officers and the Hashimite Rising 1916-1918 
The HiJaz uprising, being supported militarily, politically and financially 
by the British Government, was considered, with justification, as a pro-British 
1. Ibid., pp. 157-8. 
2. In March 1915, Uussein sent a telegram to Anwar Pasha requesting, in return 
for his active support, a general amnesty for Arab political prisoners, a 
decentralization system for Syria and the recognition of Mecca Amirate as 
hereditary one. Anwar replied, in a harsh and blunt tone, rejecting all 
of these demands. 
Amin Sa*id, Asrar ..., Op. cit., pp. 51-3. 
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action. Thus, the whole event was subsequently to pose the question of the 
extent of British commitment to Arab nationalism. For the Arab nationalists, 
the question which confronted them was on the desirability of such an alliance 
and its trustworthiness. 
The Hijaz movement took place just after the hanging of Syrian Arab nation- 
alists, conducted by Jemal Pasha. Taking also into account the deeply-rooted 1 
hostility toward the Turks among Syrian nationalists, it was logical that the 
Hijaz rising, was to be welcomed in Syria. 
1 
In Egypt, the reaction was one of 
a furious condemnation. 
2 
Even Rashid Rid;, who took part in the contacts with 
the British, was to publicly criticise Hussein*s action. 
3 
In Iraq the reaction was ruled by different factors; 
'The, news of the, Sharif's rebellion created no particular excite- 
ment' in the slow-moving minds of the local people. Many are too 
ill-informed either to grasp its importance or to credit it at all. 
The active pro Turkish party (headed by a number of ex-officials) 
think that it was unfair of the Sharif to raise the question of Arab 
independence while Turkey was at war. Shia Arabs, whose sympathies 
towards us are natural, seem to be pleased, and hope that the Sharif's 
declaration will be extended to Irak. The few Sunnies (who include 
a number of pan-Arabs) are delighted ... 94 
The sympathetic attitude of the Shi*ah could be explained by: 
The Hashim-ites' descent from 'Ali and their religious position; 
The Hijaz uprising coincided with two similar Shi*i actions in Iraq. Namely: 
the takeover of Najaf (April 1915) and Kerbalä"(May 1916). 
Indeed, 'the news of the Sharif's rebellion created no particular excitement' 
in Iraq. " The British Authorities in Iraq, being an extension of the Indian 
1. In. October 1915, Faisal, on behalf of his father, went to Damascus and held 
several meetings with Arab nationalists to discuss the situation. Of the 
important elements he met there were: All Ri¢ä al Rikabi (representative of 
the al 'Arabiya al Fetät) and Yäsin al Häshimi and many other representatives 
of cvrian public opinion. Faisal was encouraged toward the idea of an anti- 
Turkish rebellion. In-lage 1914 the Young Arab sent Fawzi al Bakri to Hijaz 
to discuss with Hussein the need for an Aran uprising. 
2. The Hijaz movement was considered as an English conspiracy to break the 
Moslem Unity. The Azhar *Ulemä' issued a Fetwa. which condemned 'the traitors 
and renegades who support the English puppet King ijussein bin 'Ali'. 
Dr. M. itussein, op. cit., p. 39. 
3. a1 Manär, _No. 
19, Cairo 1916, p. 156; also Shakib Arsalän, Sayid Rashid Ridä 
cit., pp. 203,240. 
4. F. 0.882/25/15 Arab Bureau Papers. 
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administration, were in fact opposed to the Hijaz venture. 
' 
Consequently 
it was the British in Iraq who suppressed the news of the pro-British 
movement in Hijaz and played down its political significance. 
However, there were other factors behind the absence of a strong 
favourable response towards the Hashimite movement among Iraqi nationalists. 
The Hashimites were not, prior to 1916, an active part of the Arab national- 
ist movement. Hussein assumed the Amirate of Hijaz in 1908, and his sons, 
Faisal and 'Abd Allah, became deputies of Hijaz in the Ottoman House of 
Deputies. Throughout this period none of them took part in Arab nationalist 
activities or'even had shown any sympathies with its aims. Faisal confessed 
to Antonius that, 
_'prior, 
to 1915, he did not belong to any Arab society. 
2 
In fact, it was Dr. Ahmed 9adri who acquainted Faisal, in Spring 1915, of 
the aims of : the al Fetät. 
3 
Nevertheless, the Hashim, ites, thanks to their; 
religious status, had always enjoyed a favourable position in Arab' 
nationalist circles. Since the days of Kawakibi up to the attempts of 
Sayid Talib and al Fetat, the Hashimites were seen as the best candidates 
for the Arab Caliphate. Having stated that, it is important to note: 
(a) the Arab nationalists had never offered the Hashimites'political leader=, 
ship, but only religious authority; (b) the platform of al 'Ahd made it 
clear that the Caliphate should remain in the hands of the Ottomans. 
The tyrannical behaviour of Hussein himself in conducting the political 
and military affairs of the uprising, did not form an acceptable type of 
1. Moberly wrote: '... the Indian authorities did not welcome the idea. 
They did not conceal their opinion that such action would be regarded 
by very many Mohamedans in and on the border of India as having been 
_inspired 
by us and consequently as Christian interference with their 
religion; the Governor of India anticipated that the Sharif's authority 
would be insufficient to prevent Arabs in Mesopotamia from joining the 
Turks; .. o the Sharif raised the standard of revolt at the beginning 
of June; and it soon became clear that large numbers'of Mahomedans in 
India and the North West frontiers regarded him and his Arabs as enemies 
of Islam ... Caused 
the authorities in India considerable trouble and 
anxiety'. F. J. Moberly, op. cit., Vol. III, pp. 26-7. 
2. G. Antonius, op. cit., p. 132. 
3. Dr. Ahmed 9adri, op. cit., p. 46 
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political leadership. In this respect it is sufficient to mention that 
even Faisal, up to 1919, was left by his father in complete ignorance. as 
to the contents of his agreements with the British. 
1 'Abd A11ah, gave a 
highly critical account of his father's military knowledge, or perhaps 
lack of knowledge, which was worsened by his resentment of any advice, 
even from those nearest to him. 
2 
Such impressions were often echoed by 
other Arabs, such as al Magri, Rida and others. 
The Hashimite platform which assumed a conservative approach3 was 
hardly an attractive focus for, young Arab nationalists. The uprising 
manifesto incriminated the C. U. P. of 'restricting the power oß, the treat 
Sultan and thus violating al Shara' ... making prayers and fasting voluntary 
in the armed forces ... harrassing some rich families ... advocating 
4 
equality of male and female in inheritance ..., allowing freedom to some 
anti-Islam papers'. The declaration went onto promise a complete inde- 
pendence to the Arabs with a government based on Islamic Shara'. It is 
highly, interesting that the proclamation failed to specify the boundaries 
of the promised, Arab state. - , 
It has been pointed out throughout this work that the Islamic reformers, 
the Arab nationalists and the Shi'ah 'Ulemä', however great their devotion 
to Islam was, were opposed to the conservative forms of 'Islam' and have 
supported the constitutional reforms and the attempts at the renewal of 
Islam. The concept of 'Islam' to these groups lay in the preservation of 
the Caliphate and the unity of Moslems against Western influence. Tasks 
1. Faisal confided to Gertrude Bell that while he was in Paris in 1919 
(to attend the Peace Conference) his father 'was continually urging 
me to force the Allies to fulfil their promises to the Arabs, I did 
not even know what the promises were -I had never seen the correspond- 
ence with McMahon'. G. Bell, Private letters and papers, Newcastle 
'Interview with Faisal', p. 6. 
2. 'Abd Allah bin Ilussein, o. cit., p. 174 and after. 
3. 'Abd Allah in his memories argued that the Arabs without an Ottoman 
Caliphate were 'body without a head', he praised 'Abd Al Vamid's rule, 
attacked the C. U. P. reforms and even the idea of an Arab Caliphate. 
Ibid., pp. 21-6,34-5,237. 
4. This point was added by the British 4uthoritiQs in: Cairo who put 
certain changes on the original manifesto. 
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which were hardly assured by Vussein's endeavour. 
This leads us directly to another important factor which contributed 
" to undermine the popularity of the Hijaz movement among Arab nationalists, 
namely the close relations of the uprising with the British government. 
1 
All these factors were responsible for the primary weakness of the 
Hijaz movement in attracting the enthusiasm of the Iraqi nationalists. Such 
uncertainty was exposed in the hesitation shown by Iraqi nationalists to 
accept the British offer to them of joining the Hijaz uprising. 
2 
By tracing 
the circumstances of the officers who had joined the movement, it is inter- 
esting to find that nearly all of them were Britain's prisoners of war. 
They were faced with the choices of 'volunteering' to the Hijaz service . 
unemployment, or British prison camps. Even Nuri al Sa'id,, who was to be- 
come the champion of the pro-British tendencies among Arab nationalists of 
that period, had in fact shown a remarkable reluctance, in spite of the 
death sentence, before finally committing himself to the Hashimite uprising. 
Ja'far al 'Askari, 
3 
(another important officer and politician who was to 
reconcile his pro-British tendencies with his Arab national aspirations) 
joined the Hijaz service (became C-in-C of its troops) only after his capture 
by the British troops. However, it is interesting that the British Intell- 
igence intercepted a rather indicative letter which was sent to him by Jamal 
Pasha. He asked him to desert the Hijaz service to the Ottoman troops and 
to 'remember the enthusiasm and firm determination with which you looked 
1. D. Lloyd George, Memoirs of Peace ..., op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 663 
2. G. Bell, Private Letters and papers. Memorandum 'Arab Aims', un. d., p. 3. 
G. Ball argued 'the respect which his name /Hussein/ undoubtedly arouses 
is given to him as a religious luminary, the first in Islam, not as a 
political leader. At the same time there are individual instance of 
his being regarded as the centre of Arab unity, not by the better in- 
structed town population, but among tribes and provincial Saiyids'. 
ibid., p. l. 
3. Ja'far al 'Askari (1884-1936), finished his high school studies in Baghdad 
and Mosul in 1901. In 1904 he graduated as Mulazim in the Ottoman Army. 
He served in Iraq and in 1910 was sent to Germany for higher military 
education. His absence in Germany (1910-1914) might explain his non- 
attendance to al 'Ahd. In 1915, he was appointed in Libya to participate 
in the attack on Egypt. On 26th February 1916 he was captured by the 
British (by that time he was a Colonel). After some hesitation he went. 
to Hijaz at the end of 1916. Of high military and administrative cap- 
abilities$ probably the only man in history to win both the German Iron 
Cross and the C. M. G. 
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forward to the liberation of Egypt!. 
' 
It is interesting to note that two 
17 
officers and brothers of Jalfar ('Ali Rid; and Tahsin) declined to join the 
Hashimites until after the fall of Damascus. 
In fact the first seeds of the rift between Iraq nationalists was to occur 
at that time over the issue of the attitude to be taken towards the Hijaz move- 
ment in the light of its intimate relations with the British. Several national- 
ist officers refused to the end the idea of joining the movement. 
2 
Taha'al 
Häshimi3 (serving at that time in the Yemen) declined to join the Hashimite 
uprising. He justified this attitude by his fear of British intentions and 
questioned the prudence of co-operation with them. 
4 
Yäsin al Häshimi (1880- 
1937), another distinguished leader of al 'Ahd (who was during the War serving 
in Syria), -took a similar stance. Even when the fall of bamascus became imminent, 
he rejected Faisal's offer, sent by a special envoy, to join the Arab army. 
Yäsin told the envoy 'the English are faithful neither to Faisal nor to his 
father. After promising the establishment of an Arab state, the English agreed 
with the Jews and issued the Balfour declaration, they also agreed with the 
French to give them Syria and they have linked Iraq to India ... *. 
5 When 
Damascus was conquered by the British and Arab armies (3rd October, 1918), Yäsin 
went underground until he was visited by tAli Jawdat, Nuri al Said and al 
Madfati. Yäsin decided, after a long conversation, to give up his hesitation 
1. F. 0.371/3395/12077, dated 1917. 
2. The following junior Iraqi officers refused to join the Hijaz (all of them 
were of Arab nationalist tendencies): Mahmoud Sami; Sämi al Naqshali; Jamil 
Kubtän_ Mahmoud Rämizi ShZkir al 9araghouli; Muhi al Din al Sahrawardi; 
Suleiman Fetah; Hussein 'Alwän; Shakir Mahmoud 
(Baghdad), Shikir Makimoudjý 
(flusayeb) . 
Sv.. -... ý t6.... ý1 4itJel. q,. ýý1 4-*: + t1: 6 /, w wj41 fzo. /ý. 34D . l1.0//. 
3. 
3. Taha al Häshimi (1888-1961), graduated from the Military Academy in Con- 
stantinople in 1906, and in 1909 from the Staff College. He was one of the 
founders of al 'Ahd and was the one who wrote in its programme and organized 
a large number of Iraqi officers into its ranks. On the 26th December he 
was appointed in the Yemen. In 1918 he became Colonel and remained faithful 
to the ottoman army. In 1919 'aha al Hashimi became a prisoner of war in 
Aden and left there for Constantinople on the 26th October 1919. From Baghdad, 
humble and Sunni family. 
4. In all modesty, al Häahimi admitted that after the end of the War, he was 
received coolly by Faisal in Damascus. Faisal refused to offer him a job 
and bluntly told him 'We do not need you now, you came too late'. Taha al 
Häshimi, Mudhakkirat 1919-1943, (Beirut, 1967). p. 57,8th May 1919. 
5. Amin Sal-id-0 op. cit., pp. 258-9 
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1 "_ and join his colleagues. 
On the other hand, a large-number of Iraqi officers decided to join the 
Hijaz uprising. All of them were prisoners of war who were persuaded by the 
British Authorities and by some of their Arab comrades to employ their military 
knowledge in the service of the'Hashimites. This is not to suggest that their 
motives were only to gain their freedom. 
"The risks involved in the Hijaz war, 
especially taking into account that they were ex-Ottoman officers, were of no 
simple consequence. The Arabs who helped in recruiting Arab officers were 
people+like Nuri al Saids Muzähim al Bäjahji, Muhammed Sharif 
al Färougi, and 
'Ali Jawdat. All of them had a considerable reputation among Arab nationalists 
of that time. In fact, a "Committee of 'Ahd members was formed in Cairo with the 
tasks of: 
... 
(a) to organise an anti-Turk system of espionage in con- t 
junction with the British Military Authorities, and (b) to 
recruit Arabs in Palestine and the P/W camps for the northern 
Arab Army ... '. 
2 
Thus, the first group of Arab officers arrived in Hijaz in July 1916. It 
was composed of 11 officers, of whom 8 were Iraqis and included Nuri al Sa*id. 
3 
On the 5th September 1916, Aziz 'Ali al Masri reached Hijaz and was promptly 
appointed as Minister of Defence. The second group of Arab officers turned up 
in Hijaz in December 1916. This party was composed of 35 officers, of whom 21 
r 
were, Iraqis- Mawlud Mukhli$, 
'Ali Jawdat, *Abd al Latif Nuri, Jamil al Madfati, 
'Abd al Hamid ai Shäiji, 'Abd Allah al Dulaimi and others. 
4 
Iraqi officers 
continued to arrives at Hijaz to serve the uprising. 
1. 'Ali Jawdat, op. cit., pp. 68-9 
2. F. O. S82/24/SY/l9/4 
3. The others were: Rashid al Madfati, Sasid al Madfa"i, Muhammad Hulmi, Räsim 
Sardist, Daoud $abri, Ibrahim al Räwi and Rashid al Häshimi. 
4. Shäkir al Shaikhly, Rashid al Inkouri, Bargi al *Askari, 'Abd al Karim Shah, 
Himid al W ädi, Rashid-Khamgs, ShIkir al Räwi, Shäkir 'Abd al W ahäb, 'Abd al 
Razzäg al Khojha, Shäkir a1_Nalib, Jamil 'Ali, Rauf al Shahkhly,, *Abd al Rauf 
al Musläwi, and *Abd al Karim al Tatari. 
5. Some of the important Iraqi officers who arrived after that were: Ja'far al 
'Askari, Ramadän Shelläsh, Mahmoud al Shahwäni, Sabri al 'Azäwi, Sämi Sabri, 
Thäbit 'Abd al Nurt Tahsin 'Ali#Na ji Shawkit, ý'Abd a1 
Ghafour al Badri, _ 
Ibrähim Kamäl, Isma 
il Nztaij, Sa*id Yeha, Hämid al Häshimi, Hamid al Qushtini, 
'Abd Allah ; glib, Ismail $; bir Suliman Masrour, 'Abd a1 Majid al Shaikhly, 
Ahmed Näji al Bajahji, Rashid 'Ali and others. 
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It-was an irony , that the Iraqi officers who shouldered the . burden of the 
uprising, were in the meantime, not allowed by the-British either to stay in 
Iraq or to playa parallel role in their home country. It was, during the un- 
comfortable days of . the Kut siege that the Foreign office had proposed to the 
India office to send al-Masri and Färougi to Iraq to help in raising an Arab 
resistance against the Turks. On the 30th March'1916, Basrah telegraphed the 
India Office, rejecting the offer and stating that ' ... it. appears to us-thate. - 
their political views and schemes are, much too advanced to be safe ... and 
their presence-in ... Irak would be-in our opinion undesirable and inconvenientt. 
1 
Next day the India Office informed the Foreign Office that-they 'would, depre-. 
cate the mission ... 'in any circumstances*. 
2 
This paradox played a big role in'developing rather contradictory feelings 
in the officers' formative political outlook; a sense of hostility was dominant 
among them towards the British administration in Iraq. But this was modified 
by a feeling-of alliance with the British-in Cairo,. Hijaz and Syria. It is not 
surprising that political antagonism towards the British was far more radical 
and irreconcilable among Iraq nationalists who were inside Iraq, or. outside the 
ranks of the Hijaz movement, than of those who-actually served in the Hashimate 
uprising. It is also interesting to observe that the British were subjected 
to the same phenomenon; those of them who served in an Iraq empty of its native 
administration cadres had developed a low opinion of Iraqi self-management 
qualities, the British who worked in Hijaz and Syria and came into contact with 
the Iraqi elite were more convinced of the Iraqis' administrative and'political 
capabilities. 
3 
The more sophisticated Iraqi nationalists (for instance, al 
Sa*id, `al 'Askari and above all Faisal) were able to grasp the dichotomy within 
British pclicy and to act accordingly. 
1. F. O. 883/13/MF. S/16/7. From General P. Lake (Commander of British Force in 
Mesopotamia). No. 1040. 
2. F. O. 371/2768/61639 - 
3. One finds an interesting and clear contrast in'the writings of Lawrence 
and Young on the one hand, and of Wilson, Thomas, Mann and Lyell on the 
other, in as far as Iraqi administrative qualities are concerned. 
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However, it is important tp point out that the Iraqi officers who served 
in the Hijaz did not turn out to be entirely pro-British. Their nationalist 
aspirations were not blurred by their objective alliance. 
' 
Nuri Sa*id stated 
that when the news of the Balfour declaration (2nd November, 1917) had reached 
Hijaz, Iraqi officers were utterly disturbed and refused to take any military 
action against the Turks unless the British would clarify the matter. 
2 
After 
the occupation of Aqaba (July 1917), a serious dispute took place, Arab officers, 
led by Mawlud Mukhlis3 (Commander of the 1st Arab division) resented the delay 
in advancing north. (Ma*an and consequently Syria) and rejected the British- 
inspired plan (Lawrence and Joyce) to keep them south of Matin. In April 1918, 
Mukhlis and his comrades wrote an angrily worded letter to Amir Faisal: 
'We only joined. the Arab Army to serve the Arab cause and to 
save our country from the Turks, not to gain salaries from'. 
England ... We see no reason 
behind the delay of our march 
-to the North except the ill intensions of the English and 
their stooges'. 4 
The most serious and revealing of these incidents was that one related to 
'Aziz al Ma§ri. Upon his arrival in Hijaz he was promptly appointed as Minister 
of Defence and Commander of Arab troops. It is most likely that his appointment, 
or even his arrival, which were not a source of pleasure to King Ijussein, 
5 
were 
imposed by British pressure6 rather than by nationalist officers' influence. 
7 
ýAziz suddenly (December 1916), and in obscure conditions, left Hijaz for Egypt. 
It seems that al Masri was attempting a serious plot which, had it been success- 
ful, would have radically altered the march of Arab nationalist movement. 
1. H. Young, op. cit., pp. 196-8. 
2. Nuri al Said, Speech in London Conference on Palestine, 1939 (Baghdad, 1939). 
3. Mawlud Mukhlis (1884-1954). From a humble Takriti family who lived in Mosul, 
finished his high school and joined the military academy in Constantinople 
in 1901. He was dismissed twice on account of his criticism of *Abd al 
Hamid. An active member of C. U. P. he participated in their Coups. In 1913 
he joined al *Ahd; escaped from the Ottoman army in Iraq and went to Basrah 
where he joined the Hijaz movement and was arrested for a short time after 
the above incident. 
4. T. al 'thnari, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 244. 
5. Ibid., Vol. 1, p. 3780 'Hussein rejected al Ma*ri because of his political 
life and his determined firm beliefs*. 
6. Lawrence, on. cit., p. 75; Storrs, OP- cit., p. 184 
7. Anis Säigh, OP- it-, p" 98 
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Khadduri wrote: 
'IAziz Ali, as he told me, suggested that when the attack on Madina 
became imminent /October 19167, a party of three would secretly 
contact the Ottoman command in Madina and propose ... that a joint 
Ottoman and Arab force, under his command, should immediately pro- 
ceed to Makka, take over control of supreme command from Sharif 
Husayn, and negotiate a peaceful settlement with the Ottoman Porte 
on the basis of full Arab autonomy within the Ottoman Caliphate. 
'Aziz Ali also contemplated negotiating directly with the German 
and Ottoman authorities in Syria with a view to arritying at a 
similar arrangement for other Arab lands ... the army officers in 
favour of cooperation with the British reported *Aziz*s plans to 
Sharif Ali'. ' 
This reflects the fact that some Arab nationalists neither had much 
confidence in their British allies or in the leadership of Ijussein, nor were 
their pro-Ottoman tendencies completely uprooted. Ma; ri*s story to Khadduri 
was confirmed, rather; vaguely, by two other reliable sources and also by his 
2. a 
subsequent behaviour. 'Ali Jawdat, in his memories, gave two contradictory 
accounts of this incident. On the one hand he denied that al Masri intended 
3 
any such contact. On the other hand, 'Ali Jawdat admitted that he had sent 
a cyphered letter to Fakhri Pasha (Commander of Madinä), for transmission to 
Taltat Pasha in Constantinople, containing similar ideas to the one mentioned 
in al Masri*s story, and without the knowledge of Amir 'Ali. It was al Masri 
who provided 'Ali Jawdat with the cypher to contact the Turks in Madina and 
Constantinople and himself in Cairo. 
4 However, 'Ali Jawdat, in his turn, was, 
deported by the British from Hijaz to Egypt in early 1917.5 
ýw 
.ý 
jid Khadduri, op. cit., p. 154. 
2. Fäsiz al Ghusiyan, Mudhakkiräti'An al Thawra al 'Arabiya, (Damascus, 1956), 
p. 239. 
3. 'Ali Jawdat, on. cit., p. 42 
4. Ibid., pp. 43-4 
5. Ibid., PP. 44-7 
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CHAPTERVI 
IRAQI OFFICERS IN OPPOSITION TO THE 
BRITISH ADMINISTRATION 1918-1920 
The Iraqi Officers in Syria 1918-1920 
Nevertheless, all the above-mentioned incidents'remained virtually 
marginal; they cast a light on the prevailing anxiety amongst Iraqi Arab 
nationalists towards the question of alliance with Britain and the cutting 
of Ottoman links. However, and in the final analysis, the fact remains that 
Iraqi officers, by virtue of their actual participation in the Hashimite 
movement were practically involved in an alliance with Britain's policy. 
Thus it is fair to suggest that during 1916 to 1918 the dominant'line'among 
Iraqi officers was pro-British. 
On the 3rd October 1918, Faisal entered Damascus which was deserted by 
the Turkish troops. Faisal was accompanied by his Iraqi officers and was 
later joined by a new group of them, of whom Yäsin al Häshimi was the most 
significant. In July 1920 Faisal was thrown out 
of Syria by the invading 
French army. 
Between October 1918 and July 1920, Iraqi officers were not allowed (by 
Wilson) to return to Iraq. Thus they stayed in Syria and served under Faisal's 
regime. This period witnessed two major developments in the politics of the 
Iraqi officers: (a) a considerable widening of the already existing political 
x' 
split in the officers' ranks; 
(b) a sharp deterioration in Iraqi officers' 
relations with the British Authorities in Iraq. 
(a) The Political-Split among Iraqi Officers 
Tae roots of the political split among nationalist Iraqi officers were 
already apparent according to the different attitudes 
taken by them in 
1 
regard to the Hijaz movement. It was only natural that these differences 
1. One could distinguish three rather different groups: (i) those who had 
completely refused to join the movement on grounds of resentment against 
any co-ordination with the British 
(for instance, Yäsin and Taha al 
Hashimi); (ii) on the other hand, one finds those who, since the time 
of their affiliation to the movement, had taken a clearly pro-British 
line (Nuri Sa'id and his brother-in-law Ja'far al 'Askari); (iii) some- 
where in the centre were the officers who had actually joined the move 
ment but did not cease to be politically suspicious of the British 
(Jamil 
Madfa'i, 'Ali Jawdat, Mawlud Mukhlis and Ramadän Shellash). 
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would take a clearer and sharper form after the officers' arrival in 
Damascus. Facing new tasks mainly concerning the political future of Iraq, 
the methods to be employed, and subsequent relations with the British, were 
vital issues which had broadened the rift among the nationalist officers. 
However, certain factors played an important role in delaying the 
final rupture between the militant and the moderate sections of Iraqi 
officers: 
(i) While Wilson's 'illiberal' policies were responsible for the outbreak 
of the conflict among the officers, yet such policies were a factor in 
preventing the dispute from assuming a sharp and final divorce., The 
militants saw-Wilson's line As the embodiment of Britain's, policy'and its 
'betrayal' of its Arab commitments. They demanded, and indeed practiced, 
violent methods to counter such plans.... The moderates conceived Wilson's 
policy as being only temporary and a deviation from the intended British 
policy. They considered violence as both alienating and futile. " Instead, 
they advocated persuasive and passive political methods which, in their 
opinion, could alter or modify the British policy. On the other hand, 
Wilson's policy, which did not distinguish between Arab friends and foes 
and treated both sides alike, had, inconsequence, played a role in delaying 
the final break between militants and moderates. 
(ii) Another element behind the preservation of, at least, a formal unity 
between Iraqi nationalist officers was the superbly skillful tactics of Amir 
Faisal. Although Faisal was very reluctant to provoke the British in any 
way, he still retained strong contacts with the militant Arab nationalists. 
He was aware that losing the militants' support would weaken his bargaining 
position vis-ä vis the British. However, he was equally aware that open 
involvement in radical schemes would deprive him of British sympathy; a 
sympathy which he counted on so much. 
It was during the Hijaz days. that Major Young gratefully acknowledged 
the efforts of'Nuri al Sa'id in alleviating the Iraqi officers' resentment 
towards their British counterparts. 
1 
In May 1920 Nuri was in London. By 
1. H. Young, OP- cit., pp. 197-8 
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that time the Iraqi officers had become very vigorous against the British. 
Yet Nuri sent the following telegram to his fellow nationalists: 
"'During my stay in London I became convinced that Britain, who 
liberated the Arab countries, remains sympathetic to the Iraqi 
cause and within a few weeks the question will be settled in 
the Peace Conference according to the wishes of the people by 
the institution of, at all events, National Government. ' You 
may acquaint the public for expressions of gratitude to the 
British Government'. 1 
Far from being pleased, Wilson angrily wired to the India Office - urging: 
'... the inadvisability of making any communications in London 
to Nuri Pasha with regard to Mesopotamia. He in no sense 
represents Mesopotamian interests'. 
2 
On the 1st September 1920 (during the uprising), Nuri, for the second time, 
placed himself 'At the disposal of the High Commissioner' and, ' '[awaited/ 
instructions to proceed 
[tto Iraq/' .3 However, Nuri, whose f irst'offor'of 
4 
help was rejected, complained: 'I cannot see how I can perform services ''" 
you mention while I am cut off from my country'. 
5 
Nuri was not alone in his attempts. Thäbit 'Abd al Nur, 
6 
claiming, 
that he was acting on behalf of al 'Ahd society, sent an informal suggestion 
to the Foreign Office to the effect 'that /the/ society would prove valuable 
? 
help to us the British/ in pacifying Mesopotamia'. The British Authorities 
in Iraq, even in such crucial moments, rejected such an offer. 
8 
it is evident that Wilson had seen these offers, not as friendly 
gestures of assistance, but-as 'blackmail': 
1. FO. 371/5226/E4539. From C. C. Baghdad, 5th May 1920 to 1.0. Nuri's 
telegram was dated London, 1st May 1920. 
2. Ibid. 
3. FO. 371/5228/E10766. From Nuri al Sa'id to I. O. dated 1st September 1920. 
4. F0.371/5129/E6324. From C. C. Baghdad to Cairo, repeated to 1.0. dated 8th 
June 1920. No. 6806. 'I regret that I cannot agree to Nuri Pasha visiting 
Baghdad. 
5. Nuri al Sa'id to 1.0. 
6. Thabit 'Abd al Nur, a Christian from Mosul, studied in Constantinople, 
joined al 'Ahd in 1913 and was active during al Ma; ri trial, fought in 
the Hijaz, son of a big landowner. 
7. FO. 371/5231/El2820. From S of S. Of 1.0. to H. C. Baghdad, dated 13th 
October, 1920 
8. FO. 371/5231/E13292. From H. C. Baghdad to 1.0. dated 22nd October 1920. 
No. 12708. 
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. the present situation on 
the Euphrates is in no small degree 
due to the fact that these gentlemen /Iraqi officers7 wish to draw 
the attention of the British Government to themselves in the hope 
that to quieten the present situation the British will offer them 
good-posts under the Iraqi administration'. 
' 
Gertrude Bell was of a different opinion;.. 
'One bright spot is a telegram from Allenby urging that we should 
let Ja*far Pasha come over ... to have Ja*far here hand in glove 
with us, as he will be at any rate, will knock the bottom out of 
the anti-British propaganda to which Faisal has always been opposed. 
He , 
/Ja*far;? has been writing to me all the winter asking if he may 
come back but AST. /1ilson, 7 would not let me give him any 
encouragement'. 
It is-significant that Miss Bell did not bear similar love for Yäsin al 
Häshimi. Even as late as November 1920 she explicitly stated her opposition 
to his return to Iraq. 
3 Yäsin was, as early as 1915, identified by the British 
intelligence 'to be the chief member, /öf: al *Ahd%. 
4 During 1916-1918 he'not 
only refused to join the Hijaz movement, but was also reluctant to exploit the 
opportunity of being Chief of Staff of the Ottoman troops stationed in Syria. 
5 
In late 1918, Yasin was appointed, by Faisal, as Chief of Staff of the Arab 
army. Ja*far's substitution by Yäsin must. have made the former envious and 
sparked off a personal rivalry. 
6 However, such an, appointment did not make 
Yäsin less sceptical about the British. In early 1919, they described him as 
being 'Capable, good soldier, intelligent, ambitious, fanatical, supporter of 
7 
complete independence. Potentially dangerous*. In late 1919, Wilson complained 
to the India office that Näji Suwaldi and Yäsin were actively working for the 
establishment of an Arab Government and against Ja*far *on pro-Turkish lines*. 
$ 
In August 1919, the British General Headquarters suggested to the War Office 
that 'It is desirable for. polit"ical reasons to get Yäsin Pasha ... out of 
1. F. O. 371/51291C5005. From C. C. Baghdad to 1.0. dated 27th March 1920, No. 10722. 
2. G. Bell letters and paperq, Newcastle, letter dated 4th July 1920. 
3. Ibid., letter dated 29th November 1920. 
4. P. 0.882/13/MIS/15/13. 
5. G. Antonius, OP. cit., p. 156 
6. P. 0.371/6350/116/3824. Mesopotamia Intelligence Report No. 6,31st January 1921. 
7. F. 0.882/24/SY/l9/7. 'Who is Who' in Damascus (1919). 
S. P. O. 882/23/MES/20/1.24th December 1919, No. 15508. 
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Syria'. 
I 
During November and December 1919, Yäsin*s activities had finally 
exhausted British patience. 
2 
Thus in late December, he was arrested and exiled 
to a house arrest in Palestine and could not return to Syria until May 1920.3 
Jalfar transferred the conflict into a new phase by actually inciting the 
British against his Arab comrades. Ja*far advised the British to deny Mawlud 
Mukhli§ and al Häshimi permission to return to Iraq because of their 'harmful 
influence'. 
4 
It is evident that Ja*far and Nuri remained faithful to the idea of 
establishing an Arab administration. However their visian was inf luenced ýby , 
the convictions that such an aim could only be gained through the consenting 
approval of-the British themselves. Furthermore they viewed Britain as the 
major ally of the Arab cause. Without British assistance, Arab independence 
was impracticable. The Arabs alone lacked the ability to seize independence 
or to carry its further burdens. Ja*far argued that *our only hope was /British% 
support*, and it was 'madness' to alienate "the sympathies of the English*. 
5 
He summed up the inclinations existing amongst Iraqi nationalists: 
*... a few youthful extremists think that they can run the country 
without foreign help and are against any mandate at all, but the 
renainder are ready to accept mandate provided that /British7. in- 
tentions in regard to Arab state are sincere. *6 -- 
When Miss Bell assured Ja'far that 'complete independence was what /Britain7 
ultimately wish to give', Ja'far replied 'My Lady, complete Independence is never 
given it is always taken*. Ja'far explained to Miss Bell that the Iraqis were in 
fact unable to achieve independence and thus his amazing conclusion was 'Complete 
1. F. 0.371/4235/120164.21st August 1919, No. 2627. 
2. In November, the British decided' to withdraw their troops from parts of 
Syria. It was believed that British forces were to be replaced by French 
troops. Yäsin foiled such an attempt by threatening armed opposition. S. al 
Ijusri, Yum Maiysaloun, op. cit., pp. 110.. 115. 
The British also saw Yasin's hand behind the attack on Dair al Zor. See 
coming discussion. 
3. Ibid. 
4. F. O /6s0/ff61/3824. Mesopotamia. Intelligence. Report No. 6. 
5. G. Bell, Private Letters and Papers, Newcastle, letter dated 27th November 1920 
6. F. O. 371/5229/510858. From P. Cox to S. S. for India. 2nd September 1920. 
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Independence is impossible'. 
' 
Faisal, in a telegram to his father, clearly and systematically revealed 
the moderates' point of view: 
*... Unity and independence are the objects of all of us ... 
But ... owing 
to the withdrawal of America and to the last 
Anglo-French agreement which does not acknowledge any covenant 
concluded between them and the Arabs. Your 'slave's position'' 
therefore necessitates our opposition to both these allies if 
we want to obtain our object soon, and also means compelling 
the nation to rely on her own finance and armaments which is at 
present very difficult. My political plan is the same as Yours, 
but peaceful ... ". 
ý- 
In an interview with Miss Bell, Faisal disclosed the essence of his political 
outlook: _ 
'This is how I viewed the Arab question ... Whatever A. T. Wilson 
might do I was assured that the policy of your Government was to 3, 
set up a National Government in the Iraq. I was content to wait... ' 
F aisal's assurance of British intentions was enhanced by his firm belief that 
British policy 'with regard to Arab aspirations was that they were inseparably 
connected with the Sharifian family'. 
4 
However, this shrewd Arab politician was wiser than to put all of his 
eggs in the British basket alone. Since the days of Hijaz, Faisal protected 
and patronized the militants from the wrath of both his father and the British. 
5 
During his short-lived Syrian era, Faisal gave tacit approval to nationalists' 
militant activities against the British in Iraq. But in front of the British 
authorities, Faisal paused like a new Pontius Pilate declaring his innocence 
and' claiming lack of control over his furious followers. Faisal"s personality 
and prestige aided him in maintaining such a policy. However, Ja'far and Nuri 
were unable to keep their balance on such a thin rope. 
1. G. Bell, Private Letters and, Papers, (Newcastle) 
It is important to note that the synopsis of this same letter which 
appears in the published work, Letters'of Gertrude Bell, op. cit., Voi. II 
"p. 
569, is misleading. Reference to the original copy of the letter, 2. 
cit. would alter Ja*far*s opinions considerably. 
2. F. 0.371/5216/E2896. Telegram from Faisal to King, dated 24th February 1920. 
Italics mine. " 
3. G. Bell, Private Letters and Papers, (Newoastle).. Appendix No. 1 
4. Ibid. 
5. Faisal was behind the return of 'Ali Jawdat and the release and re-appointment 
of Mawlud. He appointed Yäsin as C. in C. while in Syria. 
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Ja*far himself. confessed to the British Authorities that: 
t... he had done all he could. to bring extremists to reason but 
without success ... He 
is certain that /he7 is now looked upon 
as thoroughly pro-British by the advanced 
Nationalists and that 
his counsels are therefore discounted'. 
' 
Nuri was no better than Ja*far inasfar as the confidence of the nationalists 
was concerned. During the uprising an Iraqi 'revolutionary' paper published 
a message, from the 'Iraqi Conference' in Damascus to the leaders of the inde- 
pendence movement in Iraq: The message was warning against Nuri"s plans, de- 
scribing him as a British agent and calling on the Iraqi leaders to undermine 
his. efforts. 
2 
., 
This leaves no doubt that, thanks to the Wilsonian policies, the moderate 
element among the nationalists was losing ground to the more militant sections 
of the movement. This could be explained by the long uncertainty which engulfed 
the political future of_Iraq, and also by certain steps which the Civil Commissioner 
had assumed towards the officers. 
(b) Deterioration in Anglo-Nationalists relations 
In the previous pages, it was noted that certain Iraqis had given con- 
siderable concessions to the British in regard to Arab nationalist aims. This 
does not exculpate the British of the. responsibility of failing to meet their 
promises which were given to the Arabs during the War. On the 5th January 1918, 
Britain's Prime Minister made an open statement on Britain's war-aims, in which 
he argued that 'Arabia, Armenia, Mesopotamia, Syria and Palestine are, in our 
3 
judgement, entitled to a recognition of their separate national conditionst. 
On the 8th October 1918, the Anglo-French declaration, with its optimistic 
promises, was made public. 
However, the British Authorities in Iraq were more than reluctant to take 
1. F. 0.371/6350/116/3824. Mesopotamia Intelligence Report No. 6.31st January, 1921. 
2. Al Furät, No. 2,28th al Qu'da 1338 (July-August 1920). The letter was dated 
29th June 1920. 
3. ' D. Lloyd George, Memories of Peace .., op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 464 
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I 
any helpful steps in that promised direction. 
1 
Faisal, who was aware of the 
alarming mood of his Iraqi officers, wrote to the British Authorities (to Lord 
Allenby) stating his perplexity over developments in Iraq which were 'to turn 
away the affection of the people' from Britain. He pointed out that Iraqi 
nationalists: 
'Are well aware that it is not possible for Mesopotamia to stand 
alone, butýthey-feel very strongly the need of despatch in the 
constitution of a national government which shall clear the ground 
for the natives, so that they may show their capacity - relying 
at the same time on the assistance, advice and sympathy of Great 
Britain*. 2 
In an obvious reference to Wilson, and his like, Faisal argued: 
'To''those who maintained that it is impossible to constitute such 
a government owing to the lack of trained menu I will say that 
until now not the smallest effort has been made-to collect them*.: '" 
` Faisal concluded his letter by arguing: 
'It is probable that it is not possible for G. B. to change the 
government until the peace conference has decided the question 
of the "Mandate" and in this connection I do not see anything 
to prevent the British authorities from discussing with the Arab 
leaders in Mesopotamia the definition of the Constitution which 
is to be formed as soon as the final decision is made. This ... 
would dissipate all doubts in their minds as to the intentions 
of Great Britain'. 
4 
The British response to Faisalts letter was not positive. Wilson, as early as 
February 1919, was complaining of "Sherifian* activities in Iraqi affairs. 
5 
A 
few days after Faisal's letter, Clayton received the following telegram from 
Lord Curzon: 
'Faisal's propaganda for complete independence of Arabia has 
spread into Mesopotamia, ` and is causing considerable apprehension 
in Baghdad and here. 
It is feared by the India office, that agitation may be deriving 
1. Questions of the following type were asked in the British House of Commons: 
'Did not General Sir Stanley Maude, in March 1917,, tell the Arabs that the 
British came there Ware liberators and not as conquerors, and who is respon- 
sible for all thisH delay in setting up the Arab State? ' The Parliamentary 
Debates, 5th Series, o1.132p (HMSO 1920). Question to the P. M. from Mr., 
Lambert, 26th July 1920, p. 960. 
2. F. O. 882/23/MES/19/9 dated June, 1919. 
3. Ibid. 
4. Ibid. 
5. F. 0.882/23/MES/19/8. From C. C. Baghdad to the Director of Arab Bureau, 
Cairo,, dated 23rd February 1919. 
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'encouragement from British Officers in Syria, acting under the 
mistaken belief that aspires for the immediate establishment in 
Mesopotamia, of an uncontrolled Arab Government enjoying support 
of /H. M. G. J. Instructions to discourage movement by all means 
in their power, should be given by you to responsible British 
Officers'. 
Curzon*s telegram might well have been motivated by a letter which he had 
received from Hirtzel, who was complaining of 'Lawrence's malign influence*. 
2 
In June 1919, some Iraqi officers raised a memorandum running on 
similar lines to Faisal's letter. 
3 
Lord Curzon suggested: 
*... to inform them that the objections inherent in any 
crystalisation of Western bureaucratic methods in Mesopotamia 
are fully realised by H. M. G.; that certain steps, namely the 
formation of provincial and divisional Councils, are already 
being taken to ensure such a measure of Arab participation ... 
and that if and when a British mandate is decided upon for 
, Mesopotamia a 
British cgmmission will proceed, to that country 
at the earliest possible date to discuss, in close consultation 
; with all classes of people, what form the future Government 
should take'. 
However, and at the suggestion of the India Office, the following reply 
was sent to the Iraqi officers: 
+... pending the decision of the Peace Conference as to the 
mandatory power and nature of the mandate it would be premature 
to attempt constitutional experiment. His' Majesty's Government 
have no desire to prejudice that decision ... certain steps such 
as the form%lation of provincial and divisional councils are 
being taken ... Recent appointment of Naji Beg 
/_äl Suwaid17 to 
high administrative office in Baghdad, ... is an example of the 
desire of /H. M. G. % to offer Arabs of proved character and ability 
full scope for the exercise of their talents. *6 
1. F. 0.371/4146/95058/142. Also: F. 0.882/23/MES/19/11. From Curzon, Whitehall, 
London to Clayton Egypforce. Dated 24th June 1919. No. 20724. Italics mine, 
to stress: (a) Faisal made it clear that he was not for an 'immediate' or 
'uncontrolled' Arab government; (b) Wilson was opposed to any form of an 
Arab government, even a 'controlled' one; (c) Curzon was-; somewhere between 
the nationalists and Wilson. However, being pressurized by the 1.0. Curzon 
was more on Wilson*s side than adopting a neutral stance. 
2. F. O. 371/4149. Private letter from Hirtzel to Curzon, dated 24th June 1919. 
3. F. O. 371/4149/91481. From Clayton to the S. of S. for F. O. dated 8th June 
1919. It was signed by al 'Askari, Suwaidi, Mukhlis and 'Ali Jawdat. 
4. F. O. 371/5228/E9020. A summary of correspondence in regard to the political 
situation in Mesopotamia (by Major H. Young). F. O. No. 91491 dated 8th July 1919. 
5. This point has been repeated twice. However this was not the case: On the 
29th October 1919 Wilson informed the India Office that he had formed only 
four Divisional Councils (in Basrah, Kirkuk, Diwaniya and 'Amära) and that 
'It had not been found possible to form any other divisional Councils ... 
provincial Councils had not yet been formed nor did A ilson7 contemplate 
moving in the matter that year /19197f. Ibid. No. r486367 
6. Ibid. No. 110324. 
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Although'there is some apparent similarity between the two statements, yet the 
profound differences between them are very clear indeed. In May 1919, Wilson 
was on a short visit to Damascus where an Iraqi delegation composed- of Yäsin al 
17 17 Häshimi, Nuri al Sa*id and Näji al Suwaidi met him to discuss the political 
future of Iraq. Gertrude Bell, who was present at the meeting, described it 
as a 'turning point*. 
'They laid before him their views as to the future of Mesopotamia 
- quite reasonable views, well within the programme we are now' 
/January 19217 following; and he told them brutally that it was 
äll moonshine, that they must work on municipal councils before 
they could hope to take command ... they were at that time /May 
19197 running the whole military and civil administration In Syria 
... 
it was preposterous to tell these Major-Generals and trained 
administrators that they must be content to'run municipal councils. 
From that day they despaired of ever getting native institutions in 
Mesopotamia? and Yasin being the violent, active creature that he 
was, urged on the Mesopotamian League, of which he was the leading 
spirit, to the intensified anti-British propaganda it from that day 
adopted ... And 
it was because he Ailson7 outraged nationalist 
feeling, under-estimated the strength of-it and wholly misunderstood 
it that A. T. Wilson stands convicted of one of the greatest errors 
of policy which we have committed in Asia - an error so great that 
it now lies on the toss of a half-penny whether we can retrieve it*. 
It is obvious that this account leads to the victimization of 
Wilson as a scape- 
goat for British policy. However, it is evident that Gertrude Bell had indirectly, 
as early as November 1919, recorded her disagreement with Wilson's line. Wilson 
made no attempt to hide his differences even with the higher British Authorities. 
On the 15th November Wilson 'despatched a telegram commenting on an enclosed note 
by Miss Bell on her impressions in Syria: 
'The fundamental assumption throughout this note and, I should add, 
throughout recent official correspondence which has reached me from 
London, is that an Arab State in Mesopotamia and elsewhere within a 
short period of years is a possibility. 
My observations in this country and elsewhere'have forced me to the 
conviction that this assumption is erroneous and ... I am aware 
that in holding this view I differ from authorities and observers 
both at home and abroadt. 2 
Major Young commented on Wilson's despatch: 
'There was no reason to assume ... that ... Wilson had in any way 
modified his view that direct British Administration was necessary 
for Mesopotamia and it was clearly impossible for constitutional 
proposals to be made to him so long as he held these viewst. 
3 
1. Gertrude Bell, Private Letters and Paperst Newcastle, letter dated 30th 
January 1921. 
2. F. 0.371/5228/E9020. A summary of correspondence in regard to the political 
situation'in Mesopotamia 
(by Major H. Young). No. 172818. tifsýýý(X) 
n 
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(c) The problem of Iraqi officers' return to Iraq 
It was natural, once the War was over, that Iraqi officers were eager to 
return to their home country. Since the days of Hijaz, the conflict between 
Iraqi and Syrian officers was very apparent. Such hostility was simply and 
clearly a regionally motivated quarrel over senior posts in the Arab army. 
l 
Such a regional rivalry was intensified after the 'liberation' of Syria and 
the establishment of an Arab government. This process was concluded by the 
split. of al 'Ahd into distinct groups; an Iraqi *Ahd and a Syrian 'Ahd. 
2 
Faisal was embarrassed at such a development. Thus he was to encourage the 
Iraqis to return to Iraq with or without Wilson*s approval. 
Lord Curzon gave the following balanced account of the issue: 
*... it is impracticable. to postpone a decision regarding the return 
of these officers. They have been away from their homes for some - 
time fighting the Turk; and His Lordship /iffurzon7 would deprecate 
any appearance on the part of /H. M. G. 7 of putting obstacles in the 
way of the return to their native country of men who had volunteered 
for service in the allied cause and have been of assistance to the 
allied operations in Syria*. 3 
Furthermore, it is evident that the Iraq administration was in great need. 
of the Iraqi officers who were, to put it in Miss Bell*s terms, 'trainedadmin- 
istrators*. In March 1920, Wilson sent a long telegram to the India Office 
complaining about the small size of his administration and its consequent in- 
ability to cope with Iraqi problems: 'The resulting state of affairs in this 
country is in the highest degree dangerous. It is destructive of public con- 
fidence and it is placing a burden upon the remaining Officers of this Admin- 
istration which is heavier than they can bear*. 
In April 1920, Wilson in a more precise telegram, claimed that: 
Me country therefore at the present time is almost devoid of 
natives who have had previous administrative experience of any 
1. Amin Sa*id, Asrär ..., op. cit., pp. 239-243; also Lord Birdwood, op. cit., 
pp. 108-9. 
2. al Basir, op. cit., pp. 36,79-80,99-100. 
3. F. O. 371/4146/86170/142. A minute by Louis Mallet, summing up the views of 
Lord Curzon. Dated 16th June 1919. 
4. P. 0.882/23/MES/20/1 dated 10th March 1920. No. 3494 
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'value ... the present Administration have had the greatest 
difficulty in finding Muhammadans competent to fill even the 
lower administrative appointments'. 
1 
According to'the above-mentioned facts, one would have assumed that the 
ground for the return. of the Iraqi officers was fully prepared. It was in 
early May 1919 that Faisal asked Lawrence to arrange for the homeward journey 
of his Iragi'officers. Lawrence replied: 
*/H. M. G. % agree to your officers g61ng'to Mesopotamia, where 
t5ey may say what they may like so long as it is not contrary 
to police regulations*. 2 
A week later, Lawrence informed the Foreign Office of Faisal's request and 
briefed them with the following information: 
'These men are mostly convinced that Ab'dulla should become Bmir 
of Baghdad, and will inevitably say so on their return. *Faisal 
will not, of course, send with them, or make any expressions ofd 
his own opinion on the matter ... they are officers who have 
served us very well and are mostly very Pro-British ... I need 
hardly say that they all expect and want a British Mandate in 
Mesopotamia'. 3 
The India Office, who resented Lawrence's conduct, hurried to telegraph 
the'Foreign office drawing their attention to the 'effect of Colonel Lawrence's 
message authorising Baghdadi officers to "say what they like" on their return 
to Mesopotamia, "will naturally be to encourage their propagandist zeal ... ý4 
Furthermore, the India Office stated its position in regard to the issue in 
question in the following way: 
'Mr. Montagu would urge that explicit instructions should be 
furnished by telegraph to the British Authorities at Cairo to 
the effect that no person in the Sherifian service, whether of 
Baghdadi extraction or not, should be permitted to proceed to 
Mesopotamia without the prior concurrence of the Civil Commissioner, 
Baghdad*. S 
It was unfortunate that Lord Curzon, in spite of his sympathetic outlook, 
was to agree to such reservations 
by the India Office, 
6 
and-that subsequently 
1. F. 0.371/5226/4811. to S. *of S. for India, dated 26th April 1920, No. 5111. ' 
2. F. 0.371/4145/79634/142, dated July 1920. 
3. F. 0.371/4146/86170/142, dated 22nd May 1919. 
4. F. 0.371/4145/79623/142, dated 26th May 1919. 
S. Ibid. 
6. F. 0.371/4146/86170/142. Summary of Curzon*s views, dated 16th June 1919 
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the Foreign Office was to instruct Clayton accordingly. 
' 
This reservation 
was, in practice, to be translated that no Iraqi officer should be permitted 
to proceed to Iraq at all; Wilson was of the opinion that: 
'Individuals like Jaafar Pasha, Maulud, Nouri Said and others 
have written to their friends and relatives in Baghdad ... they 
are coming to Baghdad before long to prosecute a political 
campaign in favour of an Arab Government ... they have already 
sent a number of representatives who are conducting active 
secret propaganda on these lines, but with strong anti-foreign 
bias ... recommend ... to inform them and others of the same 
colour that they cannot be permitted at present to return to 
this country*. 2 
The appointment of Näji Suwaidi3 was considered as a gesture of good 
intentions by the British. In fact such an appointment and its subsequent 
failure was a further cause for the deterioration in the nationalists-British 
relations. 
The appointment of Näji was an exceptional deed rather than part of Wilson's 
consistent policy. It encourages the assumption that Wilson was attempting a 
reward for the evidently anti Turk, wealthy and influential family of al Suwaidi. 
However such calculations were not accurate: Näji, who took up his job (Adviser 
to the Military Governor) on the 3rd July 1919, tendered his resignation on the 
14th of the same month. A few days later he left Iraq for Syria. 
4 
Näji 
stated that he believed that he had been asked to come to Baghdad to assist 
and advise in setting up a national Government. On discovering his mistake, 
he resigned. 
5 
These two incidents were a real blow to the Iraqi officers in general and 
to their moderate elements in particular. 'This deprivation of the privilege 
of sharing the defence and administration of their country'6 was bound to 
nourish the. notion that 'A Mesopotamia free from British control seemed alone 
1. Ibid., from F. O. to General Clayton (Cairo), dated 13th June 1919, No. 195 
2. F. O. 371/4145/79634/142. Baghdad to I. O. Repeated to H. C. Cairo, 14th May 1919 
3. Näji al Suwaidi (1883-1945). Son of Yusif. Studied in Baghdad and graduated 
from the law college in Constantinople. Did not join the Hijaz movement. 
After 1918, worked under Ja'far in Allepo. Since his days in Constantinople 
he became an active Arab nationalist. 
4. Ond. 1061, op. cit., p"131 
5. P. W. Ireland, op. cit., p. 190, footnote 2. 
6. The Times., 23rd July 1920. An article by Lawrence. 
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to'offer them hope of'office. '1 Apart from Lawrence's and Bell's opinions, 
Wilson's conduct was causing anxiety even among those who shared some'of his'' 
views. Only two'days *after'the resignation of Näji, Wilson received another 
advisory letter from Hirtzel; in which the'following passages had appeared: 
'As regards Arab nationalism I think you will soon find yourself 
in pretty deep waters and, to be frank, "I do not think you are 
going the right way to work with it ... You appear to be trying 
impossibly to turn the tide instead of guiding it ... You are 
going to have an Arab state whether you like it or not, whether 
Mesopotamia wants it or not ... There is no getting out of it 
and it is much wiser to face the fact. Moreover, you are going 
to have a lot of people in Mesopotamia whose heads will be full 
of absurd ideas from Syria and Heaven knows where, and room and 
use must be found for them, and when you've got them, you must 
not let them resign. Otherwise we shall have another Egypt on 
our hands. All these things are going to be contrary to our 
most cherished hopes, and nothing that you or I can say or do 
will alter them ... the, idea of Mesopotamia as'the model of an 
efficiently administered British dependency or protectorate is 
dead ... We must adapt ourselves and our methods 
to the new 
'order of ideas and find a different way of getting what we want'. 
3 
It seems that by late 1919 the militant trend had dominated the officers' 
movement. After her visit to Syria, Miss Bell reported that: 
*Yasin is. the moving spirit of the *Ahd al Iraqi ... of whom 
there are about 300 in Faisal's service. With the exception 
of ... Suwaidi and ... 
Shawi, I, know of none who belong to one 
of our influential families ... The League is working ... for 
Arab independence without foreign control ... Some of its more, 
moderate adherents may not be in full accord with its policy, 
but I doubt whether their views ..., would-carry much weight ... 
the extremists are convinced that ... under a British mandate 
no attempt will be made to set up responsible Arab Government 
... the more moderate members ... are equally certain 
that grave 
discontent exists among all the classes in the 'Iraq ... t. 
4 
The Civil Commissioner commented: 
'... the creation of an Arab Government on the lines advocated 
by Yasin ... and Naji ... 
/vise inconsistent with ... effective 
control of any sort. For 
some years to come the appointment of 
Arab ... officials except of an advisory capacity would 
involve 
the rapid decay of authority, law and order ... t. 
5 
1. Qnd. 1061, op. cit., p. 138. 
2. G. Bell wrote 'The problem which they /Iraqi officers7 presented might have 
been partly solved if a native army, in which they could have found employ- 
ment, could have been set on foot irrespective of the long-delayed peace with 
Turkey and the granting of the mandate, as had occurred in quite different 
circumstances in Syria. *. Cmd. 1061, op. cit., p. 139. 
3. A letter from Hirtzel to Wilson, dated 16th July 1919. Cited by John Marlowe, 
op. cit., p. 165. Italics mine. 
4. ' Sudan Archives, Durham University, School of Oriental Studies, Box 303. 
Memo 'Syria in 1919", by G. Bell, 15th November 1919. 
5. F. 0.882/24/SY/19. No. 34436/75/19.15th November 1919. 
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(d) The Iraqi Conference of March 1920 
When al *Ahd split into distinct Syrian and Iraqi groups, -theIraqi *Ahd, 
in early 1918, adopted the following aims: 
'(a) the complete independence of Iraq within the frameworkýof 
Arab unity. 
'(b) Iraq is to be free to`choöse any of the advanced nations 
to assist in his economic and technical needs without any 
`-prejudice to his independence ... *1 
However, al *Ahd 'central committee' used its constitutional authority2 to 
amend paragraph (b) of the first chapter into: 'GreatABritain"is to supply 
Iraq with econömic and technical'aid .:. '. 
3 
Such an alteration was introduced in an obvious attempt to reconcile'*Ahd"s 
aims with'some of`the British intentions. It reflected the views of'the moderates. 
However, 'it-is worth observing that such an amendment was a reflection of the 
'central committee' of al *Ahd rather'than'its 'general assembly'.: Furthermore 
this amendment was to produce a new and profound split in the ranks of the Iraqi 
4"' 
nationalists. 
A new development in the attitude of al 'Ahd öccurred in mid-1919 and was 
revealed during the discussions conducted by some *Ahd members with the King- 
Crane Commission. On'the 20th March 1919, a decision was taken by the Four 
Powers to despatch an inter-Allied Commission to Mesopotamia' and the Levant to 
ascertain the wishes of the inhabitants with regard to the-application of Mandatory 
system. 
5 On°the 27th August the Commission concluded its enquiries and in Lord 
Birdwood's words' 'they recommended everything which was subsequently ' refused'. 
6 
Although the Commission was prevented from becoming acquainted with the 
Iraqi views on the spot, yet it held several meetings with some *Ahd members- 
1. al Ba§ir, op. cit., pp. 100=101. 
2. The 'central committee' was-the leading committee of al 'Ahd.. It was given 
the right of amending the programme. Chapter (6), Articles 42 and 43. 
Ibid., p. 110. 
3. Ibid., p. 114. 
4. Infra, p. 33"2 
5. R. S. Baker, Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement, Vol. III, (Heinemann, 1922), 
pp. 1-19. 
6. Lord Birdwood, op. cit., p. 106, Footnote 1. 
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in Damascus and Aleppo. The Iraqis in Syria forwarded a statement to the 
Commission in which the following demand was made: 'After the recognition 
of independence, technical and economic aid is to be asked for from U. S. A. *. 
1 
Faisal*s long hesitation not to provoke the Allies was finally overcome 
by mounting nationalist pressure. Thus the 7th March 1920 was set up to be the 
day of an elected Syrian National Conference to declare independence and Faisalts 
monarchy. 
The Iraqis (in Syria) hardly needed any encouragement to plan a similar 
action. However, Iraqi nationalists were also motivated by the need to gain 
the form of a representative body so as to strengthen their position vis 
ä-vis 
the British. Furthermore, the Iraqi nationalists were urged by Faisal himself 
into a similar conference for reasons which are going to be shown later. Thus 
a preliminary. meeting of the Iraqi community was held in Nuri*s house in Damascus, 
and representatives to the conference were elected. In addition to that some 
other Iraqis arrived from Baghdad to participate in the Conference which was 
held on the 7th March 1920.2 The Conference was concluded with a signed pro- 
clamation declaring the independence of Iraq, 'Abd Allah as king of it and 
that Iraq and Syria were to be federated. 
The British official reaction to the Conference and its results was one of 
blunt rejection. Although such a reply was expected, yet, even from a British 
point of view, it was not fully justified. One says that, bearing in mind that 
the British decision-makers had in early 1919 discussed the possibility of having 
'Abd Allah as Amir of Iraq, and had in fact reached a positive conclusion. 
1. A. al Fayyad, op. cit., p. 156. For a detailed account of the 'Commission', 
see: Harry N. Howard, The King-Crane Commission: An American Inquiry in the 
Middle East, (Beirut, 1963). 
2. It was attended by the following personalities: from Bafhdad - Major-General 
Jatfar al 'Askari; Colonel Said al Shaikhly; Major Tahsin 'Ali; Major Ismä'il 
Nämic3; Major Simi al Orfail; Captain Faraj 'Umarah, Nä 'i and Tawfi4 al Suwaidi; 
Yunis Wahbi; )jamid $adr al Din; Ahmed Rafig; Nuri al_ Cfdi (Lawyers); Rashid 
al Häshimi; Subhi Najib; Rida al Shabibi; Muhmoud Aib (Writers); 'Azzat al 
Karkhi (ex-administrator); 
'Abd al Latif al Falähi; Tawfi9 al Häshimi; Muhammad 
Bassahn (Small Merchants). From Mosul: Colonel iAli Jawdat; Colonel ' Abd 
Allah al Dulaimi; Colonel Jamil al Madfa'i; Maki al Sharbiti; Abrähim Tawhala; 
Thäbit 'Abd al Nur (Lawyers); Asa'd $a$ib; IJaj Muhammad Khairi (Small 
Merchants). Other members of the conference who could not attend were: 
Brig-General Nuri Said; Lieut-Colonel Ismail al Saffar; Colonel Rashid 
al Khoja and Fäig 
'Abd Allah. 
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On the 23rd January 1919, Balfour personally telegraphed the High 
Commissioner of Egypt informing him that: 
tAmongst--alternative schemes for Administration of Mesopotamia. -. /H. M. G. 7 will have to consider Sherif Abdullah as possible titular 
Emir and they would be glad of your opinion and, of opinions of any 
Officer having first hand knowledge of Abdullah*s character regard- 
ing his suitability. You will understand what is wanted in a king 
who will be content to reign but not to govern and whose Religious 
views are such that Shiahs may acquiesce his rule'. 
' 
Three days later the Foreign Office. informed the High Commissioner of Egypt, 
towing to religious divisions, the Political Officer at Baghdad had reported 
growing hostility to a Sherifian or. indeed .,.. to any single Arab head-of-state 
at all ... '. 
4 
1, 
The High Commissioner distributed these telegrams to the British Officials 
in the area and requested their opinions. On the 28th January the Political 
Resident at Jeddah cabled Cairo stating his approval and pointing out. that 'Abd 
Allah 'has special sympathy with the Shia sect, and in matters of religionýis -; 
broadminded*. 
3 
Cornwallis wired from Damascus supporting the nomination. 
4 
Hogarth 
concluded that "Abd Allah: 2 ... would make a presentable titular ruler ... 
Failing him I see no possible outstanding Arab for Mesopotamia ... '. Storrs 
argued that *Abdalla is in many ways. eminently qualified tobe titular Emir of 
5 
an Arab State'. 
Thus the High Commissioner of Egypt replied to the Foreign Office informing 
them of-the above-mentioned views which were given by British Officials who 
'have first hand acquaintance with Abdullah". 
6 
The High-Commissioner went on 
to state that 'Abd Allah*s 'reputation for religious and Islamic learning is 
considered as good as his father's'. Four days later he again telegraphed the 
Foreign office and in an obvious reply to the views of. th e Civil Commissioner 
1. F. O. 141/444, dated 23rd January 1919, No. 1. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid. From Wilson, Jedah to Arbur, Cairo, dated 28th January 1919. 
4. Ibid. From Briton, Damascus to Arbur, Cairo, dated 29th January 1919. 
5. Ibid. From R. Storrs, Brig-General to the Residency, Cairo. 
6. Ibid. From H. C. Cairo to F. O., dated 30th January 1919, No. 163 
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of Baghdad, ` he stated that Storrs 'thinks that leading Shi*ah may have modified 
their feeling now'. 
' 
Nuri'al Sa=id2 did not attend the Conference, due to his absence'in London. 
However, he seized the chance of meeting his'old friend Major Young, 
3 
and 
forwarded to him a long' letter explaining the formation and purpose of the 
Conference. 4 Nuri assured'Young that among all those who attended the Conference 
l... there is not one who holds any unfriendly views of our allies; the British 
... On the contrary they 
are one and all imbued with the spirit of comradeship 
with the British and are most anxious to continue on the path of loyalty and 
collaboration with, them'. 
s However, Nuri pointed out the deep national senti"- 
ment existing in Iraq. 
6 
Perhaps-one-is allowed here a moderate diversion from the issue of the 
Iraqi Conference to Nuri*s observations concerning the 'defects' of the British 
Administration and the aspirations of Iraqi nationalists. Such views.,, are by no 
means-divorced-from the general issue, but. are rather quite helpful in compre- 
bending-the-political background from which the 'Conference= emerged. In a 
supplement to his statement, Nuri-argued that: 
'there is. a general belief among the intelligent observers in Irak 
that the local administration is pursuing ... a policy at variance 
with the well-known intentions of the British Government ... and 
the following points may be cited in further evidence: 
ist. In Mosul and Baghdad no Arab flags were allowed to be flown 
or used in processions ... 
2nd. All.. communications between Irak and Syria are repressed. 
Arab newspapers are prohibited from entering the country ... 
3rd. Irakian officers ... are not permitted to enter Irak ... 
4th. The Military Administration forbids the formation of any 
organisation for discussing the political future of the 
country or its social needs. ' 
1. Ibid., From H. C. Cairo to. F. O., dated 3rd February 19199 No. 180. 
2. Nuri al Sa*id (1888-1958).. From a humble Baghdadi family. Finished high 
school in 1903, graduated, from the Military. Academy in 1906. Met al Ma§ri 
and was influenced by him during 1911 at the Staff College. Fled to Basrah 
after al Masrits arrest. His highly intelligent mind and treading of the 
signs of the times* he became convinced that "the interests of his country 
to be in alignment with Great Britain'. This view allowed him to be the 
first man in Iraq for forty years. 
3. Major H. Young was then serving with the Foreign Office. 
4. See Appendix No. II 
5. F. 0.371/5226/B2719. Letter to Major Young from Nuri al Sa*id, 5th April 1920. 
6. Ibid. 
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Nuri suggested that it was because of such repressive policies that a strong 
reaction, hostile to the'British, was 'intensely growing in Iraqi circles. He 
pointed to the disillusionment of the Arab intelligentsia. 'They now find 
themselves'confronted with the same difficulties and suffering, from the same 
disabilities of distrust and actual exile as obtained in the days of the Turks*. 
Nuri concluded his supplement by saying: 
t... I believe-that with the installation of a National Administration 
of a permanent character tendencies for intrigue would subside, 
agitation cease and the usual pursuits of life totally occupy the 
minds of the people. The tribal chiefs among whom are many leaders 
of the National Movement will prove amenable to the native 
Officials familiar with their traditions. 
The most essential thing for the people of Irak to know iss whether 
the British Government propose to render-them assistance in the 
immediate formation of an independent National Government charged 
with full respopsibility, for security of public peace and order; 
whether they are desirous of attracting to them and holding the 
sympathies of the inhabitants and furthering harmonious promotion 
of the common interest by acceding to their legitimate desires*. 
Major Young was impressed by Nuri*s argument and wrote *I came away from 
my interview with Nuri more than ever convinced that an immediate change was 
required in-the spirit of our administration in Mesopotamia ... *. 
2 
Taking into account that the British had already established a rather 
favourable view to the suitability of 'Abd Allah as Amir of Iraq, and the 
apparently convincing assurances and explanations of Nuri al Sa*id, one would 
have assumed that the British would react mildly to the *Iraqi Conference' and 
the decisions it'produced. However, this was not"the'case. I 
On the 13th March 1920, the Foreign Office telegraphed the High Commissioner 
in Egypt 'instructing him that: 
'Faisal should be informed at once that the right of Damascus 
Congress ... to settle 
future of Syria, Palestine, Mosul or 
Mesopotamia cannot be recognised by /_H. M. G. 7. These countries 
were conquered from the Turks by the AllieU Armies and their 
future which is now before the Peace Conference can only be 
determined by the Allied Powers acting in concert. 
JH. M. G. 7 cannot in any case recognise the right of a self- 
constituted body at Damascus to regulate these matters and H. M. *s 
Government together with French Government are compelled to say 
that they regard these. proceedings as null and void ... 
You should renew invitation to Amir Faisal to return to Europe 
1. - F. O. 371/5226/83110. 
Supplement to Nuri al Sa'id's statement of 5th April 1920. 
2. H. Young, 2P_ cit", p"298 
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land place his case before the Peace Conference'. 
' 
What was interesting, perhaps even alarming about this telegram lay not 
only in its 'unfriendly' tone and its denial of the Arab War efforts2 but also 
in the more decisive turn in British policy. Furthermore, it had explicitly 
stated the British intention of coordinating policy with France. 'Nothing could' 
have angered the Arab nationalists'more than that. 
King Hussein was able to'grasp the alarming nature, outlined above, behind 
such a policy. On the'3rd April 1920, the'Arab Bureau in Cairo telegraphed 
Vickery at Jeddah to the effect of the previously-mentioned telegram of the 
Foreign office. 
3 Hussein*s reply was quite indicative: 
t... Please allow me to say that yours sincerely has no relation 
or connection with the Peace Conference. 
, 
My. relation and engagements are, as I have pointed out many times 
before, solely with Great Britain. She called me, she made me 
revolt, and she accepted all my conditions with regard to the 
independence of the Arab Country and what concerns it, under the 
signature of the High Commissioner ... 94 
Hussein informed the High Commissioner of his 'support /'or7 the Syrian and "ww 
5 
Mesopotamian Congress resolutions*. The High Commissioner despatched to the 
Foreign office the content of Hussein*s new letter in which Hussein 'appeals 
to us jBritain7 not to support the opinions of those who hate British interests 
... 
(the'reference is of course to the French)2.6 
Faisal. wrote to Lord Curzon stating that fall Arabs in Syria and Mesopotamia 
desire independence and unity'. But he assured Curzon that the Arabs 'wish to 
preserve their good relations with the Allies'. However, Faisal pointed out 
that he 'will reply to the invitation to come to Europe when /H. M. G*. 7 declare 
privately, if not officially, recognition of Arab independence'.? 
1. P. 0.882/23/MES/20/1. The content of the above telegram was despatched to the 
C. C. Baghdad from S. S. for India, London. Dated 13th March 1920. No. Nil. 
2. On Arab contribution to the War effort of Britain, see LLoyd George, 
Memoirs of Peace Conference, OP. -cit.., Vol. II, p. 667. 
3. F. 0.882/24/SY/20/7. From Arbur to Vickery, Jeddah, dated 3.4.1920. No. A. B. 550. 
4. F. O. 882/23/MTS/20/2. To the H. C. Cairo dated 9th April 1920, No. 376. 
5. F. O. 882/24/SY/20/7. From H. C. Cairo to F. O. dated 27th March 1920. 
6. Ibid. 
7. F. 0.371/5034.. Text of letter from Faisal to Lord Curzon, dated 4th April, 1920. 
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The failure of the British Officials and the Arab nationalists to come 
to terms over the problems of the Iraqi Conference and its resolutions was 
beyond doubt an important factor in the breakdown of Arab nationalists' 
patience and the subsequent outbreak of violence in Iraq. One can hardly attri- 
bute high prudence to the British conduct who had dismissed the Iraqi Conference 
as a self-styled body of no representation. After-all it was none other than 
Wilson who informed the higher authorities that: 
'The /members of the I. C. % undoubtedly possess documents from 
certain parties and it will be found in practice that these documents 
emanate from the dissentient groups found in Mesopotamia ... viz 
the Persian Priesthood of Karbala, certain tribal leaders of the 
vicinity of Najaf and a small but influential group of Sunni 
politicians in Baghdad ". To this list may possibly be added a 
few leaders of tribes of Mosul Division ... *1 
It is worth mentioning that, whereas Hussein"s and Faisal*s attitudes were 
rather firm and committed, one finds that *abd Allah has assumed a different 
position: 
*... I am not in touch with, nor am I aware of the various factors 
secret or public, of the present political situation, nor am I 
acquainted with the position of the Mesopotamian Congress, as to 
their authority or nature of their powers ... 
1.2 
This statement could not have been the accurate truth because *Abd Allah had 
written to the Conference expressing his gratitude for their offer. 
3 
Years later, and in an interview with Gertrude Bell, Faisal revealed the 
following remarks which throw some light on the Iraqi Conference and Faisal's 
position vis-ä vis his family and the Arab nationalists. 
*... Do you realise why it was that in March 1920 I encouraged the 
handful of Iraqis in Syria to nominate my brother Abdullah king of 
Iraq? I knew that the whole business was laughable, but I gave it 
my countenance in order to appease my own brother ... My task was 
to obliterate family dissensions and therefore I encouraged the 4 
nomination of ... *Abd Allah to Iraq. I knew that it was absurd ... ". 
One could also suggest that Faisal*s encouragement of the nomination of 
'Abd Allah was motivated by another factor which he did not ((could not) expose 
to Miss Bell, namely his rejection of getting trapped by the critical Iraqi 
1. F. 0.882/23/MES/20/1 to S. S. for India, dated 18th March 1920, No. 3497. 
Also see A. T. Wilson, Clash of Loyalties, op. cit., p. 237. 
2. F. p. 882/23/MES/20/4. To H. E. Vickery from Abdullah, dated 6th April 1920. 
3. al *Umari, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 197. 
4. Appendix No. 1. 
- 159 - 
problem. Faisal was aware that the clash between the Iraqi nationalists and 
" 
the British Administration was inevitable and embarrassing. To commit himself 
to-the-conflict he would have either lost nationalists sympathies ors alternatively, 
British support. 
The British blunt rejection of the *Iraqi Conference' and its decisions 
could be explained by three'factors: (a) Wilson*s authority over Iraq was not 
yet radically questioned by the higher British Officials; (b) the 'Iraqi 
Conference' had independently proclaimed *Abd Allah as king of an independent 
Iraq, whereas the British favoured *Abd Allah to be appointed by them and as 
a titular head; (c) the Iraqi decision coincided with a similar Syrian one 
and involved a plan for a federation with Syria; the British in loyalty to 
their French commitment could not afford to render their agreement. 
- 160 - 
CHAPTERYII 
THE OUTBREAK OF VIOLENCE, 1920 
The Era of Violence 
There. has never been a Chinese Wall which separates politics from wars 
or violent actions. 
' Although violence is a continuation of politics, yet 
violence should be seen'as a new phase in political development. ' The necessity 
of violence arises, 'one assumes, 
*with the emergence of two conditions: ' the 
failure of 'ordinary' means and'methods to fulfil the aims of one side or the 
other. And the conviction, real or imaginery, of either side that his military 
might is powerful' enough to compel his opponent to yield to his wishes. 
Thus the very'näture of political violence necessitates political and 
human decisions. ' Decisions which might not be unanimously agreed upon due to 
differences concerning the estimation of the political situation. In this 
regard Iraq was no exception. The rise of political violence wks to draw a 
further line between the militant and moderate elements of the officers' 
movement. 
The British denunciation of the Iraqi Conference convinced some Iraqi 
officers of the futility of any political measures short of violent action. 
Wilson himself was to admit that 'there was, indeed, some justification for 
their views ... ". 
2 Here, and in regard to violence, one should clearly dis- 
tinguish between two stages. Prior to the Conference, the use of anti-British 
violence was actually practiced by some Iraqi officers, namely al Häshimi and 
Shalläsh. The 'attack on Dair took place on the 11th December 1919. However, 
this offensive was limited. in its scope, opposed from within the nationalist 
camp, and confined to a tribal and restricted military character. After the 
conference*s failure, violent action had recruited the support of the majority 
1. Clausewitz's classical definition considered violence or war as a 'mere 
continuation of policy by other means. We see, therefore, that war is not 
merely a political act, but also a real political instrument, a continuation 
of political commerce, a carrying out of the same by other means'. 
(i) 
Clausewitz saw war as tan act of violence intended to compel our opponent 
to fulfil our will". 
(ii) 
(i) General Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, trans. to English by Col. J. J. 
Graham, 5th impression, Vol. 1, (London, 1949), p. 23. 
(ii) Ibid., p. 2. 
2. A. T. Wilson, Clash of Loyalties, op. cit., p. 237. 
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of Iraqi officers and assumed a more effective military-and political nature. 
In this work, the emphasis will be on the political motives, attitudes, relations 
and consequences of such a rising'trend. 
(a) The Attack on Dair, al Zor 
On the 15th December, the al 'Arab newspaper informed the Iraqi public that 
a certain Ramadän Shalläsh had attacked Dair al Zor, imprisonned Arab and British 
officials, and that his action was not supported by the Arab Government but by 
Turkish officials. 
1 
At the date of the armistice the frontier between Syria and Iraq had not 
been defined. In: thetearly clays which followed the armistice, the British did 
not extend their authority to Dair. However, by the end of November 1918, the 
British sent a military officer to run Dair's affairs. 'The Arab Government at 
Damascus expressed its dissatisfaction and claimed that Dair should be admin- 
istered from Damascus. However, no action was taken. 
In February, and again in July, 1919, the British Administration received 
reports that Raman Shalläsh was charged by al 'Ahd to agitate Arab tribes in 
the area. This was but part of an al, "Ahd campaign inside Iraq to demand 
complete independence. He reached Raqah early in December and began actively 
to intrique among the tribes, styling himself Governor of the Euphrates and 
Khäbur. 
2 On the 11th December, Dair was entered by tribesmen led by Shalläsh. 
The British Officer in Dair, Captain Chamier, was put under house arrest and 
kept as a hostage. 'The Amir Faisal was in Paris, but on being told of the 
hostilities at Dair he sent a 
"telegram 
to his brother and deputy at Damascus, 
the Amir Zaid, repudiating in the strongest terms the action of Ramadhan al 
Shallash and ordering the Arab officials to withdraw from Dair. He added that 
all who were responsible for what had occurred would be punished as rebels. 
This, message was dropped in Dair by our /British7 aeroplanes on 22nd December ... *. 
3 
'On 21st December, two officers arrived from Aleppo, Rauf Beg /äl Kubaisi% and 
Taufiq-Beg /äi Damalouj17, Military Governor of Aleppo. Rauf ... brought a 
1. al Arab, 15th December 1919, No. 732. 
2. Cmd. 1061, on. cit., p. 134. 
3. Ibid., p. 135 
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letter from Ja'far to Captain th amier ... In it'Ja*far asked the British officer 
to consult with Rauf as to the. best means of restoring order. Rauf informed 
Captain Chamier that he had instructions to dismiss Ramadhan from his post as 
Qaimmagam of Raqqah and to send him under arrest to Aleppo'. 
1 
Damalouji met 
Wilson at Albu Kamäl and asked for British help to eject Ramadän. Wilson 
informed the Iraqi officer that the British Government decided to consider al 
Khäbur'as a provisional boundary between Syria and Iraq. 
2 
This decision meant 
that the British had recognized the Arab 'occupation' of Dair al Zor. On the 
25th December Ramadän Shalläsh released all his British prisoners. 
On the 12th January 1920, the Arab Government protested against the new 
boundaries and asked that Mayadin'and Albu Kamäl should be included in the Arab 
zone. Ramadan declared that the British must withdraw to the Hurän valley, some 
50 miles below *Änah:: He accelerated his incitement of the tribes against the 
British presence, "won the allegiance of the 'Agaidät and continued his raids 
against British garrisons in the area. By the end of January the Arab Govern- 
ment managed to replace Ramadan Shalläsh3 by Mawlud Mukhlis as a step of re- 
conciliation towards the British. 
Nevertheless, the threat to the British remained unchanged. Mawlud stepped 
up nationalist propaganda and military harrassment. In the middle of February 
the tribesmen who were this time led by Iraqi officers, attacked and occupied 
Albu Kamäl, and the British lines of communication as far south as Qäim were 
subjected to continuous raids. Meanwhile the British went on sending ultimatums 
which were not backed by actions. 
And Faisal kept on expressing to the British 
his apologies. On the 5th May 1920, the British gave a 
further concession by 
recognizing the Arab 'occupation' of Albu Kamäi. 
This was considered by Iraqi officers as a sign of military weakness on 
the part of the British, and because the real aims of the Iraqis were political 
1. Ibid., p. 136 
2. A. T. Wilson, op. it", pp. 233-4. 
3. Rama¢än. Shalläsh, a former Mukhtär of Albu Sarräi tribe near Dair al Zor. 
Graduated from 'the tribal school' in Constantinople. Was appointed as an 
officer in the Turkish army and while serving at Madinat he deserted the 
Turks and joined the Sharif. 
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rather than 'geographical*. The raids were carried on against the British 
installations, garrisons and line of communication. The officers managed to 
penetrate Iraq as deep as the line between Sämarrä'-Shurgät. The British 
received reports that Arab troops led by Iraqi officers were gathering forces 
and planned an attack in the Mosul district. The offensive took place in 
early June and was a serious acceleration in the sequence of political violence. 
The picture, as given above, is a summary of an account accepted by most 
writers. 
' 
However, it suffers certain over-simplifications and lacks certain 
important details which were disclosed only recently. 
(i) The British'Attitude: the British had, basically, treated the problem as 
a border conflict. This in itself was a grave miscalculation. It is clear that 
the Iraqi officers have used the frontier question as a mere pretext to fulfil 
their political intentions of either forcing their way into Iraq or pressurizing 
the British Administration into political concessions. The British series of 
'geographical concessions' had no impact whatsoever, save in exposing the British 
military weakness and thus undermining the British prestige in Iraq. 
Apart from al Häshimi's encouragement, Shalläsh had embarked on his 'ad- 
venture' rather single-handed. However, once he had scored his initial successes, 
other Iraqi officers were to follow suit. Violence paid off. The crux of the 
matter was that political reforms were in demand and not minor border rectifi- 
cations. The British declined to initiate immediate political reforms, and at 
the opposite extreme, they were forced at gunpoint into a retreat policy 
concerning the frontier issue; a double-sided mistake which could have produced 
nothing less than an open invitation to an armed uprising. 
Wilson argued that: 
'Seizure of Dair-uz-Zor was the first step in campaign of pene- 
tration from Syria to Mesopotamia. Occupation of Albu Kamal, 
following on recent agreement, is the second step .. for last 
week our troops have daily been in action against well-organised 
raids. Occupation of Ana is the third step, and if made effectively 
by Arab Government would imperil our position at Mosul. There 
1. Lieut-General Sir Aylmer Haldane, The Insurrection in Mesopotamia 1920, 
(Edinburgh, 1922), pp. 33-44; also, And. 1061, op. cit., pp. 132-140; 
also A. T. Wilson, op. cit., pp. 227-37. 
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fare indications that in near future we may be faced with a 
recrudescence of fanatical Pan-Arab activity ... *. 
1 
This might have been an accurate understanding of the nationalists' real 
intentions. However, Wilson dismissed any usefulness for political steps to 
calm down the rising tension. He argued that: 
'An announcement of the constitution that we propose for this 
country unlikely to have any appreciable effect on this agi- 
tation; population led by extremists whose cry is complete 
independence, exclusive of any sort of foreign influence ... 
Further concession in a constitutional direction will not 
affect this issue. ' 
Having discredited the value of political solutions, the only remaining 
remedy was the use of armed force to suppress this 'wave of anarchic energy 
which will swamps the: British presence in Iraq. This was exactly what Wilson, ' 
had requested the British Government to make available to him. 
3 
What is rather 
surprising is that Wilson was aware that the military tools at his disposal 
were in fact obsolete and hat shortage of transport and troops, consequent 
on demobilization, made military operations at such a distance from our base 
at Baghdad almost impossible, and that in the event of any sort of trouble it 
would be impossible to maintain communication between Dair-ez-lZor and Baghdad 
or Mosul *. 
4 
Within the framework of a military solution the only option left was the 
employment of, the British Air Force to combat the Iraqi mobilization on the 
borders. On several occasions Wilson and Haldane had pressed for the use of 
such a weapon. However, the British higher authorities, 
for technical and 
political reasons, declined to allow them to turn to such methods. In early 
March 1920, the War Office restricted the use of air action against hostile 
Arabs to within Iraqi borders. 
5 
In June, the British General Headquarters was 
clearly informed by the War Office that: 
1. F. 0.371/5073. To 1.0., dated 15th May, 1920, No. 5803. 
2. Ibid, Italics mine. 
3. Ibid. 
4. A. T. Wilson, Clash of Loyalties, op. cit., p. 234. Italics mine. 
5. F. O. 371/5128//. 1106. To G. H. Q. Baghdad, dated 6th March 1920, No. M. 1.2. 
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'The India and the foreign office deprecate the bombing of Dar- 
ez-Zor and Jazireh-Ibn-Omar on political grounds. The Air Ministry 
has also'been consulted and is'of the opinion that for technical 
reasons it is out of the question to bomb Dar-ez-Zor effectively*. 
Wilson went to the surprising extent of accepting military set-backs with 
their alarming. consequences rather than attempting any political understanding. 
In May 1920, Faisal suggested to send Nuri al Satid"to Baghdad to confer with 
Wilson' regarding the situation on the frontiers; 
2. 
Wilson replied with a refusal. 
3 
Had Wilson been acting from a position of strength, then his attitude might'have 
been understandable, but within a week of the above telegram, British troops had 
to suffer another setback by withdrawing from al Qaim tolnäh4 and orders for 
the evacuation of Zäkho, Dahuk and *Agrah were already given. 
5 
It is interesting to observe that whereas, Wilson saw no alternative'to the 
nationalist threat but the use of armed repression, one, finds that the India 
Office had considered immediate political changes in Iraq as a better way out. 
In a memorandum to the Foreign Office, Arthur Hirtzel'pointed out the highly 
alarming situation which was developing in Iraq. He suggested that the return 
of Sir Percy Cox as High Commissioner to Iraq in the Autumn of 1920 should be 
made known. Hirtzel went on to say: 
*... As to the proposed constitutional changes, Mr. Montagu is 
apprehensive that it may no longer be safe to permit a decision 
to wait on the formulation of the Mandate by the League of Nations, ' 
which must involve considerable delay; and he would prefer to 
instruct Colonel-Wilson to take forward action immediately ... Mr. 
Montagu would recommend the immediate creation of the President of 
Council, and a Council of State in Iraq, to be followed by the 
constitution of a Legislative Assembly as soon as an electoral law 
can be elaborated'. 
6 
In his telegram Wilson requested more military aid and explicitly stated: 
"... Further concession in a constitutional direction will not affect this 
1. F. O. 371/5129/E. 6543. From W. O. to G. O. C. Mesopotamia, dated 15th March 
1920, No. 85318. 
2. F. O. 371/5128/E. 1546. From General Headquarters, Cairo, to G. O. C. Mesopotamia, 
dated 8th March 1920, No. E. A. 3008. Also F. O. 371/5129/E. 6323 dated 27th 
March 1920. 
3. F. O. 371/5129/E. 6342. From C. C. Baghdad 
8th June 1920, No. 6806. 
4. F. O. 371/5130/E. 6798. From C. C. Baghdad 
5. F. O. 371/5129/E. 6439. 'From C. C. Baghdad 
6. F. O. 371/5226/E. 5113. From A. Hirtzel, 
of State, F. O. London, dated 
20th May 
to Cairo repeated to 1.0., 'dated 
to 1.0. dated 14th June 1920, No. 7174. 
to 1.0. dated 9th June 1920, No. 6950. 
1.0. London to the Under Secretary 
1920. 
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issue*. In the memorandum, not a single word was mentioned concerning military 
methods and its dominant argument was based on the imperativeness of constitutional 
announcements and changes. This leaves little doubt that Wilson's policy was 
in fact losing favour in the highest circles of the India office. 
(ii) The Arab Attitude and its impact on British Authorities: at the time of 
the events, the role played by Faisal, his Government and Iraqi officers was 
rather inconspicuous and a matter of dispute. The recent disclosure of documents 
and the passing of time enables one to give an account more proximate to the 
reality. 
" Once the 
World War was ; over, the Iraqi-Syrian border was considered as the 
weakest link in the British domination over Iraq and thus used "as a centre of 
Iraqi nationalists activities. It was as early as February 1919 that the British 
Authorities in Iraq became aware of certain *Sharifian* activities emanating 
from Syria and 'sowing the seed of future trouble by exciting a number of un- 
1 
attainable ambitions*. In the following month the British intercepted 
'agitating' letters from *Sharifian agents' to some Iraqis? 
However, the first armed attack on Dair which was a departure from mere 
political agitation was in fact exclusively planned by al Häshimi and Shalläsh3 
At this stage, other Iraqi officers were not directly involved. It seems that 
the majority was still in favour of 'political' methods. But the period between 
December 1919 and May 1920 witnessed a radical change in the Iraqi officers' 
attitude in the direction of joining the armed struggle. This shift became very 
clear when, in March 1920, the overwhelming majority of the officers resigned 
their Syrian service and joined the 'Iraqi army' at the Syrian borders. 
4 
Two 
factors were behind this change of attitude: British military weakness in Iraq 
was exposed and the dispute with the Civil Commissioner went on unsolved. 
1. F. 0.371/4144/17618, Extract from Arab Bulletin, February 1919. 
2. F. 0.371/4145/43823. From Political Baghdad to 1.0. London, dated 14th March 
1919, No. 2943. 
3. Appendix No-1; also "Ali Jawdat, op. cit., p. 94. 
4. M. al Basir, oZ: _. 
Eit", P" 125 
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This brings into question the political relations among Iraqi Officers. 
When al Kubaisi and al Damalouji arrived at Dair, they told Captain Chamier 
that they were opposed to Shalläsh"s activities. And when Shalläsh was replaced 
by Mukhlis, the *Ahd circles assured the British that a more treasonable' leader 
had replaced an 'extremist'. On the other hand, it is known that al Kubaisi was, 
in fact,. encouraging Shalläsh in his uncompromising attitude towards the British. 
i 
Furthermore, Mukhlis* policy was by no means less aggressive or violent against 
the British than that of his predecessor. 
Such a confusion would be*cleared if we comprehended the importance of two 
elements: personal rivalries, and dislike of Shalläsh's tribal and individual- 
istic methods played a role in removing him from his post. Furthermore, in the 
early stages of the violent period, Iraqi officers were sympathetic to Shalläsh's 
methods, but at the same time apprehensive of the outcome of such a provocative- 
policy towards the British. Subsequent developments were to sweep away all 
their hesitation and to involve them wholeheartedly into armed struggle. 
The recently disclosed documents give a confirmation of the above-argued 
opinion. Mawlud was not 'fanatically' anti-British. Upon hearing that Sir 
Percy Cox was retiring he 'earnestly desired Col. Lawrence's appointment to 
some high or the highest post in Iraq'. 
2 
Yet his actual resentment of the 
British Administration's policies in Iraq was not radically different from 
'extremists' like Shalläsh. When he replaced the latter, Wilson was not im- 
pressed, and informed the India Office that Mawlud 'far from adopting a different 
attitude, is also actively inciting tribes throughout Mesopotamia to active 
revolt and rebellion. His letters have reached tribes as far as Amaral. 
3 
A month later, Mawlud informed Wilson that he would try to settle the 
frontier issue peacefully, 'but tribes can do what they please unless a definite 
promise is given that /the British7 intend retiring'. 
4 
In the meantime Mawlud 
1. al Basir, op. cit", p. 121. 
2. F. 0.371/6348/105. From M. Palmer (Damascus) No. 66 very confidential. To 
S. of S. for F. O. London, dated 30th April 1921, 
3. F. O. 371/5128/E. 115. From C. C. Baghdad to I. 0., dated 30th January 1920, No. 1301. 
4. F. O. 371/5128/B. 114. From C. C. Baghdad to I. 0., dated 4th February 1920. 
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threatened the use of violence if the British advanced to Mayädin. 
1 
Wilson, 
in late February, suggested to the India office that 'the Arab Government 
should be induced to remove Maulud and replace him by a less headstrong person- 
ality*. 
2 
On the 12th March more agitating letters from Mawlud were intercepted 
by the British. 
3 
On the 11th February General Haldane informed the War Office 
that "Maulud'is still threatening*. 
4 
And he turned their attention to reports 
received 'of an assembly of Arab troops and tribesmen at Mayadin and Ramadhan 
Shallash moving from Damascus with reinforcementst. 
5 
Late in March Wilson cabled 
the following interesting information: 
*Ramadhan Shallash has never been arrested and is now back at 
Mayadin styling himself, leader of Arab party with the connivance, 
if not with the active assistance of Maulud Pasha at Dair-ez-Zor, 
who is Faisal*s own nominee'. 
6 
Wilson was of the opinion that without the 'funds flowing' from Syria 
'external hostile propaganda would be of little importance'.? He pointed out 
that: 
Mere is a continual flow of money and propaganda, the latter 
employing the name of Abdullah as well as that of Faisal and the 
Syrian State, from Dair-ez-Zor into this country, and it is 
difficult to see where this can come from, especially the funds, 8 
if not from the Damascus Government or officials of that. Governmentt. 
A month earlier, Wilson had bitterly complained to the India office of the 
*agitating* activities of tour subsidised friends in Syria'. 
9 A"year earlier 
the Foreign Office was provoked, at Wilson's persistence, to telegraph General 
Clayton informing him of the fears existing in the India office circles that 
10 
'agitation may be deriving encouragement from British Officers in Syria'. 
1. Ibid. 
2. F. O. 371/5128/E. 1393, dated 25th February 1920, No-2497 
3. 'F. 0.371/5129/B. 1870. From C. C. Baghdad to 1.0.12th March 1920, No. 3264 
4. F. O. 371/5128/E. 282. To W. O. dated 11th February 1920, No. X. 8149. 
5. Ibid. 
6. F. O. 73 1/5129/E. 2577. From C. C. Baghdad to I. 0.9 24th March 1920, No. 2699. 
7. F. O. 371/5130/E. 7219. From C. C. Baghdad to 1.0.18th June 1920, No. R. 7392. 
8. Ibid. 
9. F. O. 371/5074. From C. C. Baghdad to I. O. dated 18th May 1920, No. 5954 
10. F. 0.371/4146/95058.24th June 1919, No. 207 
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0 
Wilson's notions were perceptive and accurate. Nowadays it is clear that 
military operations were exclusively organized and led by Iraqi officers and 
followers of al 'Ahd. 
However, what is at stake is not how the events are seen now as much as 
how they were understood at the time itself. The ordinary Iraqi did not differ 
from Wilson or Haldane in viewing the events as a daring defiance of British 
Authority and a serious encouragement to further mutiny. However, the British 
higher authorities were not in a position, perhaps did not want, to consider 
it in a similar way: the essence of such a position finds its roots in the 
assumption that Iraqi officers' hostility to 'British' policies was not nec- 
essarily a radical threat to the British strategic presence in the area. In. 
other words, Wilson's plans were not the sole British alternative. Furthermore, 
it was evident that Iraqi officers were available for the support of a different 
alternative which, while it would satisfy some nationalists' aims, would not, 
in the-meantime, imperil essential British interests in the area. 
Major Young described this British dichotomy: 
'Our policy in the Middle East during the last three or four years 
has been very largely influenced -I will not say controlled - by 
two strong personalities. On the Syrian side we have had Colonel 
Lawrence, encouraging Arab aspirations from anti-French motives. 
On the Mesopotamian side we have had Sir Arnold Wilson checking 
the same aspirations and making no effort to disguise his reasons 
for doing sot. ' 
The attitude of the Iraqi officers was another factor in confusing the 
picture. Some of them were openly and bravely in the forefront of the struggle. 
Others took a position of duality; while discretely encouraging the movement, 
they, vis-a-vis the British, had assumed moderation and dis-association. The 
British Political Officer at Dair cleverly argued: 
I... I think there is no doubt that Yasin Pasha's party not 
only countenanced but encouraged it. It it was successful 
Ramadhan would be congratulated. If it was unsuccessful he 
would be disowned*. 
2 
1. F. O. 371/5228/B. 8483. British Policy in Mesopotamia. A memorandum by Major 
H. Young, p. 4, Un. d. (June 1920). 
2. F. O. 371/5128/E. 1264. Report from P. O. Dair-ez-Zor, January 1920. 
4 
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By disguising his real role, Faisal managed to further, confuse the 
situation. He 'displayed his shrewdness by managing to preserve friendly links 
with two sides who were at each other's throat. On the one hand, the appoint- 
ments of R amadän and Mawlud were decreed by his government. He personally gave 
the officers large sums of money to cover the costs of the border operations. 
1 
Faisal refused the dismissal, so much demanded by the British, 
2 
of the Iraqi 
officials in his region who were directly responsible for the military attacks. 
On the other hand, Faisal told the Iraqi officers that he was unable to 
come openly to their support because he needed British assistance to. preserve 
Syria*s independence. He also used that 'laughable' pretext of Iraq being *Abd 
Allah*s sphere of influence of which he can not violate. 
3 
Faisal, in front 
of the British, condemned the officers' actions and pleaded lack of control 
over his enthusiastic 
followers. 
Upon hearing the first news of the attack on Dair, Faisal, on the 18th 
December 1919, wrote to the British Chief of the Imperial General Staff and 
explicitly repudiated all connection with Ramadan*s action. 
4 When military 
operations were intensified, the Syrian Minister of Foreign Affairs wired the 
British in Cairo assuring them that "... the Syrian Government has no connection 
whatever with such affairs*. 
5 The Minister went on to say that 'Faisal is taking 
1. Tahsin al *Askari, Dhekkreiäti 'an al Thawra alIArabiya al Kubra wa al 
Thäwra al'Iragqiya, Vol. 2 (Baghdad, 1936), p. 56. The writer at the time of 
the event was head of Dair al Zor police. Also, "Ali Jawdat, op. cit., 
pp. 93-4. 
2. On the 25th February 1920, Wilson telegraphed the 1.0. suggesting that the 
Arab Government 'should be induced to remove' Iraqi officials who were re- 
sponsible for the agitation on the borders. F. 0.371/5128/E. 1392, No. 2497. 
A few days later, the 1.0. wired the F. O. informing them that 'Mr. Secret- 
ary Montagu would invite Earl Curzon ... to invite Emir Feisul (1) to 
replace officials in eastern portion of his territory, by others less 
hostile to /H. M. G. 7; (2) to hand over for trial certain individuals specified'. 
F. 0.371/5130/E. 8001. From I. O. to Under S. of S. F. O. 
3. 'Ali Jawdat, op. cit., p. 91. 
4. Together with the letter, a telegram to Amir Zeid from Faisal was attached 
demanding of him urgent action against Ramadän*s behaviour. The British 
Authorities in Iraq gave this telegram the widest possible publicity espec- 
ially in the areas around Dair. 
W. 0.33.969 
F. O. 371/5129/E. 2577. From C. C. Baghdad to 1.0. March 24th, No. 3699 
S. F. O. 371/5130/D. 9297. From Minister F. A. Damascus to G. O. C. Egyptian Exped- 
itionary Force. Dated 2.7.1920. No. 1073. 
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pains to quieten the Arabs on all occasions'. 
' 
A week later the British General 
Headquarters in Cairo telegraphed the War Office and the following most intereting 
paragraph was to occur in the telegram: 
*... It is certain that the Arab Administration know of and 
possibly encouraged the situation at Dairozzor. Gaffar Pasha 
however assures me this is not so. He also assures me that 
Faisal does all in his power to prevent it. I have however 
written to Faisal informing him of the information above and 
requesting him to take steps to stop all hostile acts. How- 
ever I doubt if he can do so. As the best course to strengthen 
his hands I consider still payments of subsidy'. 
Lord Allenby confirmed the above opinion and, during the most decisive days 
in Iraq he argued 'Lack of resources make it difficult for Faisal to maintain 
order'. 
3 
The Political Officer of'Dair wrote *I have no doubt that Amir Faisal 
is absolutely honest when he says that he didn*t countenance this move'. 
4 
It goes without saying that such views were in complete contrast to the 
'accusations' uttered by Wilson and Haldane. One is not quite sure if the 
India office was serious when they telegraphed Wilson on the 11th June asking 
him for a 'summary of hostile Sharifian action and evidence of connection with 
Damascus Government'. 
5 
Wilson in his reply pointed out: 
The sending of a succession of extremists to Dair-ez-Zor in an 
official capacity from Ahed-el-Iraq (the Mesopotamian Nationalist 
Society in Syria) is in itself sufficient proof of their lack of 
. desire 
to help'. 6 
The Civil Commissioner suggested that Faisal be made to remove 'Mesopotamian 
Nationalists' who are his representatives at Dair. 
7 Ten days earlier Wilson 
had informed the India Office that "a virtual state of war exists between 
8 
Sherifian forces and those of H. M. G. in zesopotamiat. 
1. Ibid. 
2. F. 0.371/5129/E. 6715. From G. H. Q. Egypt to W. O. No. 703G. dated 14th June 
1920. Italics mine. 
3. F. O. 371/5130/E. 8561. From Lord Allenby to W. O., dated 19th July 1920 
4. F. O. 371/5128/E. 1264. Report from P. O. Dair-ez-Zor, January 1920. 
5. F. O. 371/5130/E. 6905. From S. of S. 1.0. to C. C. Baghdad, dated 11th June 1920 
6. F. O. 371/5130/E. 7219. From C. C. Baghdad to 1.0. dated 18th June 1920 
7. Ibid. 
8. gp 371/5129/E. 6324. Dated 8th June 1920, No. 6806. 
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Nevertheless the W ar-Office'expressed doubts to the India Office concerning 
the attribution 'to Sharifian influence the anti-British activity of the Arabs 
on the Euphrates', 
1 
and enquired whether 'the hostility may not be inspired by 
the Young Arab Party of Damascus". 
2 
Major Young wrote that: 
'Colonel Gribbon rang me up today /14th June 19207 to say that 
the War office did not altogether like Sir A. Wilson's 
repeated accusations of Sharifian complicity in the frontier 
disturbances*. 3 
The India Office assumed a 'neutral' position. They telegraphed the War and 
Foreign offices 'enquiring' whether intelligence officers in Syria could 
confirm Wilson*s views. "If so' the India Office suggested that the discontin- 
uation of subsidies should be considered. 
4 
It is hard to believe that the British Authorities were genuinely unable 
to recognize the Iraqi nationalists' and Syrian Government's real role in the 
events. The crux of the matter, one assumes, is that the British over-tacademict 
attitude was, basically, motivated by their discomfort with W ilson"s policy and 
their certain 'sympathies'. with Iraqi officers. Major Young was more precise 
and straightforward when he wrote: 
'My own view is - as it always has been - that it is lamentable 
that any officer who was with Faisal should adopt an anti-British 
attitude, and that the spirit of our administration in Mesopotamia 
is largely - if not entirely - responsible for this. Wilson's 
implacable hostility to anything Sherifian has caused us a great 
deal of trouble in the past and will cause us more in the future. 
I am strongly opposed to his suggestion of offensive action beyond 
the Mesopotamian frontier by aircraft and earnestly trust that it 
may not be approved*. 
5 
The British Government was at real pains to whitewash Faisal of any 
responsibility. When Churchill was asked 'Where these Sherifian Officers 
came from? 'p he gave the extraordinary reply of I..; I-do not want to make 
6" 
any charges I cannot prove'. In the"same session Churchill publicly gave 
1. Ibid. E. 6729. From Army Council W. O. to S. of S. for I. O. un. d. 
2. Ibid. 
3. F. O. 371/5129/E. 6324. Major, H. Young*s handwritten comment (dated 14/6) on 
Wilson*s telegram No. 6806 (8th June 1920). 
4. F. O. 371/5128/E. 95. From 1.0. to W. O. and P. O., dated 12th February 1920. 
5. F. O. 371/5129/E. 6324. Major Young*s comment on Wilson*s telegram No. 6806 
6. The Pariiamentar Debates, House of Commons, Fifth Series, Volume 130 
(H. M. S. O., 1920 , dated 22nd June 1920. Question from Mr. Ormsby Gore, p. 1991 
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Faisal his *letter of indulgence*. 
*... the term "Sherifian" has been applied to the officers who 
led the attack on Tel 'Afar, but this expression may not be 
strictly accurate. Emir Faisal ... has given repeated assurances 
that these raids would be repudiated by him. It seems more 
probable that the anti-British hostility of the Arabs on the 
Euphrates is inspired rather by the Young Arab Party at Damascus 
than by the representatives of the Sherifian family*. 1 
Nearly a month later, Churchill again *assured' the members of the House of 
Commons that "there /was7 no reason to connect the rising with Arab rulers#. 
2 
To be more precise, the British attitude, at that stage, was one of confusion 
than of clarity. Wilson was, objectively, left alone and handcuffed by his 
superiors, in front of a rising and aggressive nationalist movement, which by 
shrewdness or force of circumstances was able to exploit the prevailing contra- 
dictions among the British. Had the British acted swiftly by removing Wilson 
and establishing a different policy, then they might have mastered the subsequent 
developments. By declining to use force and being hesitant to bring. about 
political reforms; the path to an armed uprising was widely opened. 
(b) The Attack on Tal 'Afar 
The offensive on Tal 'Afar was different from that on Dair in the following 
respects: (a) whereas the operations in Dair were disguised by the so-called 
'border issue', the Iraqi officers' onslaught against Tal 'Afar was an openly 
anti-British action; (b) the offensive against Tal 'Afar had, unlike Dair, 
caused the violent death of British soldiers; (c) the early operations in 
Dair were of a tribal character,. whereas the attack on Tal tAfar was solely 
organized by Iraqi officers and members of al *Ahd; (d) the operations in Tal 
'Afar were organized in the close co-operation of fAhd's members in Mosul, Tal 
'Afar and Syria in an ambitious plan to occupy the whole of the Mosul area and 
as part of , 
the preparation for the 'revolution*. 
1. Ibid. 
2. Ibid., Vol. 131, dated 15th July 1920, p. 2577. 
When Churchill was asked about the participation of Iraqis, in Syria, in 
the attacks, he replied *I should 
be rather shy of giving an answer to 
that without having an opportunity to verifying the facts*. 
Ibid., Vol. 132, dated 27th July 1920, p. 1191. 
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(i) Arab Nationalists of Mosul: All through this chapter we have been dealing 
with the activities and tendencies of""Iraqi nationalists abroad. This derived 
its justifications from several factors, one of which lies in the semi- 
independence of the 'two'componentsIof the Iraqi independence movement. Tal 
'Afar (or indeed*Mosul) confronts us with an exception. The nationalists' 
activities in that area were a product of a joint effort of Iraqi nationalists 
inside and outside Iraq. 
It has-been mentioned that a certain (al 'Alam) Arab nationalist society 
was in existence during the late Turkish-and early British periods in Mosul. 
' 
However, and because of the strong links between Mosul and Syria (the centre 
of al *Ahd), the *Alam society decided to'Join al 'Ahd, to become its Mosul 
branch and to accept political directions from al 'Ahd*s general centre in 
Damascus and afterward in Dair al Zor. This decision was taken in May 1919, 
and was sent to Syria together with the names of the new administrative 
committee'. 
2 It is interesting to observe that although the authorities 
admitted their failure to uncover the leaders of this society, 
3 
yet they were 
able to pinpoint al Jalabi, al Jalili and Thäbit as active leaders of al 'Ahd. 
4 
In terms of organization and contacts, the Arab movement in Mosul was, 
unlike that of Baghdad and the Middle of the Euphrates, in profound interaction 
with the Iraqi nationalists in Syria. However, in its political views, it was 
characterised by 
a radical and violent anti-British tendency, and a strong 
Islamic outlook. In this respect it had more in common with Iraqi national- 
ists in Baghdad than with those who were in Syria. This could be explained by 
Mosul*s proximity to Turkey and the existence of a large non-Arab population. 
The geographical proximity of Mosul to Turkey, the Turkish claim over 
1. Supra. P. 76' 
2. The committee was composed of the following persons: Muhammad Rau'f, al Ghulämi 
(Mutttamad - Agent), t)ia' Yunis al Tala*fari 
(Katib - Secretary), Ibrähim 
*ATar Bashi (treasurer), Dr. Däoud al Jalabi, Mustafa al Jalili, Said Häj 
Thäbit, Mukiammad Amin al *Umari, Yäsin al *Uribi, *Abd Allah al *Umari. 
Letter from Mosul*s *Ahd to 'general centre', dated 24th May 1919, published 
in $ada al Abrar (Mosul, 10th October 1952). 
3. F. O. 371/5130/E. 9897. Memorandum dated 25th June 1920 from P. O. Mosul. 
4. F. 0.371/6349/171. 'Personalities, Mosul, Arbil and-frontiers*, Summer 1920. 
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Mosul and the existence of an active pro Turkish society' were factors behind 
the emergence of an interesting Arab nationalist attitude in Mosul. On the one % 
hand, Mosul's=al 'Ahd was vigorously hostile to the, pro.. Turkish group. 
2 
Further. 
more, the fear of a Turkish re-occupation of, and a British failure-to defend, 
Mosul was a major factor in urging the society to demand of al 'Ahd's general 
centre-an immediate plan for an 'Arab occupation' of Mosul. 
3 
On the other hand, it was the very same factors which had motivated Mosul's 
*Ahd to envisage, indeed to explore, the possibilities of an Arab Turco co- 
operation to do away with the British occupation.. Such a notion finds its 
reflection in the content, of an important letter sent to *Ahd general centre 
from its branch-in Mosul. The letter commenced with a bitter'attack on the 
British Administration and its most 'ruthless and suppressive' methods. It 
expressed doubts as to the intentions of America whhcl6was considered as a 
"British tool', while France was seen as an Undisguised enemy. Britain had 
openly betrayed its Arab commitments and would undermine any attempt at Arab 
independence. Although political methods and diplomacy were appreciated, they 
were rather futile. Thus, the letter suggested any hope or trust in the Allies 
be given up. Instead, the only alternative for the Arabs lay in their. alliance 
with the Turks and the Bolsheviks. However, the letter pointed out that Bolshevik 
principles were =harmful' to Iraq, and what was desired was an alliance with a 
growing unimperialistic force and not the importation of its ideas. The letter 
emphasised that growing support for Mustafa Kemal in Mosul and the growing 
intolerance of British occupation. *The British will never evacuate Iraq but 
only by the force of arms', so argued the letter. This, according to the letter, 
1. This society was formed in Mosul in May 1919. It exploited the victories 
of Attaturk, the uncertainty of Mosul's future and the profound Islamic 
feelings to propagate a pro Turkish movement. The majority of its members 
were Turks, Turcoman and Kurds of whom the majority were ex-Turkish 
officials. However, this group included not a few Arabs. 
A. al Tala*fary 9ahtan, Thawrat Tela*far, (Baghdad, 1969), pp. 62-4. 
2. Ibid. 
3. (a) Letter dated 24th May 1919, from Mosul's *Ahd to ? general centre*, 
Sada al Ahrär, (Mosul, 24th October 1952) 
(b) Letter dated Feburary 1920, from Mosul's *Ahd to general centre, 
Sada al Ahrar, (Mosul, 9th April 1954). 
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pre-necessitated two conditions: the sending of Iraqi officers into tribal 
areas. and an alliance should be concluded with major powers to assist the Iragis. 
l 
Mosul's $Ahd put its theoretical beliefs into practice. Muhammad al 'Umari 
was sent to Mardin to contact the Turks. In a secret letter from Mardin, he 
disclosed that his mission was approved by Mawlud Mukhliq, 'Ali Jawdat and the 
'known' ideas of Y sin al HZshimi. He stated that an agreement was concluded 
with the Turks on the understanding that: a confederation was to be established 
between Arab and Turks; the Caliphate was to be Turkish; Arabs are to $occupy* 
Iraq including Mosul and to form a national government; the Turks were to help 
the Arab nationalists with military equipment. 
2 The Turks in Mardin gave al 
'Umari some weapons but declined to give him cannons3 due to their fear of an 
Arab occupation of Mosul. 
3 
The 'general centre' of al 'Ahd, in its turn, carried contacts with the 
Turks: Ra'uf al Shahwäni and Rashid Khoja were sent to Constantinople to 
4 
conduct negotiations. Mahmoud al Sanawi brought some arms from Diär Bakir. 
'Ali Jawdat was in constant contact with 'Ajami al Sa'dun and Turkish officers 
who provided him with large quantities of military equipment. 
6 
Arab nationalist-co-operation with the Turks assumed a new dimension when. 
Mosul's "Ahd and the pro-Turkish society were able to conclude, in mid-1920, a 
common plan of action against the British. 
7 
This solidarity lasted up to the 
arrival of Faisal in Iraq, when it was bound to break down. This new alliance 
with the Turks must have been of an important political significance. However, 
the unresolved dispute over Mosul, the non-Ottoman, or non-Islamic, tendencies 
of Mustafa Kemal, and the deep mistrust between 
Arabs and Turks were all elements 
which handicapped the development of such an alliance 
from assuming a more 
1. Letter dated 30th November 1919, from Mosul's 'Ahd to general centre, 
$ada al Ahrär, (Mosul, 3rd April 1953). 
2. Letter dated 15th April 1920, from Makhzum (Muhammad al 'Umari) to Mosul's 
'Ahd. dada al Ahrär, (Mosul, 23rd October 1954). 
3. Tahsin al 'Askari, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 92. 
4. A. al Tela'fari Qahtän, op. cit. , p. 67 
5. #Ali Jawdat, ", pp"131.4. 
6. Ibid., p. 135. 
7. A. al Tela'fari Qahtan, op. cit., pp. 70-71,396-7. 
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serious nature. In September 1920, the British Intelligence reported: 
! (a) Nationalist elements in Syria and Mesopotamia were sytem- 
atically organised for a considerable period until they obtained 
such cohesion among themselves as enabled them to exercise a 
powerful influence on local feeling in both countries, and on 
Arab Government at Damascus. 
(b) This having been achieved, their union with Turkish National- 
ists was brought about. This was considerably facilitated by 
Feisal"s failure to control extremists at the beginning of 
November 1919 . 
(c) ... Wide differences exist. There is evidence of great dis- 
trust of Arab by the Turk and vice versa, we may hope to take 
advantage of this ... 
(g) Mustafa Kemal is very luke-warm adherent to pan Islamist 
policy ... he is likewise hostile to the Arabs (but he is being 
forced ... to use them)*. 
1 
Furthermore, the Political Officer of Mosul telegraphed Wilson informing 
him that 'the movement does not appear to have had active Turkish support. 
The 'Iraq Army' was allowed to buy food in Nisibin, but the Government there 
tried to capture an officer who joined the movement'. 
2 
On the other hand, it seems that such a probable Arab-Turkish alliance 
was a factor in urging the British Authorities to promote the idea of Arab 
independence as to cut the way for any Turkish advances. On behalf of Lord 
Curzon, the India Office was informed that: 
"One of the principal dangers, not only to British policy in 
Mesopotamia, but to British policy elsewhere, is the relation 
between Mustapha Kamal and the Mesopotamian extremists ... It 
is necessary therefore to begin as soon as possible to work for 
Arab independence of a kind which will lead to division between. 
Turks and Arabs and amity between Arabs and British'. 3 
There was another element behind the strong Islamic tendencies of Mosul's 
Arab nationalists, namely the demographic character of the north of Iraq in 
general and of Mosul in particular. 
4 Mosul being surrounded by non-Arab 
ethnic groups was an element in producing (a) a sharp national Arab conscious- 
ness, and (b) this Arab awareness was accompanied, perhaps even modified, by 
1. W. 0.106/2-/34. From S. of S. to C. C. Bzghdad, dated 23rd September 1920, 
No. 1930. 
2. F. 0.371/5130/E. 9897. From P. P. Mosul, L. F. Naßder, Lieut-Colonel to C. C. 
Baghdad, dated 25th June 1920 
3. F. O. 371/5229/10440. Signed by J. A. Tilley, F. O. to S. of S. for 1.0. 
dated 11th September 1920. 
4. Stip ,, PP. 
7ý" 
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a conspicuous Islamic inclination. The latter element could also be explained 
by two other factors concerning Arab-Kurdish relations: historically speaking, 
there was hardly any racial or ethnical strife between Arabs and Kurds; 
1 both 
ethnic groups shared Islam and Sunnism. 
The primary'task for Arab nationalists at that period was the confrontation 
with the British. Contacts with the Kurds and Turcomans were considered of 
vital importance in attempting to establish"a common anti-British front. - All 
through the year of 1919, the'Kurdish area was a theatre for a series of anti- 
British uprisings. 
2 This in-itself was another factor to encourage Arab nation- 
alist approach to Kurds. When Arab nationalists decided to strike at Mosul, 
the primary target was that of Tal 'Afar, which was populated by Arabs and 
Turconan alike. Although the 'Aäferah tribe, which played a remarkable role 
in the rising, was in fact an Arab tribe, 
3 
yet the Turcoman role before and 
during the movement was of no less significance, 
4 In fact, one finds that 
some Kurds had actually joined al *Ahd society of Mosul. 
5,. 
It is interesting 
to observe, that some 32 distinguished Kurds in Mosul had raised a petition to 
the Peace Conference demanding the unity of Iraq, its independence and the 
establishment of strong ties with other Arab states. They deputed Faisal, 
Mawlud Mukhlis and 'Ali Jawdat to represent them at the Peace Conference. 
6 
However, and, in contrast to an over-optimistic notion of history, one 
has to point out that these contacts and attempts had practically produced only 
limited results of minor political impact. The Political Officer of Mosul wrote: 
1. Ja1ä1 Tä1ibäni, Kurdustän wa al Uaraka al Qawm1ya al Kurdiya, (Beirut, 1971). 
2. A. T. Wilson, Clash of Loyalties, op. cit., pp. 147-155. 
3. M. Y. S. W ahib.. Tärikh Tal'afar, (Mosul, 1967), pp. 87-8. 
4. Sh. ýabir,, Mujaz Tärikh al Turcoman, Vol. 1, (Baghdad, 1958), pp. 138-9. 
5. 'A... M. al Ghulämi, Thawratunä fi Shemäl al 'Iraq. (Baghdad, 1966), pp. 28-9 
6. Ibid., pp. 27-8, Appendix No. 1, pp. 112-3. 
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'It is a matter of congratulation that Kurdistan remained quiet. ' 
The Kaimakam of Jezirah was in communication with the leaders 
of the movement, an attack was expected at Zakho, and at the 
time of the outbreak there was a "storm focus" forming in Muzuri; 
but in spite of all, the Kurds did not move*. ' 
However, he pointed out that *Ahdcirculars, have been freely distributed through- 
out Arab and Kurdish districts. 
' 
The general trend in the Kurdish political movement aspired to Kurdish 
autonomy rather than Arab unity. "Likewise, the Arab nationalist movement in 
Iraq was essentially an Arab movement'in both its aspirations and social 
composition. Nevertheless, such contacts, which were motivated by a strong 
desire to win over Kurdish and Turcoman sympathy to the Arab'anti-British 
struggle, were bound to stamp the Mosul *Ahd outlook with clear Islamic inclin- 
ations. Such a tendency was strikingly clear in the "Ahd"s letters sent to 
Rashid Barwarri 
2 (a Kurdish leader), Nädim'Naftajhi 
3°(a 
Turcoman leader), `in- 
the leaflets directed to Kurdish areas4 and, above all, in the very ranks of 
al *Ahd itself. The aim of Iraq*s unity and independence and its confederation 
with Arab countries (Syria and Hijaz) was not compromised. However, a special 
consideration was given to the rights of minorities, an emphasis was put on the 
Islamic league and on more than one occasion patriotism (Wataniya) rather than 
nationalism ((jawmiya) was upheld. 
In regard. to this work, one finds no imperative reason for a detailed 
account concerning the rising in and the attack on Tal'afar. 
5 
However, two 
1. F. O. 371/5130/E. 9897. Report on the recent attack on Tel Afar. 
2. A. M. Ghulämi, op. cit., pp. 115-6. Appendix No. 2. 
3. Ibid., pp. 119-22. Appendix No. 4. 
4. Ibid., pp. 123-7. Appendix No. 5. 
5. An extensive campaign of political propaganda and agitation led by al 'Ahd in 
Mosul, Tal 'Afar and across the borders was taking place during May and June. 
On the 26th May news was received of the arrival at Fadghami of a body of 
'Iraq' troops, led by Jamil al Madfa'i, who was getting munitions dawn the 
Khabur. On the 2nd June, al 'Ahd organized a meeting in Tal 'Afar 'Calling 
on the aghas 
to hold themselves in readiness for the Sharif, whose forces were 
conitentrating on the road near Awainat'. On the same day the gendarme 
assistant officer, Jamil Muhammad, deserted his post and the telegraph lines 
were cut. On the 4th June, some tribesmen rode into the town and Tel 'Afar 
rose. The gendarme officer, Lieut. Stuart, was shot by one of his own native 
officers, Muhammad 'Ali, and no resistance was made by the genarmes. The 
British gendarme instructor, the clerk and the Vickers gunner held out on the 
roof of the billet 
for some time until the arrival of the Iraqi troops, when 
they were killed by grenades. The A. P. O., Major Barlow, was also shot while 
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remarks, are considered of relevance to the discussion: the preparations for 
the Arab 'occupation' of Tal 'Afar, which were carefully planned by Iraqi 
nationalists inside Mosul and across the borders in Syria, were exclusively 
organised by al. 'Ahd group. The tribal Sheikh (Sayid 'Abd Allah Sayid Waheb), 
who organized the rising of the 'Aäferah tribe, was affiliated to al 'Ahd. 
l 
The two Iraqi, police officers who led the 'mutiny' within the British-led 
gendarme force were both (Jamil Muhammad al Khalil and Muhammad 'Ali) members 
of al 'Ahd. Their plan was co-ordinated with the tribal leaders and the marching 
Iraqi force by *Abd al Hamid Dabouni (the ex-assistant of the Assistant Political 
Officer at Tal 'Afar) who was an active member of al 'Ahd. He resigned his job 
in the British Administration to. organize contacts with the "Ahd group in Syria. 
It goes without saying that Jami, 1 al Madfa*i and his fellow officers, who entered 
Tal (Afar and ended the last pockets of British resistance, were all 'Ahd members. 
2 
5 contd. 
he was'trying to escape. On the 5th June a'punitive column of British 
armoured cars was ambushed near Tal 'Afar, none of the crews escaping. 
The fall of Tel 'Afar was the sign for a general rising of all the tribes 
in the district. Small parties raided, the big and pro-British Christian and 
Yazidi villages (Tel Kaif, Uskuf, Algosh and Jabil Sinjar). All wires were 
cut, and all roads from Mosul were rendered most unsafe. 
Jamil was trying, in Albu Maria, to concentrate for a march on Mosul itself. 
The P. O. of Mosul wrote: 'Had the "Iraq" force reached the vicinity of Mosul 
I have no doubt that the outbreak in the town - which had been promised - 
would have occurred'. However, the British were quick to send more troops 
against Jamil's army and they obliged him to retreat. 
F. O. 371/5129/E. 6165. From C. C. Baghdad to 1.0. dated 4th June 1920, No. 6660. 
Also No. 6712, dated 5th June 1920, also No. 6942, dated 7th June 1920 and 
p. 0.371/5130/E. 98979 No. 8 Archives, dated 14th August 1920. 
1. Muhammad Yunis 'Abd al Waheb, Ahamiyat Tal'afar ft thawrat al 'Iräc, al Kubra, 
(Mosul, 1967). 
After the successes of Raman Shalläsh and the failure of the last Iraqi 
diplomatic effort, "Ali Jawdat and Jamil Madfa'i met Faisal on the 18th 
March 1920. They informed him of their decision to move to Dair and 'fight 
the English who had betrayed their promises'. Faisal refused to allow his 
brother, Zaid, to join them, but he agreed to aid them with financial support, 
A 'national committee' was formed of 'Ali Jawdat (President), Tabsin 'Ali, 
Mawlud Mukhiis (military governor of Dair) and Jamil Madfa'i. The latter 
formed the Iraqi army which was composed of Iraqi officers in Syria and Mosul, 
and recruited its soldiers 
from 'A4idat, Shamar, Jabur tribes. 
*Ali'Jawdat, op. cit., pp"90-122. 
- 181 - 
(ii) The Impact of the Tal"'Afar Attack: -Thanks to Wilson*s policies; 'a' '_- 
potentially non-radical group who had co-operated with the British was pushed 
into assuming a 'radical' line of anti-British violence. Wilson*s dogmatism , was 
so irrational that he openly preferred the evacuation of Iraq rather'than coming 
to. terms with the officers. On the 9th June 1920, he wrote: 
'we cannot maintain our position as mandatory by a'policy of conciliation 
of extremists ... 
If /H. M. G. 7 regard such a policy as impracticable, or beyond our 
strength, I submit that they would be better to face the alternative, 
formidable and terrible as it is, and evacuate Mesopotamia'. ' 
In an extreme constrast to such a view, Gertrude Bell wrote, on the 10th April 
1920: 1 
*I think we are on the edge of a pretty considerable Arab nation- 
alist demonstration with which I am a good deal in sympathy. It 
will', however, force our hand and we shall have to see whether it 
will leave us with enough hold to carry on here ... `. 
2 
Wilson was aware of such opinions and of the fact that his own views were not 
shared by the British higher authorities, but he was confident enough of his 
own judgement to write to a friend: 
*I am quite sure that I am on the right lines and am doing my best 
and if the Government do not think so that is their misfortune not 
mine. So long as I am here I propose to continue to carry on at 
full blast and I do not care a damn for anyone ... N. M. G. find it 
much harder to make up their minds than I do. *3 
Prior to the uprising, it was clear that the British- Authorities were divided 
on the subject of Iraq into three major trends: on the one hand there was Wilson*s 
direction demanding direct British control over Iraq; on the other hand, there 
was another trend-advocating a compromise solution with Iraqi nationalists. 
This trend was represented,. in spite of certain differences, 
4 by officials like 
Lawrence, Young and Gertrude Bell. The 'British Government' was somewhere in 
between, or to be more precise, confused by several conflicting factors and thus 
1. Sir Arnold T. Wilson, Papers and letters, Dept. of Manuscripts, British Museum. 
Vol. 52455. No. 6948. From C. C. Baghdad to S. S. I. London, dated 9th June 1920. 
2. Lady Bell, (ed. ), op. cit., Vo1.11, p. 486 
3. Sir Arnold T. °W ilson, Papers and Letterst British Museum, Vol. 52456. Extract 
from a letter to Captain C. S. Stephenson, dated 16th February 1920. 
4. Gertrude Bell wrote, "I can't believe that T. E. L. /Lawrence7 is in ignorance 
and I will therefore hold him to be guilty of the ünpardonäble sin of wil- 
fully darkening council'. 
Gertrude Bell, Private Letters and Papers, Newcastle, Letter dated 19th 
September 1920 
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unable to formulate a clear policy. This was evident in the British Govern- 
ment's failure either 'effectively to adopt and provide for the implementation 
of the policy urged on them by the Acting Civil Commissioner, or resolutely to 
call the Acting Civil Commissioner to order 'and to insist on him carrying out*1 
its policy. 
In May 1920, the Iraqi officers had organized a relatively effective army 
who represented a serious threat to the British2 and endangered their presence 
in Mosul. 
3 However, the French invasion of Syria (July 1920) had brought to 
ashes the officers' dream of 'liberating' Iraq by depriving them of Damascus's 
support. Nevertheless, Dair and Tal 'Afar were a prelude to a general uprising. 
Fahad Beg ibn Hadhdhal, the Chief of the 'Amarat section of the 'Anizah tribe 
and a dedicated supporter of the British, 
4 'prophetically'remarked to the 
British: 'Whether you believe it or not, if you do not re-occupy Dair-al-Zour 
you will have a rebellion on the Lower Euphrates within six months". 
5 
On the 30th June, 1920, the uprising was no more on the agenda; it was 
a fact. A spark from Rumaithah set the whole the the Mid-Euphrates on the 
fire of political violence. 
1. John Marlowe, op. cit., p. 125 
2. On 9th June 1920, Wilson wired the 1.0. 'G. O. C. ordered evacuation of Zakho 
... thinks 
that Dahuk and Aqrah will have to be evacuated before long ... 
Mosul can probably be defended, but lines of communication are much harassed 
by Arabs acting under Sharifian officers*. 
F. 0.371/5129/B. 6439. No. 6950. 
3. On 21st July 1920 Wilson wired the S. S. for India suggesting the evacuation 
of the whole of Mosul Wilayat. 
F. 0.371/5130. No. 8785; also Haldane, op. cit., p. 235. 
4. The Civil Commissioner of Iraq wrote, "Fahad Beg has drawn, subsidy from us 
since occupation of Baghdad and at present receives Rs. 17,000 monthly'. 
F. 0.371/5129/ß. 2944. From C. C. to I. 0., dated 1st April 1920, No. 4044; 
also, A. T. 
Wilson, op. cit., pp. 78-9. 
S. A. L. Haldane, o cit., pp. 33-4. 
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PARTIII 
IRAQ UNDER THE BRITISH ADMINISTRATION (1914-1921) 
Factors Behind the Growth of the Independence Movement 
This Part, by its very position in this work, must suffer from certain 
limitations. It occurs in a work in which the underlying concern is political 
rather than administrative. Furthermore, it is situated in a research which 
is not, essentially, dedicated to the study of the British rule over Iraq as 
much as the British rule's impact on the independence movement in Iraq. 
The writer is assuming the existence of a profound interaction between 
the British Administration and the independence movement. That the policies 
and attitudes of the Administration, perhaps its mere presence, were bound to 
generate a considerable impact on the population in regard to their attitude 
towards the nationalists., The Administration's 'shortcomings' deepened the 
nationalists' resentment and furthermore enabled them to win over larger support, 
conclude more alliances and therefore assume more political aggressiveness. 
On the other hand, the Administration's 'accomplishment' neutralized specific 
elements or groups and thus alienated them from the nationalist camp. 
A selective and not a comprehensive, a critical and not a narrätive or des- 
criptive, approach to the British Administration in Iraq therefore seems 
justified within the framework of this, work. Selective, in the sense that 
there should be special emphasis on particular areas and aspects while others 
will be neglected. Topics like taxation, land system, tribal relations, and 
areas like Shiti cities will be discussed to the exclusion of other aspects of 
British Administration like Posts, Jails, Health, etc. 
It is evident that the British Administration possessed outstanding virtues 
(e. g. efficiency and administrative integrity). Nevertheless, because this work 
is devoted to the study of the independence movement, one is bound to give more 
emphasis to the 'shortcomings' of the Administration. After all, it was these 
"misjudgements' which enabled the nationalists to penetrate the groups and 
areas which were not altogether 'impressed' by the British methods. In fact 
some of the Administration's virtuest proved, in the long run, to be counter- 
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productive. In this-regard it is helpful to quote S. H. Longrigg, -who wrote: 
0 
'Few indeed could deny the improvement in the honesty and justice of 
the /British/ Administration, its prevailing security, its achieved 
and expected progress in material matters over the familiar Turkish. 
standards. Nevertheless, the charge that the type or tone of this 
Administration were among the causes of the lawless outbreak so soon 
and so; disappointingly to follow cannot completely be denied. 
It was, first, that of a Christian Power. To some indifferent, this 
fact was objectionable to many, and not least to the Shiti hierarchy 
whose status and powers would be lost for ever if a foreign secular 
Power were to be installed. In Sunni minds a nostalgic feeling for 
the Caliphate as the true and sole legitimate source of power, even 
in its temporary defeat, was nearly allied to their religion; and 
the indulgence of such feelings was the easier and the new regime 
remain the more rootless and untrusted while peace with Turkey was 
delayed. Religion and Ottoman loyalties apart, the British regime 
was foreign and unfamiliar. Its /personnel? often weak in Arabic, 
differed from their predecessors, - to the point of strangeness, in 
dress, manner and social customs ... 
/It7 tended to rigidity of 
standard, mixed little tolerance with its uncomfortable and not 
always desired justice and was pitiless to long familiar laxities. ' 
In the first place, the conditions imposed by war itself were very difficult 
indeed. After all, the main aim of the invading British troops was the defeat 
of the Turks and not the gratification of the Arabs. The lines on which the 
British proceeded were dictated more by consideration of military necessity 
rather than by political expediency. 
2 'The shortage of transport, both inland 
and overseas, made it imperatively necessary to develop to the full every source 
of supply for military needs'. 
3 
Giving priority to military aspects made the introduction of forced labour 
upon Iraqis almost inevitable. Those twretched workmen' and 'half-clothed 
cultivators* were compelled to work under inhuman and 'heart-breakingt conditions. 
4 
Moreover, food was allowed to the markets, only after the requirements of 
the military authorities were met. 
s 
'Biletting in the towns, blockade measures 
to keep supply from the enemy, irksome sanitary and veterinary restrictions, 
control of movement and travel, road-making across canal bedse. 
6 
1. S. Longrigg, Iraq 1900-1950 ..., op. cit., p. 113. Longrigg served in the 
Iraqi Administration during 1918 to 1931. 
2. A. T. 
- 
Wilson, Clash op. cit., p. 45. 
3. Ibid. 
4. H. Young, op. cit., pp"51-2,65. 
S. C. O. 696/2. Compilations of Proclamations, Notices ... etc., Relating to 
Mesopotamia, October 31st 1918, to August 31st 1919. 'Amarah, Proclamation 
No. 1, section 14. 
6. S. Longrigg, Iraq ..., op. cit., p. 82. 
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However, more emphasis should be given to the crucially important political 
questions than to the problems of human suffering generated by the conditions of 
war. Thus, this Part will first deal with the structure of the British Admin - 
i stration (its ethnic components), its financial policy and then its attitude 
towards the Iraqi fellähin and the land problem. A separate chapter will be 
devoted to the Referendum of 1918-1919. 
The British Administration had provoked and indeed accelerated the rise 
of the independence movement. However, special emphasis ought to be given 
to those sections of the society which were most strongly provoked by the 
British policy. It will be suggested that they were the intelligentsia and 
the fe11ähin. Such a deduction will be examined in this Part. 
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CHA PT E'R VI II 
6 
0 
THE ETHNIC STRUCTURE OF THE BRITISH ADMINISTRATION IN IRAQ 
During the Ottoman era in Iraq, the Iraqis were not totally debarred from 
occupying posts in the Ottoman Administration in Iraq. Of the 'administrative 
personnel*, in the Baghdad Wilayatýnumbering 120, only 20 were Turks, while the 
1 
rest were Arabs. 'Of the principal executive officials (about 50) half were 
Turks, the remainder Arabs*. 
2 
Out of 104 principal officers holding appointments 
in the Ottoman Judicial Department in Iraq, 48 were Turks, 45 were Arabs (including 
4 Christians and 6 Jews) and 11 were Kurds. 
3 
According to Lawrence 70 per cent 
of the Ottoman executive civil service was local (i. e. Iraqis), and as far as 
the Army was concerned, the Arabs represented 60 per cent in officers and 95 
per cent in other ranks. 
4 In the year 1914 alone, there were 1,338 Iraqi cadets 
(128 were Kurds and the rest Arabs) in Ottoman military schools being prepared 
to become Ottoman officers. 
5 
It is against such a background that the composition of the British Admin- 
istration in Iraq needs to be examined. In 1917, it was reported that the Admin- 
istration of Baghdad was formed of 2,781, of whom 1,890 were Mesopotamians. 
6 
In May 1918, the Administration of Basrah was reported to be composed of 548 
personnel, of whom 251 were Mesopotamians. 
7 
In August 1920, the Civil Commissioner 
reported that his Administration contained 11,829 personnel, of whom 8,566 were 
Iraqis, 1,047 British and 2,216 were Indians. 
8 
However, all the above figures fail to distinguish between policy-making 
and executive posts and insignificant ones. Furthermore, they do not indicate 
the administrative fields occupied by the highest proportion of Iraqis. In 
1. C. 0.606/1. Administration Reports, Baghdad Wilayat, 1917, p, 3. 
2. Ibid., p. 2" (Figures stated above are for the year 1913-14). 
3. F. O. 371/6369/B. 14013. Mesopotamia Judicial Department. Report on the Admin- 
istration of Justice for the year 1920, (Baghdad, 1921). (Figures of 1914), p. 17. 
4. The 23rd July 1920. 
5. "Abd. ai Razäg al Hiläli, OP. cit., pp. 248-252. 
6. C. O. 696/1. Admin. Reports, Baghdad, 1917, p. 2. 
7. F. 0.371/3397/21421. Fortnightly Report, No. 13, ending 15th May 1918. 
8. F. 0.371/50781 Baghdad Memo. 23891. From C. C. Baghdad to'I. 0.14th August 
1920, No. 9804. 
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this respect the following table is more useful: k 
Table 
SENIOR POSTS 
(those who receive more 
than 600 Rs. per month, 
or £45) 
NON-SENIOR POSTS 
(those who receive less 
than 600 Rs. per month) 
Name of Department British Indians Arabs British Indians Arabs 
Central Admin. 5 -- 55 62 123 
Revenue 8 -- 2 13 7 
Finance 18 -- 2 130 22 
Judicial 14 - 10 1 7 238 
Customs 12 -- 9 23 75 
Executive Staff 
(Divisions) 106 -4 28 316 862 
Agriculture "11 -- 4 "22 7' 
Education 11 - 1 4 479 
Police 22 -- 56 17 2,397 
Port 28 -- 8 380 39 
Levies 37 -- 33 17 2,987 
Irrigation 42 43 1 110 178 
Other Departments 
1 203 33 315 1,109 1,112 
TOTAL 507 -7 20 515 2,209 8,546 
OVERALL TOTAL 119804 2 
The above table discloses that: 
(a) the Iraqis (of all sects and ethnic groups) formed a low percentage (only 
3.5) of the senior posts. The Iraqis were completely absent from many important 
Departments. All Departments were headed by British Officials. Apart from that, 
Iraq was divided into administrative'units of some 14 Districts, each in"charge 
of a Political Officer, of whom not a single one was an Arab. These Districts 
were in their turn divided into smaller administrative units run by Assistant 
political officers. Out of nearly 90 Assistant Political Officers there were 
only 4 of local origin, while the rest were British. This leaves no doubt that 
(i) only very few Iraqis were occupying senior positions in the Administration; 
and, (ii) Iraqis were deprived of any actual participation in decision-making 
concerning any vital administrative question; 
1. Other Departments were Jails, Health, Engineering, Repatriation, Post and 
Telegraph, Printing and Publishing, Stores, Transport, Cypher, Survey and 
Veterinary. Railways were excluded from the above. 
2. Cmd. 1061, op. cit., p. 122 
"' 
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(b) in the non-senior posts of the Administration which were uninfluential and 
did not involve any decision-making, and which were low-paid, one finds that 
the Iraqis represented' some 75 per cent. However, it is clear that more than 
half of this percentage of the Iraqis were either in the Police service (2,397) 
or in the Levies (2,987). The latter service included Iraqis who were neither 
Arabs nor Moslems. Furthermore, it is evident that nearly all Iraqis serving 
in the Police and Levies Departments were occupying non-administrative ranks. 
Such a conclusion finds its justification in Wilson*s telegram, in which he 
stated that the Indian and British administrators composed only 50.5 per cent 
of the total administrative personnel. 
1 
Further evidence was provided by the 
report of Sir Percy Cox, in which he stated that the number of Iraqis, in the 
Civil Service was only 4,200 (exclusive of Railways). 
2 
It is interesting to 
find that by the 1st April; 1920, the number of the Railways personnel of all 
grades numbered 24,928; the Indians composed 80 per cent, the British 3 per 
cent and the Iraqis (Arabs, Kurds and Jews) represented only 17 per cent. 
3 
The number of Indians employed in Iraq was, by December 1920,53,000. 
Twenty-four thousand were under the Labour Department, 10,000 in the Inland 
Water transport, and about 19,000 were employed in the Railways. 
4 
It goes with- 
out saying that the Army of occupation was totally composed of British and 
Indians and that it did not include any Arabs, officers or otherwise, in its ranks. 
The political Implication of such a Structure 
(a) The alienation of Iraqi Intelligentsia: It is unfortunate that there are 
available no figures showing the exact number of Iraqi graduates, educated or 
prepared for administrative posts. However, if in the year 1914 alone there 
were some 1,338 Iraqis in military schools, some 15,398 students (excluding 
girls) in civilian schools5 and that in 'Turkish days 70 per cent of the executive 
1. F. 0.371/5078. From C. C. Baghdad to I. O.. dated 14th August 1920, No. 9804. 
2. Sir Arnold T. Wilson, Miscellaneous Papers, Dept. of Manuscripts, British 
Museum, No. 52459, Vol. 5, Sir Percy Cox Report, dated July 1920. 
3. Cmd. 1061, p. 118. 
4. Parliamentary Debates, H. C. Vol. 139, dated 22nd March 1920, p. 2402. 
S. 'Abd al Razäq al Hiläli, op. cit., p. 252. 
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civil service was local*j then it would be clear that the British had created 
an acute problem for themselves. An educated class was given the motive and 
had the ability to incite an effective campaign of anti-British propaganda. 
Indeed it was a priceless service that was rendered by the British to the Iraqi 
nationalists by providing them with an easily recruited and most influential 
group of people. 
The best apology for the British policy was that explained by Sir Percy 
Cox. He pointed out that '"... the Turkish Administration ... personnel having 
disappeared with the retreating troops ... we had no alternative ... but to 
create a provisional administration from ... British and British Indian personnel'. 
Cox pointed out that 'certain quarters' suggested after the Armistice 'prompt 
nationalization of the Administration'. However 'the work of peace proceeded 
very slowly ... Meanwhile the spirit of "self determination" was gradually per- 
meating the East ... While at the same time our military position ... was rapidly 
being weakened'. Thus, Cox concluded that 'it would have been nothing short 
of dangerous, apart-from the mere loss of efficiency involved, to embark upon 
any drastic change in the structure of that Administration'. 
' 
It seems that Cox"s argument confuses a strategic topic like the formation 
of an Arab Government in Iraq with the question of affiliating Iraqis to some 
senior posts in the British Administration of Iraq. It is difficult to accept. 
that such a step should have awaited the Peace Treaty. In fact the Administration 
could have been more efficient and secure had it opened its ranks to the-Iraqis. 
Nothing had raised the spirit of nationalism and 'self-determination' among Iraqi 
intelligentsia than this 'galling deprivations of the posts of their country's 
Administration. 
This was mostly felt in Baghdad where the educated people were, unlike 
those of Basrah, less immersed in commerce. Furthermore, during the Ottoman 
period, 'the official Class was predominantly recruited from Baghdad and the 
towns to the north'. 
2 Wilson*s Administration in fact made little effective 
1. Lady Bell., The Letters of G. Bell, op. cit., Vo1. II; Percy Cox, 'Historical 
Summary', pP-521-3. 
2. B, Thomas, Alarms and Excursions in Arabia, (New York, 1931), p. 82. 
I 
0 
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effort to use in senior or even junior posts the considerable experience and 
good will possessed b the available Iraqis'. by Between 1916 and 1918t the 
Administration sanctioned some 282 employees in Baghdad, of whom only 17 were 
Muhammedans. 
2 The situation was aggravated by the return of many'more Iraqi 
administrators from Turkey after 1918. 
It was inevitable that conditions of unemployment and disillusionment would 
throw the majority of them into the anti-British movement. In fact they 
were to form the core of such a movement in Baghdad. In 1920, Cox observed 
that among the people of Baghdad and Mosul tthere is a very general and impatient 
desire for a greater share in the Administration and early establishment of a 
national Government. The majority of intelligentsia are no doubt strong nation- 
alists:.. f. 
3 Gertrude Bell, in her official report, gave the following account: 
'But already /early 19207 the centre of /änti-British? propaganda 
had been transferred from Syria and the Euphrates to Baghdad. The 
dissatisfied element of ex-Turkish employees had received consider- 
able reinforcements during the 18 months which had elapsed since 
the armistice... whether they were pro-Arab or pro-Turk they were 
usually averse from foreign control ... /this situation7 gave point 
to the complaints of malcontents and led them to disbelieve in the 
genuineness of official declarations. They argued that the creation, 
of the Syrian State was due to the victory of Arab arms and that 
similar liberties in Mesopotamia could be gained only by a successful 
resort to force*. 
4 
This situation of unemployment or of low salaries was accompanied by a very 
high increase in the cost of living. It was reported, in late 1917, that prices 
were 'from eight to ten times higher than pre-war figures'. 
5 
Gertrude Bell 
complained to her father that the cost of living in Baghdad was tenormoust. 
And although she was rationed, she pointed out that 'necessities of life such 
as soap, rice, eggs and sugar' were all at tpreposterous prices'. 
6 
Efficiency was Cox*s cry and his other pretext to , 
justify the non-employment 
of Iraqis in the, administration. Wilson stated that: 'It was almost impossible 
1. Longrigg, Iraq "_", op. cit., pp. 113-4. 
2. F. O. 371/3387., 7he Future of Mesopotamia, Note by Sir Percy Cox, 22nd Apri1,1918. 
3. P. O. 371/5231/E. 13471 dated 26th October 1920. 
4. Qnd. 1061, op. 
- 
ciY., pp. 139-140. 
5. F. 0.371/33.97/214221. Fortnightly report for fortnight ending 15th November 
1917, p. 3. 
6. Lady Bell (ed. ), op. cit. Vol. II, dated 31st January 1918, pp. 441-2. 
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to enlist Arab clerks for the purpose of the Civil Administration ... we had 
0 no option but to employ even in the districts a large proportion of Indian 
clerks') The Civil Commissioner justified his policy on the grounds that the 
Indians, in time of war, were cheaper than Arabs. 
2 In a telegram to the India 
Office, Wilson claimed that 'the present Administration have had the greatest 
difficulty in finding Muhammadans competent to fill even the lower appointments'. 
3 
A British Administrative report stated: 
*... those who remained /Iraqi Administrators? have been found with 
a few exceptions to be of little use to us owing: 
(1) In few cases to their pro-Turkish sympathies; 
(2) To the fact that they continued the bad traditions of the late 
Government which are not in harmony with our methods; 
(3) They were unpopular, with the landowning classes and tribal 
4 leaders'. 
All these arguments are administratively inclined. What was at stake was 
the political consequences of such a policy. It is hardly convincing that Iraqi 
administrators would have light-heartedly accepted that it was for the sake of 
their country that they should be dropped from its administration. 
Moreover, there are certain indications which suggest that Iraqi admini- 
strative efficiency was not as poor as it was argued. In Syria (1918-1920), 
Iraqi officers were virtually running the whole of the Syrian Civil Service. 
Subsequent developments in Iraq were to indicate that lack of confidence in 
Iraqi capabilities was, somehow, exaggerated. Wilson himself was to admit in 
1931 that the 'ultimate outcomes in Iraq 'was less unfavourable than he had 
feared'. 
5 In fact, one finds that some senior British officials in the Iraq 
Administration of that period did not agree with Wilson's views. In 1918, Mr. 
Bonham-Carter rendered a fine tribute to the Arab staff of his Judicial Depart- 
ment and to their valuable services, without which 
tit would have been hardly 
1. A. T. Wilson, Clash of Loyalties, op. cit., pp. 88-9. 
2. Ibid., p. 88. Thus one finds it difficult to understand Wilson's statement 
that 'from the outset I did my best to induce H. M. Government to allow me 
to introduce a very large Arab element into the Civil Administration ... ' 
Ibid., p. 313. 
3. F. 0.371/5226/4811. From C. C. Baghdad to S. S. of I. O. London, dated 26th 
April 1920, No. 5111. 
4. C. 0.696/1 A. R. Baghdad Wilayat, 1917, p. 3. 
S. A. T. Wilson, Clash...,, op. cit., p. 316. 
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possible ... to carry out the policy of applying Turkish law and procedure?. 
1 
With such views, it was not surp rising that the Department of Justice stood as 
an exception in its relatively high percentage of Arab employment. 
2 
In fact, it was soon after the Armistice, that Mr. Bonham-Carter had put 
forward proposals for associating Arabs more closely with the administration 
and suggested, amongst other proposals, the appointment of an Iraqi as Minister 
of Justice or, as an alternative, as adviser to the Department. 
3 
Neither of 
the two suggestions was adopted. 
(b) The 'Alienation' of the Administration: On the other hand the efficiency 
of the British Administration in Iraq was not altogether beyond criticism. On 
several occasions the Civil Commissioner drew the attention of the India Office 
to the considerable, even alarming, shortage in his administration personnel. 
and thus to the 'high difficulties facing his few members of staff'. 
4 Such a 
shortage was 'creating dangerous situation in Mesopotamia', was 'destructive 
of public confidence', and placing a burden upon the remaining officers 'which 
is heavier than they can bear*. 
5 In late 1919 Wilson complained 'My great 
difficulty is still shortage of staff'. 
6 
Furthermore, those 'few and over-burdened' British Officials were facing 
another difficult situation, namely their insufficient knowledge of the country 
and its traditions. 'On their first appointment comparatively few knew anything 
about the Arab, his customs or his language', so wrote Sir Percy Cox. 
7 Sir 
Aylmer Haldane divided the British Officials in the Iraqi Administration into 
1. C. O. 692/2. A. R. Report on the Administration of Justice for the year 1918 
(Mesopotamia Judicial Department), pp. 2-6. 
2. F. 0.371/6369/14013. Mesopotamia Judicial Department, Report on the Admin- 
istration of Justice for the Year 1920, p. 17. The Report stated the Department 
employed 104 personnel (immediately before the War), of whom 45 were Iraqis. 
In 1920 there were 289 employees, of whom 271 were Iraqis. 
3. Ibid.,, p"3", 
4. A. T. Wilson, Clash . _, op. cit., p. 158 (telegram dated 22nd December 1918). 
5. F. O. 371/882/23/MES/20/1, dated 10th March 1920, No. 3494. 
, 
6. Sir A. T. Wilson, Private Letters, 1903-1921, Vol. 2, The London Library, 
letter dated 9.12.1919. 
7. Sir Arnold Wilson, Miscellaneous Papers, B. M. r No. 52459, Vol. 5, Sir 
Percy Cox Report, July 1920. 
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four groups according to the sources from which they were recruited. The first 
group was composed of those who were employed from the Army after the Armistice, 
were-added to the Civil Administration and were 'stationed in outlying districts 
such as Shatrah,. Qalat Sikar, Diwaniyah and Afaj'. 
1 
According to Haldane 'these 
officers ... almost without exception, 
had no experience of the work that would 
be required of them ... t. 
2 
It is worthwhile to recall that all the above-mentioned areas were to 
become centres of the 1920 uprising. Iraqi books referring to that period are 
loaded with unfavourable accounts as to the 'harsh' conduct of British Officers 
in such areas with particular reference to Major Daly, the Political Officer of 
3 
the tribal district of Diwäniyah. In fact, it was as early as April 1917 that 
the Political Officer of Basrah had written to Wilson pointing out the unnecessary 
severity of Major Daly. 
4 Three years later the Civil Commissioner, became alarmed 
at the situation in Diwäniyah, and the harshness with which Major Daly was treating 
the Arab tribes who 'would like to be treated a little less justly and a little 
more kindly'. 
5 
In July 1920, Wilson had to write to Daly directing his attention 
to the excessive 'harshness' which he was allowing himself towards the Arabs. 
6 
In his reply, Major Daly admitted that such was the case. 
7 
The second group of British administrators in Iraq were members of the 
Indian Civil Service who had mainly controlled the headquarters of the admin- 
istrative work. They had varying periods of experience of Indian methods and 
some of them were men of distinguished abilities. However, and according 
to 
Haldane, they 'were accustomed to a settled and highly centralised form of 
administration, and one which is noteworthy 
for its fondness for regulations 
1. Sir Aylmer Haldane, op. Cit., p. 20. 
2. Ibid. 
3. 'A. al Hassani, op. cit., p. 135; also *A. Sh. al Yäsiri, P. cit., p. 172. 
4. Sir Arnold Wilson, Miscellaneous Papers, B. M. L No. 52458, Vol. 4, telegram 
from P. O. Basrah to C. C. Baghdad, dated 28th April 1917, No. 3577. 
5. Ibid. No. 52456, Vol. 2, Letter dated 24th April 1920. 
6. Ibid., No. 52458, Vol. 4, Letter to Major Daly dated 14th July 1920. 
7. Ibid., Letter dated 20th July 1920. 
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and red tape'. 
' 
The British Civil Service in the Sudan was more suited to 
provide Iraq with'some British administrators. Its methods were more flexible, 
its officers were granted more initiative and most of them had the advantage 
of knowing Arabic. However, only four British officials came to Iraq from such 
2 
a source. 
The remaining officers of the Administration of Iraq were principally 
recruited from Territorial Force officers. In Haldane's view, 'these officers 
laboured under the disadvantage of having no previous acquaintance with the 
country and no knowledge of its people or experience of administrative work". 
3 
Haldane concluded that the administration system was abased in the main on past 
Indian experience, the result being that a system came into existence which was 
far too rigid, and one to which the people not only were not accustomed, but for 
4 
which they were wholly unprepared*. 
In December 1918, Sir John Hewett and a committee of senior British Officials 
in India and Egypt arrived in Iraq on a mission charged, by the Army Council to 
report on certain questions. He left Iraq in March 
1919 and was afterwards to 
publish two reports, neither of which 
brought satisfaction to Wilson. Hewett 
confirmed, although diplomatically, the view that the British Administration 
was neither suitable 
for the post-war conditions in Iraq, nor equipped with an 
adequate knowledge of the country. 
5 
However, Hewett's report was more provocative 
to Wilson's plans. After assessing the amount due to Army Funds from Civil 
Revenues at about £2m the Hewett report continues to show that the total net 
receipts for the past three years was only 
£500,000.6 Thus, Hewettts report 
suggested that 'It is evident 
from these figures that the Civil Administration 
is not likely at an early date to be able 
to pay the bill set out above'.? 
Such an argument is highly indicative and very significant. What Hewett 
1. Sir Aylmer Haldane, op. dit., pp. 20-21. 
2. Ibid., p. 21. 
3. Ibid. 
-4. Ibid. 
5. Sir John P. Hewett, Some Impressions of Mesopotamia in 1919, (London, 1920), p. 13 
6. The total amount was distributed in the following way; 1915-16, £130,000; 
1916-17, £270,000; 1917-189 £100,000. 
7. John P. Hewett, Report to the Army Council, (London, 1919), p. 40. 
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was really saying is that Iraq was not after all such a-tempting economic 
investment in as far as the British Empire was concerned. 
1 
Hewett's report 
clearly pointed out that Iraq was in fact a financial burden to the Empire. 
The open publication of such an authoritative view in the midst of the post- 
war conditions and ideas dominating Britain was hardly an encouragement for the 
continuation of the occupation. 
2 
(c) The Growth within the British Administration of an 'Independent' Interest 
and Outlook: This, however, was not the end of Hewett*s impact on and in Iraq. 
In January 1919, while in Baghdad, Hewett gave a lecture at which all British 
Commissioned and Warrant Officers were invited to attend. In this speech, he 
openly expressed the view that the British Administration in India was doomed 
3 
to an early extinction. Wilson, months later, was to become more acquainted 
with such a view when he was to receive a private letter from Hirtzel confirming 
to him that the idea of an administered 'British dependency was dying in India 
and decomposing in Egypt. 
4 
Taking into account that most of the British Officials in Iraq were on an 
administrative loan from the British Civil Service of India, or worse still, 
had already been demobilized from the forces, and that such a 'pessimistic' view 
was uttered by an eminent authority, then one is justified in assuming that the 
direct and logical implication would have led the audience to conclude that 
employment in Iraq was the last resort. In other words, if Iraq was not a 
profitable investment to the British Empire, then perhaps it was a promising 
acquisition for the British Administration in Iraq and its personnel. Such a 
notion was encouraged by Hewett himself, who wrote: 
1. one does not want to, get involved in a theoretical discussion on the nature 
of 'imperialism' or what motivates a nation to acquire or indeed occupy the 
land of another country (is it sheer economic 'exploitation? as it was argued 
by Hobson(i) and later by Lenin, (ii) or is it imperial politics, strategic 
interests, or a combination of several elements? ). 
(i) John A. Hobson, Imperialism, (London, 1947), first published in 1902. 
(ii) V. I. Lenin, Imperialism the Highest Stage of Capitalism, (Moscow, 1959), 
first published in 1916. 
2. This argument is elaborated more fully later. 
3. A. T. Wilson, Elash op. cit., p. 167. 
4. John MarlowQ o cit., p. 165. 
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'The determination /of H. M. G. 7 - for such I believe it is - to 
exclude persons from Great Britain and the Dominions from taking 
part in the development of the country seems to me to be, very 
regrettable ... If Mesopotamia is to take the place it ought to 
in such enterprises as cotton cultivation, the manufacture of 
beet sugar, and sheep breeding, the impetus will, in my, judge-, 
ment, have to come from the white man'. 
' 
The impact of Sir John Hewett*s speech on his audience of British Officials, as 
suggested above, was confirmed by Wilson, - who. wrote that the speech 'confirmed 
itany waverers in their decision to remain in Iraq if possible*. 
2 And that tIn 
dealing with the, Indian reforms. Sir John Hewett had wielded a rhetorical sledge- 
hammer, with devastating effect on his hearers; his views had an obvious 
application to the scheme for the future Government of Iraq... '. 
3. 
Wilson did not explicitly or conspicuously state what was that 'obvious 
application' of Hewett*s views. However, he leaves us little room for doubt. 
Nevertheless, in his private papers, even such faint doubt is completely cast 
away. When in early April 1920, Hirtzel wrote to Wilson that the British 
Government 'are irrevocably committed to an Arab Government'4 Wilson replied 
with these, rather revealing words: 
'... -When the views of H. M. G. as explained 
by you become known to 
my officers they cannot be blamed if they leave a service which 
has neither honour prospects, permanence hopes of successful 
accomplishment. 
The war office has demobilized most of them and the Treasury admits' 
no liability for them'. 
5 
The Civil Commissioner was neither inventing this fear, among his officers, 
nor exaggerating it. This apprehension was prevailing and genuine. It was 
clearly shown in Leachman's letter to Wilson: 
tI an honoured by a large correspondence from Political Officers 
who tell me things I doubt if they would tell you. The majority .. '. 
ask inc if I consider they are likely to be let down. Some of them 
consider they have been already ... ". 
6 
1. Sir John, Hewett, Some Impressions ..., op. cit., p. 19 
2. A. T. Wilson, Clash .... op. cit., p. 167. 
3. Ibid. 
4. Sir Arnold T. -Wilson, Miscellaneous Papers, B. M., Serial No. 52455, Vol. 
1, Private from Hirtzel to Wilson, dated 7th HpriL 1920. Italics mine. 
5. Ibid. Serial No. 52456, Vol. 2, telegram No. 4386, From C. C. Baghdad to 
H ell, dated 10th April 1920. 
6. Ibid. Serial No. 52458, Vol. 4, letter from Lieut-Col. G. E. Leachman, Mosul, 
to A. T. Wilson, dated 20th September 1919. 
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Wilson replied: 
"Almost my sole object in sticking to my job here is to see that 
justice is done to Officers whom I have brought into the Service 
and induced to stay. It is not I but Government who may let 
them down, and I regard myself at present as standing between them 
and Government'. 
1 
Such a confusion and anxiety were further revealed in an exchange of letters 
-between Lt-Col. Howell (Deputy C. C. ) and Major Dickson (P. O. Näsiriyah). The 
former wrote 'I know no more than you do about what is going to happen to this 
country'. The latter complained that the British Officials were *kept lament- 
ably in the dark' as to what the Government policy really was about. 
2 
During 
his visit to Baghdad Cox was 'impressed with the necessity for some definite 
announcement ... 
*to remove doubt ... in the minds of the Officers'of the Civil 
Administration as to their future*. 
With the declaration of the Armistice, the future form of the administration 
of Iraq became a matter of urgency. However, some British officials thought 
than an early decision on this question was not vital. Their argument was based 
on the assumption that 'We can start with a British bureaucracy and gradually 
water it down with an infusion of Arab staff until it becomes Arab*. 
'Bonham- 
Carter opposed such a notion and pointed out its 'insuperable difficulties'. 
He argued that 'against such a change /you have? the strong vested interests 
not only of the officials but of others who have flourished under the system, 
and still stronger vested prejudices'. 
4 
This 'economic' interest in attempting to perpetuate' the British Admin- 
istration in Iraq vas flanked and strengthened by an 'ideological' conviction 
of an undisguised faith in British paternalism. In common with other' men of 
similar tradition, Wilson believed that the British Empire was destined 
1. Ibid. Letter from A. T. Wilson to G. B. Leachman, dated 26th September 1919. 
2. Major H. R. P. Dickson, Private Papers and Letters, Middle Bast Centre, Oxford 
Univ. DS. 77(DS. 51. B. 3), Brx 2A, file II. Letter dated 28th April 1919. 
3. F. 0.371/5227/ß. 7253. 'Summary of Correspondence regarding political situ- 
ation in Mesopotamia', From C. C. Baghdad No. 7693, dated 22nd June 1920. 
4. F. 0.882/23/3133, Note on the Place of the Arab in the Administration, 
Written by E. Bonham-Carter (Judicial Secretary), Strictly Confidential, 
dated 5th February 1919, Baghdad. 
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to carry a message of civilization to the backward countries. For such a 
task,, Wilson considered himself as a dedicated man, dedicated to the bearing 
of 'The White Man's Burden') In November 1918, Wilson wrote 'The world at 
large recognizes that it is our duty and our high privilege to establish an 
effective protectorate and to introduce a form of Government which shall make 
possible the development of this country'. 
2 
Years later (1930), Wilson gave an account of his beliefs, during 'those 
strenuous days' of his in Iraq. 'We believed', Wilson wrote, $that Britain's 
contribution. to the welfare of mankind is to infuse the principles of Chhristian- 
ity into its-governance ... that Iraq needed something more than the advantages 
of material civilization ... 'We believed that till Iraq was leavened with the 
principles of Christianity she would be unfit for the exercise of freedom.... 
the desire to do so inspired many and unconsciously underlay the activities of 
nearly all /British officials7'. 
3 
All these documents provide us with sufficient evidence, to confirm the 
conclusion that whereas the British-Government lacked an immediate economic 
motive in Iraq, the British Administration regarded Iraq as an important 
investment in terms of administrative office and achievement alike. This was 
of major significance. The two sides, although both of British institutions, 
conceived the question of the political future of Iraq from totally different 
angles. Whereas the British Government, in varying degrees of enthusiasm or 
reluctance, was amenable to the idea of an Iraqi independence and the establish- 
mentýof an Arab Administration, the British Administration 
in Iraq had a vested 
interest in opposing such an ultimate conclusion and in undermining any political 
or admin'3strative steps which might aid in promoting it. Wilson was not en- 
dangering his political and administrative career, by opposing his Government*s 
wishes and sometimes even instructions merely because of his ideological beliefs 
which characterized 
him as a 'late Victorian', and a 'convinced Imperialist*. 
He, in fact, was acting in accordance with the very interests of the admin- 
istrative structure that he had built and was heading. The very existence 
1. J. Marlowe, op. cit., p. 21. 
2. A. T. Wilson, oý_cit", pp. l04-5. 
k 3. Ibid, p. 114 
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of such a structure, not to speak of its supremacy of privileges, was threatened 
by the idea of an Arab administration to be implemented in Iraq. 
Such a conclusion leads to another logical implication which would assist 
in having better comprehension of the nationalist movement in Iraq. According 
to the above-mentioned factors, one could deduce that the essential contra- 
diction in Iraq was not basically between Arab nationalists, or, to be more 
accurate, the bulk of them, and the British Government as such. The major 
conflict was between Arab nationalists and the British Administration function- 
ing in Iraq. 
Furthermore, it explains the extraordinary capacity of the British Govern- 
went in assuming a conciliatory role towards Iraqi nationalists after the up- 
rising. The Cairo Conference shaped a new political formula which safeguarded 
British interests in Iraq, while, at the same time, it met some of the nationalists' 
demands. Had the British Government been a direct part of the political conflict 
in Iraq, then the Iraqi nationalist movement would have assumed a more *radicalt 
form of anti-Western nationalism. Perhaps on the lines first propagated by al 
Afghäni and advocated by al Masri. Such a line did not lack its supporters in 
Iraq: al Hashimi, al Shlräzi, abu al Timman, al Ghulämi ... etc., all of whom 
were ardent advocates of complete termination of any form of British presence 
in Iraq. However, two factors accounted for the failure of such a radical 
line: the military defeat of the forces of the uprising; and the swift 
intervention and the relative impartiality of the British Government. Once 
an Arab Administration, with its promising prospects, was 
in the making 
'radicalism' faded away and 'moderation' gained ground. 
Furthermore, Lord Curzon indicatively allowed the Sunday Times to publish 
certain correspondence between himself and Mr. Ormsby-Gore (then Member of 
Parliament and later Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies). 
In this correspondence, Lord Curzon declared that the whole of his actions and 
opinions had been aimed at 
the speedy establishment of an Arab Government in 
Mesopotamia. 'While defending to the best of his ability the band of Anglo- 
Indian officials in Mesopotamia 
he wished it to be clearly understood that 
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neither /H. M. G. % nor he in any way sympathized with the Indianization or 
Anglicization of Mesopotamia, nor with the introduction of bureaucratic admin- 
istration into the country'. 
' 
Wilson was fully aware of such British tendencies, but in a spirit of a 
Crusader-knight, he wrote to a friend in September 1919: 
'I am not loved in the India Office, I should think by now, I shall 
be-less loved before long. They seem determined to do this country 
down if they can by making suitable political arrangements, and I 
have no intention of allowing them to do it, if it can be prevented 
by anything that I can say or do ... '. 
2 
Thus, one could conclude that the very structure of the Administration 
in Iraq, being overwhelmingly dominated by British personnel (1914-1920), was 
to produce three unfavourable results: 
(a) It had provoked a reaction of discontent to the feelings, ideas and 
interests in the educated indigenous people. Thus created a suitable target 
for national agitation. In September 1920, Gertrude Bell wrote: 
'The underlying truth of all criticism is however - and it's what 
makes the critics so difficult to answer - that we had promised 
self-governing institutions, and not only made no step towards 
them but were busily setting up something entirely different. one 
of the papers says, quite rightly, that we had promised an Arab 
Government with British Advisers, and had set up a British Govern- 
ment with Arab Advisers. Thatts a perfectly fair statement... '3 
(b) Such an Administration, being relatively ignorant of the country's 
language and traditions, was unable to provide forthcoming and decisive 
solutions to the acute and prevailing problems of-Iraq. 
(c) This Administration was gradually to develop its. semi-independent interests 
and consequently political outlooks which did not always echo that of the British 
Government. On several occasions the views and indeed the conduct of the Admin- 
istration were to run counter to the wishes of the British Government. 
1. Sunday Times, 20th September 1920. 
2. ' Sir Arnold T. Wilson, Miscellaneous Papers, B. M.,, No. 52456, Vol. 2. 
dated 15th September 1919. Italics mine. 
3. Lady Bell (ed)., op. cit., Vol-II, letter dated 27th September, 1920, 
p. 502. 
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CHAPTER IX 
THE TAXATION SYSTEM AND THE FINANCIAL POLICY OF 
THE BRITISH ADMINISTRATION IN IRAQ 
It is self-evident that one of the most important factors in deciding the 
position of an administration vis-a-vis its ruled population is the financial 
policy which such an administration adopts. The task of this chapter is to 
examine the British financial policy, its methods, motives and political con- 
sequences. Furthermore it will attempt to show on which sections of the society 
the burden of taxation was falling heavily. 
The Rise of Revenues: In the first place, it is evident that the Iraqis were 
paying-a higher rate of taxation during the British era than the Turkish one. 
This is clearly shown in the following table: 
TABLE 
Year Receipts Year Receipts 
1919-20 3,795,500 or 5,727,194 1889-90 757,1251 
3 
1910-11 1,653,0752 1920-21 4,970,155 or 7,105,2104 
In other words, receipts had been trebled in the period between the two eras. 
The Wilayat of Baghdad 
5 
paid in 1909 a land revenue of Rs. 33,11,412. In 1919, 
the same revenue amounted to Rs. 114,45,500 which means that is was also trebled*6 
This large increase in taxation between-the Turkish and the British eras 
was accompanied by a parallel increase 
in taxes and revenues within the period 
of direct British rule over Iraq 
(1914-1921). Such an argument finds its ample 
justification in the Administrative Reports concerning that period. 
For instance, the revenue collected from the Saniyah land of Basrah in 
1. S. Haider, op. cit., (Ph. D. Thesis, L. S. E. ), Appendix X. p. 702. 
2. Ibid. 
3. C. 0.696/3. Budget Estimates for the year 1920-21, p. vii, Figure originally 
given in Rupees which was equivalent 
to something between one shilling and 
six old pence and two shillings to a 
Rupee. 
4. A. T. Wilson, Clash ..., op. cit., p. 224. Figure given in Rupees. 
5. Comprised the British Administrative divisions of Samara, Baghdad, Kut, 
Diwaniyah, Shämiyah, Villah, Rnmädi, Ba'gubah and Khänigin. 
6. C. O. 696/3. Admin. Report of 
the Revenue Dept. 1919, p. 5. This increase was 
justified in the British report by 1) extension and improvement of irrigation; 
2) consequent expansion of agriculture; 
3) greater security; 4) rise in 
prices of agricultural produce; and 
5) more equable collection. 
hLý 
- 202 - 
1915 was Rs. 1,26,984. In 1919 it amounted to Rs. 3,27,296.1 Basrah's figures 
suggest that in 1917-1918 its revenue (customs excluded) was Rs. 17,89,265. In 
1918-1919 it had grown to Rs. 21,99,301,2 i. e. an annual increase of 
Rs. 4,1O, 036 a year, or some 22 per cent rise a year. Compared with other 
parts of Iraq, the Basrah increase of revenue receipts was of a moderate scale: 
in one year the yield of the kodah tax alone had more than-doubled. 
3 
Between 1918 and 1919, the revenup.. sf the palm trees of Shamiyah Division 
nearly trebled. 
4 During 1917-1918, Samarra' paid a total of Rs. 39,275, of 
which Rs. 29,754 was a land revenue. In the following year, 1918-1919, Samarrä' 
had to bear the cost of Rs. 2,02,397 of which Rs. 1,65,449 came from' land duty. 
5 
-Thus Samarra' had to increase its payment by 550 per cent. 
The Assistant Political Officer of Kufah and Najaf reported'-that, 'there 
has been a marked progress of'both municipalities /Najaf and Kufah/ this year 
/1919/. Last year's receipts amounted to Rs. 38,773 in Kufah as against Rs. 
48,802 total collection for 8 months in 1919, vis, April to November; and 
Rs. 59,229 in Najaf, as against Rs. 66,750 from April to November 1919. Most 
increase is due to the introduction of Wharfage and House Tax in Kufah, and 
House Tax in Najaf'. 
6 
Najaf had in 1918 paid twice as much as it did 
to 1917, and the Kufah revenue of 1918 was three times as much as that which 
was paid in 1917.7 
Taxation in the Muntafigi division was more-remarkable in its increase. 
Muntatig revenue receipts had accelerated in the following way: 
1. C. O. 696/2. Basrah District Annual Report, 1919, p. 62. 
2. Ibid., p. 59. 
3. C. 0.696/2. Kodah Revenue Annual Report, 1919, p. 2. In 1917-1918 the 
Kodah revenue was Rs. 9,98,739. In 1918-1919, it was stepped up to 
Rs. 22,57j755. The Kodah was a tax levied on animals. 
4. C. O. 696/l. Admin. Reports 1918, Shamiyah Division, p. 74. It was 
increased from Rs. 95,000 to Rs. 2,50,000. 
5. C. O. 696/1. Admin. Reports 1918, Samara Division, p. 5. 
6. C. O. 696/2. Shamiyah Division Annual Report, 1919, p. 18. Report of A. P. O. 
Kuiah and Najaf in original. 
7. C. O. 692/1. Admin. Report, 1918, Kufah and Najaf, P. 89. It is important 
to point out that the war was ended in late 1918. This fact gives an 
economic justification to the Administration. Nevertheless it does not 
eliminate the political impact involved in such an increase. 
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TABLE 
District 1915-1916 1916-1917 1917-1918 1918-1919 1919-1920 
Qa1'at Sikar - -- - - 2,76,794 
Shatrah - - - 38,624 3,61,910 
Nasiriyah 11,341 15,403 70,395 1,01,127 2,45,044 
Suq al Shuyakh 
" 
22,216 37,061 64,744" 3,26,219 4,17,791 
TOTAL 33,557 52,464 1,35,139 4,65,970 13,01,5391 
Methods behind the rise of revenues: It is most unlikely that such an 
exceptional2 increase of revenue could be justified by any claimed economic 
improvement in the conditions of the areas. This upward curve in revenue, 
was 'due to the fact that officers in charge have been able to gain more 
knowledge as to the prices of dates, auctions, and local business transactions 
generally'? 
3 
It is. obvious that the improvement in the revenue was not re- 
lated to a rapid growth of productivity or prices, as much as to the progressing 
administrative efficiency and its improvement in financial supervision. 
An administrative report referred the increase in the revenue to the 
fact that: 
'... Some two generations ago Midhat Pasha. decided to abolish the 
method of annual assessment of crops in favour of a fixed rate. 
He took the figures of revenue for the last ten years and accepted 
the average on such figures as the land tax ... Unfortunately ... 
figures were based on the more or less faked records of the Turkish 
Revenue Department. Our aim in the future is double. First to 
raise the revenue ... Second to assess it on productive value of 
trees, quality of soil, price of crop'. 
4 
This leaves no doubt that the increase in the collected revenue was due to 
the new methods employed and the incorruptible character of the Administration. 
Furthermore it was pointed out that the introduction of new taxes had a role 
in the improvement of the revenue. 
5 
1. C. 0.696/2. Muntafiq Division Annual Report 1919, Appendix (G), p. 31. 
Municipalities revenues not included. With them the figure was Rs. 16,61,823. 
2. Muntafig Revenue was decreased in 1922-23 to Rs. 3,68,508. Report of the 
Accountant General, 1922-1923 (Baghdad, 1924), pp. 11-12. 
3. C. 0.696/2. Basrah District Annual Report, 1919, p. 62. 
4. Ibid, P. 10 
5.0.0.696/1. Admin. Report, 1918, Kufah and Najaf, p. 245. 
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-Moreover, it is evident that such a remarkable increase in the amount of 
the revenue was also due to the extension of efficient revenue collection into 
areas which had previously escaped payment. What is striking is the failure 
to consider the political consequences of such a policy. The ability of the 
Administration in extending and enforcing its taxation into tribal areas is 'a 
subject of vital importance. It will be examined in the next chapter. 
In the previous pages, the large increase of taxation and revenue has 
been clearly shown. However, this phenomenon was not confined only to the 
above-mentioned areas. It holds true to all of Iraq. This was conspicuously, 
manifested in the annual revenue receipts (of all Iraq) which were as follows 
-(in Rupees): 
TABLE 
Main Headings 1915-1916 1916-1917 1917-1918 1918-1919 1919-1920 
Land Revenue and 
General Taxes on 
agricultural 
produce2 22,55,967 21,86,555 79,34,295 217,47,430 198,27,290, 
customs 18,34,497 57,64,400 67,38,000 65,00,000 220,24,000 
Other 
Resources3 1,78,178 1,37,265 5,79,753 10,65,750 76,85,220 
TOTAL 45,68,642 81,08,250 152,52,048 '293,13,180,4989360510 4 
or 572,71,940 
The above figures5 clearly demonstrate two facts: 
1. Within five years of British occupation, the Administration revenue had 
drastically increased. In the years after the Armistice, the total amount 
levied from Iraqi taxpayers was also increasing. 
2. The above figures also reveal that the burden of taxation had fallen 
heavily on two items: the land (cultivators and settled tribes), and customs 
(the merchant classes). Other resources were of very marginal contribution. 
1. Cmd. 1061, op. cit., p. 118. 
2. Date tax, Kodah, Tapu. 
3. Judicial, Medical, Education, Posts, telegraphs, Jails, Labour supplies, 
Newspapers, transport and Miscellaneous. 
4. Figures above taken from actual receipts given in Budget Estimates 1920- 
19212 p. ii. C. 0.696/3. 
5. The total receipts from 1920-21 were Rs. 666,68,740, of which Rs. 218,16,290 
were. collected from 
land produce, and Rs. 257,82,000 were derived from customs. 
A. T. Wilson, Clash op. cit., p. 224. 
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Channels of expenditure: It had been argued that Iraqis were receiving 
" Administrative services equivalent to their tax payments. This brings into 
question the directions in which the Administration considered it suitable 
to spend the revenue. The Administration yearly expenditure was as followsl 
(in Rupees): 
TABLE 
Main Headings 1915-16 1916-17 1917-18 1918-19 1919-202 
1. Headquarter Admin- 
instrative Expend- 
iture 5,54,230 11,83,425 24,18,253 33,90,100 73,60,714 
2. Political officer's 
Revenue Establishmen t 5,48,892 9,19,085 51,89,233 93,21,690 70,67,420 
-3. Customs 1,11,893 3,85,800 5,80,350 6,75,000 29,64,169 
4. Transport - - 30,87,834 
5. Judicial 1,20,207 -1,27,295 2,11,983 yq27?, 000 8021,145 
6. Medical 61,345 87,180 . 1,39,887 4,63,750 20,31,542 
7. Education 6,500 2 , 530 '35,500 1,80,000 8,86,808 
8. police 1,99,146 2886,, 975 8,90,163 12,04,080' 22,71,389 
9. Jails 20,126 44,460 98,517 1,67,400 5,44,304 
10. Public Works -. 1,05,450 4,61,400 8,74,700 49,63,292 
11. Posts - - - - 23,74,831 
12. Telegraphs - - - - 8,19,868 
13. Survey - - - - 94,859 
14. Irrigation - - - - 38,78,605 
15. Agriculture - - - - 3,81,738 
16. Levies - - - - 66,49,490 
BAI, 16,22,344 31,63,200 100,28,286 166,49,720' 461,98,008' 
Before analysing the Administration's Budget of Receipts and Expenditures, 
; perhaps it is fair and useful to become acquainted with Wilson's explanations 
for his financial policy. The discussion of the Budget would then assume a 
more comprehensive character, as 
it would be based against the Administration's 
1, Cmd. 1061,9-2- cit., P-119- 
2. C. 0.696/3. Budget Estimates, 1920-21, p. iii. Figures given in Budget 
Estimates are actual expenditure for the year 1919-20. They vary from 
those given in Cmd. 1061, Review ..., op. cit., 119. 
3. Include Salaries of Gazetted 
Officers, Secret Service, subsistence 
allowance, Sea Passages, 
Telegrams ..., etc. 
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justifications. Once the uprising took place in Iraq, the taxation policy 
was put in the forefront of factors to be blamed for the outbreak of violence. 
The Administration was at pains to refute such a relationship between the 
taxation system and the uprising. The Civil Commissioner despatched a long 
telegram, dated 21st July. 1920, to the India Office defending his financial 
policy.. , 
, -.. -, 
In the first place, Wilson pointed out that certain Turkish taxes were 
discontinued and that 'no fresh taxes were imposed'. He emphasised that the 
Turkish rates of taxation were preserved and even reduced in cases of calam- 
'sties; reported and proved. He pointed out that demands as formulated every- 
where. were 'collected practically in full and. without undue delay or difficulty 
... those who 
know the Arabs will realise that this fact alone suffices to dis- 
credit. charges of over taxation'. Wilson went on to justify the increase in 
revenues, on grounds of extension and improvement of irrigation, consequent 
expansion of agriculture and enormous rise in prices of agricultural product. 
He argued that 'Outbreak began in two districts which in 1919 and previous 
years got off very lightly ... These areas -in 
Turkish times /were/ quite out 
'. l 
of control and paid practically no revenue 
`A few days later, the Civil Commissioner wired further 'observations' on 
the financial aspects of his policy. He argued that large increase in receipts 
during 1920 was wrongly attributed to rapid growth of taxation 'whereas really 
due, largely to payment for augmented services rendered by Civil Administration 
to .. -. the 
Army'. In return for their payments, the Iraqis were, Wilson 
claimed, receiving large and 
direct benefits from the Administration. 2 
Wilson's defence of his taxation policy could not escape an obvious 
over-enthusiasm. 
Within less than a month of the above telegram, the Civil 
Commissioner was to admit the 
'loss by the Civil Administration of that degree 
Of popularity which 
it first enjoyed'. 
3 
To explain this 'loss of popularity' 
1. ' F. 0.371/5076. tale. 
No. 8284,21st July 1920. 
2, F. 0.371/5077. tele. 
No. 8934,24th July 1920. 
3. A. T. Wilson, Clash .., op. cit., p. 
312. 
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which-paved the way for the 1920 insurrection, he gave several factors among 
which were 'collection of land revenue and other taxes', 'fear of exploitation 
by western, commercialism', 'use of aeroplanes against recalcitrants', and 
'demands for labour on flood banks ... In this matter circumstances of military 
occupation have been partly responsible. We have throughout been, and indeed 
still are, subjected to considerable legitimate pressure from the military 
0 
authorities ... 
'. 1 
The essence of Wilson's argument could be summed up by the following 
points. Rates of taxation under British rule were but similar to those imposed 
during the Turkish era. Increase of revenue was achieved by efficiency, justice 
and was also due to-the economic prosperity taking place in Iraq. In the 
meantime, Wilson claimed, 
Iraqis were getting better services in return for 
their payments. 
In the first place, it is clear that the very structure of the argument 
itself is predominated by certain notions which had virtually undermined the 
logic of the discussion. Wilson confused the political issue with the moral 
one. . And 
in regard to the latter issue, Wilson also confused Western values 
with Oriental moral principles. 
The duty of every citizen to pay taxes is, 
broadly speaking, a moral obligation which had been introduced into Europe 
2 
through certain economic, social and political developments. Such was not 
the case of the oriental Ottoman society. The 
Oriental state had not been 
considered, by its subjects, as 
the embodiment of the people's will or inter- 
ests. It had rather 
been regarded, with some undeniable justification, as an 
alien, parasitic and oppressive body. Every method, deceit and bribery not 
excluded, was resorted 
to in order to defeat the law and evade taxation. 
Such was the moral code of an 
Oriental society. To imply post-Rousseau and 
advanced European concepts 
of duty on a different society was an open invi- 
tation for political unrest. 
Ibid. 
2. Lord Acton, History of 
Freedom and Other Essays, (London, 1919), p. 19. 
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,,, Nonetheless, the 
British Administration could have modified such an 
opposition if it had carried out a policy of expenditure directed to meet the 
urgent. social needs of Iraq at large. This was what the Civil Commissioner 
claimed to have been the case., However, the Iraq Budgets do not encourage 
such a claim. 
In the first place, one finds a yearly increase in the budget surpluses 
occurring in every year of British occupation. The following table shows such 
surpluses in Rupees. 
TABLE 
Year Surplus Year Surplus 
1915-16. 29,46,298'" 1918-19 176,63,745 
1916-17 49,45,050 1919-20 111,73,932 
1917-18 52,23,762 
r. v 
Furthermore, the examination of the annual expenditure from 1915 
onward reveals"*some more disturbing points. They indicate that the 
bulk of the revenue was allocated to 'administrative expenses' rather- than, 
to Departments of direct. and tangible benefit to the public. And that in every 
year administrative expenses 
had increased at a highly drastic rate. The 
following table casts a light on the above-mentioned points. 
TABLE! 
Administrative expenses1 
Departments of Medical, Education 
in Rupees 
Irrigation and agriculture, in 
Rupees 
1915-1916 11,03,122 
672845 
1916-1917 21,02,510 1,11,710 
1917-1918 76,07 
486 1,75,387 
1318-1919 127,11,790 
6,43,750 
1919-1920 144,28,134 71,78,693 
The absence of any expenditure for irrigation and agriculture prior to 
1919. is explained by the 
fact that those departments were under the direct 
control of the Military 
Authorities rather than the Civil Administration. 
jf11.7 ýavu ý. "ý--^__. ___ _ ________- . _. ..... .. ýav avalYVi-C4 4V ý4vaa HOWAVA , 
iý "This item includes only (i) Headquarters Administrative Expenditure, and 
(ii) political officers Revenue Establishment. 
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departments, before 1919, were in the final analysis to facilitate and serve 
military purposes. Sir John Hewett, in his previously-mentioned report, 
confirms such an impression: 
ý"; -j""We are 'unanimously and emphatically of the opinion that there is 
no ground for the suggestion that the expenditure of Army funds has 
been prompted by the desire to provide for after-peace developments, 
and we consider that they have been uniformly expended with the 
=- primary object of securing the efficiency and comfort of the force '. 
l 
" `The Civil Commissioner, in his previously-mentioned telegram claimed 
that the large increase in receipts during 1919 and 1920 was wrongly attributed 
to rapid growth of taxation. Wilson argued that such an increase was 'due 
`largely'to payments for augmented services rendered by Civil Administration 
'to other departments, chiefly the Army'. Sir John Hewett's argument specified. 
'the nature of such services. Furthermore, by examining the figures of the 
1920-1921'budget, one finds that Wilson's argument is hardly justified. The 
total revenue of that year amounted to Rs. 666,68,740, of which only Rs. 56,00,000 
came from the Army. This figure was divided into Rs. 35,00,000 as payment for 
revenue for grain sold to the Army, Rs. 18,00,000 as a contribution from the 
Army for qUasi9flilitarY duties of Levies and Police. Only Rs. 3,00,000 was a 
contribution from the Army towards the upkeep of roads. 
2 
In 1919 the Departments of Irrigation and Agriculture were transferred to 
the control of the Civil Administration, 
3 
yet the expenditure of such vital 
departments remained rather unimpressive. In 1919-1920, irrigation expend- 
iture . was. 
Rs. 38,78,605, and only Rs. 3,81,738 was devoted to agriculture. This 
formed. only some 22 per cent of the Land Revenue, and some 9 per cent of the 
total expenditure of that year. In 1920-1921, irrigation expenditure was 
increased to Rs. 57, l7,000 and agriculture expenditure increased to Rs. 6877,000.4 
In spite of this increase, irrigation and agricultural expenditure remained 
. to represent 
only the same previous modest percentage of'Agricultural Revenue, 
1. Sir John Hewett, Report..., op. cit., p. 27 
2. A. T. Wilson, Clash ..., P. cit., p. 224. 
g Ibid. p"158 
4. Ibid., p. 224. 
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which went up to Rs. 218,16,290 and the total expenditure which increased to 
Rs. 710,52,100.1 
-! 'All of this was performed under the peculiar conditions whereby such vital 
departments as*the Education and Medical did not account for more than-6 percent of 
the total expenditure of 1919-1920. In the previous years it was even less 
than that figure. In 1919, ' the Education expenditure represented only 1.9 per 
cent, of the total expenditure. It is true that this department had opened some 
newrschools, 
2 however, it is equally true that the number of students attending 
3 
schools in 1919 was less than the number of students in 1914. It should be 
remembered that the British had in 
fact inherited *a fairly comprehensive system 
of education based on European methods*. 
4 
In regard to education, it is 
sufficient to recall what. -Gertrude Bell, 
in May 1920, had to say: 
#. - ; *..., We /apt. A. Lionel Smith and G. Bell7 had a long ... talk 
about the education of Arabs. I am not quite happy about what 
-we*re doing; nor is he. It*s all very well to say we mustn*t 
start secondary schools till we have really first-rate material, 
; 'both in teachers and pupils, but we can't wait for that ... the 
people here-are so immensely keen to be provided with higher edu- 
cation-that if we hold back they will think we are doing it on 
purpose to keep them back. You have to look at it from the point 6 
of politics as well'as of education*. 
The Motives behind such a policy: This administrative conduct of harsh taxation 
coupled with the hardly wise or 
fair expenditure, invites the question as to the 
motives behind such a 
financial policy. This could be explained by the obvious 
impact of the Indian administrative tradition, the attempt at the establishment 
1. Ibid. 
Wilson*s argument that irrigation had extended and improved during British 
occupation 
is not totally justified by Irrigation Expenditure. In 1919 
only, Rs. 12,27,000 was spent on new works, 
Rs. 3,44,000 on flood protection 
the'rest of the expenditure was 
devoted to maintenance of old projects. 
©0.696/2. Admin. Reports, Department of Revenue, 
1919, p. 135, Appendix L. 
2. C. 0.696/1. Administrative Report of Education, 
1918, p. 10; also C. 0.696/2. 
Admin. Reports Department of Education 1919, p. 7. 
3; 4 Number of Iraqi students 
in 14s 19949i99 including some 1,338 in military 
schools tAbd al 
Razzag 91älas 1p- 1 Pp. 248-252. Number of Iraqi 
students In 1919 was 6,317 of whom 3,308 were Sunnis, 1,725 Shi*is, 937 
Christians and 330 Jews. C. 0.696/2 
Admin. Reports Dept. of Education, 1919, 
p. 8, -APP "1" 
4. Ibid. '. P"1. 
5. Captain A. L. Smith was 
then Director of Education of Baghdad. 
6. " . Lady Bell, 
The Letters ..., o. tits Vol-II, p. 487, dated 9th May 1920. 
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of a colonial administration and the favouring of the Administration's personnel. 
In addition to that and at the core of such a policy, there was another major 
factor. Wilson exposed the essence of his taxation policy when he pointed out 
that without such a policy, *enhanced burden would have fallen on British tax 
payers who would have had to make up the deficit*. 
l 
Wilson was caught up in a vicious circle: in post-war Britain there pre- 
wailed a genuine anxiety as to any unnecessary expenditure. Time and again the 
! Mesopotamian' financial situation was raised in the House of Commons. The 
'British Government was eager to assure Parliament that the Iraqi finance was 
self-supporting and that no subsidies were given to 
its Administration from the 
British Government or the Government of India. 
2 
Here again we are confronted with the relevant implications generated by 
the conflict of interests and views among British policy makers, A large number 
of whomwere opposed 
to the financial. burden involved in the continuing occupation 
of Iraq. 
3 "I strongly suspect that several times in the past 12 months financial 
considerations must 
have tempted them /H. M. G. 7 to abandon this place /! rag7'. 
4 
Without such a pressure Wilson might not 
have been obliged to embark on his 
injudicious financial policy. 
It seems that this heavy taxation and extravagant annual surpluses were 
motivated to provide an ample assurance. 
Wilson, in his attempts to reconcile 
his desire of British control over Iraq with the British resentment of any new 
financial burden, had no option but to squeeze the Iraqis to the, utmost. 
s 
1. F. O. 371/5076 No. 8284, dated 21st July 
1920. 
2. For instance see: 
Parliamentary Debates, H. C., Vol. 119, p. 1925 dated 18th 
August 1919; also, Vol. 130, p. 2234,1920; also 
Vol. 132, p. 1191,27th 
July 1920. 
3. Ibid. Also' see J. Hewett 
Report Supra, p /9y.. r Also British Press attitude, 
Infra, p 4¬D 4/. S'- 
4. A. T. Wilson, Letters 
1903-1921, Vol. 2. London Library letter dated 22.2.1920. 
5. W ilsonts other option was 
to 'tempt' the British Government to the fact that 
*the capital value of the 
Oil Fields in Mesopotamia is £50 million ... ports, 
steamers, railway, roads 
and buildings, built by British capital ... count 
for another ten millions. 
Imports this year are about ten millions mainly 
British ... the 
/Xnglo-French%. declaration as it stands affords little 
guarantee 
for a stable government, upon the existence of which depends the 
retention and 
development. of these assets*. 
P. 0.371/4183. From 
C. C. Baghddd to 1.0. dated 21st July 1919, No. 8169 
hL 
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I 
However, such a policy was to back-fire. It proved to be highly provocative 
and formed an important. f actor behind the outbursttof 1920 which had cost the 
British, a very high financial and political price. 
' 
This in its turn was an 
essential element. in urging the British Government to pursue a better (cheaper) 
solution which by necessity was, to exclude Wilson and, sweep away his plans. 
The Social Content of the Taxation Policy and its Political Impact: It has 
been argued that Iraq, during British occupation, had undergone a phase of 
economic prosperity and was flourishing. This was supposed to justify the 
high taxation and minimize the importance. of the economic factor in 
the political unrest of Iraq. However, such an argument, authentic as it may 
be, evades some very essential questions. Prosperity is not supposed to be used- 
in absolute or abstract terms; it could not hestow its gifts on the whole of 
a society which was composed of different social groups and geographic areas. 
To consider the question in concrete terms, it is right to ask, cui bond? and 
who was 'paying the bill'? 
The yearly receipts of the Administration from 1915 to 1920 reveal that 
theýbulk of taxation was falling on two items; agricultural produce and customs. 
Together , j, those two 
items had, approximately, formed the following percentage 
of the total receipts: 
Year Year % Year % 
1915-16 95.7.1917-18 96.0 1919-20 83.4 
1916-17 98.7 1918-19 96.5 1920-21 71.52 
Thus the burden of taxation had fallen heavily on the, socially speaking, Iraqi 
feliähin and merchants. 
This overall conclusion has led not a few Iraqi intellectuals to suggest 
that the Iraqi rising was urged and led by the commercial 'bourgeoisie'. 
3 
Dr. 
1. The uprising of 1920 cost the British treasury some £40m. 
2. Calculated by the writer. 
3. For example see the 
following articles: (i) 'Ali al Tala*fari, al Thawra al 
Ira iya al Kubra, Dira 
ýssätArabic Vol. 5, No. 12, (Beirut, 1969), pp. 123-4; 
(ii) 'Ali al Talas fari, 'Awamel Ikhfaq al Thawra al 'Irägiya, Dirässät *Arabiya, 
Vol. 7, 'No. 3, (Beirut, 1971), pp. 58-9; (iii) 'Ali al Nuri, T_a'liq bawl Tabi'. C 
Thawrat al "Ashrin al Wataniya fi al 'Iraq, Dirässät "Arabiya, Vol. 6, No. 
(Beirut, 1970), pp"89-92. 
I 
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M. S. -Hassan, "an economist Iraqi authority, accepted and advocated such a con- 
clusion. This deduction, which dominated contemporary Iraqi literature, 
is worth a challenge, both from an economic and historical point of view. 
With due respect, one would like to point out that such a deduction seems 
to have been motivated by loyalty to marxist dogma rather than to deep obser- 
vitioh of Iraqi political conditions of 1920. It was the Iraqi intelligentsia 
(ex-officers, ex-officials and men of education), the Mid-Euphrates tribes and 
Shi'ah 'Ullemä' who were the rank and file of the Iraqi uprising of 1920. One 
could hardly trace a 'militant' role being practised by the so-called Iraqi 
tbourgeoisie". Furthermore, the above-mentioned 'deduction' appears to be the 
product of a rash, or one=sided, examination of the taxation policy and not 
the fruit of a deep analysis of the social content of the taxation policy. The 
following table will help to show that in actual fact the burden of taxation 
was falling more on the 
fellähin than on the merchants, and that taxes on 
Commerce were within reasonable and tolerable limits. 
TABLE 
Value of Export and ' Customs Revenue Revenue of Land and Year Imports of Iraq Agricultural products 
£££ 
1910 (Turks) 2,962,500 or 380,624 527,175 
3,950,000 
1918 (British) 8,325,000 or 487,500 or 1,631,0572 or 
11,100,000 650,000 2,174,743 
This table discloses that 
in eight years agriculatural revenue was trebled, 
w hereas the custom revenue 
remained virtually the same against a background 
of which the commercial value was 
approximatdy trebled, or, to be more precise, 
had, in eight years, increased 
by a percentage of 285. 
It is true that the Iraqi mercantile class had to increase its payments 
of customs taxes: 
in 1919 this revenue amounted to £1,651,800 (or £2,202,400). 
But in the same year the value of export and 
import goods had risen to £13,800,000 
1.. - Dr. 
M. S. Hassan, Al "Ämai al Igtisädi fi al Thawra al 'Irägiya, (Baghdad, 
-1958), PP-14,23-4. 
2. Figures of 1910 cited 
from S. Haider, 2P-- cit., p. 701; for 1918 calculated 
from Cmd"1061,22. tý", p. 
118. 
,. 
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(or. £18,400,000). Nonetheless it is equally true that Iraqi merchants were 
increasing their profits in a way equivalent,. perhaps higher, to their payments. 
Gertrude Bell gave the following yearly values of export and import goods of 
Basrah and Baghdad (figures in Lacs of Rupees). 
TABLE 
. 
4-. 4 
1910g,, ä 395 . 
1915 94 1918 1,110 
1912 398 1917 625 1919 1,8401 
4 ; -One 
should also bear in mind that taxation on Iraqi merchants was, 
politically speaking, of. less alarming consequences than that on land. The 
social structure of merchants did not allow successful resistance, and the 
economic-nature of commerce made the collection of revenue a much easier and 
disciplined task. One, also assumes. that the opening of the commercial route 
to Persia must have-met the approval of the Baghdadi merchants. 
2 
In addition 
to that, the existence of'a huge army of occupation, representing a consuming 
force, -must have helped 
in the flourishing of trade. 
The overall situation was, thus, favourable to the Iraqi merchant class, 
more especially to their upper strata. This 
is not to deny the existence of 
some grievances which, however, were of minor character and did not amount to 
a , revolutionizing process. 
, The 
Turks were trying to protect the local industry and commerce by-im- 
posing high, rates of 
import duties. 
3 
However, once Basrah was occupied, a flow 
of : imported goods 
(mainly British) was to sweep the Iraqi markets. 
4 
The major 
5 
imported item was textiles. It was because of such an irresistible competition 
that the local Iraqi industry and, commerce (humble as they were) were to be 
I. ' Ibid. 
2. A. T. Wilson, Clash '..., op. cit., P. 88. 
3. Su2ra,, p"12. 
4. For=instance in 1912, Basrah 
imported Rs. 398,10,000. In 1918 this was in- 
creased to Rs. 1,110,26,854. 
'C. 0.696/1. Admin. Reports 1918 of Certain Depts. of the C. A. of the 
Occupied Territories. VI. Gasrah Customs Report for year ending 31st 
December 1918. 
5. F instance in 1917, textile items formed Rs. 283,00,000. In 1918 they 
'formed Rs. 543,00,000. 
0 
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suffocated. l This indicates that the British policy, had some damaging 
effect-on the local Iraqi industry and commerce. However, such economic 
activities were very modest in their scope and personnel. 
2 
The larger sections 
involved in commerce were, economically, benefitting from the lift of high im- 
port duties and, politically, getting more sympathetic toward British policy 
and presence. 
Moreover, the Civil Commissioner stated that he had discontinued the 
collection of some major Turkish taxes, namely, property tax . Werko, profession 
tax Temettu, military service, bedel *Askeriya, and communication tax. 
3 
In 
1910-11, property tax amounted to £44,850, profession tax totalled £29,625, 
bedel 'Askeriya paid £52,125 and communication tax was £39,900.4 Altogether 
those taxes formed a considerable amount of one-ninth of the total revenue of 
that year (£1,653,075). It is obvious that such revenues were derived from 
rich Iraqis. The abolishing of such taxes reveals certain aspects of the 
social content of the Administration*s financial 
policy, namely its benevolent 
treatment of the rich families. 
This economic policy was bound to produce a series of political reactions. 
The Administration provoked the animosity of the intelligentsia (mainly centred 
in Baghdad and Mosul), but it gained the gratitude of the merchants. Thus it' 
was logical that whereas the Iraqi 
intelligentsia was assuming 'a nationalist 
and an anti-British attitude, the merchants were to depart from their 'nation-11 
alist' stance taken during the Turkish'period and to assume a pro-British line. 
In 1918, Wilson described the political inclinations prevailing in Iraq: *The 
merchant and landowners ... viewed the attitude of the intelligentsia of Baghdad 
with suspicion; 
they disclaimed any sympathy with or interest in king Husain 
ý1. In : the late 19th Century 
Iraqi weavers numbered 3,500. In 1920 they fell 
-'to"some 
few hundred. No Iraqi textile firms could . withstand the 
pressure and all were liquidated. 
M. S. Hassan, Tatawwur.., op. cit., pp. 283-4. 
2. Serra, PP. 2,11. 
30 'g; 6.37l/5076. From C. C. Baghdad to 1.0., dated 21st July 1920. No. 8284. 
4. S'. 'Haider, oy it., p. 702. 
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and the Sharifian party ... '. 
1 
In early 1919, the Civil Commissioner attributed the pro-British attitude 
of Basrah"s merchants to their 'flourishing trade and prosperity'. 
2 
In late 
1919, the Political Officer of Basrah wrote: tI do not think we are as popular 
in some ways, especially among certain classes, as were our Turkish predecessors*. 
However$'he pointed out that "On the other hand the land-owning and commercial 
classes want us to stay and feel that British rule alone will help them'. 
3 
The 
Assistant political officer of Basrah Sa_n. jaS pointed out that "the extension of 
taxation and its increasing burden are naturally making some regret the days of 
the accommodating Turks*. He, furthermore, referred to 'certain dissatisfaction 
because the Arabs had no 'voice in the Administration of the country'. He also 
pointed to the 'fairly active pro-Sharifian group*. Nevertheless, he asserted 
that to 'both these classes /merchants and landlords] the British Government 
stands for safety and security*. 
4 
In late 1920, Cox reported that the merchants 
and landowners of Basrah 'contemplate with some dismay the prospect of Arab Govern- 
ment and urge that it would be a betrayal on our part ... '. 
5 
All this makes it amply clear that the Iraqi merchants were strongly in 
support of the British Administration which treated them favourably. If that 
was"the case who then was carrying the burden of taxation? In the next chapter 
it will be suggested that it was the Iraqi fell hin who were carrying this 
burden and who were the second major group (in addition to the Intelligentsia) 
to be provoked by the Administration into joining the independence movement. 
--- - --------- 
1., A. T. Wilson, op. cit., p. 92. 
2. F. 0.371/23/ME5/19/7. Tele. no. 
1076 dated 26th January 1919. 
3. C. O. 696/2. -Admin. Report Basrah 1919, pp. 25-6. 
4. Ibid., p. 59. 
S. F. O. 371/5231/13471, tele. no. 
12986 dated 26th October 1920. 
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CHAPTER X 
THE BRITISH ADMINISTRATION AND THE IRAQI FELLAJjIN 
It is well known that the rising of-1920 was essentially a peasant revolt 
which occurred in the area known as the Mid-Euphrates. Less well-known are the 
conditions which generated such a turning point in the modern history of Iraq. 
The "significance of the events was of major importance to both the nationalist 
movement 
and to the forms of political peasantry activities alike. 
The Iraqi independence movement which had gathered a high political 
momentum in 1920 was articulated, 
led and inspired by a group of Iraqi Arab. 
nationalists who were mainly, resident 
in the large towns of Iraq or abroad. 
Nevertheless, without the actual initiative of the Mid-Euphrates tribes in 
breaking out the rising, the independence movement would have lacked effective 
-power. The discontented 
intelligentsia would have been imprisoned within the 
boundaries of petitions, border harrassments and prolonged negotiations con- 
ducted with an unsympathetic Administration. In short, it was those thousands 
of fellahin who, through 
their stormy rising, had rendered the independence 
movement its striking arm which, 
in the final analysis, was its most effective 
lever. 
Such a deduction defies the assumption which considers the movement as"a 
chaotic mutiny by anarchist 
tribes incited by outside agitators. The latter 
notion is based on 
the assumption which considers Iraqi tribes as a marginal 
social force which existed outside 
the national system. It underestimates 
r political awareness, and confuses 
the previous tribal disorders with theei 
the rising oß 1920. It will 
be suggested (in this chapter and the next) that 
Iraqi tribes were gradually 
driven to be integrated within the national, socio- 
political Iraqi structure. 
Their political awareness will be examined in a 
different; chapter. 
It is true that peasantry strife was not new in Iraq. But what was novel 
about""the 1920 revolt 
was its 'national' character and aspiration. This was 
- 218 - 
" 
clearly displayed by five facts: . 
the rising was -the product of a collective 
and wide, tribal unity; it was directed against the central authority; its 
demands and slogans were those 'of the 'independence movement';: it was conducted 
in.,, conjunction with the nationalists and the Shi'i, 
'ulemä'; and finally it had 
effected the national political development of Iraq. 
z-; Nevertheless,. 
it ought to be pointed; out that the fellähin movement and 
the. 'nationalist' one were not necessarily identical. Each of them had retained 
ggs., own dynamics and aims.. It was due to a certain socio-political and 
historical development that the. two movements were to achieve certain unity 
and, interaction. However, such a process 
did not amount to the full unification 
of the two components; of 
the independence movement. In short Iraqi fellihin 
were approaching the stage of national consciousness and action 
but did not 
by-pass. its preliminary juncture. 
, I, The task of 
this chapter is to define the term fellahin, to examine the 
motives behind their engagement 
in politics and to trace the historical process 
of their, political 
intervention on a national scale. The next chapter will 
carry more elaboration on the subject. 
All of this will be examined against 
the background of the outlined British 
Administration policy. 
The, participation of peasantry in 'politics', its motives, methods, 
dimensions and consequences are subjects that have been claiming a wide interest 
and research. 
1 
However, the subject is still far from assuming a unified out- 
look., For some writers, peasantry are 
the pioneers of a new human era. They 
'alone are revolutionary' and 
'proletariat of our times'. 
2 
To others, peasantry 
are the 'barbarians', 
3 
a 'class that represents the barbarism within civilization'! 
Even to rather sympathetic eyes 
the peasantry were considered as 'a brake on the 
1.,;, For, instance see 
the works of M. Beqiraj, B. Galeski, E. J. Hobsbaum, 
N. G. Ranga, E. R. Wolf, 
P. Worsley, listed in bibliography, 
2. -Franz Fanon, The Wretched of 
the Earth, (London, 1967), p. 47 
3---Maxim Gorky, "The Barbarians;, in T. Shanin (ed. ), Peasants and Peasant 
Societies, (Middlesex, 1971), pp. 369-71. 
4. K. Marx and F. Engels, Selected Works, Voll, (London, 1959), p. 159. 
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revolution '. 
l' Some other writers argued that peasantry possess 'two souls' 
or"dual position', one for progress and social solidarity, the other for 
stagnation and narrow selfish individualism. 
2 
In this work and on several occasions, it has been pointed out that life 
and reality are richer than any generalization or abstract concepts. This 
holds true particularly of Iraqi fellähin; a highly complex social structure 
with (enormous dissimilarities. From several angles, one could distinguish 
between those who relied on irrigation and those who depended on rain; between 
cultivators of cereals, date or rice; between Shi'i peasantry 
and Sunni; 
between the Shi'ah nearer to Najaf and Karbelä' and those remote from them. 
Socially speaking, one could also distinguish between areas in which the 
social relations were peasantry versus 
landholders and areas of which the 
relations were those peasant members of tribes versus Sheikhs. 
Nonetheless such a 'reality' of diversities could not render the term 
Yell peasantry into a meaningless one. Without conceptual delineation shin or 
of'fellä in and their societies as a social structure, this work will turn 
into a"ghost hunt'. Furthermore, the existence of peasantry as a realistic 
(andý'not purely semantic) concept can-be justified by and claimed for both 
empirical and conceptual reasons. 
Certain common peasants' attributes could 
be`pointed out in reference to the Iraqi fellähin: Teodor Shanin suggests 
that lone could delimit peasant societies by establishing a general type with 
four basic facets: 
-°"'1 "The peasant family /or tribe/ farm as the basic unit of 
multidimensional social organization ... 
2. Land husbandry as the main means of livelihood directly 
providing the major part of the consumption needs ... 
`3, Specific traditional culture related to the way of life of 
small communities ... 
4, The under dog position - the domination of peasantry by 
outsiders ... . 
Without any violation of reality, all of 
the above-mentioned conditions wore 
in existence among 
the Iraqi peasantry during the period of our concern. 
1 a_ F, '. Fanon, 
op. cit., p. 47 
V. G. Kiernan, 
'The Peasant Revolution', The Socialist Register, (London, 
1970), PP"30'33. 
3. T. Shanin, Peasants 
and Peasant Societies, op. Cit., pp. 14-5 
szD 
,.. Conceptually, a , tendency. -to treat fella in as a meaningless notion can 
be-defeated on assumptions related to the essence of sociology. 'A socio- 
logical generalization does not imply a claim of homogeneity or an attempt 
at: unif ormity. Quite the contrary, a comparative study implies the existence 
of both: similarities and differences, without which a generalization would, 
1 
of course, be pointless'. 
What are the motives behind peasantry involvement in 'militant' politics? 
In, contrast to the wishful thinking of some romantic revolutionaries, it has 
s been suggested that it is highly difficult for peasantry to engage in sustained 
rebellion. 'Peasants are especially handicapped in passing from passive recog- 
nition of wrongs to political participation as a means for setting them right'. 
2 
Involvement in a political activity on a national level is preconditioned, one 
assumes, by an awareness or, conceptual outlook of a national character. A 
peasantry (of the pre-communication revolution era and of the concrete conditions 
of Iraq) by his very socio-economic structure, lacked such a vision. His world 
had been confined to the boundaries of his village, family and tribe. 
The disengagement from political action by the peasantry was attributed 
to, their individualistic and competitive economic and social structure. 
3 
Furthermore 'tyranny of work weigh heavily upon peasants ... Momentary alter- 
nations of routine threaten their ability to take up the routine later'. 
4 
Moreover, 'Peasants as a rule, have been kept at arm's length from the social 
sources of power. 
Their political subjection interlinks with cultural sub- 
ordination ... 
9.5 Thus it was argued that 'The Middle-East peasant-is poor 
and exploited. but hardly anyone 
in the area expects him to rebel ... 
'. s 
Nonetheless, the fact remains that Iraqi fell .n had risen in an armed 
and sustained rebellion which was of a 
far-reaching effect. Hence it is fair 
Ibid., p. 13 
2. E. R. Wolf, 'on Peasant Rebellions', International Social Sciences Journal 
Vol. 21,1969. Distributed as a paper by the Sociology Department, Durham 
University, p"1. 
3. ' Ibid., pp. 1-2 
4. - Ibid. 
5". T. Shanin, 9p. cit., 
pp. 14-5 
6. M. Halpern, The 
Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North 
Africa, (Princeton, 1965), pp. 87-8 
- 221 - 
to-suggest that the above-mentioned factors must have been neutralized or 
negated by the presence of counter and more effective elements. 
; '-, S; In the evaluation of peasantry rebellions an essential importance was' 
attached to the existence of historical tradition of political violence among 
the peasants. 
1. 
Such traditions explained and motivated the recurrence of' 
peasantry risings. 
2 
"Itýwas'also suggested thatýin colonial countries, the 
peasants who are 'kept outside the class system' are the 'first to=discover. 
3 
that only violence pays'. 
The Iraqi peasants werervery 
violence and perpetual mutinies. 
4 
tribal upheavals which took place 
the Khäz'il, (1763) and the Muntaf: 
rich indeed in their traditions-of political 
Lorimer draw attention to three important 
in the 18th century; the Ban1 1äm (1763), ". 
5 
Lq (1769). It is sufficient-to mention that 
al Fir'on counted some 15 major peasants outbursts of political violence (in 
the Mid-Euphrates) during the past two centuries of Iraqi history. 
6 
The motive-forces behind this almost perpetual peasant unrest were 
basically taking two forms: tribal mutinies directed against the central 
government-land, taxation or conscript policies; and inter; tribal-clashes- 
over=land or water settlement. The second form of conflict was often encouraged 
by,, the, TurkishGovernment. It was obviously of a"local character and formed 
a, major handicap to the growth of a national awareness. 
,, 
However the first form of tribal unrest, by virtue of being directed 
against the Central Government, was bound to assume a 'primitive' national 
character. In its early stages,, such an upheaval was often, arrested within 
its local boundaries. But on certain occasions, such an unrest was to claim 
a. wider. tribal unity. For instance, the Muntafiq tribal rising (1909) 
1: J, P. Harrison, The Communists and the Chinese Peasant Rebellion, (London, 
1970), pp. 265,276. 
2. -'--Mao Tse-Tung, The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party, 
. -,,, 
(Peking, 1958), p. 78 
3. F. Fanon, op. p. 48 
4. The Zunj movement 
(869-883), the Carmathian movement (901-6). 
r_e-tmer. on. cit., pp. 1127-32 
gý"" F. M. a1 Fir'on, OP. it., pp. 26-35 
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embraced a confederation of tribes and was directed against the=Sa'dun and 
thet. Turks alike. Such forms of tribal movements allowed the advent of a 
limited national awareness which by-passed the local boundaries-of strife and 
sought alliance with political leaders in towns remote from-the arena of the 
directýconf litt. It will be remembered that inj1910 there emerged some polit- 
ical'co-ordination between Talib Pasha of Basrah and some tribal leaders in 
Muntafi9,. Sh9nriyah and Najaf. All of them discovered unity in their clash 
with the Sa'dun and the Turkish rule., 
. By! the turn of the current century the form of tribal-governmental clashes 
were gaining dominance. The inter-tribal strife was fading away. This was duo 
to the'rise of certain socio-political changes of which the most important were 
the:, introduction of the 
äu system and the administrative measures of central- 
izatj. on. 
.x,. s. 
In many parts ' of Iraq the inter-tribal squabbles over land and water faded 
into,, insignificance before the much more difficult contention between tribesmen 
and t apu holders. Thus dispute for land possession was fought between the 
fellä in whose ancestors-had cultivated the land for centuries, paying only 
revenue forgovernment and 
'avoiding payment when they dared' and 'some influ- 
- ential: absenteelandlords who could produce a 
book of title deeds, all in order, 
seriallyýnumbered,, each for the same-vast area ... with unrecognizable bound- 
arias, and wholly unsupported by possession'. 
' 
r-. 
It,, goes without saying'that the absentee landlords were not only un- 
supported, by the actual possession of 
the land but also lacked the means and 
methods except the government support - of putting their, claims into effective 
practice. 
'Therefore, it is somehow misleading to speak of Peasant-landlord 
conflict. It 
is more accurate to refer to such a conflict as between the 
peasants and the government acting on 
behalf of the landlords., Without the 
government's assistance 
the t_apu sanad is nothing but ink on paper. 
In-addition to that the growing strength and the aggressive centralization 
oßrthe,, Turks was accompanied=by 
an increasing, demand for taxation and conscript. 
0.696/2. Admin. Report of the Revenue Dept. 1919, p. 24 
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It was, logical. -that the tribes, -in, their resistance, were to discover that 
their 'struggle' should be directed against the Central Government and that 
only-a. -unified stance, 
both locally and nationally, could-withstand the rising 
governmental, pressure. Such a conclusion was to mark the-beginning of a_. 
national awareness and. to. pave the way for the actual participation of Iraqi 
fellähin, in national politics. 
, -;,, °, 
To clarify the picture, a short historical examination is deemed necessary. 
In:. the 18th and 19th-centuries, Iraq witnessed a series of fellähin outbursts 
of violence. However, such movements were-of a purely peasant character in 
the sense of being confined to local peasant demands, aspects and motives. 
None of, these movements had assumed any 'national' character or role. The 
same judgement could hardly pass the, 1920 movement whose national aspects and 
contacts were visible. Such a change was part of a historical process of 
which the 1920 was but a fruit of a certain chain of developments. In the 
early years of the 20th century new political developments were to occur. -. 
Contacts-between town politicians and tribal leaders were taking place and 
tribal--politics were beginning to assume a role far beyond their local-limits. 
In the background oß, such a turn lay certain socio-economic changes 
which were occurring in<-Iraq mainly in land ownership relations. Inter-tribal 
conflicts were-fading away and gradually being replaced by a new form of 
social conflict which was, essentially, a governmental-tribal dispute. Land 
ownership did not-rest solely on brute force, and governmental decisions were 
assuming more importance. The growth of profit economy (replacing subsistence 
economy)*ýriver and land communication and administrative measures at, central- 
ization were all elements affecting the reduction of the gap between town and 
- countryside. The spread of. nationalist 
ideas and the general-increase in 
political. interests which marked 
the C. U. P. era were all factors in enhancing 
such a development. 
-Sucha process was to 
be reflected among the more aware elements of the 
tribal sheikhs who became conscious that their tribal grievances would better 
be handled in conjunction with the 'politics' of the towns. Hence, in order 
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to defend their basic agrarian demands, they started to seek allies amongst 
the towns' politicians. At the other end, the intelligent Sayid Tälib was 
to grasp that in order to. protect and further his power, he needed to-conclude 
certain alliances with tribal sheikhs., When-in 1911 Taub formed his political 
92 
party, -l3izb al $urria wa al Itiläß, he attempted to win-over the support of 
some Iraqi and Arab personnel. Amongst others, T51ib wrote to Sheikh 'Abd 
L 
Allah al"-Fälih al'Sa dun in Muntafiq, 'Atiya abu Kulal in Najaf, 'Sayid Hädi 
ZuwFn and Sayid 'AlwAn al Yäsiri of Shämiyah and Sheikh Mubdir al Fir'aun of 
the Fetla tribe? According to al Ba ir, al Yäsiri and al Fir'aun became strong 
supporters'of the nationalist ideas. 'But the form of their anti-government 
agitation assumed a style suitable to the social conditions in their area'. 
They started to criticize the local officials and incite against taxes and 
duties'. 
3 
Basir's 'but' is indicative of the direction of his argument 
which could not envisage the profound interaction between adopting 'nationalism' 
and resenting taxation. Talib's attempt and the significant, although limited, 
tribal response was to set up a pioneering example. 
The historical process which started during the Turkish era was to inten- 
sify on a much larger scale during the British rule, more especially after 
1918. That was due to the very policy adopted and enforced by the new Admin- 
istration. The nationalists and the Shi'i activities contributed to the 
solidification of that process which was concluded 
by the emergence of the 
y, 
Wis . 
nationalist-Shi'i-tribal alliance. 
For reasons of chronology this chapter will confine itself to the discussion 
of the Administration's 
financial policy in the tribal areas. The next chapter 
will try to examine 
the essential question of the Administration's attitude 
towards the land ownership and the tribal structure. A different part will 
elaborate on the consequences 
of such a policy and its unwitting provocation 
of the nationalist-Shi'i-tribal alliance. 
Falib disputed 'Ajimi al Sa'dun on the leadership of Muntafig. The latter 
sided with the Turks 
in attempting to put an end to the growing influence. 
, Of alib. 
S. Fai¢i, op. cit., p. 98 
3. M. al Basir, op. ccit., p. 
42 
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In the first place it is relevant to draw attention. to a certain fact; 
for. military reasons, the British troops' advancement through Iraq was along 
the Tigris river. The Tigris tribes were not only exhausted in the heat of 
the great strife but also had no illusions as to the British military might. 
This cast some light on the submissiveness of the Tigris tribes in comparison 
1 
'to: the'"unsubdued tribes of the Euphrates. Furthermore, during 1914-1918, 
the Euphrates tribes were left aloie to enjoy a considerable period of self- 
rule under which there existed no taxes, government or melläkiya revenue. 
The: British attempt at reimposing he administration's authority was to be 
delayed until 1918. It was logica] that such an attempt would have faced a 
strong resentment. It was argued 
that: 
zý'There 
appear to be several causes for this rather pardonable 
state of mind /resentment of all forms of government/. First 
v: we have had the bad government of the Turks before us, the 
tyranny of the Saadun before Jhem and lastly the fact that they, 
"..;, 
the tribes, have tasted the sweets of almost complete freedom 
from any sort of Government restraint ... . 
In fact the Administration itself had encouraged tribal disorder by a 
policy which involved intolerable shifts 
from one extreme position to the 
other. ""During the war 
it was the British policy to keep the tribes quiescent. 
This was done 'by large doles, subsidies and no taxation'. 
3 
It was only in 
1918 that<the Gharäf was occupied and for the greater part of that year 'the 
%A. p. O_/ was compelled owing to the hostility of the tribes to keep within 
4 
the walls of that town'. Following upon the Armistice, the tribes of the 
Gharäf, 'after many years of freedom from all taxation paid up revenue in full 
5 
and to the landlord his share of the crop'. 
1 However, this point was of a wider dimension. The Iraqi ßellähin tradition 
of political violence was enhanced and 
justified by their life experience which 
-'See also 
Supra, pp. 8,14. 
2., p. 0.882/26. Arab Bulletin 
No. 36, Sept. 18 1917. Abstract from the Admin. 
Report of the A. P. O. Suq al 
Shuyukh. - 
3. 
, 
C. 0.696/4. Admin. Reports, Muntafiq 1921, p. 18 
4. Ibid.. , 
5. Ibid. 
- 226 - 
had-portrayed to them that 'violence pays'. The perpetual resistance of the 
fellätLin had eventually convinced the Turks to 'accept only nominal payments 
1 
for the government share'. 
Wilson's argument'that his rates of taxation'were similar to those of 
the Turks is a superficial and misleading hypothesis. It evades the fact 
that Turkish 'revenue demands were never collected in full'. 
2 
An official 
British report admitted that 'In Turkish times the severity of the /revenue/ 
terms was neutralized by the impossibility of enforcement'. 
3 
For instance 
the Sheikhs of Shämiyah, under the Ottoman rule, 'were a law unto themselves 
and paid`or did not pay revenue 
(in case of payment at a much lower figure 
than the demand) according to their own wishes. 
4 
Furthermore, it was argued 
that'Turkish methods of revenue assessment 
'allowed room for abuse and corruption 
bothin the estimation of average yield ... as well as 
"by eye" ... so that 
I 5 
the assessment was far below the theoretical share of the state'. 
Such conditions were to produce among the ße11 hin a mental situation 
of the following sort: 
The fact that no rice, date or wheat revenue has been paid for 
many years to the Turks has had 
its effect, especially on the 
younger generation of tribesmen, who are 
in consequence arrogant, 
conceited and boastful. Their arguments are crude but logical, 
and are something as follows: 
Firstly, "No Government" means that we retain crops or money 
-" ý-which could otherwise 
be taken from us in the form of revenue. 
Secondly, we retain lands from which we have ejected the rightful 
A '-'' owners, therefore we have to pay no 
"Mallakiyah" (rent) to anyone 
and have gained and possess good rice lands for nothing. Thirdly, 
we exist and are prepared 
to defend ourselves by right of our strong 
arm, always a popular 
form of existence among savages'. 
6 
Nonetheless, it seems that the implications of such an outlook were not 
seriously considered 
by the majority of the British officials. The re- 
introduction of taxes 
in the Mid-Euphrates area was accounted by most officers 
Haider, 2E:. cit ., p. 613 
2. 
_ 
Ibid. 
3. C. 0.696/1. Hillah Admin. 
Report, 1918, p. 135 
4 C; p. 696/2. Admin. Report of 
Shamiyah, 1919, p. 1 
5. S. Haider, op. cit., p. 
613 
6. F. 0.882/26. 
Arab Bulletin No. 36, Sept. 18 1917. Abstracts from the Admin. 
Report of the A. P. 
O. Suq, e1 Shuyukh 
L 
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as a moral victory and an administrative achievement. The eventual conse- 
quences of such taxation were overlooked, or at least underestimated. 
In 1919, the Assistant Political Officer of Qal'at Sirkar proudly wrote: 
'This year was the first for 16 years in which any revenue has 
been taken from the district. It is interesting to note that 
the Turks seeing how futile were their efforts to get revenue, 
8. years before the war /1914/ organised the system of taking 
a half 
lfrom 
the merchants exporting grain through Kut, Qurnah, 
etc. '. 
The 1919 Annual Report of the Assistant Political Officer of Sug al Shuyukh 
was more revealing and informative: 
4 
'... the disturbed state generally of the Muntafiq tribes (more 
especially those round Suq), and the fact that they had never 
paid revenue to the Turks for the previous 15 to 20 years, made 
its re-introduction a very delicate matter indeed. In 1916 and 
1917 the G. O. C. Euphrates front, Gen. Sir George Brooking, issued 
orders that no revenue whatsoever was to be taken on cereals. 
This was a wise move, as probably any attempts at its collection 
would have resulted in armed resistance and"possibly open rebellion ... '. 
2 
It is thus surprising that with such an understanding of historical circum- 
stances that the report went on to show that: 
... During 
1918 there has been a thorough count of all Suq date 
trees ... Shitwi or wheat and 
Barley Revenue for 1918 was taken 
at one-tenth rate. This again will be increased during 1919, 
and so Revenue from this 3source 
will be doubled probably trebled, 
during the coming year'. 
In common with the Muntafi9 Division (comprising Näsiriyah, Sug, Shatrah 
and Qal'at. Sikar), other tribal areas, namely those which comprised the Mid- 
Euphrates (Hillah, Diwäniyah, Rumaithah, Samäwah, 'Afaij, Daghärah, Shämiyah, 
Abu Sukhair, Hindiyah,, Rust. miyah, Kifl, and Kufah), all shared some mutual 
characteristics which will be discussed in due course. However, and in as 
far as taxation was concerned, it is noteworthy that the bulk of the settled 
tribes. of this area were tax-evasive. They had resisted all Turkish attempts 
at tax collection, and were allowed to continue so at the early stage of 
British occupation. However, it was during late 1918 and early 1919 that 
these areas were to be 
'subdued', at least temporarily, by the British: 
taxes were introduced and collection was taking place. 
c. 0.696/2. Muntafiq Division Annual Report for 1919, Qal'at Sikar, p. 47 
2.8.0.696/1. Adman 
Reports. 1918, Sug al Shuyukh, P. 382. Italics mine. 
3o' 1bj: d_ Italics mine. 
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-. ä a In 1918, the 'Political Officer of Hillah gave the -following account,, of, 
" 
the conditions of Diwäniyah: 
'Especially in the case in Diwaniyah, the tribes of which were 
a constant thorn in the side of the Turkish Government. Paying 
little or no revenue, they more than once caused Turkish forces 
despatched for its collection to beat a hasty retreat. 
The change which Capt. Daly has brought in the nine months during 
which he has been in charge of other districts may be judged by 
the fact that 10,000 tons of revenue grain has been paid in. 
While the tribes. have themselves been persuaded to destroy the, 
great majority of their towers'. 
' 
Prior to February 1919, DiwAniyah district was included in Hillah division. 
Rümaithah and Samäwah formed a separate administrative unit known as Samäwäh 
division. During the early stages of the occupation of the Mid Euphrates, 
the Administration considered it 'expedient' to grant subsidies to various' 
tribes. 'Practically every Sheikh in Samawah Division jSamawah and Rumaithah 
2 
districts/ was in receipt of a monthly allowance'. Thus when Diwäniyah, in 
1918, had paid a 'considerable revenue', the situation assumed a certain 
contrast with the adjoining district (Rumaithah) paying practically nothing 
although the agricultural conditions of the two districts were identical. To 
alter this situation the Civil Commissioner decided to exclude Diwäniyah 
district from Hillah division. In February 1918 a new division was established 
which included the districts of Diwäniyah, 
'Afj, Samäwah and Rumaithah. It 
was named the Diwäniyah division. Daly, who was promoted to the rank of Major, 
whose successful efforts in Diwaniyah district were appreciated, and whose 
'harshness' was overlooked, was appointed as Political Officer of the new 
division. 
Upon his appointment, Major Daly decided to subdue the Bani tu, jaim con- 
federation who had hitherto 
'paid little or no Revenue and whose conduct had' 
3 
leßt'MUch to be desired This, according to Major Daly, was aimed at bringing 
the Huj aim . 
into line' with the Diwäniyah and 'Afaj tribes who, due to his 
p" 
efforts, 'had, in 1918 and early 
1919, behaved in an exemplary manner ... 
C. 0.696/2. Admin. Report of Diwaniyah Division for 1919, p. l. Italics mine 
2. C. 0.696/2. Admin. Report of 
Diwaniyah Division for 1919, p. l 
3. I_ d. 
i 
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paid a heavy Revenue for the first time in modern history, demolished their 
posts and voluntarily handed in their arms '. 
1 
Thus, the Samawah and Rumaithah Sheikhs were summoned to Diwaniyah to 
meet their new Political Of icer and the Diwaniyah and 'Afj Sheikhs 'whose 
example, it was hoped, they would follow'. This did not happen, instead they 
(the Sheikhs oß Rumaithan and Samawah) attributed the obedience displayed by 
the latter to fear of consequences and took upon themselves to condemn the 
2 
Diwaniyah and 'Afaj tribes as 'cowards'. On their return journey to Rumaithah, 
they took oaths at the Shrine of Uamzah to the effect that they will resist all 
I 
attempts of the Administration. 
Major Daly gave the following account of the delicate situation he was 
facing: 
'We were then confronted with a difficult problem. We could, on 
the one hand, leave Rumaithah alone on the grounds that it was 
better not to precipitate embarrassment, or we must accept the 
challenge of authority. The former course would have had serious 
results. The whole of the remaining tribes were watching events, 
and would have resumed their former lawlessness had they seen 
Rumaithah defying Government with impunity .. A small force was 
despatched to protect Rumaithah from the tribes, and air raids 
were carried out for some days ... Results were satisfactory, 
and the demolition of forts and surrender of arms were embodied 
in the terms of peace offered and accepted. The tribes of Rumaithah 
have since behaved remarkably well and are themselves conscious 
of the advantages and amenity of peaceful cultivation'. 
3 
It is astonishing that the Administration had lulled itself into a false 
sense of security. The 
Administration was convinced that 'the tribes were 
contented with the 
British rule and'have a pleasing readiness to obey orders'. 
4 
And that even 'in case of any rising', wrote the Political Officer of Samawah, 
Shinafiyah and Rumaithah, 
'I think it would be easily quelled'. 
5 
In January 
1920, Major Daly of Diwäniyah informed the Civil Commissioner that the tribes 
of his Division 
'were most emphatic that the present form (of Government? 
'I_. Italics mine. 
2. Ibid. 
Ibid. 
4'. C, p. 696/l. Reports of 
Admin. for 1918, Samawah, p. 55 
5. 'I bid. 
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;- should- continue' .1 
Such an opinion was apparently the dominent one amongst British Officials 
in. Iraq. During the first week in December 1917, the Civil Commissioner 
visited Hillah, wairij, `Xufah, Najaf and Karbalä'. He formulated the opinion 
'that. there'is no likelihood of any serious rising on the part of the Euphrates 
', tribes, nine-tenths of whom appreciate what"is being done /by the4Administration, 
(, In February 1918, Wilson raised the extraordinary argument that 'all leading 
c: -/Iraqi/ men have been greatly disturbed by recent announcement ... suggesting 
} 
; 
-, 
that the future of this country ... will be decided at the peace conference, 
or. will be settled with due respect for the wishes of the inhabitants ". 
3 
-. Such an exaggerated 
'optimism' as to the pro-British tendencies of the Iraqi 
tribes must have been generated by confusing the genuine and actual tendencies 
,, with pronouncements motivated 
by dissimulation. 
Less than a month after Wilson's remark it was officially reported in 
. early=March 
1918, that Bani Ard, the powerful tribe on the river bank 
pof the Hillah branch of 
the Euphrates (between Samäwah and Rumaithah) 
, had adopted a 'threatening attitude'. 
4 
A month later it was reported 
thatthe same tribe was preparing to form a league, 'the object of which 
was to prevent the assessment of their lands for revenue to be gathered on the 
crops which are about to be reaped'. 
5 In late May 1918, 'British Officers were 
1. F. 0.371/5226/E. 5723. Baghdad despatch January 9th 1920, enclosing copy of 
letter dated Jan. 6th 1920. From P. O. Diwaniyah reported on the views of 
the notables in his district. Major Daly also argued 'Mid Euphrates area 
'14 is the-most prosperous in Iraq and provides most of the Revenue of the 
country and is entitled to a voice in its destinies - at present their 
-voice is weak, and cannot compare with 
the clamour of amateur politicians 
of Baghdad and disappointed Sunni ex-Turkish officials but ten years hence 
they will have a very big "say". ' One assumes that Major Daly was rather 
-disappointed when the 
'say' of the Mid-Euphrates tribes was declared with- 
in less than ten months. 
2. F: 0.371/3397/81648. Fortnightly Reports by P. O. 's (Mesopotamia); No. 3. 
Report ending 15th December 1917. 
3. F; 0.371/3397/87149. Fortnightly Reports No. 7. Report for the period 
between ist, to 15th February 1918. 
4. F. 0.371/3397/165202. Fortnightly Report, No. 9, dated 1st to 15th March, 
1918, section A. Paragraph 6. 
Ibid. Fortnightly Reports, No. 9, for the period 15th April to 1st May, 
1918. Section A., Para. 2. 
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pelted with mud inithe streets of Rumaithah'1 and. albu Jarib 'refused to 
permit assessment of their crops for revenue'. On 31st May 1918, some villages 
in.. Rumaithah district were'bombed by the R. A. F. 
2 
In May 1919, Rumaithah tribes again defied the Administration and 'air 
3 
raids were carried out for some days' against the villages of those tribes. 
'Results', according, to the BritishAdministration, 'were-satisfactory and-the 
demolition of forts and surrender of arms ... were accepted'. 
4 
The Pblitical 
Officer of Uiillah reported in 1919 the outbreak of certain activities in Hillah 
and Musaiyb by 'the anti-British party in Iraq'. 
5 
British armed boats arrived 
from Baghdad and patrolled the river between 'the Barrage and Imam Hamzah', V 
and 'indulged in gun practice in the lands of the suspected tribes'. In the 
6 
same year, Major Daly reported that a 'Sharifian' propaganda had blown through 
, 
Diwäniyah. 
7 
The annual Report of the Revenue Department for the year 1919 stated that 
there were difficulties over revenue collection 'in parts of Ba'qubah, Nasiriyah 
and the AfaJ_District of Diwaniyah. In the Rumaithah District there was even 
some attempt at organized resistance, which however collapsed ... '. 
$ 
The evidence resentment of the taxation system shown by the Iraqi fellahin 
should not be conceived as a mere product of spoiled anarchic tendencies. The 
grievances of the fellähin were genuine, justified and deep-rooted. It has 
"been"suggested that 'nowhere in any part of the world was agricultural pro- 
duction taxed so heavily as it was in the Irrigation Zone /öf Iraq? during 
this~, period /1890-1937/. ' One could add to this justified, argument that 
at no time did the Iraqi Yelläh? n of the Mid-Euphrates have to pay so much 
Ibid., Fortnightly Reports, No. 14, for the period 15th May to ist June 
1918, Sect. A. Para 5. 
2. Ibid. 
3. C. O. 696/2. Admin. Report of Diwaniyah Division for 1919, p. 1 
4. Ibid. 
5. Ibid., Admin. Report of Hillah Division for 1919, p. 27 
Ibid. 
7. Ibid., Admin. Monthly Report of Diwaniyah Division for August 1919, 'p. 25 
'g. Ibid., Admin. Report of the Revenue Department for the year 1919, p. 6. 
`9. S. Haider, O . 
E. cit., pp. 615-6 
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in taxes as they did during the period between 1918 to 1921, as it is shown 
in the following table: 
TABLE ' The annual land revenue levied in Iraq. 
S££ 
1888-90 311,9291 1918-19 1p461t725 3 1922-23 816,3005 
1910-11 527,1752 1920-21 19867t929 1924-29 946,350 
46 
This table reveals that land revenue was trebled within a period of ten years. 
After, the implications of the rising were comprehended the revenue was drastic- 
ally reduced (some 100 per cent) within only two years. 
In 1920 Muntafig, Diwaniyah and Shämiyah together paid £414,982.7 However 
the expenditure on the same area did not exceed £143,708.8 In 1919, Muntafic 
paid a revenue of £124,636,9 In 1926, it had to pay only £75,201.10 
The high increase of taxation on agricultural production had, unlike that 
on trade, no justification on grounds of agricultural improvement. In fact the 
agrarian situation had deteriorated to an alarming extent. The War conditions 
had caused the decrease of cereal production in 1918 to one-fourth of what it 
was in 1913.11 Such production did not regain its pre-War standards until the 
12 
mid-twenties. At the end of 
1917, an official British Report summed up the 
agricultural situation as 
follows: 
'In I4hanigin the population is famine stricken; and there is no 
cultivation ... the Samara district is suffering from lack of food 
1. S.. Haider, opt t., p. 702. 
2. S. Iimädeh, Al Ni¢äm al Igtisädi fi al 'Iraq, (Beirut, 1938), p. 461. 
3. Cmd. ' 1061, op. cit., p. 118. Figure was given in Rs. 217,47,430, including 
and and kodah revenue. The kodah of 1918-19 amounted to Rs. 22,57,755. 
C. 0.696/2. Kodah Revenue Annual Report, 1919, p. 2. The remaining was 
calculated into £ by the writer. 
4. A. T. Wilson, op. cit., p. 224 
S. B. Dowsons op. cit., p. 16. Figure originally given in Rupees. 
6. Ibid., Annual average. 
7. C. O. 696/3. Budget Estimates 
1920-1921. P. iv. Figure in Rupees 
8. Ibid., P. v 
9. C. O. 696/4. Admin. Report Muntafiq 
1921, p. 31 
10. Report on the u Operations of 
the Revenue Dept., Ministry of Finance, 1926- 
1927, (Baghdad, 1927), p. 23 
11. M. S. Ifassan, al 
*Amil al Igtisidi ..., op. cit., p. 14. 
12. Ibids 
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'and fodder. - In the neighbourhood of Baghdad ... there has not 
been sufficient seed to risk a catch crop in the rainland ... On 
. ', the Euphrates, permission to send seed to Fallujah and Ramadi was 
received only at the very end of November; and full development 
. ýof the area 
has,, for military reasons been impossible'. 1 
In late i -1917 the Civil Commissioner of Iraq warned that 'Famine was threatening 
2 
, the -civil `population'. Wilson' described the agricultural conditions as follows: 
'";. *..: the crops on the Hindiyä branch of theýEuphrates ..: were 
entirely deprived of water, and in the Hindiya district there was 
" V4, no crop whatever. Along the Hilla branch of the river ... the 
yield of the matured crop had been very light. The town of Karbala 
: and , the surrounding lands had been flooded ... the rice crop sown 
in the Shamiya district .. had largely failed. Some pumps existed 
'in-the Diwaniya district, but they were out of action owing to lack 
of oil, and the canals had long since silted up ... 
on the Tigris from Samarra to the vicinity of Baghdad all culti- 
vation had been destroyed by military operations ... Near Baghdad 
rain failed ... In the Baquba area many acres of grain were des- 
troyed by military operations ... 
The canals had everywhere deteriorated. Thus, in the rich Hilla 
: --area-at the 
time of our occupation there were 54 canals, all in 
very bad condition'. 
3 
Wilson also pointed out that during 1918 'Even the date-groves (and fruit can 
be. grown in Mesopotamia only under date-trees) had suffered from the scarcity 
of labour ... the trees 
had been left uncleaned and the ground untilled, for 
three or four years, and insect pests had multiplied accordingly*. 
4 In fact 
it was as late as the end of 1919 that the Political Officer of Shämiyah was 
to report that: , 
*... the vast bulk of the population had stood for many months 
under `a cloud of disappointment due to the devastation of their 
winter crops, through the act of God and the error of man's ways 
combined. - 
Floods, hail, locusts and the failure of irrigation schemes each 
in', turn added its quota till the burden of loss and disappointment 
reached a point which under any but British Administration, must 
have led to, grave unreste. 
5 
A11"of these burdensome difficulties were worsened by the drastic increase 
in the prices of materials essential to Iraqi fella n. Between 1913 and 1918 
1. F. 0.371/3406. Alain. Report, Department of Revenue, Baghdad, 1918, p. 31. 
2. :AT, 
Wilson, Clash -' op . cit. ' p. 56 
3. 
Ibid. q pp. 
55-6. - 
4, -Ibid., PP- 
80-1- 
5., C. 0.696/2. Admin 
Report of Shamiyah for 1919, pp. 1-2. 
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the price of rice increased 150 per cent, the cost of tea had trebled and that 1 
of sugar had increased five times. 
' 
Such conditions were not the direct fault of the British as much as the 
expected outcome of circumstances'created by conditions of war. Nonetheless, 
I 
the British Administration, in setting up its taxation policy, had apparently 
failed to take into account the financial hardships facing the fellähin. After 
all, the yearly increase of agricultural revenue was always linked to, and ex- 
plained by, the efficiency of the Officers on the spot rather than to any 
hypothetical increase in agricultural production. 
It was rather too late when the Civil Commissioner was to recognise the 
perils involved in the situation generated by the Administration's financial 
policy., only one day before the outbreak of the rising, Wilson informed the 
India office of the 'necessity for adequate land settlement and wise regulation 
2 
of_taxation*. He pointed out that the situation in Näqiriyah was *unsatis- 
factory*, owing to 'the fact that districts watered by Hai are wholly in... 
accessible to troops'. However, Wilson did not omit to point out the opinion 
that tfor a permanent solution we must look ... not to political changes for 
which there is no demand ... but to adequate land settlement to carry. through 
which Administration has not got at present necessary skilled staff, and to 
3 
wise regulation of taxationt. 
Upon*the arrival of Wilson's telegram, Major Young was to minute the 
following remark: 
!I do not agree with Colonel Wilson that political changes will not 
provide the remedy. Colonel Gordon Walker, of Basrah, tells me 
that our-repressive taxation, with no corresponding benefits given, 
is exceedingly unpopular with the Arab tribes, from whom the Turks 
never succeeded in extracting revenue ... the situation is really 
becoming dangerous ... It needs pacification ... Wilson can only 4 imagine brigades and batteries (which are not the proper remedies)9. 
The importance of Young*s argument did not lie in his opposition to Wilson*s 
notions alone. Young was 
in fact advocating a new and a different policy to 
1. M. S. -Ilassan, al *Ami1 al Igtigädi ..., op. cit., p. 15. 
2. F. 0.371/5227/ß. 7725. dated 
28th June 1920, No. 7825. 
3., Ibid. 
4. Ind. 
r 
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be carried out in Iraq. It was a political indication of the future. A 
policy whose main pillars were the establishment of an Arab Administration 
and-the drastic reduction of taxation. The conflict was neither personal nor 
trivial. It was a clash between two different outlooks and methods, between 
an outdated and unrealistic 'colonial' vision and an up to date and practical 
'imperial' outlook. 
In an attempt to dismiss the 'economic' factor behind the outbreak, Wilson 
argued that 
'Outbreak began in two districts which in 1919 and previous years got 
off very lightly. With one partial exception it has since been con- 
fined to districts of which same is true. ... These areas in Turkish [times 
were/ quite out of control and paid practically no revenue. They 
have never seen British armies and were never subdued. Their attitude 
where outbreak has occurred is not protest against our taxation but 
:,:: rather revolt against settled government of any 
kind inspired by 
malicious propaganda ... *. 
1 
The conditions and circumstances outlined by Wilson were accurate but his 
conclusion was mistaken. 
In contrast to his deduction, it was logical that 
areas which had previously evaded 
taxation and were unsubdued. were to display 
the strongest resistance to the Administration's attempts. It has been 
suggested that peasantry 
located in peripheral areas outside the domains of 
. 
landlords and government control are, culturally speaking, the main bearers 
of peasant tradition and 
form a conservative stratum. But seen from a political 
angle such a peasant stratum 
is the most instrumental in dynamiting the social 
order when it 
is attempted to be imposed on them. 
2 
A few days after the rising, Wilson informed the India Office that the 
demands of the rebellion*s leader (are complete expulsion of British from Mes- 
opotamia and an Islamic 
kingdom'. This 'means the theocratic state which is 
their /Shitah/ ideal; to tribes 
it means no government at all, or government 
.: 1iä .. 
_. ", '. 
by chiefs who they can 
ignore at will; to a small minority of towns-people it 
connotes an Amir*. 
3 
1. F. O. 371/5076. No. 8284, dated 21st July 
1920 
2. B, R, W01f, 'The Peasantry as a Class*, in T. Shanin (ed. ), op. cit., pp. 
269-70. 
3. . F. O. 371/5228/E. 9849, dated 
12th July 1920. 
A 
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'1 Wilson's assessment might have been very true. After all, the 'peasant 
Utopia is the free village, untrammelled by tax collectors, labour recruiters, 
large landowners, officials ... they also lack any acquaintance with the oper- 
ation of 'the state. as a complex machinery, experiencing it only as a "cold 
monster" 
y... for peasants the state is a negative quantity, an evils. to be 
replaced in short shrift by their own-"home made" social order. That order, 
1 
they believe, can run without the state'. 
Wilson's other argument that 'Actual burden of land revenue falls ... on 
Shaikhs, Sirkals and Tapu holders. These three classes admittedly richer since 
2 
British occupation'. 9 was intended to dismiss the factor of 'improverishment' as 
a cause behind the rebellion. Once again, Wilson's account was right but his 
deduction mistaken. 
`A tendency to attribute political militancy to poor peasants who 'have 
nothing to lose' 
is a widespread notion which was originated by Marxist literature. 
However, such a view is not necessarily the sole representative of the social 
truth. It has been observed that the 'middle peasants' are initially the most 
militant element of the peasantry especially 
in generating the initial impetus 
3 
of f the 'peasant rebellion'. 
Such a notion was justified on the assumption that 
the"'middle peasant is relatively the most vulnerable to economic changes wrought 
by- commercialism, while his social relations remain encased 
within the traditional 
design. ,. 
Middle peasants are also the least able to withstand the depredation 
of tax collectors or 
landlords. Furthermore, middle peasants are also the most 
, exposed to 
influences from the developing outside world. 
4 
Theorising of 1920 was led, among the. fellähin, by the unpropertied sheikhs, 
the siräkil and the 
'free' peasant. The downfall of the large tribal Confer- 
ation system allowed 
these groups to emerge as the rising tribal leadership 
1. B. Wolf, 'On Peasant Rebellions', op. cit., p. 10. 
2. F. 0.371/5076. No. 8284, dated 21st July 
1920. 
3. H' Alavi, 'Peasants and Revolution, The Socialist Register, (London, 1965), 
pp. 241-77. 
4, X, g;; Wolf, 'The Peasantry as a class', OP. cit., pp. 269-70. 
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capable of leading their fellow tribesmen. The Administration's taxation, 
land, and tribal policy intensified the process of integrating the fellähin 
within the national socio-political system and was deeply resented by the 
bulk of them. The 'middle' peasants being in contact with the town poli- 
I 
tician and the Shi*i "Ulemä' were to assist in giving the agrarian unrest 
a political character. A combination of all these factors was finally to 
dynamite the intended Wilsonian social order. 
The Government rents of land revenue were as follows: 
Table 
District Type of Land 
Täpu Miri Saniyah 
Government Melläkiyah 
(per cent) 
Share 
Baghdad 20 20 331 36 
Diyalä 122 20 25 36 
Hillah 20 20 60-44 36 
Duliam 131 20 - 36 
KarbalP 20 20 24J 36 
Diwäniyah 20 20 40 38J 
Kut rý,..: 0 
20 20 20 25 
Muntafiq 20 20 40 40 
Gasrah 20 20 20 40 
This table discloses some relevant details; it shows that IJillah, Diwäniyah 
and Muntafig; were the regions most hit by the rates on the Miri land. of 
thethree. types of land the t_äpu was the most heavily taxed in the case of 
a governmental, support to the absentee landholder: This will form part of 
the, next chapter. 
1", Figures reproduced 
from Admin. Report of the Revenue Dept., Baghdad, 1918. 
. Lt. 
Colonel E. B. Nowell in C. 0.696/1. 
9 
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CHAPTER XI 
ý= y 
THE BRITISH POLICY TOWARDS THE LAID PROBLEM 
AND THE TRIBAL SYSTEM 
I. Conditions of. Land Ownership prior to the British Occupation 
When the ottomans were expelled from Iraq, they left behind the difficult 
and unresolved problem of land ownership. The origins and nature of this 
question were dealt with in the first chapter of this work. It was suggested 
that British methods of tackling this issue would play an important role in 
deciding the future events and the socio-economic structure of Iraqi In this 
part of the work, the task is an attempt to explore the developments of this 
problem, the British attitude towards it and the political consequences gener- 
ated by it. 
There. is a tcommon impression' that Midhatts land policy had produced 
two effects: the disintegration of tribal bonds and the establishment of 'feudal. ' 
and absentee-ownership of land. These two effects are, in fact, two sides of 
the one'coin. . 
The underlying force behind tribalism is the common property of 
the land or dire. If this form of property had truly vanished, then the tribal 
structure would have subsequently disintegrated. However, this 'impression' is 
one-sided, oversimplified and unrepresentative of all the details -of a compli- 
cated, perhaps even contradictory, process. 
Midhat*s land policy, which in fact was an attempt to apply in Iraq the 
Ottoman Land Code of 1858, lasted for a period of less than twelve years. The 
mere brevity of such'a period, coupled with other 
factors, was insufficient to 
4t, 
perform stich a radical coup d'etat 
in the socio-economic structure of Iraq. In 
1880 'and 1882, Midhat"s täpu system was suspended by two iräda (decrees). 
2 
The Ottomans, subsequent to Midhat, considered that the allocation of 
land to' 
, 
the tribes, and particularly to sheikhs, would deprive them (the Turks) 
of a position through which 
they could control the tribes. Proceeding from 
such an' 
assumption, the Turks lost no opportunity to use the principle of state 
1.,, Supra, p. 27. 
2, E. 
'Dson, 
op" cit., P"21; M. S. Hassan, op. cit., p. 190. 
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landownership by appointing as lessees those 'loyal' and 'untiring' sheikhs. 
O&n"the other hand the Turks withheld such a privilege from any tribe or sheikh 
who had shown signs of disobedience or independent Aendencies. 
1 
. `- It-is 
interesting to observe that the decrees, suspending the äpu system, 
were directed at the southern rather than the northern part of 'Iraq. 
2 
This iis- 
criminating'policy might have been motivated by two other factorsi- economic, and 
sectarian . The economic element 
found its root in the, fact that, unlike other 
parts of the Ottoman'Empirei the Iraqi land of the irrigation zone (south) was 
nominally paying a much higher rate than the 'ushur (one-tenth) that was due on 
tt pu; land. 
3 
Thus the'alienation of the land in accordance with the" äu system 
would"have#involved the abdication by the state of its additional share of the 
produce=over and above the"lu. shur; while payment in lieu of 
äpu value and in 
4 
registration fees proved disappointing'. 
'§In, addition, Ottoman"sultans took care to make fiefs (miri land) only 
temporary, frequently redividing them, dispersing holdings, and allocating them 
in areas where the fief-holder was a stranger. 
5 
This-was obviously done to 
prevent `a arr; r 
from establishing itself on any miri or state owned land. 
It, ýhas, also been suggested that-Turkish reluctance to alienate land in 
the-southern part of Iraq-was motivated by'sectarian prejudices. It is difficult 
to`consider"as--a mere accident that the Kurdish Aghas of the north and the Arab 
beneficiaries of the t_äpu in Mosul who had acquired large areas of land asýmulk 
1'. ' S op. cit., p. 593. 
2. M. S. -, Hassan,, op. cit., p. 190. -j 
3. In the Ottoman Empire and on mulk and tapu land only the land revenue (one- 
tenth) was demanded. On 
mini land both land revenue and mellakiya (one-fifth) 
were demanded. 
(') In Iraq it was applied in a different way: (a) Before 
Midhat: 10 per, cent on crops irrigated by lift or by drains, 20 per cent on 
dates and fruits, 30 per cent on wheat and barley and 50 per cent on rice in 
land, irr. igated by canal. 
(ii) (b) Midhat reforms: land irrigated by drains 
and life was still to 
be subject to 10 per cent of the gross produce. Land 
irrigated by flow and alienated in the apu was to be subject to a flat rate 
of 20 per cent. 
(i) S. Haider, ap. cit., pp. 597-8. 
(ii) Ibid., p. 308. 
iü) Ibid., P 599. 
. 4. . 
Ibid., p. 594. 
Poliak, Feudalism in Egypt, S ria . Palestine and the Lebanon 1250-1900, 
The Royal Asiatic Society (London, 
1939), pp. 18,23-5,61-. 9-78. 
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were both-Sunni. The only sheikhs, in the Mid-Euphrates-who obtained extensive 
proportions of land-were the Sa'dun family, them. 3elves Sunnis. The tribes' and 
sheikhs of the south who, everwhelmingly, were of the Shi'i faith went empty 
handed out of the ä iu system. 
_:., 
None the less9 one ought to point to the, fact that the Shi*i tribes-bear a 
great; deai of -responsibility. They declined to grasp the opportunity when it 
was offered, due to their fear of taxation, conscription and in accordance with 
their r-itradition of-land acquisition by force rather than by 'paper'. 
. Therefore it would not be a great 'deviation from the truth to argue that 
in Iraq, most of the *feudal lords' acquired absolute ownership of their land 
in. thel: 1930s and 1940s. *Because in Ottoman times the cultivators /on tribal 
lands) had no legal title to the land which they occupied, the landlords were 
able, during the period, of mandate, to use their political power find British 
sympathy71to secure legal title to land which was by custom and tradition the 
2 
property of -the tribe . Dr. Warriner. went on to' suggest that: 
*... the process' is being hastened by mechanization, which gives 
the big landowners an advantage as against the small cultivator 
3 : and by inflation, which gives them the impetus to invest'. 
Thus, during the period of direct British rule over Iraq (1914-192. t), the 
British` Administration was facing several forms of land conditions and land 
property. Before giving an abstract and a generalized description of these forms, 
it. is wise to confess that the writer finds himself in no better position than 
the able. expert, Sir Ernest Dowson, who wrote: 
$These; conditions /of land tenure) vary so much not only from 
province to province, but from ýöcality to locality and from 
community to community, that no picture of them can be presented 
which combines fidelity of detail with a comprehensive view'. 4 
Yet it is impossible to examine the situation and its impact without at least 
some general outline of 
the conditions which prevailed. 
Variations of Land tenure which were generated by the introduction of the 
1. Added by the writer. 
2. D. W arriner, Land and Poverty in the Middle East, (London, 1948), p. 107. 
X"" Ibid. 
4.... __E. -Dowson, 
°p_. _cit", 
pp. 11_12. 
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täpu system could be seen from different angles. However, in this -field of 
study the socio-political aspects of the issue are more interesting. In this 
respect one could point Ito three forms of land social ownership which were in 
evidence-before and during-the period of direct British rule. One ought also 
to, examine tk , different impacts of the different forms of land property, on 
the tribal system of each area. 
;: In some areas the tä2,1 system was not applied and thus the land had pre- 
served its miri character. It goes without saying that in such regions the 
tribal system was hardly touched and had, virtually,, preserved its previous 
strength. Such was the case in some parts of the Mid Euphrates. 
--In other areas the 
äpu system was much in evidence and therefore the 
system of land, ownership had undergone certain changes. However in such locations 
it=is necessary. to differentiate between at least three distinct forms of land 
alienation. In some provinces the land was allocated to the sheikhs or aghas 
who were the heads of the actual cultivators of that land. In such , 
territories, 
l 
the 
. 
tribal system was hit at the core of its heart. By transferring the sheikhs 
into landholders, the roots of animosity were cultivated between the sheikhs and 
their., fellow, tribesmen., The tribe-as a social unit was to disintegrate and a 
detribalization n-process was taking place. Furthermore, the fellähin, in these 
circumstances, were left deprived of any recognized leadership to organize or 
lead their 'struggle*. 
In other districts, as in Muntafiq, the land was assigned to the paramount 
sheikhs of the large tribal confederations. This guaranteed the breakdown of 
the Confederation system and the loss by al Sa'dun of their previous popularity. 
However, the small tribal units were to re-emerge and the previously 'small' 
sheikhs of the confederated tribes were to lead their tribesmen*s struggle 
against the paramount sheikhs who preferred the temptation of becoming landholders. 
Thuss. in such conditions, the tribal confederations were to undergo a breakdown 
process, whereas the smaller, 
tribal units were, to emerge on much stronger 
foundations. 
- ------- - ----- 
------ 
1. Seich conditions prevailed mostly in the Kurkish areas and Mosul. 
'r~_~ý 
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Briefly, 'what the Saldun in the past-acquired as their hereditary dues, 
they exchanged, under the Turks, for right. According to law and since the. 
day they called in 'the government to support them against the tribes, they lost 
their sympathy; and it was not long before the tribes threw o`f their yoke, 
thus reproducing the present struggle in the tribal system, where the minor 
leaders have thrown off the authority of the paramount shaikh and the latter 
1 
is calling upon government to support him'. 
The Sa*dun were once the undisputed leaders and paramount sheikhs of the 
Muntafiq federation. Upon their accepting to become -landholders, they, in fact, 
had invited their own degradation. 'The result of this course was to make the 
tribesmen the tenant of the Sa*dun, instead of his followers; this definitely 
turned him against them with the result that, after much disorder the tribes 
finally revolted against the Sa'dun, and to this day /x9207 do not accept them 
2 
" either as landlords or sheikh*. 
In other provinces, the actual cultivators were completely ignored. The 
land was portioned out to some merchants and town notables. However this was 
only theoretical and 
in accordance with the äpu system. In practice the actual 
cultivators (the tribesmen) remained masters of 
their land, while the new land- 
holders were absentees wholly dependent on the government. 
In regions of this description, the tribal system was to grow stronger 
than ever. Conditions of that sort exposed to the 
fellähin that it was only by 
means of their collective strength 
as members of a tribe that they were able to 
defend themselves against government officials and täpu holders alike. In con- 
sequence the 
tribesmen grew more than ever conscious of their tribe as a unit 
and of their 
land as a tribal d. ira held and protected collectively by the whole 
tribe. Hence it was 
in such areas that the tribal system, in both its socio- 
political and militant 
sense, had assumed its most powerful momentum. Such was 
the case with most of 
the Mid-Euphrates provinces. 
In general terms, the writer could give the following relevant details 
1. C. O. 696/4. Admin. Reportst Muntafig Division, 1920, p. 60. 
2. Ibid. p. 61. 
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concerning the 'formst of land prevailing in Iraq during 1914-1921: - the lands 
of Ram3di area were all miri with the exception of 'Aziziyah canal, which was 
saniyah. In Fallujah nearly the whole area was t5pu. 
1 
In Musaiyib, a large 
portion of the land was santyah; in Karbalä' it'was almost entirely pu L in 
Hindiyah and Diwäniyah, miri predominated; In Hillah it was tffpu. 
2 
Nearly all 
the land throughout the Sämarrä' district was'miri, and tapu was conspicuous by 
its absence. 
3 In Ba'9ubah district, the greater part was täpu, yet there existed 
a' large portion of land which was wagf and two large estates4 which were santyah 
and miri. 
5 In Muntafiq division, including Näsiriyah, Shatrah, Sug al'Shuyukh 
and Qai*at Sikar, `"täp. land predominated. 
6 And so was the case of Qurnah7 and 
#Amaräh. 
$ 
However; what is essential to"this work is to examine the social conflict 
which was introduced by the täpu system of' land ownership and its political 
consequences. ý 'Such an examination will render priority to the socio-political 
character of the conflict without getting 
involved in the legal aspects of'the 
problem. The second step will be an attempt to study the attitude taken by the 
British Administration towards the conflict and the political impacts of such 
an-attitude. 
Such a proposed outline involves the exclusion of other forms of land 
property apart from the one subjected 
to'täpu claims. It is 'a deliberate evasion; 
Malt, Muses tah and Wagf lands represented no political problems, and such was 
the case-with the Milk land which, anyhow, was rare'in its existence. 
xSani ah and Miri land formed a different representation. Melläkiyah rents 
were not demanded on such 
forms of land. Furthermore, there existed no dispute 
J. ' C. 0.696/1. Baghdad Wilyat Administration Report for the year 1917, p. 89. 
2.,. Ibi Admin. Reports 1918, Hillah Division, p. 121 
3. Ibid., 1918, Samarra District, p. 5. 
4. Namely, rail of the Mahrute and the 
'Uthmäniyah. 
5. C. O. 696/1" Admin Reports 
for 1918, Bagubah District, p. 15. 
6. C. O. 696/2. Admin. Reports Muntafiq Division, 1919, pp. 1-2. 
7" F. 0.371/3049/178231. 
Memo; "'Administration Report for Qurnah and district', 
Signed, J. B. Mackie, A. P. O., dated 23rd July 1917. 
S. C. O. 696/3. Admi`eportt 
Amarah Division 1920, pp. 25-6. 
9 
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over the ownership of those lands, both of which were duly recognized to be 
owned by the government. The essential conflict over miri lani was centred' 
on taxation; an issue already dealt with. 
It was pointed out. that the Iraqi tribesmen 9 looked upon the payment of 
taxes as a necessary evil and will pay up the Khumus /the one-fifth? without 
demur. It is the payment of Mallakiyah around which centres all the trouble ... ". 
1 
A similar notion was formulated by yet another official British report. It was 
affirmed that a tribesman did not base his case on tribal ownership, but on the 
grounds that the land is the property of the Government on which for generations, 
the tribesmen have been settled, acting as agents of Government and that the 
täpu holders 'by a trick filched-away the tribal rights*. 
2 
Furthermore, it seems that the Santyah land had the advantage of an 
efficient administration coupled with terms of loans and rent acceptable to 
the cultivators. It was reported by the British Administration that these 
Saniyah lands (private estates of the Crown) were under very active management. 
They occupied no 'insignificant proportion of the earth*s surface in Iraq, and 
3 
comprised many of the most valuable properties'. They were often acquired in 
dubious ways, 'but once acquired they were well looked after'. The tenants 
were encouraged, by loans and other methods, to feel that the sovereign 'took 
a personal interest in their welfare, and, if he helped himself to the lion's 
share of the produce, he was also capable of showing a judicious liberality 
upon occasions, and was an enterprising and enlightened landlord". 
4 
The report 
went to the extent of suggesting that 'the personal popularity which Sultan 
Abdul Hamid enjoyed in Iraq and the veneration, which his name still generally 
co Lands, are largely 
due 
- 
to the way in which his Sanniyah properties were 
managed*ý. 
5 
However, in 1903 came the proclamation of the constitution and the end 
of the old regime. The status of 
the Saniyah lands was changed and their title 
1. C. O. 696/2" Admin. Reports, Muntafiq Division , 1919, pp. 31-2. 
2. C. O. 696/4. Admin. Reports, 
Muntafig Division, 1921L p. 60. 
3. C. 0.696/2" Admin. Report of the Department of Revenue for the Year, 1919, p. 3t. 
4. Ibid. 
Ibid. 
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was altered to Amläk al Mudawarah (Converted Estates). This was the outward 
sign. of nationalization. Thus the distinction between miri and mudawarah had 
to'a. great extant disappeared before British occupation. Nevertheless, favour- 
able conditions of agrarian loans and administrative assistance went on unchanged. 
l 
It is evident that the rents which the fellähin had to pay were amply justified 
by the services rendered to them by the Saniyah Administration. 2 
Thus one hopes that in confining the discussion of the social conflict over 
land ownership to the lands claimed by the tapu system is a justified approach 
both in theory and in practice. 
II. British Policy towards Land Problems 
To start with, it is very clear that the dispute between the actual cut- 
tivators (fetlähin) and the äpu holders (absentee or not) was very acute indeed 
and at the core of the agrarian unrest in the irrigation zone of Iraq. 
3 
In 1911, 
the Turkish Government was compelled to institute a Committee of Enquiry to 
investigate the causes of tribal disorders. The Commission was understood to 
attribute the 'troubles to the fact that the arable lands of the tribes are in 
the hands of a few powerful Shaikhs, who oppress their fellow tribesmen and 
keep them at variance and that the proper remedy is thoroughgoing partition 
4 
of. the lands' . 
During the period of British Occupation, an official report confirmed the 
above-mentioned information and added 'Today /19217 the position is much the 
same. The agrarian problems are more acute and land settlement has been rele- 
gated to the dim 
future, in addition to which the tribes are faced with revenue 
demands which they can not meet*. 
5 
1. Ibid. 
2. S. Haider, op. cit", pp. 584-5. 
3. Suffice to mention that in Nisiriyah district alone, the A. P. O. had to deal 
with 64 disputes regarding water, 
102 disputes regarding land boundaries, 
34 petitions requesting payment of Sarkalah, 70 petitions requesting payment 
of M akiyah and 
42 applications for the attestation of äpu Sanads. All 
of that was in only one year, 
1919. C. 0.696/2. Adman Reports, Muntafig 
Division Nagiriyah District, 1919, p. 39. 
4. C. 0.696/2. Adm Report of the Revenue Department for the year 1919, p. 24, 
para. 88. 
5. C. O. 696 /4. Ad " Reports. Muntafiq Division, _1921, p. 18, para. J. 
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To stress-the importance and acuteness of the problem, it is sufficient 
to draw attention to the fact that it was during the 'earlier years' of British 
occupation that the Administration recognised that difficulties connected with 
the tenure and ownership of 'agricultural lapis would prove one of its most 
formidable tasks, 'perhaps the most formidable of all*. 
' 
However it was un- 
fortunate that suchýa realization was'tempered by an inclination towards a post- 
poned solution. 'But naturally, while the war was'in progress, nothing could be 
done towards finding a solution of this difficulty', so argued a senior British 
officiat. 
2 
However, the British officials on'the spot protested against such a relaxed 
attitude and pointed out that the problem was so urgent and acute that it cannot 
afford to be 'shelved even during the war period*'. 
3 
- 
Two principal aspects. of the land problem were to confront the new admtn- 
istration and to demand satisfactory solutions. The first was the legal or the 
administrative side of the question. The second was the socio-political aspect 
which demanded decisions of a political nature and consequences. Neither of 
those two manifestations of the issue was clear-cut or easily resolved. Al- 
though the political side of the problem'is of more relevance to this work, the 
legal'aspect cannot be' totally ignored. 
(a) The Administrative Aspect'of the Land Question: It seems that the Ottoman 
Administration, backward and corrupt as it had been, was incapable of accomplishing 
such an ambitious scheme as 
it had embarked upon on land partition. Thus the 
net outcome of such an attempt was an 
'albsurd', 'chaotic' and 'utterly confused' 
situation to be 
left to the British Administration. 
The conditions of land tenure were 'different in every liwäy according to 
the degree of effective control exercised by the Turks and to the habits'and 
cu. 3toms of the 
inhabitants: 
1. C. 0.696/2. Admin. Romort of the Revenue Dept. for the Year*lglg. p. 21 
2. Ibid. It was also stated that upon the solution of this problem depended 
tribal peace. and contentment. Ibid. p. 25, para. 89. 
3. Ibid., p. 23, para. 85. 
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'No general rules could be laid down and it was not until 1919 
that sufficient data were available to enable the Administration, 
through the revenue Commissioner to pronounce with any certainty 
on the respective right of Government, tribal chiefs, landlords 
holders of the fiefs (uqr) and tenants in different districts#. 
, However pessimistic this argument might sound, the reality was worse. It is- 
extremely doubtful that by 1919 'sufficient data were available'. The previously 
mentioned Dowson Report (1931) and other official reports indicate the contrary. 
For instance, Captain T. C. 'Orgill, the Assistant Political Officer of 
Nasiriyah, embarked on a thorough examination of title deeds, issued by the 
Turkish 1ä2u Department of his district, and of the alleged rights of the Melläkin. 
From. this examination it appeared that "no two cases were alike; every possible 
variety was discovered* .2 Captain Orgill described these varieties: 
*1. Maitaks in'possession of title-deeds, who have never actually 
been able to obtain any income at all from the tribes ... 
2. Mallaks in possession of title deeds in which the boundaries 
as stated are obviously absurd. Some of the boundaries ... 
might be taken to include a large portion of Iraq. 
3. Mallaks in possession of title-deeds, the areas as stated in 
which are infinitessimal, whereas the real area of the 
property runs into hundreds of acres. - 
4. Mallaks in possession of title-deeds in which no areas are 
stated at all. 
. 5. Mallaks 
in'possession of no title-deeds at aiit. 
3 
Furthermore it was reported that: 
'In many cases deeds were acquired in the most irregular manner 
and not in accordance with the provisions of the tapu law: added 
to this, the wording of the title deeds is of the vaguest. Tracts 
-, `measuring thousands of acres are shamelessly recorded as being 
two or three donums in extent, merely to avoid the payment of full 
registration fees to Government. The boundaries ... quite in- 
capable of practical interpretation on the spott. 
4 
Complicated as it is, one would like to add to the picture the fact that 
some of the Melläkin with 
the worst title-deeds actually received in years 
previous to British occupation 
fair payments from the tribes. On the other hand, 
many of those holders of 
title-deeds that approached nearest to legality had 
been'unable. to enforce even a 
fraction of their claims. Superimposed on this 
1. A. T. Wilson, Clash . ý, p. cit., p. 78. 
2. C. O. 696/2. Admin. 
Reports, Muntafiq Division, - Näsirivah District, 1919, p. 37. 
3. Ibid. 
4. C. O. 696/2" Admin"Report of 
the Muntafig. Division for 1919, p. 2. 
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the historical fact that the exorbitant claims of some of the Melläkin at a 
certain period had provoked a rebellion in the tribes, in the course of which 
the tribesmen hurled out. those Meiläkin by force of arms. No doubt that Captain 
Orgill*s conclusion in which he stated that 'this will give an idea of the tangled 
situation with which an already heavily worked District Officer is ordered to deal*, 
1 
is-a fair and logical conclusion. 
Furthermore, it was clear what an utter farce the Ottoman t! 2u system really 
was in Iraq. According to Article 1 of the TT pu Law (of 7 Ramazan 1274=21st April 
1858), 'No one in future-for any reasons whatever shall be able to possess state 
2 
land without having a title deed'. Nevertheless, it was reported in 1919, 'even 
of the lands around Baghdad, 
for example, of which possession apart from boundary 
questions is generally undisputed; the greater part afe held without sanads from 
the Tapu Department ... Even the Department of Auqaf never took out Tapu sanads 
for-the vast properties which it claims'. 
3 
The t2u law of inheritance was not strictly in accordance with the Sharta 
law. This is believed to have been the cause which prevented many persons who 
had long held cultivating possession of miri lands, from applying for registration 
of their lands in the Täpu Department. - 
Another reason lay in the rascality which 
prevailed in Eapu officers, and 
the high fees charged. Yet another reason was 
the low' value, as security, of the deed even when obtained. 
4 
(b) The Socio-Political Aspect of the Land Ownership: The socio-political 
apsect of the conflict was of a 
far more complicated nature. It was, virtually, 
an insoluble dispute with the 
two sides (the fe113h and the land holder) assuming, 
irreconcilable positions. Furthermore the very conditions of the conflict were 
to impose on the government resolutions of a political character which subsequently 
could not escape political 
reactions. 
JL lb id, Näsiriyah Districts p. 37. 
2'. Ibid. 
3. C. O. 696/2. Admiiistration Report of 
the Revenue Department for the year 
1g19PTp. 23. 
4. Ibid.! 
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The täß holder considered himself as the legal owner of the claimed land. 
For, him., ownership was determined by the sanad which he had obtained by paying 
his°fee. The government, Turkish or British, bore 'legal' responsibility towards 
him and was supposed to aid in his melläkiyah rent collection. 
As for the felläh, the question was conceived from a totally different 
angle. The äu sanad was an unrecognized innovation which did not stein from 
any of his conceptual outlooks, traditions or the fact of actual cultivation. 
Thus, he utterly denied any importance attached to a 'paper' and furiously 
resented any claimed rights generated by such a document. 
A tribal non-propertied Sheikh explained to a British Administrator-why 
he did not bother to acquire a sanad for his land, 'My sword is my boundary ... 
yes a sword is the thing and no nonsense about writing'. 
1 
Crude and wild as it 
sounds, such an argument, nonetheless, revealed a genuine aryl prevailing outlook 
based on years of tradition and practice. Moreover, an argument of this character 
finds its roots, perhaps even justifications, in the very conditions of peasant 
life itself. 
It has been argued that "Landlords are not needed to establish the fact 
of peasantry'. 
2 Land property has been defined 'as a socially accepted exclusive 
right to hold and utilize concerned, right which is se crate from rights acquired 
3 
by the investment of labour and capital'. Furthermore there is a clear distinction be- 
tween ways of holding land property defined by Shanin thus: 'on the one hand, the peasant 
3family 
holding defined by custom, on the other hand, of politically formalized 
pt. 
4 It is obvious that the two forms are not necessarily 1ownershi 
identical. In the Iraqi conditions of 
1914-1921, the two forms of land property 
Were ýtotal1y 
incompatible. ' in fact Shanlu suggests that the landholders' 
actual appropriation of part of 
the peasants' produce and even their political 
and administrative 
domination has generally 'failed to break the basic features 
1. T. S. Mann, An Administrator in the Making, (London, 1921), p. 202. 
2. R. Redfield, Peasant Society and Culture, (Chicago, 1956), p. 23. 
3. T. Shanin, op.. ýit", P"9. Italics mine. 
4. Ibid., Italics mine. 
a 
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of--the peasant land relationship'. 
1 
However, it should be added that neither 
such an appropriation nor - domination was in evidence at that stage of Iraqi 
history. Concerning the concrete conditions of the Middle East, Dr. Warriner 
argued that 
*Ownership'in no way affects the methods of cultivation; in a 
landowner*s village, the peasants continue their /separate) strip 
cultivation, ` even sometimes on the mushaa system, without in any 
way changing their methods or working under direction. Landownership 
is a credit operation, nothing more*. 2 
Investment oý capital in the land by a landlord might have encouraged the 
acceptance of the-peasants of the landlord*s claimed 'legal or formalized-owner- 
ship. But it was suggested that in'the Iraqi conditions of'1914-1921, the agrarian 
problem was accentuated because most landholders were absentees, living outside 
their=-claimedlandsand'tdemand 20 per cent of the crop 'and put nothing back 
3 
into the-land'. The fe üä 's. 'one fear-is that'he may be burdened for all 
time with a'mere drone-fora landlord.. who evinces more interest in his camels 
4 
than inthe tribes on the land': Furthermore, it was officially reported that: 
"... If he /the fellä47 had to choose between the lesser of two 
evils, that is to say; the Sarkal or the Mallak, he would undoubt- 
edly plump for, the former, the reason being that the Sarkal keeps 
open house, organises labour, provides in case of necessity money 
to buy seed, usually by appealing to Government for a loan and 
acts as an intermediary between him and Government; whereas the 
absentee landlord disdains to interest himself in anything but his 
camels and mallakiyah*. 
5 
The foregoing makes it difficult to deny that the Iraqi fella 's resentment 
of the landholder's claims was 
fully justified in Iraqi conditions. 
The introduction of the täpu system in Iraq was not the: fruitof an 
internal. development of the Iraqi conditions. The corruption, inefficiency 
and misconduct which surrounded 
the implication of the system were to add 
further complications to the situation. It was this very fact which had pro- 
duced the political aspect of the land problem. In short, the Law was an 
1. Ibid. 
2. D. W arriner, Land and Poverty ... ' op. cit., p. 23. 
3. C. O. 696/4. Admin. Report, Muntafi 1921, p. 61. 
4.0.0.696/2. Admin. Resort, 
Muntafiq, 1918, p. 2. 
s, C. O. 696/4. Admin. Report. 
Muntafiq. 1921, pß61. 
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imposed one and it was impossible to implement it without the force of the 
State itself. It was highly improbable for the melläk and the felläb to come 
to terms. It was equally improbable for the täpu holder to earn his claimed 
melläkiyah without the effective assistance of the powerful State. Hence the 
Government was unable-to avoid, taking sides. 
The situation developed into an active political and social polarization 
and exploded into the 1909 fellahin uprising which covered the whole of the 
Muntafig Division. The British Administration was confronted, with the dispute 
from the early days of its establishment. The Administration was unable to 
enjoy a luxurious impartiality. It had to throw in its lot with one side or 
the other. In short, the main political issue, generated by the land problem, 
rendered, itself into the question, whether or not the Administration was to 
recognize and enforce the 'rights' of the" äpu holders. 
Captain Mackie, summed up the problem in the following way:. 
'Undoubtedly the largest revenue question we have. to face is the 
question of the absentee landlord armed with his tapu sanad but 
unable to collect his mallakiyah unless we are willing to help 
him to do so ... at present 
'July 1917/ we have no policy on which 
to. work. We can only tell them to wait. The need of a definite 
ruling however that we are to support either the man who has 
possession but no title deeds or the man who has the title deeds 
but not possession_is most pressing and cannot be too strongly 
emphasised. The /fellä !/ have in the majority of cases been 
cultivating the land and enjoying the full products of it for 
many years and are now claiming the land as theirs against the 
absentee landlords, and they in their turn look to us to support 
in, ---their cause against-their opponents'. 
1 
In'March 1918, the Political Officer at Nasiriyah confirmed the above- 
mentioned argument and pointed out that the Administration was confronted with 
two alternatives: 
'1. if we want peace and quiet in the country and early settle- 
ment of all our problems, we should' support the Arab tribes 
irrespective of right of landlords ... 
/this/ would win every 
tribe over to our side definitely. 
. 2. 
If we support the /landlords? then we must support /them/ 
right away through, which will, I fear, effectually alienate 
the tribesmen. Result will possibly be perpetual trouble, 
large garrison, frequent punitive expeditions and much 
expenditure'. 
2 
1. F'. 0.371/3049/178231. Memo 
'Administration Report for Qurnah and District'. 
Signed Captain J. B. Mackie, A. P. O. Qurnah, dated 23rd July 1917. 
2. P. 0.371/3406/102207. 
Report by Captain H. R. P. Dickson, A. P. O. of Suq-ash. 
Shuyukh, dated 9th May 1917. Included in the Report of P. O. Nasiriyah for 
"the year ending 
31st March 1918, p. 39 
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However', Captain Dickson went on to point out that there were two other 
'middle courses', each of which, he thought was worthy of consideration. The 
first was to allow the 'landlord to retain his claims only to his land, but 
1 
forbid him from interfering with it at all'. The second course was based on 
sound and logical legal and jurisprudential considerations; and that was to: 
'Examine the tape sanad of each landlord, if it has all four boundaries 
definitely established and if the number of donums agree with the 
acreage then let it stand and Government to enforce that landlord's 
rights in full. If donums do not agree with the acreage and boundary 
marks are not all fixed, then Government to step in and arbitrarily 
cut down the property until the landlord only possesses a strip of 
date palm along the river bank with say 300 yards depth of waste 
land behind. The balance land so taken away to be handed over to 
tribesmen and tapu papers issued to them'. 
Thus the British Administration was confronted with two choices; one 
would have paved 
'the real road to peace', brought the allegiance of the power- 
ful tribes to-the Administration and eased the injustices inflicted upon the 
fellahin by the corrupted ottoman Administration. The other alternative would 
have caused 'perpetual trouble, 
frequent punitive expeditions', 'alienated the 
tribes' and "incurred a very great 
deal of odium in the eyes of the tribes'. ' 
A 'middle course' which was jurisprudential rather than political would have 
given the Administration a 
breathing space and allowed a thorough investigation 
of land claims. By all accounts, 
legal, political, economic and human, the 
British Administration was not supposed, one assumes, 
to side with the land- 
lords. However, that was not the actual 
'course' upon which the Administration 
embarked. 
ýcý e British Policy: To start with, 
the writer would like to confess 
that it was very difficult 
indeed to pinpoint the actual British policy to- 
wards the land problem. 
This was for reasons beyond the writer's responsibilities; 
it was officially admitted 
that: 
'Although the records of Captain Levy who made preliminary inves- 
itigations3 ... are complete 
in their reference as to who had a 
1. Ibid., p. 40 
2. Ibid., p. 41 
3. By, the end of 
1919, a Land Commission, with Legislative powers and all the 
paraphernalia of chainsmen 
and surveyors was formed. More details on this 
Commission will be given 
later in the coyrse of discussion. 
. 2ss- 
0 right to own land and who had not, the methods by which he proposed 
to translate his decisions into action are not on record, nor is 
there any record"of a line of policy, if indeed one had been decided 
upon'. 
' 
However, it was essential to embark on the tiresome and complicated task of 
attempting to trace the line of policy which the British Administration had 
adopted. 
During the war it was the Administration's policy to keep the tribes 
quiescent and this was done by 'large doles, subsidies and no taxation 
2 
} 
Following upon. the Armistice and the collapse of the Turkish Empire, a complete 
turn in the, Administration's policy was to take place. For instance the tribes 
of the Gharaf alone had 'after many years of freedom from all taxation, paid up 
revenue in, full and to the landlord also his share-of the crop. In 1919, about 
34 
16. to 17 lackhs , 
of. revenue, /alone/ was collected It was not surprising 
that"'in 1920, the disturbances broke out and the situation again reverted to 
anarchy'. 
5 
Thus it is clear-that prior to the Armistice the Administration did not 
commit itself either way. _ 
This in effect was to the advantage of the 'un- 
propertied' tribesmen. Captain Orgill of Näsiriyah pointed out that on the 
British arrival, they found a 'class of Mallaks' whom he indicatively described 
as 'holders of pseudo-title deeds who claimed revenue'. However, during the 
first year or two 'no principle was ' enunciated'. In this way British Officers 
6 
'retained full ßreedom' in treating the question. On the 18th December 1917 
a proclamation was published by the G. O. C. confirming and 'enabling district 
Officers to retain this freedom'.? However, this line of policy did not last 
for long. That freedom was abandoned. 
1. C. 0.696/4. Admin. Reports. Muntafiq Division, 1921, p. 60 
2. C. 0.696/2. Admin. Report Muntafiq Division, 1921, p. 18 
3.16 to 17 lacks of Rupees were equivalent to some £160,000 to £170,000. 
4, Ibid. 
5. Ibid. 
6. C. O. 696/2. Admin. Report. Muntafiq Division = Nasiriyah 1919, p. 37 
7. Ibid. 
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At the close of 1918, and in reply to i. emo No. 249 of 10th December 1918, 
it was decided'that on lands where the landlord and tenant could not come to 
terms, the division'of the crop'should be as follows: 
'50 per cent to go to the Fallah 
20 do Government as revenue 
20 do Mallak as rent 
10 do Shaikh or Sarkal'. 
Thus the total share of the Government and the mellak amounted to 40 per cent 
of the total production. 'This was of course too heavy a burden for agricult- 
'. The tribes protested against the excessiveness of the ural land to bear 
2 
rates. 
In July 1919, the Revenue Secretary, after consultations with the Political 
Officers on the spot, decided to reduce the total demand to 30 per cent. 
3 
'District Officers were ordered to collect this 30 per cent and themselves 
to the mallak the share of 15 
4 
to pay per cent'. 
These decisions which were announced at a public meeting by the Revenue 
Secretary were as follows: 
'(1) A normal demand of 40 per cent was too high ... 
(2) The demand should, therefore, be reduced all round on lands 
where no private right of ownership is claimed, to 30 per cent. 
.E, '. . 
r ,,, 
(3) on privately owned lands: 
(a) Where the so called owner had come to terms] the agreement 
between them whether attested by an /A. P. O_/ or not, should 
be understood as made with his consent and enforced unless 
it was obviously grossly unfair either through undue in- 
f luence exerted at the time of completion or by reason of 
subsequent calamity: Repudiation of contract should only 
be allowed in very rare cases, especially where the contract 
had been ratified by the /Ä. P. 0_/. 
(b) Where the parties had been unable to come to terms, Govern- 
mentj being bound by the undertakings given should collect 
at 30 per cent and surrender to the owner whose position 
as owner they previously admitted, the half of the amount 
realised by them. In such cases the owner had no right 
to interfere in the management of the estate claimed by 
him., 5 
. ý'r F 
,. ý 
ý' 
9 `, 
Ibid., Muntafig Division 1919, p. 2. 
2. Ibid., Nassiriyah 1919, p. 
37 
3. Ibid., Muntafig Division 
1919, p. 2. 
4. Ibid., Nass iriyah, 1919, p. 
37. 
Müntaßig, 1919, p. 25 5. Ibid. # _. _-ý 
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Thus the British Administration, for reasons to be discussed later, had 
embarked on a policy which, in essence, was to back the landlords. A deduction 
of . 
this sort is justified in the light of, at least, two elements. 
First, the Government took upon itself the collection of the melläkiyah 
on behalf of the melläk. Thus 'Revenues and Mallakiyah now /1919/ go hand in 
glove and figure nowadays very large in the tribesman's eye'. 
1 
Prior to that, 
a mellik was never able to get 20 or 15 per cent rent and, more often than 
not, was willing to accept any sum, no matter how trifling. In some cases, 
if a sanad was drawn up between the sheikh or serkäl and the claimant, it was 
customary for the latter to-, grant a large rebate as serkälah, merely to get 
2 
the sheikh or"serkal to recognize his claim. 
;;,,:; On the other hand it was officially reported that land holders 'who have 
not - entered 
into agreement with their tenants for a fixed sum as rent, now 
/1919/-recover their rent from government and in most cases this has been 
resulted in their getting a far greater sum than they have ever yet been able 
to-obtain ... many cases 
have come to light of landlords who have been unable 
to collect any rents whatever, during the last ten or fifteen years but who 
will now realize a sum'far above their wildest expectations'. 
3 
Thus in both 
cases : (sanad or no sanad), 
the melläk was enabled to collect a rent from 
'cultivators who, were they not cowed by fear of British Government, would 
have resented such action by cutting the throat of'Mallak and Mamur alike'. 
4 
Furthermore, the intervention of the Administration was to make the sheikh 
or serkal lose his serkalah. 
The second measure of the British land policy in Iraq exposes a further 
and a clear. bias towards 
landholding classes. It-is unnecessary to re-describe 
the absurdity of land boundaries as entered in Turkish t-apu sanada. Never- 
theless, it could have-been 
that this very absurdity rgquired. thorough 
C. 0.696/3. Admin. Reports Muntafig 1919, p. l. 
Ibid., p. 2. 
3. Ibid., p. 4. 
43, C. 0.696/l. -Hillab Admin. Report 1918, p. 135 
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W.. 
examination of. each'19pu sanad as an imperative and justified precondition 
to deciding the sanad's validity. Furthermore, it appears to me that no 
attempt at enforced and governmental collection of mellakiyah should have 
occurred without a proper and'prior thorough investigation'of land claims 
being completed. 
Surprisingly this was not the, 'course' of the British Administration land 
policy. t In a rare and clear case of 
'putting the cart before the horse' it 
was officially reported: 
'Having granted that the Sa'dun possess certain rights to the land, 
verification of their title deeds is the next step. The fact that 
the Sa'dun may have no documentary evidence, to their claims does 
not lessen, in any way, their vociferousness'. 
1 
Thus it was concluded that the absentee-landholders 
'must be recognized as 
2 
some form of landlords'. 
It ought to be remembered that the above-mentioned argument was not 
opinions or suggestions. 
It was the real course of the policy which the Admin- 
istration had decided upon. After all the decision of governmental collection 
. oZ mellakiyah 
was taken at the end of 1918, whereas the investigation committee 
was established in early 
1920, Moreover, it was admitted in late 1921 that 
"no'attempt has been made on the intricate problem of demarcating boundaries, 
3 
on which the whole subject of 
land ownership rests'. 
Thus it is'evident that the government 
had decided on the extra-ordinary 
course of collecting mellakiyah 
from the actual cultivators on lands whose 
claimants possessed neither 
documentary evidence nor clearly defined boundaries. 
Cd) rho political Consequences of the British 
Land Policy: A policy of 
this-peculiar' nature was 
Justified (intended) as being only temporary, 
pending the. 
verification of the sanads. In this regard it is highly inter- 
esting to find that the Government had neither brought the satisfaction of 
the landholders nor was able 
to avoid the wrath of the actual cultivators: 
i, C. 0.696/4. Admin. Report 
Muntafiq Division, 1921,, p. 61 
2. Ibid. 
Ibid. 
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... vested interests such as absentee 
landlords and tribal-over- 
lords looked with disfavour on cadestral surveys, which would help 
to establish the prescriptive rights of cultivators ... 
' 
. On; the other hand the 
Political Officer of Muntaf19 wrote in 1919 that: 
'He /the tribesman/. views with the strongest disfavour and 
alarm the high rates of Mallakiyah he is now called upon to 
pay. It. is useless to tell him that the present is only a 
temporary arrangement ... The great war is over, peace con- 
_-,,, - . 
ditions obtain, land settlement grows nearer and his one fear 2 is that he may be burdened for all time with a mere drone ... 
It was pointed out that the 'chief mistakes' were made: 
'(1) By the collection and payment to the mallak of the same 
proportion of the produce of the land as that taken by 
Government, the mallaks have been given large ideas about 
the demands-they can in future make on the tribes ... 
(2) Government has incurred a very great deal of odium in the 
eyes of the tribes by the collection of Mallakiyah on 
behalf of the mallak'. 
3 
The Assistant Political Officer of Nasiriyah suggested that the first' 
mistake could be rectified 
if the Government' lowered the maximum limit of the 
mellakiyah to a figure 
between 5 to 10 per cent. Furthermore, he argued that 
, 'Government. should on no account continue 
to collect mallakiyah on behalf of 
"mallak- 
... 
' .4 
The Political Officer of Hillah admitted that 'the so called legitimate 
demand "which leaves only 40 per cent of the gross yield to the fellah, plus 
asmall'rebate to the särkel, is obviously inequitable'. 
5 And in a confi- 
`"dential note dated 22nd October 1918, he suggested that 'no person or class, 
should, "as a result of 
the British occupation, derive an excessive profit at 
6 
the expense of any other person or class'. 
Thus it is clear that the British Officers on the spot were aware of the 
development of a formidable situation which was pregnant with alarming possi- 
bilities. Some of them were so far-sighted as to anticipate that grarian 
lý A. T. Wilson, Clash op. Cit., p. 
253. 
2. C. O. 696/2. Admin. Report, Muntaf 
iq, 1919, p. 2. Italics mine. 
3. Ibid, ý Muntaßiq, 
Massiriyah, 1919, p. 37 
Ibid. 
t5. 
C. O. 696/l. Hillah Admin. 
Report 1918, p. 135 
6" ' , id., p. 136 
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I 
grievances might well burst-into political disturbances. Months before the 
rising, Major Hedgcock, the Political Officer of tAmärah, warned against indi- 
cations thatýthe *sarkels will in the near future raise the banner of Istiglal*. 
1 
He.. pointed out that although theraverage serkäl was better off than-he was in 
Turkish days, yet the feels the injustice and tyranny of his shaikh more than 
3 formerly :2 
This, according to, Major Hedgcock, was the outcome of.. two factors. The 
first was embodied in the fact-that although 'it is true that the shaikh squeezed 
the. sarkal as much then as he does now 'x9207, but the difference lies in the 
fact that whereas formerly the money was needed for the upkeep of the shaikh's 
hoshiyah /bodyguard7, -and for other expenses incidental. to unsettled times, now 
it: is extorted from the Sarkal to fill the already overflowing coffers of a 
3 
prosperous Shaikh*. 
It is a valid explanation. However, it did not grasp the core of the 
problem, namely, the socio-economic changes which were brought about by the 
introduction of the äu system and its practical enforcement by the British 
Administration. This system had altered or re-regulated the fell; h-Sheikh 
relationship. Whereas in the past when social association was established on 
the basis of Sheikh tribesman affinity, it underwent certain changes which trans- 
ferred it into a conflicting landholder-fellah connexion. The conflict was 
furthermore intensified due to the development of the economy from one of sub- 
sistence to one of profit and market. 
The Iraqi-felläh was not slow either in grasping the changes or in resent- 
Ing them. He did not need *sociological readings' to understand what was happen- 
ing. Life itself, divulged it to him. His reaction was quick and violent. The 
deteriorating position and 'degrading status' of the once popular and powerful 
Sa'dun"among their 'former' 
followers was clear manifestation of such a militant 
awareness. 
1 C. O. 696/3. Admin. Report Amarah, 1920, p. 26. Italics mine. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid. 
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Furthermore, it did not take Thämir al Khudair (the chief sheikh'of al 
Azairij), 
1 
more than a couple of months to be ousted and shot dead by his own 
tribal men, once he accepted to become a t_äpu holder, dared to collect melläkiyah 
2 
and thus inflicted dulm (injustice) upon his fellahin. Moreover it was reported 
that in early January 1920, Shaikh Thajil al Jinah (the head of the Jinah section 
of the Bani Khaigän confederation) tried to collect land rent from 'his cultivators 
as their landlord. The cultivators resented this ... and he was brutally murdered*3 
In February 1920, Sheikh Häshim al Hassun of the Nowashu al Hadr tribes was also 
killed for similar motives. 
4 
Shortly after that, Sheikh Maihud al Sagr of the albu KhalTfah tribe 
'invited his tribesmen to discussion in regard to the payment of land revenue 
and taxes'. His men accepted the invitation, but instead of a 'cordial discussion*, 
they shot him dead and 'riddled his body with bullets*. 
5 
It was officially 
concluded that: 
*In all these cases the only motive for the crimes appears to 
have been a desire on the part of the tribesmen to rid them- 
selves of the yoke of the Shaikht. 
6 
There was another factor which: made the serkäl and the fell; h, under the 
British Administration, more aware of the landholder's injustices than 'formerly'. 
Similar to taxation, in Turkish days the severity of the terms was neutralised 
by the impossibility of enforcement. 'On tapu lands*, commented the Political 
Officer of Hillah, 'conditions are obviously extortionate'. However, he pointed 
out: - 
'But in Turkish times, as might be expected, they were not enforced 
r ... The-Sarkal 
cheerfully signed any lease, whatever the terms, 
being firmly resolved to pay not an ounce more than he could help 
="°_and knowing that. it was not likely that any great compulsion would 
be employed by the Government. The lease, in fact, meant practically 
1. A1-Azairij; " a large, tribe which was settled in the area extended from 
*Amärah on the Tigris to some parts of the Muntaf ig on the Euphrates. 
2; --co0.696/2. 
Admin. Reports, Muntafiq Division 1919, Nassiriyah, p. 21. 
3.00C. O. 696/4. Admin. Reports, Muntafiq 1921, p. 3. Bani Khaigän; a confed- 
erated tribe which was settled in the Su4 district. 
4. - Ibid. . 
5. Ibid. 
6. Ibid., p. 4. 
- 260 - 
*nothing; what counted was the strength of each party when the crops 
were cut :.. what is abundantly clear is that, with very few ex- 
ceptions, `the /melläk7 never gathered his full due according to the 
share rule or äccording to the lease ... *. 
1 
The British Administration was proud of its efficiency and determined to 
enforce flaw and ordert. It could not allow a situation'of this sort of continue. 
But instead of altering 'the obviously extortionate conditions', the Administration 
decided to enforce them. The outcome of such a 'course' was cleverly summarized 
by the political Officer of "Amärah: 
'Now /x9207, however, the Pax Britannica makes it unnecessary 
/for the landholder, to retain- the goodwill of the sarkal, who 
Ts thus entirely at the mercy of the /landholder), the more so 
as the latter has reason, to feel fairly confident that Govern- 
ment will not interfere between sarkal and shaikh'. 2 
It is precisely this point which could provide us with a better under- 
standing of the tribal rising of summer 1920, and of the factors which enabled 
the tribal rising to assume a 
, 
national form and role. The Turkish Administration 
was acting upon 'divide and rule' and was incapable of enforcing its taxation or 
its land policy. The British Administration was responsible neither for the 
introduction of the täpu system nor for other land regulations. Nevertheless, 
the British accepted the Turkish rules at their face value and furthermore 
attempted the enforced implementation of such rules. 
In the past the conflict was, to the Turk's convenience, of an inter-tribal 
character. By acting on behalf of the landholders, the British Administration 
% 
had aided in transferring the conflict into a tribal-governmental one. Thus it 
was the British Administration who was, 
in a way, responsible for the unpre- 
cedented unity of the tribes who poured their anger and mutiny upon the Admin- 
istration. 
This began the process of turning a more or less perennial series of 
peasant rebellions 
into a rebellion of 'nationalist' aim and character. The 
tribal rising of 1920 was the outcome of tribal unity, -mlming at the liquid- 
ation of the political British presence. A goal which was shared by the town 
1. C. 0.696/19 Hillah Admin. Report 1918, p. 135. 
2. C. 0.696/3. Amarah Admin. Report, 1920, p. 26. 
.. ýý 
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nationalists and the Shi*i *Ulemä', who did not hesitate to exploit the develop- 
ment and extended, political bridges to the discontented tribes. 
' 
The social natureýof the uprising was revealed when it was officially 
reported that 'during the uprising, decisions in land disputes made by Assistant 
Political officers were reopened and settled by bullets'. 
2 
On the other hand 
it was argued that the absentee-landlords class was not less worried than the 
Administration, of the outcome of the uprising. 
3 
Gertrude Bell confirmed this 
impression and stated that some of Baghdad's notables who, at the beginning took 
a hand in the agitation, were horrified at the development of the uprising. 
4 
Throughout this chapter, the writer has tried to show that the majority 
of the British officers on the spot were, to say the least, not in favour of 
the adopted policy. Not a few of them had stated their open sympathy for the 
actual cultivators and their undisguised disrespect toward the landholders. It 
is highly interesting to find the higher Authorities in London were also cautious 
about committing the British Administration in Iraq to a hastily formulated land 
policy. 
4 
In June 1918, the Foreign Office informed the India Office that: 
$Mr. Balfour would suggest that a solution of the difficulty which 
--has arisen would 
be for the state of Iraq, if such is formed, to 
acquire the /solution) ... It would clearly be necessary to avoid 
adopting any permanent responsibility for the collection of rents, 
while at the same time avoiding any injustice to the chieftain class' s 
In early 1920, the India Office instructed the Civil Commissioner that: 
"... Settlement officers ... should abstain at this stage from 
: definite acceptance and application of principles differing 
materially from basic principles of Turkish revenue administration'. 
6 
Instructions and opinions of the above-mentioned nature raise some important 
questions as to the real motives and aims of the actual policy adopted by the 
'Administration and was *materially' different to that of the Turks, This leads 
, the discussion into a new stage. 
1. See Chapters 13 and 14 
2. C. O. 696/4. Admin. Reports, Muntafiq 1921, p. 4., 
#jjfJ" 
3. R. Coke, The Heart of the Middle Bast, (London, 1925). p. 178. 
4. Gertrude Bell, Private letters and Papers, a letter dated Baghdad, 
30th August 1920. 
3. F. 0.371/3406/68571. From F. 0, to the Under S. of S. of I. O. dated 17th June 
1918, No. 102207/W/44. Italics mine. 
6.192.371/5070" From 
mine. 
Of S. of I. 0. to C. C. Baghdad, dated 25th February 
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III. The British Administration and the Tribal System in Iraq. 
In a highly important note entitled The Future of Mesopotamiat, 
1 
Sir 
Percy Cox bluntly exposed the essence of the social order that the British 
Administration was attempting to establish in Iraq. Cox wrote: 
22. The elements that we most need to encourage are: Firstly, 
the Jewish community in Baghdad ... Secondly, the Arab 
notables and nobility among the townspeople of Baghdad 
and Basrah. They are a somewhat impecunious and backward 
element,, but one which is very necessary to encourage and 
take into our counsels as far as possible. Thirdly the 
wealthy landlord element, both Arab and Jews, and the 
important Shaikhs of the settled tribes ... '. 
2 
In harmony with this line, the Civil Commissioner disclosed that the aim of his 
Administration was 'to secure the full benefit of co-operation by tribal leaders 
and large owners in the administration of these territories". 
3 
Once again we are faced with a manifestation of 'putting the cart before 
the horse*. A line of policy was decided upon. Consequences and political, 
administrative and moral considerations were only of secondary importance. How- 
ever, this is not" to suggest that Cox and Wilson had utterly neglected to examine 
the alternatives of the situation. It is those alternatives, the British choice 
and its tragic outcome, which will form the topics of the following discussion. 
The implementation of such a line (proposed by Cox and Wilson) necessitated 
the 'revival' and enhancement of the already enfeebled tribal system. Such a 
necessity was not overlooked by the British Administration. In late 1919, the 
.. t 
Civil commissioner pointed out that 'it has been our policy to maintain and 
develop he tribal organization in Mesopotamia7'. 
4 
It goes without saying that once this line of policy was decided by the 
1. -"F. 0.371/33872 dated London, 22nd April 1918. See Appendix VII. 
2. Ibid. Italics original. 
3. F. 0.37l/4152. To S. of S. for 1.0., 10th November 1918, No. 9696. 
4, ` F. 0.371/4152. From Political Baghdad to S. of S. for India, dated 10th 
" 
November 1919, No. 9695. It is surprising that A. T. Wilson, in 1930, has 
written '... the conviction that the break-up of the tribal system was 
essential to orderly progress ... this belief was reflected in the gradual 
functional changes in the organization of the administration during 1919 
and 1920 "'. "*" 
A. T. Wilson, Clash ..., op. cit., p. 78. 
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head of the Administration, "it was to be püt into actual practice, with or with- 
out the approval of'the Junior British Officers. Thus the Political Officer of 
}3illah stated, -'in his annual report for 1918, that his major aim throughout the 
year was the 'strengthening of the position of the Shaikh and solidifying of 
1 
the tribal system*. Major Nalder, the Political Officer of Ramädi, reported, 
in late 1917, that *I am doing everything possible to establish Shaikh Dhari's2 
prestige. He appears to be working hard to establish his authority and I hope 
in time to get his influence felt throughout the whole tribe#. 
3 
Major Dickson 
of the Näsiriyah Division wrote in late 1918: "It has been my endeavour during 
my last three and a half years in the Muntafiq to get the power in each tribe 
into the hands of one man. This person is the Shaikh, and he is selected by 
the Government in each case*. 
4 In his annual report for 1919, the Political 
Officer of Hillah pointed out that 'Throughout the year the policy of maintain- 
ing and strengthening the authority of the Shaikh has been consistently followed 
and generally speaking the tribal system remains the basis of the district 
administration*. 
5 
The tribal system in general, and the sheikh's authority in particular, 
could not be restored by wishful thinking or. by administrative decrees, 
no matter how powerful was the proclaimer. 
6 
The essence of the Iraqi tribal 
system had been largely dependent on the collective or communal ownership of 
the tribal land or dira. It is hard to conceive the abolition of the common 
ownership of the land and, at the same time, the maintenance of the tribal 
system or the prestige of the propertied sheikh. 
1. C. O. 696/1. Admin. Reports for 19189 Hillah, p. 121. 
2. Sheikh Däri b. Dähir b. Mahmoud b. Sulimän, sheikh of Zoba' (Sunni) tribe. 
He-assumed a hostile attitude toward the British in the early days of the 
occupation (Baghdad Wilyat Admin. Rpt. 1917, pp. 43-44). After a period of 
co-operation with the A: ministration, he participated in the rising of 1920. 
3. C. O. 696/1. Baghdad Wilyat Admin. Report, 1917, p. 89 
4. C. O. 696/1. Admin. Reports 1918, Nasiriyah, p. 351. 
5, p. 0.371/6348/99. #Admin. Rpt. of the Hillah Division for the year 19191. 
6. A. T. Wilson, op. cit., p. 77. 
Such an intended task was made more difficult to achieve by the attempt of 
the Administration to reconcile two incompatible conditions: the recognition 
and enforcement of private 
land ownership and the attempt to*revive the 
former t 
sucht a 
the tribal sstem. 
open question. 
How did the Administration 
envisage 
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The elapse of some ten years had apparently altered Wilson*s views on 
the subject and made them more accurate and responsible. In referring in 1931 
to the question mentioned above, he was to write: 
t... it constituted one of the major problems with which we were 
faced, for it raised the whole question of the future form of 
Government in 'Iraq. Ought we to aim at a 'bureaucratic' form of 
administration ..., involving direct control by a central govern- 
ment', and the replacement of the powerful tribal confederation by 
the smaller tribal or sub-tribal unit as a prelude to individual 
in place of communal ownership of land, or should our aim be to 
retain, and, subject to suitable safeguards, to strengthen the 
authority of tribal chiefs, and to make them the agents and official 
representatives of government within their respective areas, The 
latter policy had been already adopted, in default of a better in 
the Basra wilayat and especially in the Muntafiq division ... *. 
l 
Even this description of the socio-political alternatives 
which faced the British is somehow limited. The Administration was not totally 
free in. taking its decisions. The tribal system was already disintegrating and 
a noticeable detribalization process was effectively taking place. Wilson him- 
self. was to admit that: 
'Our, hands were not, of course, entirely freep some fifty years 
earlier the Turks had taken steps to break the power of the larger 
tribes in the Shamiya region by alloting part of their lands to 
smaller tribal groups and to Saiyids. The head of the smaller tribes 
had in turn divided the allotted lands amongst the heads of their 
families keeping only a portion for themselves. These original heads 
of families, nov known as sarkals, have the same right as their chiefs 
to their land'. 
This development had its impact on the tribes who, according to Wilson, show 
themselves 
e 
, 
'almost too ready to throw off their allegiance, to their chiefs and 
to deal directly with civil officials in regard to revenue and other 
,.. matters. 
This tendency showed itself during 19183 in varying degrees 
0 in every district of Mesopotamia, ... t 
4 
However., the British Administration decided not to accelerate the process 
of detribalization 
but to put an end to it. The motives of such a plan, the 
methods used to carry 
it out, and the outcome of such a line are topics which 
the discussion will 
be divided into. 
1. A. T. Wiisons op-cit"9 P"77" 
2. Ibid. 
g. It was at the close of 
1918 that the Administration decided to put its 
weight in favour of 
the landholders. 
4. A. T. Wilson, ., p. 
77. 
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(a) The motives behind such a policy: It appears that the British Administration 
had identified its authority and prestige with that of the sheikh. Thus it was 
assumed that in order to restore the governmental control-over the Euphrates 
tribes, it was necessary to reimpose the authority of the sheikh. 
It was officially-reported that since the early days of the British arrival 
in Iraqi tribal areas, 'it was assumed as an incontrovertible maxim that to ad- 
minister the tribes properly it was essential to do so directly through their 
sheikhst. 
' Such an intention was challenged by the prevailing conditions which 
as were described follows: 
'Unfortunately the Turkish system of tribal Administration was based 
on a directly contrary principle, namely the principle of division, 
i. e., of the careful nursing of anarchy to prevent cohesion among the 
. sections 
of a tribe. The Turkish axiom of division was carried out 
to such lengths that almost complete anarchy ruled throughout the 
Euphrates area, the tribes resenting the authority of their own Shaikhs 
... almost 
as much as they still resent ... the sovereignty of 
Government". 
2_ 
, 
Instead of analysing the grass roots, of such a phenomenon (land ownership), the 
Administration leaped, to a different deduction. The Political Officer of Muntafi9 
went on to. point out that: 
r. 
}. 'The 
f irst. aim of the civil administration, therefore, was to reduce 
this chaos to order by restoring their authority to the Shaikhs and 
. using 
them, thus bolstered up with the confidence of British prestige, 
to restore the authority of Government throughout the area*. 
3 
This line of policy was motivated by several factors. In the first place 
it was assumed that the sheikh might 
help in'shouldering some of the'admin- 
i strative tasks which otherwise 
'would press hard. on the time of already over- 
4 
burdened political 
öfficers, and prove a lucrative source of income to Mamurs". 
Major Wilson, the Political Officer of'Kut al *Amärah, gave a more com- 
prehensive account of the Administration's outlook and expectation of the policy 
outlined above. He wrote: 
7 
1. C. 0.696/4. Admin. Reports. 
Muntafiq, 1921,. p. 2. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid., p. 3. 
696/2. Admin. Reports, Hillah, 1919, p. 17. 4. C. O. 
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'It is difficult to overestimate the value of such a man /Mu1ammad 
Saihud Amir of Rabi'ah7, and he deserves all the assistance we can 
give him. It is moreöver "Business" for us to assist him ... A big 
tribe such as the Rabi'ah under a strong overnment in peaceful times 
loses its raison d'etre and so becomes liable to, disruption. Certain 
sections have been untiring in their efforts to gain their independ- 
ence. Apart from the fact that the shortage of population and the 
work required make it necessary., it is still very much to the interest 
of Government, especially. such as this, striving after "economy even 
at the expense of efficiency" to keep the big tribe together. Not 
only is it economical, but it has been proved more efficient ... 
One big Shaikh can build a road, but-20 petty Shaikhs can not. 
Until we have reached a much more advanced stage than at present 
it would seem advisable to delay the inevitable breaking up. '. 
l 
Major Dickson of Näsiriyah pointed to another factor behind such a policy. He 
wrote: 
'Whereas one found 6 or, 7 Shaikhs in each tribe all of equal stand- 
ing (to say nothing of a host of pretenders) when we first occupied 
Nasiriyah and Suq, now we find one strong man, who, as a general 
rule, gets a subsidy from Gc rnment and knows it is worth his while 
to`play straight'. 2 
In return for the assistance rendered to the sheikhs, the Administration 
required or demanded certain services of 
the sheikhs. These responsibilities, 
3 could be summarized as follows: gathered from different 
Administrative. Reports, 
3 
Maintenance of Law. and Order in the tribe. on the area under, their control. 
2. *prompt payment of. trevenue", 
and assistance in the collection of revenue. 
3. 'The collection and handing over to the landlord of the annual rental 
where such is possible'. 
4. protection of travellers and Government property and to assist in the 
maintenance of communications, telegraph, telephone, etc. 
5. Arrest and surrender of offenders and tmalefactors'. 
6. 
,. 
General good, service and loyalty to Government. 
7. Equitable conduct in settling disputes. 
g, 'To'assist in the maintenance of good relations between sub-tribes and 
other matters of similar nature. 
g. Settling the smaller 
disputes among his tribesmen, and the larger ones 
that may be referred to him by his Assistant Political Officer. 
1. C. O. 696/2. Admin. Reports, 
Kut al Amarah, 1919 
2. C. O. 696/1" Admin. 
Reports, Nasiriyah, 1918, p. 351. 
Hillah, 1919, p. 18, also, Ibid., 3. Ibid. A1so1919; 
6p. 2; 
alsonC. Oe696/4. Admin. Reports, hamiyah, Muntafiq, 192, p. 4. 
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(b) The methods used to implement such a policy: However, the Administration 
was aware that the sheikh*s authority was unable to fulfil these demands. Hence 
it. was decided to enhance his prestige. And this was assumed to be accomplished 
by two other methods (apart from direct governmental support); financial allow- 
ances, and the introduction of'the 'Tribal Disputes Regulations'. 
It has been pointed out that 'popular opinion' was not on the sheikh's side, 
'and-it is difficult to'find a force to compel the Sirkers /Serkals%, who form 
the majority, to comply fully with his orders which are based on the orders 
which. -he -himself 
has received from the Government*. 
1 
Thus Captain O'Sullivan 
of Ramadi was to suggest that: - 
'Two remedies seem to offer themselves as solutions to this difficulty. 
One would be to subsidize him, enabling him to keep a small armed 
,; personal guard, actually in his own pay, who would be sufficient to 
urge on the /Serkals7 to adequate efforts, and to give a driving 
force behind his "unpopular" orderst. 2 
The=other remedy was to include a sliding scale of fines that-will be levied in 
direct ratio with his tribe's non-compliance with the orders issued to them. 
3 
Furthermore, it seems that the Administration, -tried to give the sheikh a financial 
4 
interest in the collection of revenue in his area. 'In pursuance of this policy 
certain remissions of the government share have been made 
As early as 19177 in 
such a way as to give the Shaikh a share 
/in the revenue7t. 
5 
dSir Arnold Wilson wrote: 
'I had meanwhile /July 19177 authorized the grant of certain 
revenue concessions to the leading shaikhs in the. Euphrates 6 
, area in return 
for their cooperation*. 
The Administration's financial allowances to the sheikhs took several forms: 
subsidies and gifts, salaries, rebates, concessions and a share of the collected 
1. C. O. 696/1. Admin. Reports, Baghdad Wilyat, Ramada area, 1917, p. 99-. 
2. Ibid. 
3. bid- 
4. F. 0.371/3406/139231. Admin. Report of Revenue Dept., Baghdad, 22nd Mach 
31st December 1917. 
S. I bid. 
6. A. T. W ilsons op. cit., p. 
57 
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revenue. 
' 
The writer sees no point in elaborating on this subject, save to 
mention that such allowances, not a few of which were deducted from taxes 
imposed on cultivators, were, virtually, futile and formed a further burden 
on the actual cultivators. In this respect it is sufficient to mention that 
during 1919, and in the Muntafiq Division alone, the Sa'duns received Rs. 27,840; 
the sheikhs of Suq District (Albu Saleh, Hammar Shargi and Gharbi) were paid Rs. 
995 per month; in Nä§iriyah District the sheikhs (of al Hasan, Bani KhaTgän, 
Mujarrah, Sayid) Rs. 1,200 p. m. The sheikhs of Shatrah were in receipt of a 
monthly payment of Rs. 1,250, Qal*at Sikar was allowed Rs. 200. Sheikh Khaiyun 
of al *Ubaid was receiving Rs. 500 a month. 
2 
. Soon after 
the British occupation of some tribal areas in Iraq, the Admin- 
istration was convinced that some specific legislation was necessary to enable 
Political officers to dispose of civil and criminal cases in their district 
'without referring to the Courts established in Basra, Amara and Nasiriyat. 
3 
Thus the Tribal Criminal and Civil Disputes Regulation was drawn up by Mr. H. R. C. 
Dobbs. The Regulation was promulgated in February, 1916. And it was drawn on' 
the-lines of the Indian (North-West) Frontier Regulation known as the 'Sandeman 
System'. 
The Regulation gave Political Officers authority to invoke a tribal ma les 
(arbitra. te body) to deal on tribal lines and in accordance with tribal customs 
with all cases 
in which any of the parties concerned was a tribesman. At the 
same time the Regulation 
invested the Political officers with full magisterial 
powers to try cases which 
it may be expedient to refer to arbitration. 
4 
Apart from genuine tribal aims and considerations, the Regulation 'raised 
the importance-of the shaikhs by giving them a recognized place in the political 
and legal system. The Political Officers, on their side, 
found that considerable 
1. C. O. 696/1. Admin. Reports Nassiriyah, 1918, p. 351. Major Dickson pointed 
out that every sheikh 
in his Division was paid R s. 200/- p. m. (Salaries of 
Mudir excluded). Also, Ibid., Baghdad Wilyat Admin. Report, 1917, p. 91. 
2. C. O. 696/2. Admin. Reports Muntafig, 
1919, Appendix C and D. 
3. F. O. 882/27. Arab Bulletin 
No. 86, dated 21st April 1918, Mesopotamia. 
. 
Tribal Disputes Regulation. 
4. Ibid. 
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work was taken off their shoulders". 
1 
The Regulation proved to be of considerable assistance to the Administration 
and its personnel. On the other hand it did not lack certain drawbacks. It was 
officially reported that: 
'Tribal law is not an effective deterrent to crime, in that the 
liability to punishment lies'not on the individual who commits the 
crime, but the family, sub-tribe or tribe to which he belongs. The 
share of a blood fine which the actual criminal in fact pays may 
thus be insignificantt. 2 
--Furthermore, 'Over one point of tribal justice the views of the'tribesmen 
and of the Political'Officers often clashed. In cases of murder arising out of 
a}blood feud, the tribesmen were accustomed to regard fast or payment of money 
and»usually of women, as sufficient to settle the score and to end the' feud. 
Imprisonment or capital punishment was thus considered not only harsh but un- 
3 
necessary'. 
Another method which was used by the Administration to enhance its position 
among the tribes was the recruitment of some tribesmen into a security-force 
called shabana. The total number of this 
force at the end of 1917 stood at 
about 1,500. In April 1920 there were about 
4,800 shabana, about 800 of whom 
were'Kurds; the remainder were 
Arabs, with a proportion of Persians. 
4 
Such a step had its advantages, both to the Administration and to the 
development-of Iraq. However it was ironic that one of its outcomes was to 
foil the British attempts. 'It tended to weaken the authority of the Shaikhs 
over their tribes, to 
deprive them of some of their best men, to break down the 
hard and fast line. between tribes ... t. 
5 
Furthermore, such a move failed to give the Administration the favourable 
image it desired to have among the tribes. Instead, the members of the shabana 
were isolated, 
loathed and hated by the tribes. The Civil, Commissioner wrote: 
1. p. W. Ireland, op. cit., p. 
86 
2. C. O. 696/2. Report on the 
Administration of Justice for the year 1919, p. 6 
3. P. W. Ireland, op. t", p. 
86 
4. A. T. Wilson, omit., p. 
86 
5ý Ibid. p p. 
69 
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'They /shabana7 were openly called infidels in the streets and 
were refusedLood in the bazaars and coffee-shops, and vessels 
from which they had drunk were publicly broken. Their women 
would crowd round the barracks, calling on their husbands and 
sons to come and protect them. To stay with the Levies meant 
to many that they would be disowned by their tribes: in several 1 
cases their wives were violated, carried off, or even killed ... ". 
The obloquy in which the name of shabana was once held was so great that 
shabana was often refused the reply to his salläm *Alaikum as an infidel. 
2 
The British Administration policy made the sheikh occupy 'the position of 
a government official' and allowed him to exercise 'functions which are little 
removed from Magisterial and Judicial'. 
3 
However, such a policy. proved tobe 
futile and dangerous. It failed to -tresurrectf the waning influence of the 
sheikh and it invited the indignation of the tribesmen. 
(c) The outcome of such a policy: The failure of the Administration's endeavour 
'was decided in advance by its very attempt to reconcile contradictory positions 
or tasks. It was hard 
for the sheikh to be, at the one time, a landlord and a 
recognized leader of his tribe. It was also difficult to the sheikh to earn the 
respect of his tribe while he was asked to collect taxes from his tribesmen on 
behalf of the Government. The Political Officer of Muntafiq gave the following 
balanced account: 
'The position today /1921% is that though he may be willing to carry 
out these services, 
the Shaikh is incapable of doing so. He cannot 
serve two masters. To be popular with the tribe he must fall in with 
the views of his tribesmen and their sectional leaddrs /the serkäls7 
whose general outlook if summed up would be "if the Government can- 
enforce payment of revenue we will pay, but not otherwise". 
The waning influence of the Shaikh is, however, not entirely due to 
the lack of support by Government. His authority was forced on the 
tribes and on the strength of this he seized every opportunity of 
exacting what he considered his rightful due from his unwilling 
tribesmen. Now he can take no more and when asked to carry out any 
of the services expected 
from him as a shaikh of the tribe, his 
immediate reply is a request for force. He is averse from paying 
up his own revenue demands and at the same time he is unable to 
collect any taxes 
from his tribesmen?. 4 
A. 
. 
Ibid., p"70 
2. C. O. 696/3. Admin Report. Arab and Kurdish Levies and Gendarmerie, 1915-1920 
3, F. 0.371/6348/99. Admin. Report of the Hillah Division for the year 1919. 
4. C. O. 696/4. Admin. Report Muntafiq, 1921, p. 4. 
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The above argument indicates that the British policy was not only un- 
productive but rather counter-productive. The sheikhs had abused the authority 
invested in them by the Government and used it for their personal aggrandizement. 
The other sheikhs and tribesmen resented the growing power of the Government 
sheikhs. They identified their power and conduct with that of the Government 
itself. In Gertrude Bells words *The policy of backing the shaikh had its 
drawbacks. He is"a petty tyrant whose misdeeds reflect on the Government 
I 
which support him". Thus it was logical that the resentment of the proper- 
tied sheikhs was bound to assume an anti-government line and pour within the 
wide stream of the independence movement. 
The social and national character of the 1920 uprising was clearly re- 
vealed by the 'significant 
fact that when the Assistant Political Officers of 
districts were evacuated, Paramount Shaikhs - who until then had been bolstered 
up by British gold and British 
bayonets - left with them ... until British 
columns again marched through their 
districts'. 2 
In a well-balanced evaluation of British tribal policy, Major Hedgcock 
went on to argue, 'as a matter of 
fact he /the sheikh) is more or less of a 
figurehead, with very little power beyond that which he obtains from the support 
of Government. This 
individuality of the Shaikh,... counts for very little*. 
3 
The Political Officer of *Amarah concluded that: 
*W e have fallen into the error of over-rating his /the sheikh, value 
and consulting him too much, to the exclusion of educated and far- 
seeing men of other classes. For 
instance, on the "Amarah Council 
of Notables there are eleven shaikhs to 
five townsmen, the sarkal 
and fallah, who form by 
far the largest proportion of the inhab- 
itants of the Division, being unrepresented*. 
4 
"Even from an agricultural point of view, it seems that the Administration 
have 'lost sight of the 
fact that the shaikh does not represent agricultural 
1. cmd. 1061, t", p. 
143 
2. C. O. 696/4. Admin Report, Muntafiq, 
1921, pp. 4"5 
3. C. 0.696/3. Admin Report, 
Amarah, 1920, p. 26 
4. Ibid. . 
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interests from the point of view of either the sarkäl or*the fe1i h*; 
1 
in 
fact it was argued that the 'sheikh' was 
t. usually ignorant, narrow-minded, and unprogressive, extremely 
selfish and possessed of an inordinate greed for money. He, will 
never recommend any scheme which, however beneficial to the rest 
of the community, touches his pocket or his dignity in the slightest 
degree. Consequently the fact that most of the wealth and land of 
the Division is in the hands of a few tribal shaikhs causes a certain 2 
amount of ill feeling'. 
It is difficult to hide a certain admiration for the flexible, intelligent 
and pragmatic British approach. In the depth of their 'misguided' policy, they 
were able to pin-point an alternative course which, furthermore, was to be 
finally adopted. 'As official knowledge grew, so did the conviction that the 
break-up of the tribal system was essential to orderly progress under whatever 
form of organized government might be constituted in future. This belief was 
reflected in the gradual functional changes in the organization of the admin- 
ý7 
istration ... '. 
3 
Such a new radical change in the British policy was to take 
place immediately after the uprising of 1920 which gave ample evidence as to 
the futility of the old policy. 
The Administration was aware of the rising per of the seräkil and of 
their general desire to throw off all vestige of control by the sheikh and to 
#deal direct with the local executive in all matters concerning themselves and 
government'.. 
4 
. 
In fact it was as early as 1917 that the Administration was aware 
of the necessity 'to work down to the sarkal'. 
S 
However, such a view was dis- 
missed due to the 'danger' of encouraging 
'the already rapidly moving process 
of disintegration be accelerated and the power of the shaikh weakened'. 
6 
Further- 
more, it was as early as 
1916 that the British Intelligence in the Euphrates 
reported that al Khazä'i1 tribe 
(who live in the area between S amawah and Kufah) 
1. Ibid. 
2. Ibid., PP"26-7 
3. A. T. Wilson, op. cit., p. 78 
4. C. O. 696/4. Admin. Report, Muntafiq 1921, p. 4. 
5. F. O. 371/3406/68571. Admin. Report. Revenue Board, Baghdad 22nd March 
31st December 1917, p. 24 
6. Ibid. 
;r, 
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have sent a letter to the British Authorities offering assistance to the 
British troops upon their arrival in Samäwah. 
1 
It. was a sign of profound 
understanding that the British Intelligence commented on such an,, oßßer: 
'We could not, however, reckon on much support from the Arab 
tribes on the Euphrates. Although at present specially anti- 
Turk, they are probably, as the ZPolitical Officer/'of Nasiriyah 
observes, anti any government, and wish to remain independent'. 2 
It is surprising that all of those wise notions and profound assessments 
kf ' 
were shelved in favour of a policy which, basically, had no objective justi- 
fications. The growing and productive power of the seräkil and the unpropertied 
sheikhs was sacrificed for the advantage of feeble and selfish landholders. 
The genuine and established desire of tribesmen and fellähin for autonomous 
conditions was overlooked and, instead, a rigid, over-taxed and a highly 
centralized form of governmental administration was imposed. Thus it is not 
an exaggeration to suggest that the British Administration was, in the final 
analysis, acting as undertaker of its own funeral. 
The 'ill-feelings' of the fellähin, seräkil and the unpropertied sheikhs 
were to reach a point of no return. The arrest by Major Daly of Sheikh Sh'alän 
abu al Jun (29th June 1920) was the final straw which broke the camel's back. 
In summer 1920, the whole of the'Mid-Euphrates sprang to arms. The Admin- 
istration and its 'spoiled' sheikhs were swept out of the area. The uprising 
expanded to Diyala and Ramadi; and Baghdad was haunted by a destir resembling 
that of Gordon Pasha's Khartoum. 
Peasant involvement in national politics was brought about by certain 
8OCio-economic changes and 
land regulations which were introduced by the Turks. 
British enforcement of such measures intensified the fellähin engagement in 
politics. Nevertheless such a participation remained within a limited scope. 
The fellähin 'struggle' advanced from inter-tribal to anti-government and 
from local to'regional. However it did not assume final unity or identifi- 
cation with the nationalists. 
1. F. p. 882/26/Arab Bulletin, 38. Euphrates Intelligence, December 1916 
2, Ibid. , 
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The basic demand of the unpropertied sheikhs was the acquisition of 
the cultivated land. T ej were aware that the Administration was 
coming to the conclusion that when 'a sheikh holds a huge tract of 
land the cultivators of which all belong to a different tribe from 
his own ... 
/he should/ be made to give it up to experienced farmers 
capable of improving that land. 
l Some of the unpropertied sheikhs 
were acquainted with a view among the Administration advocating that the 
British should 'make /the tribesmen/ into landowners with a chance of themselves 
taking out tapu papers eventually ... '. 
2 
In short some sheikhs comprehended 
that the Administration was about to review its policy. 
Such an awareness was to water down the conflict and to neutralize and 
alienate some sheikhs from the movement. Others assumed a two faced 
attitude. On the one hand they allowed their tribesmen to revolt, occupy 
official buildings and raise upon it the flag of al Istiglal. On the other 
hand they protected the British Officials and resisted all attempts at the 
expansion of the rising into surrounding areas and declined to offer any 
substantial assistance to the forces of the 
'insurrection in their battles with 
the British Army. 
This attitude casts some light on the reasons behind the failure of 
the rising in transforming itself into a striking force beyond the limited 
tribal areas. Furthermore, it allowed the Administration ample time to gather 
its forces and thus strike its counter-blow which ended the uprising. After 
concluding its victory the 
Administration rewarded its 'Trojan Horse'. Its 
gratitude was translated 
into large tracts of land presented to, for instance, 
3 
Sheikh Khaiyun, of whom the Administration promised that 'Whatever may be the 
1. C. 0.696/3. Admin. Report Amarah, 1920. pp. 26-7. 
2. F. O. 371/3406/102207. Report by Capt. H. R. P. Dickson, A. P. O. Suq-ash-Shuyukh 
dated 9th May 1917. 
3. Sheikh Khaiyun al 
'Ubaid delayed his submission to the British Authorities 
to as late as 1918. On his 
first visit, the Political Officer of Nasiriyah 
(Major Dickson) had to appoint Khaiyun as British representative in Shatrah. 
'Khaiyun is the strongest and most influential man in the district. He has 
been Turkish Qaimmagam of Shatrah ... Cordially hated and inexpressibly 
. 
feared, he has always ruled Shatrah with a rod of iron. ' 
C. o. 696/1. Admin. Reports 
1918, Shatrah, p. 381 
In 1921 it was officially reported that 'tribal disintegration fostered by 
contd... 
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future form of Government of this country, Shaikh Khaiyun's, services should 
not be forgotten'. 
1 
And indeed they were not 'forgotten'. 
,1 
However, the peasant, uprising rendered. the Iraqi independence movement 
a priceless service. It was the final blow which proved the futility of 
Wilson's plans; it drove the British Government into adopting a new policy; 
it displayed the strength of the Iraqi, Arab nationalism and gave the Iraqi 
nationalists a powerful position to negotiate from. The creation of the-Iraqi 
state, was largely due to the mass political explosion of the Iraqi fellähin 
of summer 1920. 
Nevertheless, it remains true that those ßellä in had gained the least 
from the products of their own movement. It was the Iraqi officers and officials 
who were to run the country after 1920. Some of the unpropertied sheikhs were 
to acquire land, but the bulk of the fellähin and seräkil were left unpropertied 
and underprivileged. 
Years after the events, Sheikh-Sh'alän was entertaining Glubb Pasha. He 
complained of the 'futile' blood shed of his tribesmen. 'But now you have an 
independent state, a king and an Arab Administration. What more do you want? ' 
replied the British General. 
'Yes Pasha, all that is true, but we got nothing 
of it', Sh'alan said. 
2 
Sh'alan's evaluation was very accurate indeed. Nevertheless, perhaps he 
was not aware of the distinction 
between what politically is accidental and 
perpetual. 'The peasants' chances of influencing the political sphere increase 
sharply in times of national crises. When non=peasant social forces clash, when 
rulers are divided or 
foreign powers attack, the peasantry's attitude and action 
3 contd. the Turkish 
Government 
. is already a fait accompli. There are 
now three classes 
/in Muntafiq/. 1. The powerful and paramount shaikhs. 
2. The Shaikhs of a tribe whose influence mainly depends on Government 
support, and 3. 
The Sarkals or leaders of sections and sub-sections of 
tribes predominantly numerical ... In the case of (1) there are only three 
men in this division, who can 
be regarded as wielding the influence of 
paramount Shaikhs; Salim al Khaiyun of Bani Asad, Badr al Rumaiyidh of 
Albu Sahih and Khaiyun al 'Ubaid of the'Abudah tribe in the Gharräf. 
C. 0.696/4. Admin. Report, Muntafiq, 1921, p. 5. 
C. O. 696/3, Admin Report, Muntafiq, 1920, p. 11. 
2. Personal communication, 
dated 1970. 
-276-" 
may well prove decisive. Whether this potential is realized is mainly 
dependent upon the peasants' ability to act in unison, with or without formal 
organization. This in turn, is dependent upon the cohesion of the peasantry, 
its economic, social and cultural homogeneity as well as interaction and, on 
the reflection of these in the ideological sphere'. 
l 
Most of the above-mentioned conditions of enhancing the peasantry's 
chances of influencing the outcome of Iraqi politics were, to some extent, in 
evidence. 'Yet to the long run it is the basic weakness of the peasantry 
which has tended to stand out. The peasantry has proved no match for smaller, 
closely knit, better organized and technically superior groups, and has, time 
and again, been 
"double-crossed" or suppressed politically and by force of 
2 
arms ... 
It seems the Iraqi felläýin, in spite of all their sacrifices and major 
contribution to the independence movement, could not escape the 
'general' rules 
of peasantry political-sociology. 
'Once again the course of historical develop- 
3 
ment seems to weaken 
peasants' political influence'. Iraqi fellahin plough 
and'sow the land but 
it was not they who harvested the end-product. 
T. Shanin, 'The Peasantry as a 
Political Factor', SociologicaI Review, 
Vol. 14,1966, No. 1, p: 
21. 
Ibid., p"20 - 
3, Ibid. 
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CHAPTER XII 
'THE GENERAL REFERENDUM OF 1918-1919 
1.. The Reasons, behind ' the Referendum 
The 1918'General-'Referendum in Iraq played an important role in the 
subsequent history of that country. Its motivation throws considerable light 
on the' conflicting viewsof British policy=makers concerning Iraq. Its conduct 
reflected 
. 
-a' profou 
I 
nd conflict between the British Administration in Iraq and 
its allies on the one hand and the'rising'independence movement on the other. 
The Referendum had accelerated the'ýprocess'of polarization into two' major 
"' groups and hastened their clash. -' 
Some Iraqi historians were. -inclined to explain the move`towards' the 
Referendum -as'a 'liberal'-step adopted by the British Government to express 
its'-displeasure with Wilson's policies in Iraq. 
' 
This may be partially true. 
2 
3 
By comparing the two texts (the proposal and the acceptance4) it is easy to 
discern the profound differences between the aims reflected 'in the two texts. 
However, the fact- remains that'it was Wilson who initiated the suggestion of 
holding. a plebiscite. On the 24th November, 1918, Wilson telegraphed the India 
office suggesting the idea of a referendum: 'All agree that opinion of the 
country must be taken 
before any decision can rightly be come to ... *. 
5 
illusions Nevertheless, Wilson did not allow any about his motives. 
He explicitly'stated his aim: 'The opinion of the country must 
be 
taken :.. on the clear understanding bi 'the 
"inhabitants of the country 
themselves, that a protectorate will 
"in due course be 'declared and that, 
for-the present, military, administration will continue'. Wilson finished his 
telegram with the significant conclusion *I do not doubt that 'our confidence 
will. be justified 
by results*. 
6 
' Why did Wilson suggest the plebiscite since 
1. Al IJassani, al Thawra al *Irägiya al Kubra, (Sida, 1965), p. 32. 
2. H. "young, The Independent 
Arab, (London, 1933). On p. 280 Young did not 
indicate that it was Wilson who suggested the referendum. 
3., A. T. Wilson, A Clash of Loyalties, 
(London, 1931), pp. 108-109. 
4. g. p; 882/23,, telegram 
from S. of S. for India to Political Baghdad, 28th 
November 1918. 
5. A. T. Wilson, I Clash of Loyalties, op. cit., p. 108. 
6; 'Ibid. 
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he had already decided its-result in advance? 
. 
Most. Iraqi historians have argued that Wilson was. 'distorting'and'falsifying' 
the referendum which was only a 'folly', 'myth' and 'tragic comedy'. 
l 
On the 
other hand, a historian of considerable repute accepted. that_Wilson's confidence 
was well founded: -- 
'He % ilson_? counted, rightly,. on the fact that the Sharifians were 
quite unknown in the area, and on the political tradition of a 
country-like"Mesopotamia., which holds it dangerous to-express dis- 
like of the ruler of the moment, to obtain evidence with which to 
support the policy he was urging the Government, in London*. 2 
The argument of the Iraqi 'nationalist' historian represents only half 
, "the truth. Although there was an open 
interference. by the authorities in the 
procedure of the referendum, Lt was also true that there was a consideräble 
trend among the Iraqis . which, favoured- the, continuance, of the British Admin- 
istration. 
As for Kedourie's explanation, one would like to point out two objections. 
Firstly, 'Lt is not very accurate to state that 'the Sharifians were quite un- 
known in-the area'. Wilson himself pointed out that "a son of King Husain 
would meet with widespread acceptance, in Baghdad and would probably be well 
-received: elsewhere, and 
in particular by the Shiahs of Mesopotamia, on account 
of the-well-known latitude of King Husaints religious views'. Moreover, and 
3 
referring to the same. period with which we are dealing, Kedourie himself stated 
explicitly that tSharifian propaganda in Mesopotamia was well organisedt. 
4 
Secondly,. there is the problem of-the 'interpretation' of the 'political trad- 
ition' of Iraq. It is obvious that Wilson was by no means responsible for 
such a tradition. But what ,, K6dourie 
forgot to mention was that 
Wilson had encouraged such a ! political tradition' of fear and intimidation, 
by a series of. ädministrative, orders, 
1. M. M. al Basir, Tärikh al Qadiya al *Irägia, (Baghdad, 1924), p. 81. Also al 
Hassani, op.. _t", pp"32,44. Also al Fir"on, op. cit., p. 69. 
2. Elie Kedourie, - England and the'Middle East, (London, 1956), p. 184. 
3. A. T. "Wilson, 
Clash _, 00. cit., p. 108. 
4ý E. K, edourie, op. cit., p. 
182. 
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For one reason or another, even after the Anglo-French declaration, 
Wilson was under the impression that the British Government generally shared 
his own views. 'Everything indicated that the French in Syria, and the British 
in Iraq, intended to create effective protectorates, and that the Anglo-French 
declaration was not intended to be taken literally'. 
' 
After all, it was the 
Secretary of State for India who assured Wilson that the 'intention of the 
Anglo-French Declaration was primarily to clear up the existing situation in 
Syria which Arab suspicion of French intention had created. It should be under- 
stood by all that the Peace Conference will settle the ultimate status of all 
2 
Arab provincest. However, Wilson*s understanding of the telegram was selective. 
, 
In the same telegram it was stated: 
'It is'laid down meanwhile in the Declaration that H. M. G. will as 
part of their policy assist in 
the establishment of native govern- 
went in the liberated area, and do not intend to impose on the pop- 
tilation any government which is distasteful to them*. 
3 
Moreover, it was as early as the 12th March 1918, when his friend, 
Hirtzel, warned him: 
tEntirely different currents are flowing now, and we must shape our 
course to them if we are to get what we want 
in Iraq. The old watch- 
words are obsolete, and the question 
is how we are to secure what is 
essential'under the new ones. The thing can 
be done, but certain re- 
orientation is necessary. The 
tArab facade' may have to be something 
rather. more solid than we had originally contemplated'. 
4 
one can sum up Wilson*s plans for the political future of Iraq as 
having two aims. First, Iraq should be a united political entity (i. e. Mosul, 
Baghdad and Basrah were to 
form one political unit). Secondly, Iraq should 
remain for a considerable period of 
time under the direct control of the British. 
Against'such a notion there were many hostile trends and opinions, some 
of which enjoyed a considerable 
influence. In the first place, the unity of 
of Iraq was disputed, mainly with reference 
to the problem of Mosul. Further= 
Wilson, OP- cit., P-110- 
2. F. 0.882/23, dated 28th 
November 1918, 
3. "Ibid. The telegram should 
be understood in its totality which represents 
"dichotomy in attitude and the predicament of the British Government 
over the political 
futureof Iraq. 
4. Wilson, ' op, _. Ejt"' p. 
166, footnote. 
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more,. Wilsongs plans for the political future of Iraq were seriously challenged 
by the growing boldness of the 'Nationalists' inside and outside Iraq, and the 
growing influence of 'Arab sympathizers' inside the British Government circles. 
This was coupled with certain doubts on the part of the higher British author- 
1 
ities and-the 'evacuationist" tendencies of the British Press. These new winds 
blowing in Iraq, alarmed Wilson who gradually became aware that he was not the 
sole representative of British Government policy towards Iraq. In short, he 
wanted an Iraqi mandate to support him and to satisfy the liberal tendency in 
Britain and abroad. As for Iraqi opposition, which he had always underestimated, 
he thought that he was able to put an end to its mounting aggression which he 
A 
attributed to the encouragement given 
from certain British circles in Damascus, 
Cairo and London.. 
According to the Sykes-Picot agreement, Mosul2 was allocated to the French 
sphere of influence. 
3 This was contrary to the Hussein-McMahon agreement in 
which Mosul was to 
be part of the proposed Arab State. 
4 
Furthermore, it was 
in-conflict with the actual realities of political life. Mosul was occupied 
by British' troopsp unaided by Arabs or, French, on the 7th November 1918. More- 
over,. the very promising reports on 
the rich oil potentialities in Mosul would 
have made the British extremely reluctant 
to hand over such an opulent land. 
But France, ignoring the above 
fact, insisted on its rights in Mosul. Britain, 
who"was divided between 
her 'European policy' and her 'Imperial interest' had 
to act very cautiously so as not 
to provoke France or sacrifice her own Imperial 
interests. Thus, the idea of a referendum, in which the people of Iraq and the 
inhabitants of Mosul would show their desire for political unity seemed a 
suitable solution 
to this problem. Anyhow, in his first visit to England, 
1. F. O. 882/23/3133' Telegram No. 10973,10th December 1918 from Political Bagh- 
dad to S. ' of S. for India London. Wilson was complaining of a series of 
articles in The Times. 
2. Dr. Fädil Hussein, Mushkilat al Musil, 
(Baghdad, 1955). Originally a Ph. D. 
thesis to Indiana University, U. S. A., 1952. 
3. Mosul was part of Area 
(A) in the Sykes-Picot agreement. 
4. See the {aussein-McMahon correspondence, 
in particular McMahon's second 
letter, dated Cairo, 24th October-. 1915. 
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Clemenceau, in a moment of generosity and expectation, gave up Frances claim 
to Mosul. 
I 
The dispute with Turkey over Mosul was of a more serious nature. After 
all, France was an ally, while Mosul, in Turkish hands, "would*constitute not-- 
only a constant menace against the English in Iraq (Baghdad) and the French in 
Syria, but would, place the. Turks in possession of all the routes of invasion 
descending on Aleppo, Baghdad and Damascus'. 
2 Moreover, the Turkish 
claims on Mosul were more plausible than those of France. For Turkey, the 
occupation of Mosul occurred in 'violation' of the Armistice Agreement. The 
4 
Mudros Armistice was declared on the 30th October 1918, and all hostilities 
between' the Turks and the,; British were to cease as from noon local time on the 
3 
31st October 1918. . 
On the,. 2nd November, Baghdad, received orders from the War 
Office to occupy Mosul. General Marshall, who by the 31st October, was 
fourteen miles south. of Mosul, was given new orders. He carried out the 
4 
instruction and. occupied Mosul. The Turkish Commander although he did-, 
not resist the British advance, registered his protest in the surrendering 
document. The British justified their action by referring to Clause 7 of the 
Armistice. 
5 Whether this clause. justifies the British occupation of Mosul or 
not tit was evident that the British 
forces were determined that the Turks 
6 
should evacuate the, entire region'. 
Turkey refused to, acknowledge the legitimacy of the British occupation 
of Mosul. Ismet 
Pasha summed up the. Turkish case for demanding back Mosul on 
the basis that the majority of its population were not Arabs but Kurds and Turks, 
1. 'David Lloyd George, Memoirs of the Peace Conference, 2 vols., (New Haven, 
, 
1939), Vo1.2, p. 673. 
2. Harry N. Howard, The Partition of Turkey; A Diplomatic History 1913-23,, 
., 
(Norman, 
, 
1931), P"298. 
3. Article 25(XXV) of Mudros Armistice cited by H. W. V. Temperley, AHistory 
of the Peace Conference of 
Paris, 6 Vols., (London, 1920-24), Voi. VI, p. 497. 
4. Wilson, 2t", PP"16-21. 
5. Article 7(VII) of the Mudros 
Armistice, cited by H. W. V. Temperley, op. 
cit., 'p. 496. 
6. Harry`N. Howard, The 
Great Powers and Partition of Turkey, Ph. D. thesis, 
University of California, 
1929. Cited by Henry Foster, The Making of 
Modern Iraq -a Product of 
World Forces, (London, 1936), p. 107. 
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that geographically and politically it was part of Anatolia, and that the 
possession of Mosul"was indispensable for Turkey*s economic life and security. 
l 
He raised-the, 9uestion of the 'illegitimate' occupation of Mosul. 
2 
All these points could-be disputed, but, what is really important in Ismet 
Pasha*s argument'was his claim that: 
*The. inhabitants of the Wilayet demand that they may be restored 
to Turkey, for they know that in that event they will cease to be 
a colonized people and become citizens of an independent state'. 
3 
The consistent refusal of Turkey to accept the British occupation of Mosul 
was a source of political headache to Wilson, especially since he was aware of 
a strong pro-Turkish sympathy 
in Mosul particularly among the ex-servicemen 
of that district,. Such uncertainty alarmed Wilson, who was convinced that 
'whatever form of government might ultimately be established'in Mesopotamia, 
it was vital to its effective continuance 
that it should cover the three Wilayets 
4 
of Basrah; Baghdad and 
Mosult. Wilson, at the same time, was quite aware that 
such a view 'ran counter 
to the theories underlying the Sykes-Picot agreement 
and the tentative 
instruction already promulgated by /H. M. G 7 as to the future 
5 
governance of the Wilayets of 
Basra and Baghdad respectively*. 
As far as the political future of Iraq was concerned, the challenges which 
Wilson had to confront were of a 
decisively alarming nature. The cessation of 
hostilities had apparently left the British 
Government without a definite and 
fixed policy to be adopted 
in Iraq and with a heritage of conflicting commit- 
ments"and demands which needed 
to be sorted out. Thus the door was open for 
several schools and 
trends of political opinion to propose various solutions 
which were not necessarily 
compatible with those of Wilson. 
The first signal came on the 8th January 1918 with the declaration of 
President Wilson's 
'Fourteen Points'. Article twelve of these principles was 
of special importance owing 
to its relevance to the ex Turkish territories which 
1. cmd. "1814, Turkey No. 
1 (1923), pp. 351-2, Clauses 1,3,4 and 5. 
r2. Ibid:. Clause 6. 
3. Ibid., pp. 351-2, 
Clause 2. 
4. F, o. 371/5127. 'From 
C. C. Baghdad to 1.0., 18th November 1918. 
ý5. Ibid. 
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were promised the right of self determination. The real blow came with the 
publication of the Anglo-French Declaration on the 8th November 1918. Here 
the Allies committed themselves openly and without reservations to the 'setting 
up of national governments and administrations that shall derive their authority 
from the'free exercise of the initiative and choice of the indigenous populations'. 
The Declaration continued 'France and Great Britain agree to further 
and assist in the setting up of indigenous governments and administrations in 
Syria and Mesopotamia*. 
Gertrude Bell wrote "Given"the short period of time, it would have been 
difficult to arouse more sound and fury, not to speak of heartburnings and 
intrigue, than have been created in Baghdad by the declaration ... t. 
2 
For 
the Declaration was a 'disastrous error": to him 'it was a'veritable W ilson' 
3 
bombshell shattering in advance the gigantic imperial structure of which he 
had long dreamed as covering the whole area of the Middle Bast'-4 
The-Civil Commissioner*s opposition to the Anglo-French Declaration was 
clearly made in' his telegram to the India Office: 
"I will not be doing my duty if I did not first of all record my 
conviction that the Anglo-French Declaration ... in so far as it 
refers to Mesopotamia, bids fair to involve us in difficulties ... 
the Declaration involves us in ... diplomatic insincerities ... 
and places a potent weapon in the hands of those least fitted to 
control a nation's destinies ... The Arabs of Mesopotamia will not 
tolerate that foreign Arabs should have any say in their affairs 
... the average. 
Arab, as opposed to a handful of amateur politi- 
cians of Baghdad, sees the future as one of fair dealing and 
material and moral progress under the aegis of Great Britain ... 
With the experience of my Political Officers behind me, I can 
confidently declare that the country as a whole neither expects 
nor desires any such sweeping scheme of independence as it is 
adumbrated, if not clearly denoted, in the Anglo-French Declaration*. 
5 
A few days later, on the 18th November, the Secretary of State for India 
telegraphed to Wilson the 
following proposals: 
6 
1. F. O. 371/5153/B213. 
2. F. O. 371/4150/5394. Memorandum No. 524, Baghdad, 22nd February 1919, from 
Lt. -Col. A. T. 
Wilson to the Under Secretary of State for India, p. 7. 
3. Wilson, OP* cit., p. 103. 
4. H. B. Philby, Arabian Days, 
(London, 1948), p. 173. 
5. A. T. Wilson, op. cit., p. 
104. 
6. -Ireland, 
o li. 1, p. 156. 
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tColonel Lawrence has-submitted proposal to H. M. Government for 
dealing with Arab question. He advocates viz. 1. Lower Mesopotamia, 
2. Upper Mesopotamia, 3. Syria, to be placed respectively under 
Abdullab, Zeid and Feisal, "sons of King Hussain. ... It is of course 
understood that both states would be in the British sphere and 
Lower Mesopotamia under effective British control*. 
The telegram was ended by a 'request for Wilson*s views on those proposals 'with 
as little delay as possible'. 
These proposals were in complete contrast to Wilson's views, and also 
confirmed his fears about the degree of influence that the British Government 
had allowed to the 'Arab School'. Thus, he replied asking his government to 
'exclude this country definitely once and for all from any contemplated Sharifian 
settlement*. 'I urged*, Wilson wrote, "as did Sir Percy Cox in 1917, that 
the Wilayats of Basra, Baghdad and Mosul should be regarded, as a single unit 
for administrative purposes, under effective British. control*. 
2 A few days 
later Wilson, 
- 
explained his reasons. for opposing the establishment of an Arab 
state (ruled by a Sharifian) 
in Iraq. In the first place he emphasised the 
S hi'i majority of Iraq which he claimed was 'bitterly opposed to the idea of 
3 
Arab unity under the aüspicies of the Sunnist. Wilson also raised the subject 
of, the animosity of 
ibn Saud to the Sharifians. He argued that: 
#If we encourage-the-idea of Arab, as' opposed to European predominance 
in Arab speaking territories ... we shall without doubt excite 
latent religious hatreds between Sunni and Shi*ah in Iraq, thereby 
depriving ourselves of some of the strategic advantages which the 
possession of this ganglion gives ust. 
4 
Wilson also pointed out that: 
'To pursue our 'present Arab policy may 
in certain circumstances 
have the effect of creating a series of Muhammadan States, having 
nothing in common except 
their religion and their anti-European, 
that is to say racial, prejudices. This would result in the neg- 
ation of progress and the 
destruction of the hope of peace within 
a reasonable period 
in the Middle Easte. 5 
Against such-a background Wilson proposed the idea of holding a pleb- 
iscite to-ascertain public opinion. 
6 4Anyhow, in the same telegram he gauged 
1. Ibid. Telegram 10031,20th November 
1918, p. 157. 
2. Wilson, 22: _5-1t", 
p"107 
3. p. 0.882/23/3133. 
From Political Baghdad, to S. of S. for India. No. 10973, 
10th December 1918. 
4. Ibid. 
s. Ibid. 
cit., p. 108 
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the educated opinion in Iraq as running on the following lines: 
'Idea of Arab kingdom without British advice, assistance or control 
is put aside ... Arab State under an 
Arab Amir, including Basra, 
Baghdad and Mosul is considered an ideal solution ... British High 
Commissioner and British Advisers in all the Ministries of the Arab 
State and throughout the Country are unanimously desired ... All 
agree in wishing Sir Percy Cox to be the first incumbent of the 
post. This feeling is general to my personal knowledge all over 
Iraq, particularly in Najaf and Karbala and in the country districts, 
where his name carries the greatest weight*. 
Wilson then went on to discuss the merits of the various names that had been 
unofficially put forward as possible candidates for the Amirate of Iraq. - The 
names he discussed in that telegram were: (1) H di Pasha al 'Umari;. (2) Member 
of-family of Sultan of Egypt; (3) Son of Sharif of Mecca; and, (4) Nagib of 
Baghdad. 
1 In a separate telegram, Wilson discussed the nomination df the Sheikh 
of Muhatmnarah as a possible Amir of Iraq. 
2 As for the latter, Wilson stated 
that: 
"His /Sheikh of Muhammara% case put very briefly in his own words 
is as _ follows ... 
Shiah, loyal ... As Amir I shall be the nec- 
essary figurehead for Arab state and shall in all matters act in 
accordance with wishes and orders of /H. M. G. 7'. 
3 
However Wilson argued that 'on general political grounds, however, his success 
would be little short of disastrous*, because 'it would raise throughout Iraq 
latent animosity between Shiah and Sunni ... '. 
4 A few days later the Civil 
Commissioner received a telegram from the India Office accepting his argument, 
and asking him to 'take steps .. to discourage his candidature*. 
5 
Wilson concluded that none of the above-mentioned candidates was suitable 
for the Amirate of Iraq. He therefore was to suggest that: 
*A possible alternative has not yet been discussed in Baghdad but 
if I might be authorised to suggest it would probably meet with 
immediate acquiescence in Baghdad and would be even more acceptable 
to the rural districts, namely, that Sir Percy Cox should be 
appointed High Commissioner for the first five years without any 
Arab Amir or other head of the State, but with Arab Ministers 
backed by British Advisers'. 
6 
1. Ireland, op. cit., p. 158. 
2. F. O. 882/23/3133 JABS/19/7. No. 11454,22nd November 1918. 
3. I_ d., 
4. Ibid. ' 
5. F, 0.141/444/Fi1e 
12215, From S. of S. for India to C. C. Baghdad, No. 11608, 
27th. November 1918. 
6.. Wilson, M"-sit., 
P. 108. 
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The '"Inter-departmental Committee' 
1 in its meeting on the 27th November 
considered the telegram of Wilson and decided to authorize him to hold,,, a-refer- 
enduni in Mesopotamia; 
2 
It seems that up to that time the 'Inter-departmental Committee' had been un- 
able-to formulate a definite policy concerning Iraq. A minute concerning 
the meeting mentioned above, shows up the radical differences 
between several trends of opinion about the future of-Iraq. We are already 
aware of Colonel Lawrence's proposals which were discussed in the same meeting. 
Apart from that, General MacDonogh submitted a memorandum on the 4th November 
1918 in support of a single state unifying the three Wilayats. He also 
suggested that''Abdullah should 
be the head of the new state with a direct 
British Administration controlled by a British Resident. 
3 
Commander Hogarth 
of the Arab Bureau submitted a 
'memorandum on the 15th November 1918 suggesting 
4 
that Mosul should be a separate state.. Sir Percy Cox agreed on the idea of 
having a High Commissioner and, if required, a cabinet might be established, 
half of which were to be British officials-and the other half Iraqi nationals. 
This was suggested on the understanding that the Cabinet would be an admini- 
strative body; otherwise an advisory 
body should be established consisting- 
entirely of Iraqi nationals. 
If a figurehead was needed, Cox suggested the 
._5 Nagib'of Baghdad. Major Young, the Secretary-of the Committee, wrote comment- 
ing on Wilson's proposals: 
'He /Wiison7 was also undoubtedly right. in pointing out-from the 
fir st that-it would be fatal to the 
future of Iraq to deprive her 
of the Mosul Vilayet ... What he /%ilson7 
failed to realise was 
that matters had already gone 
too far for any British Administration 
'however benevolent, to secure for long the willing acceptance of 
the people of Mesopotamiat. 
5 
1. To avoid, conflict of authority this 
body was created to co-ordinate the 
policies of the 
F. O. and India office over Iraq. The India Government, 
the War Office and the Arab Bureau had representatives on this committee 
also. 
2. Young, op. cit., p. 280 
3. g. p. 371/4148/1329g Eastern 
Committee, 39th meeting, secret, 27th November, 191E 
4. Ibid. In this meeting, 
Lord Curzon described McMahon's promises as tembarrass- 
ing*ý and the Sykes-Picot committments as 'a millstone round our necks''. 
5. Ibid. 
op. cit., p. 280 6. young o 
4 
- 287 - 
Curzon considered it *presümpttous folly*`for the Committee to decide 
the political future ofYIraq without taking into account the views of the 
population. 
' Thus', the 'Inter-departmental Committee' at its meeting on the 
27th November 1918 decided toauthörize Wilson to hold the proposed plebiscite. 
The Secretary of State for India telegraphed to Wilson informing him of the 
decision. 
2 A paragraph of the telegram made it quite clear that the 'Committee' 
was still unable to reach a definite conclusion apart from agreeing on the idea 
of the referendum. 'In the meantime our attention is being given to the 
question of the best form 
of Government to set up'. 
3 
According to the telegram', the Political Commissioner was to put three 
specific questions to the pepple of Iraq: 
'1. Do the y favour a, single Arab state under British tutelage 
stretching from the Northern boundary of the Mosul Wilayat to 
the Persian Gulf? 
2. In this event, do they consider that a titular Arab head 
should be placed over this new State? 
3. % In that case, whom would they prefer as head? '4' 
One could be justified in seeing a great deal of unfairness in the way 
the questions were worded. First, the establishment of a single Arab State 
was directly linked to the existence of a 
'British tutelage'; and secondly, 
that the Arab head, if he was wanted, would be nothing but 'titular*. To 
formulate the questions in such a way was an open hint to the Iraqis as to 
the desire d. results that the British Government would like to see. 
Nevertheless, and within this framework, the British Government was still 
aware of the 'great 
importance to get a genuine expression of local opinion on 
these points, and one of such a'kind that'could be announced to the world as 
the unbiased 
pronouncement of the population of Mesopotamia'. 
5 
it seems as if 
Wilson was not satisfied with the already existing restric- 
tions. The Political Commissioner 
worsened the situation by ordering more 
1. F. O. 371/4148/13298 Eastern Committee, 39th meeting, 27th November 1918. 
2. *'F. o. 882/23/3133. Telegram 
from S. of S. for India to Political Baghdad 
dated 28th and received 30th November 1918. 
3. Ii 
4. ry Ibid. 
5. Ibid. 
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restrictions. On. the same day he received the authorization, that is 30th 
November 1918, he. gave=the following instructions to the Political Officers: 
'In connection with the first point, you should ascertain whether 
the inhabitants of your area wish to form a part of an Iraq state 
stretching from, Ragqah on the-Euphrates-and Jazirat ibn 'Umar on- 
Tigris to Basrah and the head waters of the Greater' and Lower Zab. 
This question only arises in Kurdistan, Mosul Wilayet and Daituz- 
Zor. But it, is of greatest importance. Alternative is establish- 
ment of separate state, roughly Mosul Wilayet not under British 
Protection.. 
As regards second point the correspondence annexed to the memo- 
randum sufficiently indicates the arguments for and against the 
possible alternatives. 
As regards third point, answer is of course inseparable from 
the decision in point two. Here again the correspondence is 
sufficiently explicit as regards possible choices. Too much 
emphasis cannot be laid upon the importance of avoiding the 
exacerbation of religious differences which might follow upon 
an indiscreet selection in this connection ,.. 
As soon as you can conveniently after the receipt of this letter,. 
you should discuss the questions raised therein confidentially 
with the principal personalities in your area, and ascertain from 
them what the trend of public opinion is likely to be, and inform 
me accordingly. 
When public opinion appears likely,,, under the guidance ofýthe' 
persons you have consulted, to take a definitely satisfactory 
line, you are authorized to convene an assembly of all leading 
nö übles and shaikhs with a view to placing before them the 
abovequestions, in orming them that their answers will be commun- 
icated to me for submission to Government. When public opinion 
appears likely to be sharply divided or in the unlikely event of 
its being unfavourable, you should defer holding a meeting and 
report to me for instructions. 
In such, cases, it may be anticipated that the favourable verdict 
of neighbouring districts will tend to have a favourable effect 
informing public opinion. 
When opinion is favourable, it is desirable that it should be 
reduced to writing and signed by as many as possible'. 
1 
These instructions: left no space for any doubt that Wilson was planning 
quite deliberately to 
interfere with the results of the referendum so as to 
make them. agree with 
his own expressed views. Such a conclusion could be 
fairly deduced from the implications of his instructions. 
Firsti : he restricted the plebiscite to be held only among the-'leading 
notable, s. and shaikhs*. ý: 
This was not mentioned in the India Office telegram. 
In Wilson*s telegram where 
he proposed for, the first time the idea of, a refer- 
enduni, he suggested 
eliciting the opinions of the 'educated' people. The 
p. O. 882/13/3640, Memorandum 
27190, Secret and Confidential, Civil Commissioner 
to Political Officers, 
Baghdad, 30th November 1918. Italics mine. 
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'educated' and-the 'leading notables' in Iraq were not necessarily in the same 
category. In actual practice, the Civil Commissioner was denying the greater 
part of the population the chance of expressing their views on such a vital 
subject. The educated people of-Iraq, at that time, consisted mainly of the 
ex-officials and, ýex-officers, who, according to Wilson's scheme, were excluded 
from showing their opinions. Among the tribal areas, the instructions recog- 
nized only the leading sheikhs, who did not in any way represent the bulk of 
the tribes especially in an era where tribal confederations were disintegrating 
and the social tide was promoting the small sheikhs and sirkäls. On the other 
hand, the -tleading' sheiks" verdict was quite predictable owing to the profound 
unity of interests with'the British Administration who was subsidizing them 
financially and solidifying their position politically. One, could notice here 
" that the small merchant and 
the Effendi groups were out of Wilson's scheme 
while politically speaking their 
influence could not fairly be ignored. 
Secondly:. the Civil Commissioner made it quite clear that the referendum 
should. take place only when the 
trend of public opinion was in a 'definitely 
satisfactory line'. - The Political 
Officers were asked to contact the Civil 
Commissioner when public opinion 'is clearly divided or taking an unfavourable 
trend'. Such instructions were contrary to the India Office telegram which 
was seeking to get 
'a genuine expression of local opinion'. 
Thirdly: the Civil Commissioner sent his instructions to the Political 
officers accompanied by his telegrams to the India Office in which he set for- 
ward his opinions and proposals concerning 
the'future of Iraq, the proposed 
titular head and the necessity of an effective 
British control. Undoubtedly, 
these strongly worded and 
fully convinced telegrams were to be used for guidance 
and clues as to which 
trends were to be considered *favourables. 
Fourthi : one could also be justified in criticizing the procedure of 
the plebiscite proposed 
by Wilson to his Political. Officers in which they were 
to invite the 'principal personalities' of 
their areas to discuss the matter 
with them individually 
and 'confidentially'. If the trend of public opinion 
was 
Idefinitely satisfactory, then, and only then, was an open meeting to be 
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held consisting of all the 'leading notables and shaikhs' to give their views, 
after being informed 'that their views would be communicated to the Civil Comm- 
issioner'. By using this tactic Wilson was playing on the worst aspects of the 
'Oriental traditions'. Ahmed Pasha al ýIn a', who declared bluntly: 'I don't 
1 
want other Government than a purely British one', had whispered a warning to 
the political Officer of Basrah: 'Don't convene a meeting and put the questions 
to it. They might'vote for you through fear, but they might possibly combine 
and'-say: "We don't want you; leave our country"'. 
2 Another pro-British element 
stated to the'Political Officer: 'You are very wise to ask each man separately 
and confidentially for his opinions". 
3 
In January, 1919, Wilson sent to London the. results of, the Referendum 
together with his mentioned instructions. The reaction to his instructions 
as to the methods of conducting the Referendum was one of dismay and anger. 
Lord Curzon wrote that "... Wilson may have acted with the best intentions. 
But his intentions were not our orders'. 
4 Major Young wrote that such instructions 
had made'it clear tthat public opinion is not to be encouraged, or even allowed 
to express itself in a sense contrary to Colonel Wilson*s opinion". 
5 
II. The Plebiscite in Action 
(a) The Favourable Replies: In Basrah, where the upper classes experienced 
improvement and prosperity as a result of British occupation which subsequently 
made these classes less 
favourable to the idea of Arab independence, 
6 
and although 
the town was-visited by the Civil Commissioner to consult its notables at the 
time of the plebiscite, 
7 
yet, it seems that it was 'difficult to. gauge opinions 
8. 
in Basrah'. The Political Officer of Basrah, apparently taking the advice of 
1. F. O. 882/23/5050, Self-Determination in Iraq, (Secret compilation of 
Declarations and telegrams), p. 3. 
2. . Ibid. 
3. I d. 
4. p. 0.371/4178, dated 29th January 1919. 
5. Ib L dated 24th January, 1919 
6. p. o. 371/5231/E. 13471. P. Cox telegram dated 26th October 1920. 
7. ' p. 0.882/23/3133, telegram 
No. 11453,22nd December 1918. From Political, 
: 
Baghdad to S. of S. for India. 
e8. e 
ibid. 
4 
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some pro-British elements, declined to hold a general meeting, for the notables 
of. the town; insteadg, he interviewed some of the leading personalities 'and 
recorded their. individual personal views*. 
The Political Officer of Basrah 'considered the . views of. 
the, seventeen 
individuals whome he interviewed as representative of the whole of Basrah. 
However, in a., telegram to the Civil. Commissioner, he-stated. that the 'majority' 
of Basrah*s Moslems were for an independent-Iraq, but regard as out of, the 
question the selection of-an Amirfrom the family of the Sharif ... tthere 
being no'family and noýman-in-Iraq suitable and selection from without being 
distasteful'. 
2 According to the, Political Officer the Moslems of Basrah-were 
mixed in their minds. -- Some 
favoured complete independence and considered the 
British as Kafir, the others desired' to see the. continuance of 'thei- present 
civil British, administration modified to suit peace conditions, 'natives of 
Iraq being employed to the fullest extent-,... *. 
3 
The Political Officer, taking 
into account the views of-other. sects and races in Basrah, concluded: 
'We have a demand for the continuance of British administration,, 
liberal to national sentiments, under a British High Commissioner 
and without. a native Amir, the Iraq State inclusive of the Mosul 
vilayet*. 
4 
Although the Political Officer referred in his telegram to a group of 
'Mohammedans', "who 
demanded' complete independence, unfortunately he failed 
to give any details concerning their political outlook and activities or their 
social weight amongst 
the Basrah community. Instead, he dismissed them as 
mere . 'fanatics 
in religious sentiment or in the fear of just government which 
will put an end to 
the robbery and corruption which suited the genius of 
5 
particular persons'. 
Of the seventeen individuals interviewed by the Political 
Officer, the only exception to the general trend was Sulimän Pa1d3,. a young 
1. F. 0.882/23/3505. Self-Determination in Iraq, (Secret Compilation of Declar- 
ations and telegrams), pp. 2,6. There were seventeen persons, thirteen of 
them were Moslem Arabs, one was a Kurd and the rest were a Jew, a Christian 
and an Armenian. 
2. F. 0.882/23/3505. Telegram 
from P. O. Basrah to C. C. Baghdad, No. 536,21st 
December 1918. 
3. i bid. 
4. Ibid. 
5. Ibid. 
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lawyer and aýstrong-supporter of Sayid T31ib during the Turkish period. He 
wanted an independent , Iraq under British guidance, favoured the idea of an Arab 
Amir and thought 'it. would do to put in one of the Sharif's family'. 
' 
It is interesting'to observe the social background and economic structure 
that had-played, a decisive role in formulating the political outlook of Basrah*s 
citizens., 'Whereas the, mercantile and -landowning classes, generally speaking, 
wish for a fully equipped British administration, and no Amir, there, is a 
section of-educated Muhammadans who favour the eventual estanlishment of an 
Arab Government under an Amir". 
2 
In (? urnah a petition was signed by thirty tribal Sheikhs, head-men of 
villages and other notables. They declared, 'We wish to remain "under. the pro- 
tection, and care of this just nation /Britain' and we accept as Governor- 
3 
General in Iraq, Sir Percy Cox'. Seven of the signatories asked for the 
4 
continuation of the Tribal Penal Code; fourteen of the *Amärah Sheikhs signed 
a similar petition in which they asked 
for 'Englishmen speaking Arabic to be 
their Political Officers and Assistant Political Officers'; they wanted no 
#Arab off Officer', and asked for a Shara' judge from the Ja*fari sect, favoured 
the return of Sir Percy Cox, and asked for the continuation of the tribal Penal 
Code. 
5 Like Qurnah, but in clearer' terms they requested that: 
*... so long as a Sheikh-is performing his duties to the Government 
faithfully,, he should be allowed to live in his Mu"gata*ah and his 
district and no higher offers for our Mu'gata'ah from selfish men 
should be entertained, so that., we may be able to do our best to 
restore the land to prosperity". 
6 
In Kut, two declarations were signed, expressing exactly the same content 
and- differing only, 
in words. Thus they included the following demands: a uni- 
fied Iraq including Mosul; no need for an Arab Amir; and, British Administration 
1. P. 0.882/23/3505. Summaries of opinion expressed by leading citizens of 
Basrah, p. 6. 
2. g. 0.882/23/WS/19/7. Telegram No. 
1076,26th January 1919. From Political 
Baghdad to S. of S. for India. 
3. Self Determination in Iraq, No. 2, p. 7. 
4. Ibid- 
5. Ibid, No. 3, P-8- 
6. Ibid. 
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should continue. 'In "Aziziyah, the situation was just the same, 'the Assistant 
Political officer stated that tthe appointment of a son of the Sharif is strongly 
opposed everywhere". 
2 
The declaration of Näsiriyah was signed by 271 'tribal Sheikhs; Notables 
of the towns and other persons of importance'. 
3 
They requested the return of 
Sir Percy Cox, coupled with the maintenance of British Administration. The idea 
of an Arab Amir was 
accepted as a desirable one, but not for the time being, and 
it was thought that such an Amir ought not to be an'Iragi, 'because the Iraqis 
4 
are so much divided*. Mosul, the petition demanded, should be an integral part 
of Iraq. 
s 
In the Samäwah district, four declarations were signed by 33,14,9 and 
27 individuals respectively. All supported the continuation of the British 
6 
Administration. In Rumaithah, centre of the armed uprising of 1920, the out- 
one was rather different, and the existence of a challenging opposition was 
strongly felt. 
7 This will be elaborated later in the chapter. 
In iJillah, Hindiyah, Musaiyb and Diwaniyah, five declarations were signed 
by 400,209 6 and 159 individuals respectively requesting the continuation of 
8 
the British Administration. The first three petitions asked for the return 
of Sir Percy Cox, the Diwäniyah Mu 
ba a while considering the appointment of 
an Amir "is in accord with common sense, with our religion, which enjoins us 
to' appoint an Immam', yet it concluded that this "is at present impossible'. 
9 
1.. Ibid., No. 4(a), p. 9. The first declaration was signed by only one, the 
second by nine. 
2. Ibid., No. 4(b), p. 9. 
3. Ibid., No, S,. p. 11. 
4. " Ibid. They gave the most astonishing reason for refusing to have an Amir, 
e. g. 'because we are the most faithless and hypocritical nation*. 
5. Ibid. The declaration, in eloquent wording, stated, 'Ever since our child- 
hood, we have been hearing that the Iraq is composed of these three Vilayets 
- Baghdad, 
Basrah and Mosul ... Mosul is attached to Baghdad, as Baghdad is 
watered by Mosul, and Mosul gets good 
from Baghdad by the sea trade ... 
6. Ibid_ ,. No. 6, p. 
12. 
7. . 
Ibid., No. 6, pp. 12-13. 
8. I bid.,, No. 8, pp. 
17-18. 
9. Ibid. 
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The declaration of Khänigin, signed by 150 persons, was distinguished 
from the others by a long introduction devoted to show the shortcomings of the 
Turkish Administration in contrast with the profound achievements of the British. 
After expressing their gratitude, they ended the declaration with a strong call 
for the continuation of the prevailing order. 
1 
Mandali, through 12 signatures, 
expressed its desire for a unified Iraq under direct British control. 
2 
In 
Kifri, 'All' the tribal Sheikhs (Kurds and Arabs), with some representative 
of town notables, declared their wish for an Arab Amir; but, nevertheless, 
they requested that the British should postpone his appointment until such a 
3 
time that they *could have a definite opinion on the matter. Kirkuk Mudbata 
with its 17 signatures demanded a unified Iraq protected and assisted by the 
British. 
4 
"iS 
This was the stance of the individuals and areas who supported the British 
during the Plebiscite. By examining their declarations and economic or social 
structure, one could classify them 
into the following groups: 
(ä) the religious minorities; 
5 
(b) the merchant and landowning classes; 
(c) most tribal Sheikhs; 
(d) those who would support anyone in power. 
It was not surprising that the great section of the big merchants would 
support the British. On the one 
hand their trade was flowing to the British 
Empire, and on the other, it was carried and marketed by British trade companies. 
In addition to that, the security of the roads and the prevailing condition of 
flaw and ordert were vital for their trade, and was reasonably achieved by the 
British authorities. The landowning class support to the. British was inevitable. 
Being absentee landlords, the government was the only body able to collect, on 
their behalf, their revenues.. 
As for the tribal Sheikhs, their attitude was two- 
1. Ibid., No. 10, P-20- 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibd., No. 11., P-21- 
4# I_ d., No. 12, p. 21. 
5., Their attitude will 
be discussed later in the chapter. 
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fold: their adherence to the British was linked to a'series of measures 
4 
produced by the British to strengthen their (the Sheikh's) power and prestige; 
the tribal Penal Code and the land possessions were on the top of--the list. 
The Sheikhs' conflict with the absentee landlords was. also on the agenda as the 
'Amärah petition, in particular, clearly showed. Thus the Sheikhs' s'upport I was, 
in a way, conditional rather than absolute. 
(b) The"Attitude of the Minorities: One of the striking things which was re- 
vealed by the Plebiscite was the attitude of the religious and ethnic minorities. 
While among Moslem Arabs, defiance and opposition to the British administration 
were strongly felt in some areas, And overwhelmingly in others, as we are going 
to see, later in the chapter, one cannot claim that it was so among the minorities. 
The Political Officer of. Basrah stated that the Jews and Christians, who 
represented about two fifths of the total inhabitants of the town, 'would have a 
British protectorate ... would view with alarm the creation of an autonomous 
1 
Arab Government'. Messrs. Mir (a Jew) and GaribINn (an Armenian) told the 
political officer that most of the rich Jews and Christians would leave the 
2 
country if the British went. 
The class factor, in spite of its relevance, does not explain the whole 
question. By examining the. position of the religious minorities in other areas, 
especially Mosul and Baghdad, one could deduce that the 'class' element did not 
stand as the sole factor in generating or formulating the religious minorities' 
stance. It was obvious that 'communalism' had played a decisive role. 
in Mosul, several petitions of pro-British tune provide a clear evidence 
for the ideas mentioned above. The Chaldean Patriarch with thirty of the most 
tprominent' members of his community (the Chaldean Catholic) signed a declaration 
requesting an assurance that they will 'remain under the shade of the British 
'. 
3 
Empire 
i. F. 0.882/23/3505. Telegram from P. O. Basrah to C. C. Baghdad, No. 536,21st 
December 1918. 
2. Sei if-Determination in Iraq. Summaries of Opinions expressed by leading 
citizeas of Basrah, p. 45. 
3. Self -Determination 
in Iraq, mit., No. 14(1), p. 26. 
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Twelve 'representatives' of the Jewish, community of Mosul signed a 
request to the British Government expressing gratitude and We pray you to 
receive us. as subjects and to protect us constantly under your Government and 
your Justice . 
1- 
Zwenty4"representatives* of the Armenian'community of Mosul 
2 
revealed a-similar attitude.. and so did, a petition signed by the Jacobite Arch- 
bishop of Mosul and thirty men of his community with some 'representatives' of 
3 
the Protestants. ". The-Archbishop of the Syrian Catholics led twenty 'prominent' 
members of his community in signing a; declaration requesting the protection of 
the British. This was followed by another petition with 150 signatures of 
4 
Priests and'Notables of, the same-community asking for their submission to the 
British Government and King George-V and declaring bluntly that 'no Arab Govern- 
5 
meet should ever rule over use. Two other statements came, from. Mosul. One was 
signed by seven ýKurdish -'leaders 
', the other by fifty, including the whole of 
Yazidis. 
6 Both declarations were stating, in virtually the same words,, their 
complete opposition to Arab rule.? 
The clear rejection-by the-religious minorities of the idea of Arab rule 
was, taking the historical circumstances of 
that period into account, hardly 
surprising. Arab Administration meant 
for them not only a backward government, 
but also, and more alarmingly, an Islamic administration, in which, under its 
Shama regulation, they. would inevitably be reduced to second class citizens. 
The independence movement and Arab nationalists 
in Iraq were in a formative 
8 
period and unable to approach the Jews and the Christians politically to assure 
1. Ibid., No. 14(3), p. 26. 
2. Ibid., No. 14(4), p. 26. - 
3. Ibid., No. 14(6), pp. 26-27. 
4. Ibid., No. 14(7), p. 27. 
5. Ibid., No. 1'4(10), p. 27. 
6. On Yazidis, `see al: Bassani, al Yazidiya 
fi Hadirihim wa Madihim, 
, 
(Baghdad, it .d 
?. ' Self-Determination 
in Ir aq, 011. cit., No. 14(8 and 9), p. 27. 
g. It seems that the Jewish-community of Baghdad was very influential due to 
,. 
its education and leadership in commerce. 
Howard M. Sachar, The Emergence'of the Middle East 1914-1924, (London, 1969). 
p. 366; also C10619 op. cit., p. 
94. 
It is interesting to observe that 'From the start, when the Balfour Declar- 
ation was issued, the reaction of 
the Jews of Baghdad to Zionism was tepid, 
dot to say unfriendly*. 
. 
A. T. Wilson, " , p. 305. 
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them on their future by providing a mature, responsible and perhaps secular(? ) 
political programme. Far from that, nationalist aspirations in Iraq were very 
much linked to Islamic sentiments, which consequently made the demand for 
political independence more likely to cause considerable alarm among the minor- 
ities, more particularly when the new ruler, being non-Moslem, was the self- 
appointed protector of religious minorities. 
The benevolent attitude of the Administration towards the Christian and 
Jewish communities of Iraq was a matter of an established policy. 
' 
For instance, 
between 1916 to 1918, some 282 persons were employed in the Administration of 
Baghdad, 132 of whom were Christians, 60 Jews and only 17 were Moslems. In 
2 
1919, Rs. 47,830 were grants allocated to Iraqi schools of various religious 
bodies. Christiän schools earned 37,900, while Moslems re ce. ived only 5,930.3 
All this was done against a background of having, in 1919,5,033 Moslem students, 
330 Jewish and 855 Christian. 
4 Such a policy was bound to alienate the denom- 
irrational communities from the independence movement and to link them more 
closely to the Administration. This 
factor throws a light on the Islamic 
inclination which dominated the Iragi"nationalists, and was, in its turn, to 
widen the gap between them and 
those communities. 
The 'class' or economic factor had its influence also. The leading Jews 
and Christians of Iraqi towns were mainly merchants who 
had flourished under 
the British occupation. In showing their gratitude, they were merely echoing 
the same response shown by their Moslem counterparts. Furthermore we have 
noticed earlier 
that the Jewish and Christian merchants were trading mainly 
with Britain and 
Europe, and it goes without saying that to preserve the 
political links with 
England was an accurate reflection of their commercial 
interests. Another factor which might cast light on the minorities' political 
inclination was the European education of some of the younger members of these 
grotPps who'were either 
sent to Europe or to Missionary schools. All these 
0 p. O. 
371/3387, 'The Future of Mesopotamia $. Note by-Sir Percy Cox, 22nd 
April 1918. See Appendix 
VI9 pp. 
2. Ibid. 
3. C. O. 696/2" Admin. 
Report, Dept. of Education 1919, p. 8. 
4. Ibid., Appendix 
1" 
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factors had acted to generate ,a solid Jewish-Christian attitude hostile to the 
, 
idea of Arab rule and favourable to the continuation of the British Administration. 
'The independence movement had to, exert stronger efforts and to produce 
iä clearer 
political vision before it could win over the religious minorities to its cause. 
(c) The Opposition: The Referendum procedure did not go very smoothly in spite 
of all the precautionary measures taken by the Civil Commissioner. The 
'independence movement' used the event as an-opportunity to'solidify its ranks, 
develop several alignments, spread political agitation and to demonstrate, 
for-the first time since the British occupation, its strong' existence in a 
determined and 'striking way. 
The first sign of opposition came from al Rumaithah district. Among the 
tribes of *that area, 13 Sheikhs favoured the continuation oß the British 
Administration, while 7 Sheikhs demanded the Sharifs son as a king. Among the 
notables of al Rumaithah, twenty chose 
the continuation of the British Admin- 
i stratlon, as OPPosed to eighteen who expressed their desire for an Arab king 
of the Sharif's 
family. 
l 
Because of the exceptional' importance of'Najaf, the Civil Commissioner 
visited it and presided over-a meeting 
in which the. Nagib of Najaf, representing 
divines, tribal, Sheikhs and men of education were invited to discuss the question 
raised by, the; Plebiscite. 
The meeting, held on the 11th December 1918, was 
also attended by Major Newberry, 
the Political Officer of Shämiyah and Najaf. 
A ccording, to. the British sources, 
'the gathering was unanimously in favour of 
the continuance. of British protection 
from Mosul'to the Gulf without an Amir+. 
2 
Several sources sharply disputed the above account; they claimed that the 
meeting dispersed without 
reaching any definite conclusions and that the atmos- 
phere aas one of controversy 
and challenge rather than of approval. 
3 
It-seems that Sayid Hädi al Rufai'i, the Nagib of al A shrif, declared in 
1. Self-Determination in Iraq., op. cit., No. 6(5 and 6), pp. 12-13. 
2. F. p. 311/4150/5394. Self-Determination 
in Mesopotamia, Memorandum No. S. 24, 
dated Baghdad, 22nd February 1919. From A. T. Wilson to Under S. of S. for'India. 
3. A. Basar, o p. cit., pp. 
82-84; al Hassani, op. cit., pp. 40- ; also 
al Fir*on, op. cit., pp. 
74-78 
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the meeting 'We want no one but the English*. This provoked Sheikh *Abd al 
Wähid Häji Sikar, a politically-minded prominent Sheikh of al Fetlah, to denounce 
such a view and to state, We demand a National Arab Government'. Sheikh Muhammad 
Ri41 al Shabibi, a man of education and an ardent nationalist, added: 
'The Iraqi people conceive Mosul as an indispensible part of Iraq. 
The Iraqis think it is in their right to form an Independent 
National Government with complete independence. There is no one 
among us who would like to choose a foreign ruler /Britain7'. 
1 
Sayid 'Alwän al Yäsiri asked for the postponment of the meeting to enable the 
attendance to make up their minds. Wilson concluded the meeting by agreeing 
2 
to that and asked them to send him their views through Major Newberry. 
After the gathering was over, some of those who had attended it went to 
Sayid Kim Yazdi (the chief Shi*ah Mujtahid of his day) to consult his opinion. 
'The matter is of an absolute gravity. Everyone, from the highest person to the 
lowest has the right to discuss the subject'. That was al Yazdi's reply. He 
asked them to assemble, discuss the question and 
inform him of their conclusion 
so that he, would endorse 
it. 3 
The meeting advised by al Yazdi. took place in the house of Sheikh Muhammad 
Jewäd ai Jawahir. Apparently, there was a great deal of discussion and con- 
fusion. *Abd al Waiid Sik4r contemplated to end the confusion by delivering 
a short, but eloquent speech, 
in which he said: 
+We are not yet mature for a replublic. We are not Persians, 
"Turks or British, so as to choose a ruler from those nations. 
But we are Arabs, thus our ruler should be an Arab. And since 
the Sharifian house is the highest in the Arab World, there- 
fore we ought to demand an independent Arab Government, headed 
1. Ja'far al Mahbuba, Maas. at Najaf wa Iia4hiruha, 
(Najaf, 1958), Vol. 1, p. 258. 
2. ibid. Among those attending this meeting were 
Sheikh 'Abd at Karim al Jazzi'ri 
and Sheikh Muhammad 
Jawäd Sahib at Jawähir, both. were prominent Shitah 
Mujtahids. 
Al Baz. irkän, al Waq'äi' al Ijagigiya fi at Thawra at 'Irägiya, 
(Baghdad, 1954),. pp. 72-75. Others attending included: Sayid Muhsin abu Tabikh, 
Sayid Nur at Yäsiril Hädi Zuwain, Muhammad at 
Abtän, Häji Muhsin Shlish, 
Sayid Abas at Kilidar, Sheikh Bägir at 
Shabibi. al Firton, op. cit., p. 74. 
Sayid Hadi Nagib at Ashraf was 
described by the P. O. as 'In reality a great 
supporter of government, 
but pitifully weak and vacillating and consequently 
useless when he is most needed. Not possessed of much intelligence'. 
C. 0.961/1/Administration 
Reports of Shamiyah and Najaf, 1918, Appendix 11, 
p. 108. Onthe other 
hand, it must be pointed out that, contrary to the 
Sunna, the Nagib of Shi'ah 
is of no great prestige, because he lacks religious 
authority which is confined to the Mujtahids. 
3. al Hassani, 
mit-, p. 42 
16 
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'by one of the Sharifs sons. '1 
This blunt speech gained the approval of the meeting and ended it. 
2 
The leaders of the meeting went to Kutah to inform al Yazdi of their 
decision, and to-gain his approval. The latter refrained from fulfilling his 
promises on the pretext that he is a pious man. He, al Yazdi claimed, knew 
nothing-about politics and-his knowledge was only confined to * illä1 and aräm* 
3 
The British did not fail to acknowledge their debt to al Yazdi, 'Nor will 
those among us who were participants in the drama*, wrote Miss Bell. -'fail to 
remember the support which we, on our side, received from the Naqib /öf'baghdad7 
and Sayid Muhammad Kadhim Yazdi". 
4 However, this support was, in fact, of a 
negative nature, *In spite of much pressure, he refused to express himself un- 
favourably to foreign intervention in Iraq .. - and has Al Yazdi7; even ällowed 
it tobe known that his sympathies are on the other side*. 
5 
In spite of that, 
at Yazdi never came out openly in support of the British. Miss Bell, in an 
attempt to explain and justify his latter attitude, wrote: 
'If he overstepped this mark his influence as a religious leader 
would suffer and the value to ourselves of his tacit support 
-would diminish correspondingly'. 
6 
This last statement and the whole incident is very revealing. In the 
first place, it shows clearly that the independence movement had acquired a 
strength to the'extent of 
forcing the highest religious authority to refrain 
from publishing his own Was and views. Furthermore, it exposes the weaknesses 
in-the belief, held by some historians and certain circles among the British 
Administration of Iraq, that the Iraqi independence moveax: nt was nothing more 
than a religious response to the calls of the Shi'ah Mujtahids. It was in 
spite of al Yazdi's attitude that the 
independence movement carried on asserting 
its views in defiance of 
the British and al Yazdi. 
7 
1. Said Amin, at Thawra at 'Arabiya at Kubra, (Cairo, 1935), Vo1.2, p. 11; also, 
'Abd at Shahid at Yäsiri, at Butula fi thawrat at tAshrin, (Najaf, 1966), 
pp. 112-115,. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Al 8assani, 'op. cit., p. 42. 
4. Memorandum, Self-Determination in Mesopotamia, P. cit., p. 7. 
5. Ibid., p. 3. Italics mine. 
6 Ibid., p. 3. 
7. one should not commit 
the 'opposite' mistake of underestimating the influence 
of the Mujtahids. 
Had al Yazdi come to the support of the-Opposition, the 
British would be 
in a very embarrassing situation indeed. 
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The leaders of Najaf and Shämiyah continued their'efforts to sign a 
petition expressing their wish for an independent Iraq. They held another 
meeting at the house of Sayid Nur al Yäsiri, a distinguished Sayid from Shamiyah, 
to, materialise their intentions. The meeting was broken up by the police and 
the participants had to take refuge amongst their own tribes. Two days later 
they were invited by the Political Officer of Kufah, who tried to persuade 
them to endorse a petition. favourable to the Administration. They refused; 
and instead they signed a declaration demanding a unified Iraq with an Arab 
Government, headed by a'son of the Sharif and restricted by a legislative 
assembly. 
l 
i Nevertheless, the British did not accept a total defeat in, such an im- 
portant centre. . The 
Political Officer contacted some 'moderate' elements, 
including al Yazdi and al Nailb, encouraging them to submit 'favourabie' 
petitions. Thus, the 
Political Officer was able to obtain fourteen declar- 
ations which were officially recognised. 
Nine of these petitions were each 
signed by one person only, and another 
was signed by three persons only. The 
following points emerge from a consideration of these petitions: 
2 
(a), all the Signatories were of a 
limited status, politically or religiously; 
(b) while the British were bitterly complaining about the 
'Persian' Mujtahids 
agitating against 
them3 one finds a large number of the people asked by 
the political Officer to submit their views were either 
'Persians' or 
Indian subjects of the British Government. 
(c) in spite of that, the results obtained were definitely not favourable 
to the British. 
4 
The petition, which-was signed by twenty-one persons, ignored the idea 
of British tutelage and 
demanded an Arab Amir who was not identified, but 
.. al 
Fir'on, op. cit., pp. 82-84; al Hassani, op. cit., pp. 42-43. 
_lf-Determinati2on 
in Iraq., op. cit., No. 7(2-13), pp. 15-16, the four 
remaining petitions; two of them were signed 
by twenty-one each and the 
other two by thirty-six and 
ten respectively. 
3. Memo. Self-Determination 
in Mesopotamia, op. cit., p. 3. 
q. Five of the ten petitions 
evaded the questions at stake, claiming either 
ignorance or religious 
devotion. Those who supported the British were: 
Sayid Hishim al 
Hindi, Mahmud Agha Sheikh 'Ali, Sheikh Muhammad Rio! Kashif 
al Ghatä' and 
Sayid Ja'far Bahr al 'Ulum Tabtýabä'i. 
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it was stated that he should be Muhammadan. 
l 
The declaration signed by thirty- 
six notables, merchants and Mosque's servants was openly for the continuation 
of the British Administration and asked to postpone the appointment of an amir. 
2 
This was followed by a petition signed by al Naqib and twenty-one merchants 
3 
and notables of Najaf, which ran on the same lines as the pre reeding one. On 
the'28th December, a declaration came from Shamiyah, bearing ten signatures of 
sheikhs demanding an independent Iraq with an Arab Amir of the Sharif's family. 
4 
In Karbala', the British met their first total defeat. Major Tyler, the 
Political officer, called some notables and merchants for a gathering at which 
he submitted the three questions of the Referendum, asking them for their views. 
Sayid 'Abd al"Wahab argued that the Committee did not adequately represent 
Karbdla'j furthermore, . ample time was needed to reach a responsible-. con- 
clusion. Major Tyler agreed 
to postpone the meeting for another three days. 
5 
Subsequent events proved that this decision was a major mistake on his part. 
The supporters of independence rushed to al 
Shirazi, whose anti-British opinions 
were very well known 
to them, and asked him to express, in writing, his views 
concerning the question. 
Al Shirazi, a great Shi'i Mujtahid, and second only 
to al Yazdi, did not hestiate to 
issue a Fetwa in which it was stated: 
, No Moslem is allowed to elect or choose a non-Moslem to rule 
'6 over Moslems. 
y ,: - The outcome 
of this Fetwa was far reaching. In Karbala, those who were 
Supporting the British were reluctant 
to defy al Shiräzi's religious order. 
Thuss"not a" single petition was signed in Karbalä' in support of the British, 
. the-, only declaration 
issued in Karbala' was in accord and harmony with the 
1. Self-Determination in 
Iraq, op. cit., No. 7(10), p. 14. 
2. Ibid., No. 7(9), P-15- 
3. Ibid., No. 7(10). 
4. Ibid., No. 7(14), p. 16. 
In spite of the results being rather 'unsatisfactory', 
it"wasadmitted by the P. O. that a direct and official pressure was exerted 
by'the authorities to obtain the desired results. C. O. 961/2/Administration 
Reports. Shamiyah, 1919, p. 1. 
5. A. R. Massani, op. 
'cit., p. 34. 
6. FIM, al Fir'on, op. cit., p. 
80. A Xeroxed copy Of the Fetwa. 
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aims of the independence movement. 
1 
While the supporters of the British, 
according to Miss Bell, 'hesitated, in face of this pronouncement /the Fetwa/ 
to express their views in writing while verbally assuring the /A. P. O_/ of 
their adherence to ourselves'. 
2 
However, the- authorities, annoyed with the 
content of Karbala' petition, refused to enrol it in the official publication 
of the results of the Referendum. 
3 
On the other hand, al Shirazi's pronouncement did, undoubtedly, give a 
driving force to the nationalist cause in the whole of Iraq. The nationalists 
copied his Fetwa in tens and distributed it all over the country. 
4 
The rel- 
ations between al Shirazi and the nationalists went back to an earlier period, 
in fact his departure from Samara' and settlement in Karbala', was part of 
5 
the al Shirazi-nationalist plan. But his new step had strengthened the 
nationalists by providing them with a religious backing and thus had enhanced 
the co-ordination between al Shiräzi and the nationalists. 
In the third Shi'i holy centre, Kaimain, the British were to confront 
I 
another serious challenge. Kadimain was particularly influenced by two centres: 
firstly by Najaf and Karbala', because it shared with them the Shi'i faith; 
and secondly by Baghdad because of its contiguity to it. Baghdad, at this 
11 
time, was the arena of the nationalists activists. Taking also into account 
the attitude of the Mujtahids of Najaf and the Fetwa of al Shirazi, there can 
be no surprise at the hostile outcome of the Referendum in Kadimain. But, 
what is striking was the behaviour of certain leading clerics. Sayid Ismä'il 
al ýadr, öne of the most influential Mujtahids in the Shi'i world, and his 
relative Sayid Vassan al $adr, were among the very few Shi'ah 'Ulema' who 
'Abd al Razag al Wahb, Tarikh Kerbela', ($aghdad, 1935), P. 51. Xeroxed 
copy of the petition. The petition after quoting the Anglo-French declar- 
ation went on to 
demand an Independent Iraq, with an Arab Government and 
stated that the signatories 
had chosen one, the Sharif's son, to be their 
king,, restricted by an elected legislative assembly. 
2. Memo. Self-Determination in Mesopotamia, op. cit., p. 3. 
3. C. 0.691/2/Administration Reports. Shamiyah, 1919, p. 30. 
A. R. al, {iassani, op, cit., p. 35. 
5. Sheikh*Mutiammad al 
Khali2i, Batal al Islam, Biography of his father. 
(Kalimain, 1939) (unpublished manuscript) p. 114. 
0 
- 304 - 
declined to endorse the Jjhad Fetwa against the British in the early days of 
the war. By the time of the Plebiscite a complete change occurred in their 
positions. They moved to the forefront of the opposition to the British 
Administration. 
1 
Such a change of attitude shows the ever mounting pressure 
of .. feelings hostile to the Administration. Furthermore, it brings to the 
surface the deteriorating relations between the Shi'ah Mujtahids and the British 
Authorities. The influential men who led the anti-British campaign in Kadimain 
were Sayid Muhammad Mahdi, the son of Hassan al Sadr, and Muhammad ibn Mahdi 
2 
al Khalisi. The latter, through his political career did not try. to hide his 
strong Islamic beliefs which made his opposed to British occupation and 
a supporter, although a Shi! i, of the Islamic State of the Ottomans. 
3 
The hostile onslaught against the British was intensified to such*a scale 
that 'the `'"Ulema'-threatened with excommunication and exclusion from the Mosque 
anyone who voted for British control'. 
4 
The product of such an atmosphere was 
a declaration signed by one hundred and 
forty three persons, in which they 
affirmed: ' 
w, 
. 
being the local Arab Iragination, choose a new Arab Moslem 
Government to be ruled by a Muhammadan king, one of the sons of our 
Lord, the Sharif bound by local Majlis (assembly)'. 
5 
The pro-British faction organised a counter-petition requesting the 
continuance of the British 
Administration, the return of Cox, and declaring 
the impracticability of an Arab Amir. The petition was signed by twenty-five 
persons. 
6 These included some notables, merchants, local sheikhs and British 
Indian subjects. The attempt was led, by the head of the municipality who was 
also the principal 
'merchant of the town. 
7 
1. Memo. Self-Determination in Mesopotamia, OP. cit., p. 4. 
2. : Ibid. 
30 al Imam al Sheikh Muhammad al Khalisi, Kitäb ßi Sat; 
-il Allah, undated 
memoirs (unpublished manuscripts), p. 7. 
4. F. 0'. 882/23/MES/19/7. Telegram No. 1077, dated 25th January 1919. From 
, political Baghdad 
to S. of S. for India, London. 
5. e1ß-Determination in Iraq, op. cit., No. 13(8), p. 25. 
g, Ibid., No. 13(9), p. 
25. 
7. rF. 
0.882/23/MES/19/7. Telegram No. 1077. Cited above. 
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(d) The Referendum in Baghdad: The Civil Commissioner was aware that Baghdad 
was of vital importance to the Referendum, because of the following factors: 
being the capital, the centre of political activities, the largest populated 
town in Iraq, and the place of residence of the most influential men. '' Wilson 
was also aware of the strong nationalist tendencies among the Baghdadi influen- 
tial men. So', - 
he ; planned to have Baghdad as the last and final place in which 
to hold the Referendum, apparently on the assumption that the 'satisfactory' 
results -coming from other. parts of -the country would positively -influence the 
opinion of the Baghdadi notables. 
' 
The Civil Commissioner wrote to the Nagib of Baghdad, the Shi*i Qädi 
(Sheikh Shukr Allah), the grand Rabbi and to the heads of the Christian 
communities, asking them to nominate twenty-five Sunni, twenty-five Shi'i, 
twenty Jews and ten Christian delegates respectively. 
2 This, on Wilson*s part, 
seems to be a calculated step to obtain 
favourable results from Baghdad. Wilson 
was quite confident of Jewish and Christian support. The Shiti 
ädi owed his 
position to the British 
Administration; his post was previously unrecognised 
3 
by the Turks. Wilson, being familiar with the Nagib's opinions, "hoped that 
the-Sunnah delegates being chosen by the Nagib would be up to his expectations. 
The views of the Nagib deserve more attention, because of his strong in- 
fluence and due to the fact that he was to become the first Prime Minister of 
Iraq: 
'He /ai. Na9ib7 is entirely opposed to an Arab Government ... 
considers that discussion of Arab independence is unworthy of 
attention ... wishes the 
inclusion of Mosul in the Mesopotamia 
Administration. He is of the opinion that a local man could 
never be head of the Iraq State, though after a 
long period of 
time an Arab might be appointed as such. He rejects the idea 
1. Ibid. The C. C. stated in this telegram 'Each delegate /from Baghdad? was 
provided with a, statement showing 
the opinions elicited up to date from 
other parts of Mesopotamia'. 
2. Ibid. Baghdad population 
in July 1917 was some'210,200, of whom 109,400 
were Arab Moslems 
(Shi'ah and Sunna), 80,000 Jews and 12,000 Christians', 
8.000 were Kurds and 800 Persians. 
F. O. 882/26/Arab Bureau Bulletin No. 66,21st October 1917. 
3. Me-Mo. Self-Determination 
in Mesopotamia, op. cit., p. 4. Miss Bell described 
the Shi'i gad is a weak and colourless individual, whose self-effacing 
piety is his best recommendation'. 
4 
t 
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to: the appointment of a son of the Sharif now or in the future'. 
' 
w 
The Nagib wanted to see, a strong British Administration to rule Iraq, 
'backed by. an army. of. occupation of not unier forty thousand'. 
2 It is wdrth 
observing that-! in common with most, if not all, of the older notables of the 
town, he /äl Nagib% has a great fear of the revival of Arab Political Societies, 
run on the lines'of the. 'Union and Progress' organisation; the prospect of 
3 
which is almost a nightmare-to them'. Moreover, another attitude of al Nagib 
reflected a deep feeling, certainly shared by others, of political impotence 
and alienation: 
*Khatun, /Madam% your nation is great, wealthy and powerful: 
where is 
our pöwer? If I say that I wish for the rule of the 
English and the English do not consent to rule us, how can I 
force them? And, if r wish for the rule of another and the 
English resolve to remain, how can I eject them? I recognise 
your victory. You are the governor and I am the governed. 
And when I am asked what is my opinion as to the continuance 4 
of British rule, I reply that I am the subject of the victor*. 
The NagTb, who did not approve the whole idea of the Referendum 
5 
was 
consistent with himself 
by declining to act, although he agreed on his sub- 
stitution by the Qädi of the 
Sunna, Häji 'Ali Allusi. 
6 
The Sunni Qädi, acc- 
ording to Miss Bell, was very much under 
the influence of two anti-British 
brothers. 
7 One was 'Abd al W ahäb al Nä'1b, Judge of the Peace Court under 
8 
British Administrations and the other was 
Sheikh Sa*id Naqashbandi, the leader 
of the Baghdad branch of 
the underground, al 'Ahd (Covenant) Party'-9 Apart from' 
1, F. O. 882/23/MES/19/7. Telegram No. 
11669, dated 29th December 1918. From 
political Baghdad to Retanandum, London. These ideas were expressed in 
an interview with G. Bell. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid. 
4. A. T. Wilson, op. cit., Appendix III, Annex I, p. 
338. Nagib"s views were 
expressed in a second 
interview with Miss Bell, dated 6th February 1919. 
5. Ibid., p. 339. 
6. Memo. Sei etermination in Mesopotamia, op. cit., pp. 4-5. Miss Bell 
described the Sunni Qadi as an exceedingly devout Moslem, who has been on 
terms of intimacy and 
friendship with British Officials since the occupation. 
But his character is not sufficiently strong to resist an appeal to his 
religious sentiments.. 
7. Ibid. 
8. Ibid., p. 5. al 
Nä'ib was described by Miss Bell, 'His duties as judge of 
the Peace Court, he has performed 
to. universal satisfaction*. 
9. Al Basir, 221_cit"' Pp"151-152. 
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these two brothers, the anti-British agitation, among the Sunnah was led by men 
who, according to Miss Bell, were: *Under 30, two of them /damdi Bäjahji1 and 
Saldun Shäwi7 being. members of good families. While the rest were of no position 
2 
social or economic'. As among the Baghdadi Shi"ah, it seems the most prominent 
figure in the anti-British movement was, Sayid Ja'far abu al. Timmän. Although a 
small merchant, he enjoyed a considerable prestige among the Shi*ah, otherwise 
he would not have represented-them in the Municipal and Educational Committees 
of Baghdad. 
3 
However, the two Qädi, instead of selecting the representatives as they 
had been asked to do, called for meetings of their communities for the purpose 
of election. In both meetings,, the nationalists had the upper hand and domin- 
ated the gatherings. The meetings were ended by the selection of twenty-five 
representatives for each sect on the con4ition that they should be bound by the 
will of the general meeting to demand an Arab Government, free from any European 
protection., 
4 
.,. 
The Sunni meeting was held at the Legal Court of Baghdad on the 17th 
January 1919.. A petition was signed by the great majority, stating, that they 
had mandated their Qädi to select,: their representatives on the clear understand- 
ing that those delegates were bound by, the principles decided by the gathering. 
These principles were: 
'First, Iraq, from, North of Mosul to the Persian Gulf is fully 
competent of ruling itself. 
Second, the Iraqi call for a purely Arab Government. 
Third, the greatest defender and Mujähid for Arab dignity is the 
Sharif. Thus it should be one of his sons, and not anyone else, 
to1be Amir of Iraq, bound by a national legislative assembly like 
all other civilised governments'. 
5 
It seems that the decisions of the Conference did not meet the full 
approval of all who attended 
it. Musa Jalabi Bäjahji left the meeting in a 
1. Hamdi Bäjahji was at that time a Lecturer of Economics and International 
Relations at the Law College of Baghdad. 
2. Memo. Self__Determination in Mesopotamia, op. cit., p. 5. 
3. Ibid. 
4. F. O. 882/23/MES/19/7. Telegram No. 1077, op. cit. 
5, al Hassani, ýp_ cit., p. 
39. 
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protesting manner. 'Seven out of the twenty-five Sunni delegates resigned and 
five new-names were added-to the Sunni list. In the Shi'ah conference, a 
similar decision 'was reached. The only one who refused to accept the majority 
decision was Häji al Mu11ä-Rid7a. 
1 
Two points' concerning the pro-British faction are noteworthy, namely 
-their social composition and 'the political action which was supposed'to express 
their views. Musa Jalabi Bäjahji was 'head of one of the principal` families 
and largest landowners of the town*. 
2 He also, theld high official positions 
. under, the 
Turks, but resigned after the Constitution. Hates and fears the 
C. U. P. *3- Four of those who resigned from the Sunni list because of their pro- 
British tendencies were of the Nagib Zädah and Jam-il Zädah. These two families 
were 'in wealth and position the second to none in'Baghdadt, 
4 
and 'very wealthy 
landownezs'. 
5 The seven who withdrew from the Sunni list 'represent a very 
large proportion of the property owned by the fifty'delegates'. 
6 
The one Shi'i 
who withdrew his support, Häji at Mull! Ridäp was also 'a well known landownert. 
Two . petitions' 
were signed in Baghdad by some Sunnis to express support for the 
British Administration, 'and opposition to the nationalists. The first petition 
ten individuals and the second by seven 
8 
was signed by ,Y persons. Five of those 
signatories were working 
for the Administration itself, either in'the Wagif or 
the Education Department, another five of them were amongst the biggest merchants 
in. Baghdad, and three were very wealthy landowners. 
9 
The other interesting phenomenon concerning the pro-British elements in 
Baghdad, was the methods in which they expressed (or did not express) their 
views. The Nagib, 
in spite of his strong influence and profound beliefs, was 
1. Memo. Self-Determination in Mesopotamia, op. cit., p. S. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid., Appendix D., No. 5, p. 50. - 
4. Ibid., p. 5., 
5. Ibid., Appendix D-, No. 1, p. 50. 
6. - p. 0.882/23/MES/19/7. Telegram No. 1077, op. cit. 
7. Memo. Self-Determination 
in Mesopotamia, oft., p. 5. 
g. Self-D°te'rmination in Iraq, p. cit.. No. 13(1 and 3), p. 23. 
9. Memo. Seif-Determination 
in Mesopotamia, op. cit., pp. 49-50. 
14 -- 
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very reluctant"to'make such beliefs public. The two of al Na9ib's relatives' 
who withdrew"from the Sunni list did not offer any explanation for their- 
resignation -Mullä Ridä told the British Military' Governor that 'he'could"not 
face'the religious obloquy which would have resulted from open protest and that 
he had determined to drop out and offer no explanationt. 
I 
The Civil Commissioner 
telegraphed the'India Office 'Most of them /the seven) want British rule'pure 
and simple: ... but were not prepared to face the religious obloquy involved 
in a public declaration of'their wishes'. 
2 It is interesting to find that some 
of those who signed the nationalist declaration were, in private, deeply 'against 
it: ""'Some of them visited the Military Governor and explained their attitude as 
3 
a' result of political pressure. What is important here is the clear emergence 
of what seems to be an embryonic"form'of"0dual authority'. What we find id'a 
group of people, fully supported by 
the military administration, yet unable to 
express its oivn ideas freely because of the'effective political (perhaps religious) 
pressure of the opposition, while the opposition who did not control any of the 
machinery of-the state was, nevertheless, able to suppress and intimidate any 
open" support- for the' established authority. 
After the preliminary meetings in which the delegates were chosen, a 
general gathering was held on the 22nd January 
1919, and was attended by seventy 
, seven 
persons representing the Moslems, Shi*ah, and Sunnah, the Jews and the 
Christians. The Moslem delegates agreed unanimously on the following petition: 
*... We, 'being of the Musulman Arab nation and representing the 
Musulmans of the Shi'ah and Sunni communities inhabiting Baghdad 
and its suburbs, resolve that the Country extending from northern 
Mosul as far as the Persian Gulf become one Arab State, headed 
by a Muhammadan king, one of the sons of our Sharif Husain, bound 
by a local"Legislative Council sitting at Baghdad, the Capital of 
Iraq'. 4 R 
This. petition'was signed by forty-seven persons, twenty-four of whom were Shin 
and twenty-three 
Sunnis. ' It is interesting to notice haw radically they differed 
in their social class'from that of the pro-British elements. Most of them were 
1. Ibid., P. S. 
2. F. 0.882/23/MBS/19/7. Telegram No. 1077, op. cit. 
3. Memo. Seif-Determination 
in Mesopotamia, o 
'cit., p. 
g. 
49, Seif Determination in Iraq, 2p. cit., No. 13(3), p. 23. 
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small merchants, small landowners, teachers, ex-servicemen, artisans and some, 
Mosque keepers. 
1 
} 
The pro-British section signed two counter-petitions. The first carried 
the signatures of eight Sunnis, in which they demanded an Arab Government, but 
to be controlled by Sir Percy Cox. In harmony with their interests, they asked 
for 'complete liberty in internal and financial affairs'. 
2 
The other petition 
was signed by eleven. and asked for British rule., or alternatively to be con- 
3 
sidered as British subjects. While the nationalist declaration was signed by 
people directly elected by their communities and their declaration was publicly 
distributed, the signatories of the other petitions did not. enjoy a represent- 
ative'character, neither were they able to openly publicize their views., 
The only defeat which the nationalists were to suffer in Baghdad was the 
one they faced at the hands of the minorities. Although the nationalists tried 
to approach and win them over, it seems these attempts were doomed to failure., 
"Abdal W ahäb al. Nil b contacted some Jewish and Christian delegates and tried 
to gain their support by assuring them on their 'representation in a 'proposed 
Council*. This, with a similar move by Hamdi al Bäjahji, were futile and in 
fact raised more suspicions. 'It was clear to us that a complete scheme of 
4 
Moslem Government had been thought out*, so observed a Jewish delegate rather 
anguishedly. The. Jewish and Christian-delegates declined to affix their sig- 
natures to the petition 
drawn up, by the Moslems and they decided to withdraw 
from the. conference after it became clear that it was dominated by the nation- 
alists. 
5 Instead, they presented three petitions. Eighteen Jews declared 
that an Amir for Mesopotamia was *inadmissablet, while a direct British rule 
6 
was Indispens able 
Three Christians, representing the Baghdadi Armenians, 
raised a petition in which 
they openly disclaimed any belonging to Iraq, and" 
yet asked for a 
direct British rule in Iraq to 'conform with your Excellency's 
1. See'Appendix IV 
2. Seif -Determination 
in Iraq, op. cit., No. 13(1), p. 23. 
3, Ibid., No. 13(3), P. 23. 
4. Ibid., No. 13(3), p. 23. 
5 Ibid. 
6@etermination 
in Iraq, 
. 
9P. cit., No. 13(5), p. 24. 
- 311 - 
wishes'. 
1 
Eight representatives of the Christian communities in Baghdad signed 
a petition preferring *a British Governor-General with a British Government in 
2 
direct relation with. that of London'. 
III The Impacts of the Referendum 
On the 27th December, ° 1918, Miss Bett wrote to her father: 
*About Arab rule. In Mesopotamia, they want us and no one else 
... they realise 
that an Arab Amir is impossible, because, 
though they like the idea in theory, in practice they could 
never agree as to the individual*. 
A fortnight later, she wrote again, pointing out the political situation 
created by the Referendum, 'We have been having rather a difficult time here*. 
4 
This change from a confident attitude to ae of serious worry was the best 
manifestation of what the Referendum had generated in the Iraqi political scene. 
On the surface,, the results of the Referendum were a confirmation of 
Wilson's expectations. After all, ten political divisions out of fourteen had 
asked for the continuation of the British Administration 
5 
and some of these 
divisions supported the return of Cox. Some of the areas which expressed a 
desire for an Arab Amir had, at the same time, confessed that a British pro- 
tection was necessary for the time being. On the Mosul question, nearly all 
divisions agreed that it should be part of the proposed state. In spite of 
this Miss Bell did not allow herself to be-misled by such superficial indications. 
She rightly knew that the Referendum marked a turning point in the history of 
Iraq, and that it created a profound conflict between the Administration and 
an 'East who lost his 
head*. One could say in fairness that the Referendum 
had played an outstanding role in the political development of Iraq, and in 
many ways, have paved 
the way for the armed uprising of 1920. 
The lack of tolerance, of differences on the part of the Administration 
had deepened among'the Iraqis a sense of powerlessness which took two forms: 
1. Ibid., No. 13(6), p. 24. 
2. Ibid., No. 13(7), p. 24. 
3. Lady Bell, The Letters of Gertrude Bell, Vol. II, (London, 1927), p. 464. 
4. Ibid., p. 465 
tiPt ±ýý* nation 5. 
in Iraq. 9y. cam,, Basrah, Qurnah', 'Amärah, Kut, Nä§iriyah, 
Sam wah, Hi11ah,. Kirkuk, Khänigin and Mosul. 
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a subjective form; and an objective one. As for the first form, it was made 
clear by the kind of statements given by the Baghdadi Armenians "... to conform 
with yº'iar 1 wcallo1Sy'ß /the c`Lvf I '; rn'ýissiýºni r? Wjpliaý ... " or th*t of Say Id 
Muhamma4 Barakät, a big merchant from Basrah: 'To my mind that you are govern- 
ment and should come to. me, and ask me what kind of Government I want in Iraq 
denotes an extraordinary state of-affairs, it is quite unieard of. What has 
the matter to do with me? '. 
2 
As for the imposed alienation, the conduct of the Referendum cannot fail 
to give us a striking example of this form of deprivation from exercising political 
liberties. The representative declaration of Karbalä' was totally rejected by 
the Administration, and"thus Karbala' was deprived Of any chance of expressing 
its ideas. 
3 
The opinions of the people of Ba' qubah town were absent from 
the official British publication of the results of the Referendum. But, in 
a secret telegram to London, Wilson stated: 
'Townspeople of, Ba'qubah. town, who have, been extensively canvassed 
from Baghdad, ask somewhat diffidently for titular Arab head to 
rule from Mosul to Basrah. Opinion is divided as to who should fill 
the post but a majority appear to favour the son of the Sharif'. 4 
The declaration of the representatives of the Baghdadi Moslems was dismissed 
on the grounds that 
it was unrepresentative of the economically important 
s 
families of Baghdad. Out of 165,000 Arab Moslem inhabitants of Mosul, a pet- 
ition'signed by only twenty persons was considered as a representative attitude 
6 
of all the Arab Moslems 
in the town. Al 'Umart, an Iraqi historian who wit- 
messed the events, said 
that such conduct raised the wrath of Mosul's population 
against the signatories and 
the Administration alike. According to al 'Umarie 
1. Sel f-Determination in Iraq, 2p. cit., No. 13(5), p. 24. 
2. Ibid., p. 3. 
3. Ibid., Karbala' was absent from this official publication. 
4. F: 0.882/23/M0/19/7. Telegram No. 1076, from Political Baghdad to S. of S. 
for India, London, 26th January 1919. 
5. . Memo. Self Determination in Mesopotamia, op. cit. 
6. Self Determination 
in Iraq, op. cit. 
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no one, apart from the twenty, was consulted; this made the people start 
thinking seriously of means and methods to do away with the occupying Admin- 
istratlon. 
l No attempt was made to consult the Kurds, who represent one-fifth 
of-Iraq's population, on their views regarding this vital subject. Further- 
more, the whole of the Dulaim District, 
Including Faluja and Ramädi, was 
completely deprived from expressing its opinion. In Hillah, an uproar and 
discontent was aroused by the Political Officer*s decision to assign only 
Sayid Muhammad al Qazwini to gather signatures for a pro-British petition. Al 
Basirg an able'Iragi historian and an eyewitness, said that a nationalist 
petition,. signed by the head oAc the Municipality and several other important 
people was rejected by the Political"Officer. 
2 
The lack of-tolerance and the absence of flexibility on the part of the 
Civil Commissioner must have led the advocates of independence, in the depths 
of their frustration, to think of 
different methods than the constitutional 
and passive ones to counter 
Wilson's policy. 
The other.. important phenomenon which the Referen3um had revealed was. 
the existence of an embryonic 
form of *dual authority'. If the British Admin- 
istration was able, being the ruling body, to practice indirect and direct 
methods to influence 
the results of the Referendum and force people to express 
certain ideas, the. 
independence movement, with its major components (the Shi'ah 
'Ulemä''and the nationalists), was in its turn well able to practice counter- 
pressures to'impose 
its own will on certain sections of the population. The 
fear felt by the-Pro-Administration sections in making their opinions known, 
make it reasonable 
to assume that the independence movement had commanded 
the minds and hearts of the 
Arab Moslems at least in certain areas, and thus 
made it quite difficult, 
f Or its opponents to voice their genuine opinions. 
There was some other evidence to suggest that the methods used went beyond 
Muhammad, Tähir, Tärikh Mugidirrät at 'Iräq at Siyäsiya, Vol. 3, (Baghdad, 
1925), pp"9-12. 
2, Al Basir, o ", pp. 
69-70. 
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moral pressure, into threats of physical violence by nationalist underground 
1 
organisations. Anyhow, this situation (of dual authority) explains the refusal 
of Basrah's notables to. publically express their pro-British opinions. It also 
explains the motives behind openly signing an anti-British declaration while 
discreetly apologising to the British Governor, as was the case with some* 
Baghdadis. 
The prestige and authority of the Shitah 'U1em3' among their followers 
were by no means less than that of the official authority. Their Fetwas were 
of a decisive nature. The Alliance between the Shi'ah 'Ulem 
' and the nation- 
alists gave mutual strength. 
for both, and helped them in forming a new centre 
of power or. 'illegal' Government, seriously 
threatening the power of the pre- 
wailing authority. 
Furthermore, the cleavage between the anti- and pro-British factions was 
of considerable depth. What made 
the conflict more alarming was the fact that 
it was not chaotic, but polarizing 
into two crystallized sections. A quick 
look at the declaration would reveal that most of the pro-independence'declar- 
ations were almost 
identical in their demands and even their phraseology. 
Similarly, the pro-British declarations were also 
identical in their wishes 
and 'Showed a strong resemblance. 
This apparent polarization, coupled with 
the absence of institutionalized methods of solving 
it, was an open invitation 
for a disruptive conflict. 
Thus, the Referendum not only failed in reflecting the local opinion in 
ar 
its genuine form, but 
it also fed a revolutionary process, which led to the 
events of 1920. 
In brilliant anticipation Miss Bell, as early as the 22nd 
February, 1919, wrote 
*, '.. There can be no question that sooner or later a Nationalist 
party with inflated ambitions, under men like Hamdi Pachahji, and 
Ja*afar abu Timman, must have sprung to life; as a result of 
recent proceedings, /The Referendum) it has come sooner to the birth'. 
2 
1. Majid Kana was tried and sentenced 
to death by a British Military Court be- 
causes it-was claimed, 
he formed a 'terrorist' group, which threatened death 
to anyone who did co-operate with the British 
Authorities. He has hanged 
on the 25th 
September 1920. 
ai *IraNewspaper, 
No. 100, dated 26th September 1920. 
Memo, -Detgrmination 
in Mesopotamia, p. 7. 2. 
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PART FQ U R_ 
CHAPTER XIII 
THE ORIGINS Or' THE NATIONALIST-SHI'I-'TRIBAL ALLIANCE 
1919-1920 
From 1914 up to late 1918, the Iraqi independence movement had undergone 
a period of political . quiescence. 
Up to late 1918 it was argued that {the 
great bulk, of the people of Mesopotamia had been resigned to and content with 
British Administration' and that they 'had thought that only Allah could shift 
the British*. 
1 
However, in July 1920, Wilson wrote that certain conditions 
'have created a state of restlessness in the public mind which words cannot 
dissipatet. 
2 
My purpose in examining the Administration*s policies, the taxation, 
the employment and the land issues, was to clarify the reasons behind the dis- 
content of the Iraqi, intelligentsia and peasantry. It was this resentment which 
provided the nationalists, who became the tension focus, with a wide social 
support. However the nationalists were, essentially, interested in the estab- 
lishment of a national administration rather than in solving the peasants' 
grievances. The nationalists' 
failure in obtaining such an administration 
was the prime motive behind their persistent and successful attempt at a nation- 
alist-Shi'i-tribal alliance. Thus it 
is logical to discuss the problem of the 
national administration before examining the growth of the nationalist movement 
and its alliances.. 
prominent among the factors which nourished the 'state of restlessness in 
Iraq' was the unresolved conflict amongst British decision-makers concerning the 
political future of Iraq. This conflict caused great uncertainty and weakened 
the position of the Civil Commissioner. Its impact on the nationalists was pro- 
found. On the one hand they fett assured that they were acting well within the 
open promises of the 
British Government, and they received ample encouragement 
from the British Press and'Parliament. On the other hand, they were losing 
patience with 
the Civil Commissioner*s reluctance and delays. 
1. B. Thomas, op. cit., pp. 68-9 
2. A. T. Wilson, Private Papers, B. M. No. 52457, Vol. 3, dated 5th July 1920 
.,, 
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When General Maude entered Baghdad . 
(March 1917),, almost his first act was 
to issue a proclamation which fed rosy hopes of an impending Arab State. '... our 
Armies have not come, as Conquerors .. but as Liberators ... the people;...; 
shall flourish,..., under institutions which are in consonance, with their sacred.. 
1 
laws and their, racial ideals... At that time the Iraqi public, were not, aware, 
that 'the British Cabinet,. overriding the advice of, its political officers. on the 
spot /Cox, rWilson, Bell/, insisted on publication 
of a flowery piece of, Syke's 
2 
ebullience'. However, Wilson, had no 
intention whatsoever of implementing. the 
Declaration. 
3" 
I 
The armistice was to put the question of Iraq"s political future into. the 
forefront, of interest. Thus on the occasion of the 'successful conclusions of 
hostilities against the Turkish Armies*, the G. O. C. -in-Chief in Mesopotamia pro- 
claimed measures which did not-go 
beyond generalities of 'relaxation of restriction 
on personal. freedom ..., conveyance of corpses 
for burial at Karbala and Najaf ... 
4 
release of soar. prisoners-... 
food to the poor ... *. The proclamation absolutely 
failed to touch on questions related to, the,, political future of Iraq. 
Moreover, a few days later, theAnglo-French, Declaration was made public. 
Apart from its own importance, Elizabeth Monroe pointed to the, significance of its 
timing: 'of quite another kind is the promise, given by a. victor at, the moment 
of its victory; 
for he should be in a position to keep his word*. 
5, 
This Deciar- 
ation came, as a complete, contrastto 
the actual policies of the British, in Iraq. 
*We had promised seif-governing institution, and not only made no step toward 
that but were busily setting up something entirely 
different*. 
The Problem of an Arab Administration:: This obvious contrast could be clarified 
once it is related 
to its real origin as"a conflict between the British policy- 
makers and their 
'man on the spot'. My purpose here is not to present a full 
1. Compilation of Proclamations, Notices, etc. Relating to Mesopotamia. October 
31st 1914, to August 31st 1919 (Baghdad, 1919), dated 19th March 1917 
2. E. Monroe, Britain's ..., op. cit., PP-41-2 
3. A. T. Wilson, Mesopotamia, 
1914-1917, Loyalties, (Oxford, 1930), p. 240 
4. Com ilation ... o= 
t_, dated 2nd November 1918 
S. B. Monroe, Philby of 
Arabia, (London, 1973), p. 96. (November 7th 1918) 
6. Lady Bei' (ed)-, op. Cites, 
Vol. 2, p. 502, dated'10th October 1920 
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exposition of this conflict. The discussion will be confined to topics which 
had actually affected the independence movement. 
Ivis clear that Wilson had bluntly refused to implement the policies decided 
by his own superiors. In 1920 Wilson wrote that since November 1918 the policies 
of the Foreign Office-'did not-, lead to anything but disaster'. 
1 
He believed that 
the 'considerable influence' of Young was being used 'almost entirely in a sense 
hostile to the existing Mesopotamian Administration'. A few days before the 
2 
rising, Wilson admitted that he ! cannot-. honestly continue to act much longer here 
as-the representative of A M. G. 
7t. 3 
The conflict was centred round the question of the future Administration in 
Iraq. In March 1920, Wilson wrote to, Hirtzel: 
"I do not wish to appear tobe leaving a sinking ship ... I am 
prepared to ... endeavour to devise something constructive to meet 
present, exigenciesý probably on the lines of Central Legislative 
Council with /H. G. as President with native members in charge of 
Departments with British Secretaries*. 4 
Such a line was no longer acceptable, Hirtzel confirmed to Wilson 'As I 
have told you all along /H. M. G_7 are irrevocably committed to an Arab Government 
and intends that it shall be a reality and not a sham'. 
5 Wilson, who did not 
agree, felt in a position to write back *it has been maintained all along /by 
Cox and himself%xthatsit-is-not within the power of /H. M. G. % to give early effect 
to their published intentions'. 
6 
In March 1920, Churchill- referring to Iraq - 
made public the -developed and 
important theory ofthe strategic use of, the air 
force. 
7 Furthermore, Churchill pointed out that 'Other methods (rather than 
military) would have to 
be-devised if we were to continue to keep Mesopotamiat. $ 
-instead of grasping 
the importance of the pronouncement, Wilson considered it as 
'likely to have worst effect. It is bound to be: used extensively. for propaganda 
1. A. T. Wilson, -Private Papers, B. M. No. 52455, _Vol. 
1, to S. of S. for I. O. 
No. 9180,29th July 1920 
2. Ibid., to P. Cox, 2nd January, 1920, Private letter 
3-. Ibid., to Montagu,, 3rd June 1920, Private letter 
4. Ibid., No. 52456, Vol. 2, to A. Hirtzel No. 3517A, 19th March 1920 
5. Ibid., No. 52455, Vol. 
1,7th April 1920, Private letter 
6. Ib, No. 52456, Vol. 2, to Hirtzel, 10th April 1920, No. 4386' 
7. The essence of this theory was to hold Mesopotamia through air rather than by 
military force. 
This concept was adopted by the Cairo Conference (March 1921). 
'Air. 5/829, pp. 5,37 and 
Appendix 13 
8. A. T. Wilson, 
Private Papers, B. M. No. 52455, Vol. 1, copy deleted from 
Reuters, 26th march 
1920 
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1 
purpose*. 
This encounter took its real dimension when Wilson wrote: 
* there is a tendency on occasions with the Home Government 
to. interfere wholly unjustifiably in local matters ... I need 
hardly say that I have not accepted their orders, but we should 
not be put in that positions. 
In fact Wilson took the liberty of altering pronouncements which he was instructed 
by 'London' to announce. In this respect it is instructive to compare the actual 
announcement issued in Iraq on the 20th June with that authorised by the India 
Office in their telegram of the 7th June as modified by their telegram of the 18th 
June; the India Office Announcement originaily read: 
*/H. M. G. 7 ... anticipate 
that the mandate will ... require them 
tö formulate within a fixed period, which will probably not 
exceed two years, an organic law, to be framed in consultation 
itith the native authorities ... 
/H. M. G. 7, having regard to 
expressed wishes of the people or Mesopotamia for return of Sir 
p. Cox have decided to entrust to him ... to call into being 
(1) a predominantly Arab Council of State under an Arab Pres- 
ident, and (2) a general Assembly representative of the peoples 
of Mesopotamia as a whole, and 
it will be his duty to prepare, 
in consultation with these provisional bodies, a permanent 
organic law'. 
The actual announcement published in Iraq avoided all mention of the. underlined 
phrases. In a telegram dated 
9th June 1920, the Civil Commissioner argued: 'We 
must be prepared, regardless oflLeague of 
Nations, to go very slowly with con- 
4 
stitutional or democratic 
institutions*. Such aconviction clearly manifested 
itself in regard to the issue of the suggested Municipal and Divisonal Councils. 
As a result of an Inter-Departmental Committee meeting which was held on 
the 17th April 1919, at which the Civil Contnissioner was present, it was decided 
that he should be authorized to take steps towards the creation of five provinces 
for Iraq. 
The provisional formation of provincial Councils and the development 
. councils were 
approved. These steps were regarded by the conference 
as necessary measures towards the development of a constitution in 
Mesopotamia. Formal auttority was conveyed by an India Office telegram 
of the 9th May 
/19197*. 
1. Ibid. to 1.0.27th March 1920 
2. Ibid. Private letter to Cox, 2nd January 1920. Italics mine 
3. F . O. 
371/5228. Foreign Office, 29th July 1920. Including the two announcements. 
Italics mine. '° 
4. F. 0.371/5227. C. C. Baghdad to 1.0. No. 6948, dated 9th June 1920 
S. F. O. 371/5228/E. 9020. 
A summary of correspondence in regard'to the Political 
situation 
in Mesopotamia (by Major Young). 
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However, on the 29th October 1919, Wilson wrote that: 
*... a Divisional Council at Basrah had been in full swing 
... Provincial 
/Municipal? Councils had not yet been formed 
nor did he contemplate moving in the matter that year'. 
' 
Furthermore it should be observed that the Divisional Councils which existed 
only in Basrah, 'Amärah, Kirkuk and Diwäniyah2 were aimed 
'to secure the full benefit of co-operation by tribal leaders and 
large landowners in the administration of these territories ... 
They /the Councils? will consist of not more than 12 members all 
of, whöm will, for the present, be nominated by the Divisional 
Political Officers'. 3 
Furthermore 'they will however at first be purely advisory'. 
4 
It is not 
surprising that: 
'The inception of those councils aroused but little interest among 
the masses, and the politically minded elite took no part in their 
deliberations. They did not like the system of nomination, though 
it was worked with complete impartiality*. 
5 
However, a leader in the Basrah Times gave a different view: 'The Council could 
hardly be expected to take quite an impartial view of some of the subjects that 
have come under discussion ... as every member 
is a landlord#. 
6 
Thus, in W ilson"s 
own words, an Arab state 
though not on the lines desired by /H. M. G. % may yet 
come, but it will 
be by revolution and not by evolution'. 
7 
As a result of the Armistice many of the politically exiled, the ex-officials 
and ex-officers had returned 
to Iraq. They had hoped for the fulfiifinent of 
British promises but Wilson*s policies drove them into acute opposition to the 
Administration. The British intelligence asserted that 'There is little doubt 
that ex Turkish officials are 
fanning the sparks of unrest and excitement and look 
forward to open demonstration if not actual open revolt in the near futuret. 
8 
1. Ibid. E. 148636 
2. Wilson admitted that 'no steps have been taken at hair, Baghdad, Hillah, 
Najaf, Kut, Nasiriyah, Ramadi, Samarra, Bakubah, Khanikin ... nor do I 
contemplate moving 
in the matter this year'. F. 0.371/4152/14836 
3. A. T. Wilson, Clash...., op. cit., p. 211 
4. Ibid. 
5. Ibid. 
6. The Basrah Times, 
10th January 1920 
7. B. C. Busch, Britain, _India 
and the Arabs 1914-1921, (London, 1971), p. 412 
S. F. 0.371/5074. 
Mesopotamian Police, Abstracts of Intelligence, No. 14, dated 
3rd April 1920, 
Para. 225 
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Percy Cox visited Iraq just before the outbreak of violence. He admitted 
that the situation was 'undoubtedly very difficult*. The immediate urgency was 
to keep it under control, to avert for the next three or four months any systematic 
outbreak and, at the same time, to take such action as would bring the moderates 
into the open on our side. 'This object*, Cox argued, 'could only be achieved 
by giving some material for discussion and proof of our bona fides ... it might 
be necessary to allow a deputation to proceed to London in order to gain time'. 
1 
It was under such circumstances that the India Office had authorized the 
Civil Commissioner to announce the previously-mentioned proclamation. However, 
such a step was too late. Three days earlier Wilson 
had informed the India Office 
that he had learnt that the nationalists will 'propose in future negotiation with 
me to insist on the liberty of people to select Mandatory Power'. 
2 In fact, and 
at an earlier date, Wilson made clear 
his conviction that there were no more 
bridges between his Administration and the Iraqi nationalists. 
3 
The Iraqi nation- 
alists-had, since April 1920, rejected 
the Mandate. 4 The Hijazi delegation to 
the Peace Conference submitted a memorandum which pointed out that the Mandates 
were allotted without taking 
into consideration the wishes of the population 
'whose aspirations were proclaimed by the. Damascus Congress'5 of March 1920, 
Thus it is clear that the announcement even in its tIndianO form was hardly 
acceptable to the Iraqi nationalists. 
In fact even the final form of the India 
Office was not considered acceptable. by members of the Foreign Office: 
Me only fresh points in the announcement authorized by the 
India office are: 
(1) the reference to the Organic Law which really adJs nothing, 6 
(2) the description ofthe Council of State as predominantly Arab... 
Sir A. J. Tilley agreed with 
Young's remarks and added that 'Cox while at Baghdad 
might let 
it be known that we should not be at all averse for a sharifian Emir'.? 
1. F. O. 371/5227/E. 7253. 'Summary of Correspondence regarding_political 
situation in Mesopotamia'. 
2. Ibid., E. 6800, From C. C. Baghdad, No. 
7199, dated 15th June 1920 
3. F. 0.371/5227/E. 
6060. From C. C. Baghdad No. 6584, dated 3rd June 1920 
4,. Infra. 
5.8.0.371/5035. From 
Vansittart, Paris, Dated 3rd May 1920 
6. F. 0.371/5227/E. 
6509, dated 16th June 1920 
7. Ib`. 
- 321 - 
Furthermore,, Wilson, Simultaneously,, issued another-announcement in which 
he asserted that there will be no withdrawal of British troops, and that in case 
of necessity, he would not hestitate to call upon the military authorities to 
give full support to, the Sovereign Power. 
1 
In his second°declaration, Wilson 
did not even consult-, his, -higher Authorities. 
2 
It'goes without saying that such 
'non-conciliatory' announcements were neither able to gain-a positive response 
from the nationalists-, nor=capable of encouraging the moderates to 'come to the 
open' and confront the nationalists' 'reign of terror'. 
The Civil Commissioner explained to-the India, Office, the purpose-behind. his 
suggested omissions: 
! To refer questions afresh to divisional councils and to 'local 
opinions can have but one result. The extremists who ... are 
demanding, absolute. independence ... will by threats and bytappeais 
... win over moderate men who 
have hitherto looked to /H. M. G. 7 
for a schemesoffering a-reasonable chance of success and which 
they can support'. 
3 
Major Young commented:, 
'These /extr emists9 appeals will be all the more difficult to, 
resist If the extremists can point to the fact that /N. M. G. 7 
have imposed upon the country a constitution which is pre- 
dominantly British. I am convinced-that the constitution should 
be purely Arab 9.4 
Nevertheless Wilson published the, Announcement 'the way he liked it', 
Major Young wrote: 
'I have little doubt that it is the words "predominantly Arab" 
to which Colonel Wilson objects. He would prefer a British 5 
majority on the Council of State*. 
The second suggestion ofrCox was to allow an Iraqi delegation to proceed to 
England. Had the right delegation been allowed, it might have eased the very 
tense confrontation which was snowballing. Suwaidi and al Sadr were hoping to 
tgo to London, there they proposed to lay their case to /N. M. G. 7.. 
6 
Such an idea 
came from Yusif*s son 
Niji who in early 1920 wrote to his father (the letter was 
a1 *Ira , No. 
17,21st June 1920 
2. F. O. 371/5227/E. 7459 
3. p. O. 371/5226/E. 4789. From C. C. Baghdad to I. O. No. 5559, dated 8th May 1920 
4. Ibid... 
5. F. o. 371/5227/E. 6509, dated 16th June 1920 
6. I. o. 371/6349/2172. 
Mesopotamia Intelligence Report, No. 3, dated 15th December 
1920 
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intercepted by. -the British) suggesting the formation, of a delegation to, proceed 
to London. 
Nevertheless; such an attempt-did not materialize. In an inter-departmental 
meeting, Hirtzel asserted-that 'Wilson strongly. objected to the idea of further 
2 
consultations with-. the people of-the country'. In another meeting, Lord Curzon 
revealed Wilson*s suggestion of 'a., deputation of, eight, persons who' Curzon 
indicatively pointed-outý'would, no doubt be carefully selected by himself*. 
_, 
Curzon 
went on to say that 'In an earlier telegram, No. 6791, of the 7th June, He, Jl ilson7 
suggested that no good purpose would be served by his seeing the extremists*. 
Curzon disclosed that these telegrams left him with an 'unpleasant impression' 
3 
of Wilson*s incapacity, to deal with the situation. Young elaborated more on 
the issue and the factors behind the Foreign-Office refusal of the Iraqi delegation; 
'My objection to this proposal is that no deputation from Meso-,. 
potamia nominated by Colonel Wilson would really represent the 
views of the exiled Baghdadis who are the root cause, of all the 
trouble ... The prime movers are the twenty-nine Mesopotamians 
, who met at 
Damascus to proclaim Abdullah king of Mesopotamia. 
It would in my opinion be very much better that these men should 
be invited to Baghdad-to state their case to Sir Percy Cox, than 
a picked " deputation selected by Wilson should proceed to 
England, to repeat the views expressed in the course of the self- 
determination enquiry of last year'. 
4 
This time Mr. Montagu was to admit that he had never held the view that 
Wilson 'with his marked inclination to concentrate power in his own hands could 
fairly be asked to carry out the policy of /H. M. G. 7'. 
5 
Nevertheless Montagu 
pointed out that the 
'possible effect of refusing to allow Wilson to send his 
proposed deputation must not 
be lost sight off. He would even include 'those 
Baghdadis who were not present in Mesopotamia*. 
6 
Curzon argued: 
'Mr. Montagu had ... mentioned the case of Zaghiul, but was there 
any reason to suppose that this was the kind of man Colonel Wilson 
would-send? We wanted the local Zaghlul, not a picked deputation 
of obedient admirerst. 
7 
1. Näji suggested the following Iraqis who were living in Syria to accompany the 
delegation: Nuri al Satid, Taha al Häshimi, Rashid at Khoja, 'Ali Jawdat, 
Fahmi at Mudarris, Jamil Madfa'i, Ra'ouf at Jibaji, Tahsin 'Ali, Ra'ouf al 
Kubaisi and Shäkir al Shaikhly. F. 0.371/5082. 
2. F. 0.371/5225/4811. Minutes of I. D. C. E., 26th May 1920 
3. Ibid., Minutes of I. D. C. E., 27th June 1920, p. 3 
4. F. 0.371/5227/E. 6509 dated 16th June 1920 
-5. F. o. 371/5226/4811. 
Minutes of I. D. C. B., 27th June 1920 
6. Ibid., P"4 
zýibid. -pp.. -)_6 
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11 
The two-trends amongst British policymakers were motivated by different- 
interests and different outlooks. 
' 
It. was extremely difficult to roc; oncilu 
the -practical-, policies necessitated 
by one trend or the other. The unwise delay 
in fully adopting one line or the other was largely responsible-for the outbreak 
of violence. 
2_. Among other things, it was in March 1920. that Wilson anticipated 
'trouble' on the Euphrates during the summer. He=informed his superiors that- 
Shamiyah and Najaf-were 'selected, by the Syrian Party /sic7 as the most promising 
ground-for their propaganda'. 
3 In June, Bell 
4 
abd Cox5 confirmed the seriousness 
of the situation. 
To counteract such circumstances, "only-two alternatives were open: con- 
ciliatory: measures, towards the nationalists, aor the utilization , of force. The... -, 
first line was rejected by Wilson, ! We cannot maintain our position as mandatory 
by a policy of conciliation of extremists'. 
6 
The second line was refused by, 
'London' who considered; that, 'We, could not hold /Mesopotamia) by spending 15 to 
7 
29 millions a year on it*, and was of the opinion that "The whole bent of Wilson's 
mind was wrong and 
/Wilsonts%-presence at the head-of-Administration ... was not 
8 
practicable'. Thus an 
impossible situation was established; a 'non-conciliatory 
Civil Commissioner was allowed to continue his policy of provoking the nationalists 
without being allowed the means and methods of protectin g 
his policy. On the other 
hand, a *conciliatoryt British Government was incapable of displaying its mod- 
eration, because-`its 
'man on-the spots refused>to carry out its 'conciliatory 
Some writers, who had administrative experience in Iraq, attributed the rise 
of the independence movement 
to the conciliatory pronouncement uttered by the 
ailies. 
9 This represents only part of the truth. It should be remembered that 
1. See Chapters VIII and XV 
2. Wilson wrote to his mother 
t/H. M. G. 7 find it convenient to pretend that what 
has happened is not due to any fault of theirs but to me*. A. T. Wilson, 
Letters, in London Library, vol. 2,1903-1921, dated 6.9.20 
3. A. T. Wilson, -Private Papers, B. M. No. 52455, Vol. 1, to 1.0.31st March 1920 
4. Lady Bell (ed), OP. cit., 
Vol. 2, p. 489, June 14th 1920 
5, F. 0.371/5227/E. 7253. From 
C. C. Baghdad, No. 7693,22nd June 1920 
6. A. T. Wilson, Private 
Papers, B. M. No. 52457, Vol. 3, to S. S. 1.0. No. 6948, 
9th June 1920 
7e 
gis, Vol. l. Churchill speech, 26th March 1920 
. 8. F. 0.371/5226/4811. 
Minutes of I. D. C. E. 27th June 1920 (Lord Curzon) 
9. B. Thomas, op it-9 pp. 
68-9; J. Mann, op. cit., p. 292 
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Iraqi nationalists had'as early7as 1912-1914 demanded the *Arabization" of the 
Administration. 
' 
In fact, it was in February 1913 that Tälib of Basrah had 
concluded an agreement with the Turks to that effect. 
2 
However the Baghdadi 
nationalists viewed even-such'an accord with dismay. 
3 
The actual British policy' 
in Iraq (during Wilson*s era) was in fact a negative turnabout: - This enraged 
the nationalists: 'Did we fight to get rid of the Turks . `.. only to replace them 
by the British? ' and urged the intelligentsia, en mass, to, a vigorous support of 
4 
the cause of independence: -a 
The Syrian , model of an independent Arab Government with its promises and 
obvious contrast'to the Iraqi conditions was another 
factor behind the restless 
5 
politics-of Iraqi nationalists. The progress of the national movement in Turkey 
and the victories of Mustafa Kemal were 
'being closely watched' by the Iragis. 
6 
The Irish disturbances did not lack theirhimpact. The Egyptian rising of-1919 
contributed to the cultivation of anti-British 
feelings and enhanced nationalists, 
aspirations. 
7 
,°1 11, 
The impact of the Russian Revolution on the Iraqi movement is worth a short 
examination. Iraqi events of 
1920 were supposed to have been largely influenced 
by the Bolsheviks; in July 1920, the Civil Commissioner was of the opinion that 
Mirza Muhananad Ridä (son of the Chief Mujtahid, al Shiräzi) was 'working for the 
8 
Bolshevik cause in Karbala*. In-mid November; the High Commissioner reported 
the... presence in Baghdad of 
two Bolshevik agents, one of whom was an lex-Commissar 
in Moscow*. 
9 In late November the British Intelligence reported the existence 
1. See Chapter III 
2. S. Faidi, op_ t., pp. 
131-2 
3. M. al Bajr,, o . cit., pp. 46-7 
4. Z, Zeine, The Struggle 
for Arab Indeperrlence, (Beirut, 1960)ß'p. 146 
5. F. 0.371/5227/E. 6060. From C. C. Baghdad to 
1.0.3rd June 1920, No. 6584; 
A. T. Wilson, Clash . op. cit., pp. 212,251 
6. Ibid., p. 212 
7. M. T. at 'Umari, Tärikh _. 9 op. cit., 
Vol. 3, p. 99 -" 
S. F. O. 371/5078. Baghdad 
Memo No. 20760,14th July 1920, covering Report by A. P. O. 
Karbala on Activities of, 
Anti-Government Party and precis of evidence against 
each deportee. 
9. F. 0.371/5292/E. 
14660. From H. C. Baghdad, 16th November 1920, No. 13946, 
Very secret, no 
distribution. 
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of an underground group called Haqq (Right) which had 'already received a letter 
from the Bolshevik Government' promising assistance. 
' 
On the 15th December, the 
British Intelligence 'received information that Mirza Muhammad Ridha ... has been 
... adcovating an understanding 
with the Bolsheviks'. 
2 
It was also reported that 
'four Bolshevik agents' have 'undoubtedly passed /carrying% recommendations to 
Shaikh al Shariah /äl Isfähani%*. 
3 
In January 1921 the Intelligence reported 
that in Baku an army of one thousand Arabs was formed. 
4 
This irrational estim- 
ation of 'Bolshevik peril' reached 
its climax when the War Office concluded that 
the Iraqi insurrection was but part of 'the malign influence of Moscow'. 
5 
According to Baghdad Police 'Intelligence' Muhammad al Sadr was a Bolshevist! 
6 
Some contemporary Arab writers also tend to attribute an overdue influence 
to the Soviet system on the Iraqi events of 1920.7 Amil Tuma went to the extent 
of suggesting that the national government of Iraq was one of the outcomes of 
the October (Bolshevik) Revolution. 
However, there is no evidence to support such claimed interaction or direct 
influence. In fact, it seems that the Bolsheviks had considered IMesopotamiaS 
as an 'exceptionally 
backward area'. Apart from a short declaration to the 
9 
'Peasants of Mesopotamia*, which most probably did not reach Iraq, there are 
no indications of any 
direct impact. 
Furthermore, the Iraqi nationalists' attitude towards Bolshevism reveals 
the limited relations between the two movements. Al Furät, the mouthpiece of 
1. F. O. 371/6349/2172. Intelligence Report No. 2,30th November, "1920, p. 4 
2. Ibid., Intelligence Report, No. 3,15th December 1920, p. 7 
3. Ibid. 
4. F. O. 371/6350/3824. Mesopotamia Intelligence Report, No. 6,31st January 1921. 
5. W. O. 33/969. General Staff, W. O., Cause of the Outbreak in Mesopotamia, 
October 1920 
6. F. o. 371/5081. Baghdad Police Reports, Prepared by the 1.0.2nd November 1920. 
Information dated 20 and 27th March 1920, pp. 86,95,207. 
7. For instance, see 'A. M. al Nuri, Thawrat al 
*Iräq al Walani aa; Al Thagäfa 
al Jadida, Baghdad 
No. 14, June 1970, pp. 30-1. Also S. Khaiyri, Al Thawra 
al-'ýägia al 
Awlav Al Thagäfa al Jadida, No. 38, July 1972, pp. 77-9 
8. A. Tuma, Al 
Wabda al "Arabiya fi Tatawriha al Tärikhi, (Haifa, 1970), p. 12 
Originally a Ph. D. 
thesis to Moscow university. 
9. Demetrio Boersner, 
The Bolsheviks and the National and Colonial Question 
. 
2; ý 
(Geneve-Paris, pp- 98,129 
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the Rising, clearly distinguished between the aims of the two movements (one is 
social and international; the other-is political and national). In this regard 
al Furät identified the Iraq movement with its 'sisters', the Egyptian and Irish 
'revolutions'. 
' 
After the fall of Enzeli, al Furt predicted a Russian advance 
into Iraq and urged the nationalists to consider a final dedision on which side 
2 
'should the Iraqis fight'. 'In the same issue the paper did not hide its 
suspicions as to"the Bolsheviks' intentions; 
3 
z, 
II The Formation of New Political Parties 
The discussion in this Chapter will be confined to Baghdad. Basrah had 
ceased to play an effective 'nationalist' role. Political activities in Mosul 
were discussed earlier. However a short evaluation of its political conditions 
is useful. 
In late 1919, the Political Officer pointed to a 'disturbed' situation in 
Mosul of which he referred to external 'influences*. 
4 
He asserted that the non- 
Moslems were not sympathetic towards the nationalists. 
s 
Such a view was voiced 
6 
by the Civil Commissioner a year earlier. Even in late 1920 it was reported 
that the news of an impending, Arab Government had 'produced something very like 
a panic' amongst religious minorities. 
7 
"As regards the Muhammadans*, the Political Officer wrote in late 1919: 
'The city magnates, landowners and intellectuals ... did not as a 
rule feel the hardships of Turkish, -Administration ... Sharifian 
propaganda found considerable adherence on the part of those who 
;;. might well hope that the'Government posts now held by foreigners 
would under an Arab Government 
fall to their share ... leaning 
towards Turkey is. to be expected'. 
8 
However, such leanings were short-lived because of the fact, previously mentioned, 
that Mustafa Kemal himself had no Arabian ambitions: 'his objection'is 
not to 
Arab independence but to Britain running Iraq+. 
9 
al Furat, No. 2, ý28th Dhee al Qu'da, 
1338 (August 1920) 
2. Ibid., No. 3,5th Dhee al 
Huja 1338 (1920) 
3. Ibid., No-2 
4. - E. g. president' Wilson's 
pronouncement, the delay of peace treaty with Turkey, 
the Arab State of Syria. 
5.0.0.696/2. Admin. 
Report, Mosul 1919, p. 7 
6. F. 0.371/4147/146. Political Baghdad to 1.0., 26th December 1918, No. 11569 
7. C. 0.696/3. Adm 
Reoort Mosul, 1920, p. 25 
8. ' C. 0.696/2. Admin Report Mosul, 1919. p. 7 
90 F. 0.371/6353/71. From H. C. Iraq to S. S. for the Colonies, No. 534 
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In late 1920, `the Political Officer of Mosul, wrote: 
'of the Arabs themselves, the tribes are probably in favour of 
/an Arab Government? as likely to conduce to Government weakness 
... The agriculturalists are probably against it for exactly 
the same reason. The attitude of the small town population ... 
the idea that the Arabs are perfectly capable of managing their 
own affairs without any assistance or supervision from anyone, 
is not nearly so strong as it was'. 
1 
In spite of the underground character of the nationalist movement in Mosul, 
the British Administration were able to report the following information: 
'Amin al Umari: Employed by us in 1919, he resigned and went 
to Syria ... Appeared as 
liaison officer betweenrthe Kemalists 
and Sharifian force which attacked Tall 'Afar ... of the Ahd 
Group ... 
Aziz Arab: -a'young merchant, long-suspected of being an active 
member of al Aha ... arrested for trial for sedition. 
Aziz Ismail al Umari: Young teacher. Reported as using his lessons 
for propaganda, of being a channel for the Ahd communications 
with Baghdad and of being specially detailed to discover who are 
our special service agents. 
Dr. Daud Chalabi: An educated doctor. Believed to be head of the 
Ahd committee in Mosul ... 
Hamdi th ilmaran: Young merchant. Member of al Ahd. Imprisoned a 
short time in May 1920 ... 
Mulla'Muhammad Arab : Imam of Nabi Jarjis Mosque ... Believed to be 
extremely fanatical and intensely anti-British. Took a prominent 
part in the August maulud of 1920.2 
Mustafa b. Haji Hussin Agha: /A Young Lawyer_?, member of Ahd; in 
Baghdad-became a member of the Haras and is the local head of 
that society in Mosul. 
Mustafa Ahmed al'Umari: /Student of Law? at Baghdad. Extreme 
nationalist ... was a member of the sub-committee of the 40 
`Mandubs. 
3 
... the Baghdad correspondent of the Ahd. 
Sa*id b. Haji Thabit: Merchant in his . 
35th7. Undoubtedly a 
prominent member of the Ahd. Escaped 
from arrest to Mardin ... *. 
4 
I 
It was in'late 1918 that an administrative committee leading al 'Ahd was 
organized in Baghdad. 
It was composed of Sheikh Said Nagshabandi (Mu'tamad, 
president), his brother, 'A1ä' al Nä'ib, his cousin 
Bahä' Naqshabandi, Nuri Fetal) 
(ex-officer and-responsible for communication with the 'General Centre' in Damascus) 
Hassan Ridä (lawyer), Amin Zaki (ex-officer ), Simi and Anwar Nagshali (brothers 
and ex-officers) and 
*Izat al At4ami (writer). The Baghdad branch started to 
produce its magazine 
al Lisän (The Tongue), while the centre in Damascus issued 
5 
its alý" 
1. C. O. 696/3. Admin Re ort, Mosul, 
1920, p. 26 
2. "' Infra pp. 3 &a-3,3`9_70 "... _ 
3. Infra pp 364-5)3746 
3gy" 
4. g. o. 371/6349/171 
'Personalities In Mosul' 
5. Al Hassani, op 
t., p. 56 
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In contrast to its wings in Syria and Mosul, the Baghdadi branch of al 'Ahd 
could not emerge as a polarizing centre of political activities. In late 1919 
and thereafter Iraqi nationalists founded a different party ( gras ai: Istigläl) 
to represent their aims an9 organize their efforts. 
This fact is not widely known and no attempt has been made to explain it. 
In this respect it is useful to remember the previously mentioned amendment in 
the *Ahd constitution which established Britain as the sole source of assistance. 
Such a line was not welcomed by the nationalist groups inside Iraq. The inside 
movement was more hostile to 
the British and less aware of the 'anti-Wilson' and 
'liberal' tendencies interacting within the British policy-makers. It is most 
likely that the attachment of the Baghdadi branch to its 'Syrians centre had 
deprived it of the necessary political initiative and flexibility. The over- 
whelming military 
(and Sunni) character of *Ahd might be another factor in ex- 
plaining its weakness amongst civilians 
(and Shi*ah). 
A more thorough pursuit of the political and intellectual history of Said 
Nagshabandi (leader of Baghdad 'Ahd) was helpful 
in comprehending his political 
failure. His sectarian and conservative views were a serious barrier for him to 
assume the nationalists' 
leadership. When the older Shiräzi was playing his 
tprogressive* role of supporting the constitutional movement and combatting the 
tobacco concession, Naqshabandi, after gaining the Wali*s permission, left 
for 
Säsmarrä in 1893 to combat the rising popularity of Shiräzi. He opened a religious 
school there where 
its main purpose was to 'preserve the Sunni faith and character 
, 
of Sämarra'" The sectarian 
conflict exploded in SämarräJand endangered the whole 
of Iraq and might 
have b. roughtýoreign intervention save for the wisdom exercised 
by al Shiräzi. 
l 
In 1910, an Iraqi magazine, Tanwir al Ifkär, reproduced an article by al 
Zahäwi advocating certain rights 
for women. A formidable outcry of protest was 
initiated by the Sunni 
'Ulemä' which resulted in the dismissal. of al Zahäwi from 
his post in the Law 
College. Zahäwi had to escape from Baghdad to save his life 
from the fanatical mob. 
2 During this occasion Nagshabandi revealed more of his 
al ahr3ni, _al 
Mujadid al Shiräzi (Najaf n. 1. A. 13;. T, d. ). pp. 19-23ý Y. al Sämarrä i 
rarkh ? Ulem' 
Samarrä , (Baghdad, 19o6), pp-R-4; Y. Samarräs, Tärikh Madenet 
marr , V01.29 
(Baghdad, 1971), pp. 177-8 
2.. +A. R. al Hiläli, al Zahäwi ... op. cit., p. 43 
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ultra=conservative inclinations; he published-his-. pamphlet, al Sayf al Bäriq 
fi *Unuq al'Märiq. 
1 
Nagshabandi was'also a leading member of the Iraqi 'conservative' group 
al Mashwara, which was formed-to oppose the C. U. P. in Iraq. -It is useful to 
2 
remember'that most of the'Iragi nationalists'were, durin; ýthex. period of 1908-1912 
ardent supporters of the constitutionalist and reformist claims of the C. U. P. 
They turned against the C. U. P. " only when it, disclosed its Turkish prejudices 
and tyrannical methods. 
Thus in February 1919, 'a new group was formed and it was called gras al 
Isttiigl5ll (Guards of Independence). Those who took the initiative in the formation 
of this group were young nationalists in their twenties: Shäkir Matanoud, Maýmoud 
Rämiz, *Aref Hikmet (ex-Officers), 'Ali Effendi Blzirkän (teacher), Jaläl Bäbän 
(Lawyer)'änd Bigir al Shabibi (writer). 
3 
Once this party was formed, its 
'militant''character was to attract'the support of larger groups, Soon afterwards 
it was joined by Näji Shawket, Dr. Sämi Shawkýt, Hamdi Bäjahji (all were active 
members in the early al 'Ah3); Ja*fer abu al Timman, Bahjat Zaynal (small merchants) 
'Abd al Ghafour al Badri (ex-officer and editor of al Istigial) and "Abd al Majid 
Kanah (popular leader). 
4 
The despaire of some young Iraqis over the moderation of the Baghdadi 'Ahd 
had urged them to form an'underground society called Jam'iat al Shabiba al 
Wa ani a (The Society of the Patriotic Youth). They were Ja'far H. amandi, Sädiq 
Habah, Simi Khundah, 
'Sädiq al Shihrabäni, 'Abbas Mahdi', Qässim al +Alawi and Sa'd 
Sä1ih. 
5 They were Ia mixture of young Sunni and Shi'i graduates. Their 'extremism' 
was revealed in the 
British Intelligence Report: 
1. The exact translation is: 'The Blunt Sword on the neck of the Renegades. 
2. Leading members of that group were: 'Abd al. Rak. wman al Nac1ib, 'Isa Effindi 
al Jamil, 'Abd_al Ratman Pasha al Uaydri, Muiammad Facjil al Daghistini, 
Mula Najm al W04, Mu§tafa al Shihribäni. All were Sunni, wealthy and 
conservatives. Dr. 
'A. al Wardi, Aspects ..., op. cit., Vol. 3, p. 164 
3. al Basir, 22. ., p"137 
4. , a1 Hasani, off. cit., 
p. 57 
5. Ibid., p. 58 
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.ý 
*Arif Hikmat Chapan told an agent that there was a secret society 
(apparently a branch of al Shabibat al Wataniyah) which has 
branches in Basrah, Baghdad and Mosul and other of the larger.. 
towns, the object of which was to get rid of persons supposed 
to be hostile to their aims /Istiglal and Arab . unity7. t? 
The emergence of al Uaras with its militant platform and remarkably non-sectarian 
structure had encouraged the members of at Shabiba to affiliate their society 
2 
to al Haras. 
The real triumph of at Tiaras was achieved when this group gained the support 
and patronage of Yusif al Suwaidi and Muhammad at Sadr. Amongst Baghdadi Sunnah 
al Suwaidi was second only to al Nagib. He returned to Iraq from Turkish exile 
after the armistice. It was a great surprise 
for the Administration that al 
Str4aidi assumed a militant attitude and took part in the anti-British nationalist 
camp. 
3 Amongst Baghdadi'Shi'ah, al Sadr was second to none: 
*There's a group of these worthies in Kadhimain ... bitterly 
pan-Islamic, anti-British 'et tout le batoclan*. Chief among 
them are a family called Sadr, possibly more distinguished for 
religious learning than any other 
family in the whole Shiah worldt. 
4 
Gertrude Bell met Sayid Hassan al Sadr 
(father of Muhammad) on the 13th March 
1920: 
+Y ,.. told 
him ... that Faisal was to be crowned. "Over the 
whole of Syria to the sea? ", he asked, with sudlen 
interest. 
"No", I answered, "the French stay in Beirut". "Then it is no 
good", he replied+. 
5 
The British Intelligence reported the following information which was 
indicative of the political tendencies of Suwaidi and Sadr: 
*Tahsin Bey /äl "Askari7 ... met Yusnf Suwaidi and Saiyid 
Muhammad al Sadr at Anäh /they left Iraq to escape arrest7, 
they declared that it was not their intention to 
join the 
Turks who are opposed to Arab Nationalism, but that they 
. 
intended to make their way... to London. There they proposed 
to lay their case to /d. M. G. 
7.0 
The biographer of al 
Sadr pointed out that he was profoundly influenced by Afghani 
7 
and "Abduh's reformist 
ideas. Furthermore, he was also influenced by the ideas 
F. 0.371/6352/8635. Intelligence Report No. 
14, Baghdad, 1st June 1921 
2. Al Basir, op. cit., p. 
142 
3. T. al Räwi, Dkhikkera 
Yusif al Suwaidi, (Baghdad, 1930) 
4. Lady Bell, (ed. 
), op. cit", Vol-II, p. 484, dated 14th March 1920 
5ý Ibid., p. 485 
6. F. o. 371/6349/2172. 
Mesopotamia Intelligence ReportL No. 3,15th December 1920 
7ý "A. , Ali, Za! 
im al Thawra al_'I g ya- (Baghdad, 1950), pp. 19-23,25-7 
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of 'Arab nationalism? emanating from Syria and Egypt and reflected in the 'Ahd 
group and the National Club of Baghdad. 
' 
Thus al Sadr was to support the 
constitutional movement and the C. U. P. in its early years, but was disappointed 
afterwards. 
2 The British considered him as *a genuine pro-Arab'. 
3 
The Has programme (al Mihhäj al Asäsi) included: 
*. 2. The society's aim is the full independence (al 
Ist glä1 al Mutlaq) of Iraq. -"' 
3. The society recognizes one of King Hussein*s sons as a 
constitutional democratic kind of Iraq; 
4. The society will undertake whatever necessary action, 
within evolutionary process, to gain the political aim in 
clause 2. 
5. The, society will exert all its effottsto affiliate Iraq 
into Arab unity ... 
7. The primary task of the society is the unity ofsall Iraqis 
regardless of their factions and schisms and the society will 
render all effort to end all differences caused by religions 
or denominations*. 
4 
Such 'a programme is worthy of some remarks. It was only in late 1918 and 
early 1919 that the Iraqi nationalist movement was to adopt the aim of al 
Istigläl al Täm. Once the Moslem Turks were replaced by the British, the road 
was open for new demands which, hitherto, were not on the agenda. Moreover, the 
new programme treated Iraq as a political entity in itself; no regional demands 
were requested. However 
the aim of Arab unity was preserved. 
Some Arab historians, in a subjective projection on history, have been 
playing 
down the Iraqi demand for a Hashimite king. However, the historical 
fact remains that such a clause was an essential term in the conditions formulated 
by'the independence movement during that period. Such a fact manifested itself 
during the R-eferendum, the events which preceded the rising and during the rising 
itself. ' it reflected the influence of Hijaz, Syria and that of the Iraqi nation- 
alists abroad. 
A third point which is worth attention is the declared aim of al Maras to 
unite all Iraqis regardless 
of their religions or denominational differences. 
1. Ibid., pp. 20-23 
2. Ibid., pp. 29-30 
3.. This was to distinguish 
him from pro-Ottoman Islamists. 
F. 0.371/6353/279. Intelligence Report No. 17,15th July 1921. 
4ý "A. R. al Hassani, op. cit., pp. 58-9 
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Such a principle, represanted a deep nationalist awareness and a high political 
skill. In fact al Haras was very successful in the actual translation of such 
an aim; its very structure was remarkably non-sectarian. A determined effort 
was dedicated to bring about. such a unity. Contacts were established with the 
Shi'i mujtahids, the Christians and Jews. 
The success of al Haras and the incompetence of Baghdad's al 'Ahd was causing 
concern for the Iraqi officers in Syria. Furthermore the conflict between the two 
groups was assuming an alarming turn. Thus the Iraqi 'Ahd in Syria sent, in July 
1919, al Madfa'i and Ibrahim Kemal for the purpose of sorting out the differences. 
l 
'Ali al Bäzerkän, a founder-member of al aras, wrote that the 'administrative 
committee' unanimously refused al Madfa'i's amalgamation plan. This was because 
of two factors: al arcs rejected leadership from Damascus and resented the idea 
of considering Britain as the sole supplier of assistance; this was considered 
as ': a violation of our 
independence .2 
Subsequent development proved that al Haras was to emerge as the centre of 
the nationalist movement and consequently the moving spirit of the 1920 rising. 
Nevertheless it is important to assert that up to late 1918, the nationalists 
movement was, confined to 
the circles of the intelligentsia. What enabled the 
movement to influence 
the bulk of the population, in the mid-Euphrates and else- 
where, was that 
(tribal and taxation) policy adopted by the Administration which 
was highly resented 
by the population. The Administration, by alienating itself 
from large sections of the society, was acting as the undertaker of its own funeral. 
The Iraqi Arab nationalists were, On the other hand, aware that in failing to ally 
themselves with the. Shi'ah and the 
fellähIn, they would be playing their funeral 
march. It was a combination 
of the Administration's 'blunder' and the nationalists' 
clever utilization 
of such shortcomings that enabled the nationalist movement to 
assume its. popular support 
which, in the final analysis, was its. real lever, 
III ° The Nationalist-Shi'i-Tribal Alliance: It is evident that the Iraqi Shi'ah 
played a distinguished 
role in the struggle for Iraq's independence. The rising 
Al Basir, op. cit", pp. 139-41 
2. 'A, al Bazirkän, op. 
* cit., pp. 180-3 
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itself was mainly-located in their areas. The Shi'i (etwa had their impact in 
invigorating a tense situation of restlessness. In short, the Shi'ah 'for the 
most part /were/ very hostile, to the Administration/'. The growing nationalist- 
Shi'i alliance and its impact was clearly established by the Civil Commissioner: 
'Chief Mujtahid of Karbala. Lal Shiräzi/ recentlyýissued-Fetwa 
to effect that service under British Administration was unlawful. 
This is borne out by increased resignations in Diwaniyah Division 
... Fetwa 
has been issued ... to cause disturbances in Mesopotamia 
/by/ pan-Arab party which includes entourage of above mentioned 
Mujtahid ... corpse of member of 
Arab Levies ... was not accorded 
the usual burial rights by the local Shiah priest. This fact is 
considerably discussed by tribes and if persisted in elsewhere may 
seriously affect recruiting'. 
When the disturbances broke out, Wilson wrote to Hirtzel 'It is the Shiahs who 
are doing all the damage. 
They are undoubtedly bolshevistically inclined, -i. e. 
3 
they are out against all governments as such'. In. a mixture of bitterness and 
irony, Wilson wrote: 
'The essence of the Shia religion is the denial of the validity 
of any temporal Government ... 
As a Shia said to me recently "if the Mahdi himself appeared, 
the Mujtahids would refuse to recognise him, for to do so would 
involve the loss of their livelihood". '. 
4 
Before examining the motives'behind such a Shi'i attitude, one ought to 
distinguish between four sections among 
the Shi'ah: the nationalists, the Mujtahids, 
the Saiyids and the tribal 
Sheikhs. The first group was in fact an organic part 
of the nationalist movement. 
However, by virtue of being Shi'ah or from Shi'i 
areas or traditions, 
they were able to extend political bridges which linked the 
Shi'ah to the nationalist movement. 
Prominent personalities amongst them were 
al Sadr, abu TLmman, 
the Shabibi brothers, Basir, al Shargi and Bazirkän. 
The Mujtahids were men of religion dedicated to theological studies. Never- 
thelessa and as the writer tried to show earlier, 
it was impossible for such men 
to keep aloof from political 
problems. The five most prominent Mujtahids of the 
period between 
1916-1920 were al Yazdi (Kufah) al Shirazi (Samarra and then Karbalä), 
al Igfahäni 
(Najaf), Hassan al Sadr and al Khälisi (Käjimain). It is useful to 
Iady Bell (ed),, op. cit., 
Vol. 2, p. 483,14th March 1920 
20 F. 0.882/23/MES/20. 
to S. S. for India No. 3496,18th March 1920 
3. A. T. Wilson, 
Private Letters and Papers, B. M., 52455, Voll, letter dated 
26th July 1920 
_... ýr I ettnr 
AatAd 9+h 
_T, mn I Qen 
Ibid. 5G'Oo' moo,...... --" ....,. - ý- 4. 
ý. _ 
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give some information (as seen by. the British) about some of the politically 
oriented mujtahids: 
'Saiyid Muhammad Kadhim al Yazdi: the greatest Shi'ah Mujtahid-of 
the day /1919/ ... He is at heart pro-British and very anti-Turk ... 
and undoubtedly, at heart, he is a hater of the constitutionalists, 
and a staunch royalist ... His remark to Colonel Stokes was character- 
istic when, on the latter saying that he was in Persia at the time 
of the Constitution, he replied, "Yes, when Persia began to go back". 
His "hakamtu" on the Shar'ah case is final', but he will notýgive a 
decision against the decision of /aal Shiräzi% .., 
Shaikh al Shari'at äl Isfahani: the second most important Mujtahid 
in Najaf and the fourth in the Shi'ah world . /supported the Con- 
stitutionalist/ ... prone to interference in 
political affairs and 
to intrigues sub rosa against Lal Yazdi/ ... He took a prominent 
part in the Jihad, but owing to pressure ... It is impossible to 
say whether he is pro-anything at heart ... He is an O. B. LOudh 
Bequest/ Mujtahid distributor ... 
Shaikh 'Ali al Shaikh Muhammad Kashif al Ghata: He has great influence 
among the tribes, both owing to his own personal worth and owing to 
his family. He is very anti-Turkish. He is openly pro-British ... 
have very great influence with jal Yazdi/. ... 
Shaikh Hasan Sahib al Jawahir: O. B. distributor. Very pro-British, 
but of no influence. 
Shaikh Jawad Sahib al Jawahir: The cleverest man in Najaf ... He 
invariably interferes in politics, and no intrigue can be carried 
on without his knowledge. 
Shaikh 'Abdul Karim Jazairi: ... Very prominent as an enemy propa- 
gandist before the fall of Baghdad. His brother, Shaikh Muhammad 
Jawad, was arrested in connection with the captured documents found 
with the German Political Officer in 'Anah. 
2 
Haji Agha Mahmud al Hindi: O. B. distributor ... Openly pro-British ... 
He acts as /al Yazdi's/ secretary ... He has rendered excellent services, 
both in September 1917 and during the blockade3 ... he is not influential. 
Shaikh Mahdi al Shaikh Asadullah: O. B. distributor ... of no influence. 
A hearty admirer and supporter of the British Government ... 
Saiyid Ja'far Bahr_al 'Ulum: Of the famous family ... and so respected. O. B. distributor. Pro-British and one of the very few who seems to 
have the courage of his convictions. His cousin, Saiyid Muhammad 'Ali, 
will be remembered in connection with the captured document, and 
suffered accordingly. 
Shaikh Mahdi Kishmiri: O. B. distributor ... Pro-British, butýof no 
influence whatever ... 
Saiyid Abdul Qasim Kashani: Now in Kadhimain. An intriguer and 
thoroughly pro Turkish. 
1. C. O. 696/1. Admin. Report of Shamiyah and Najaf, 1918; Appendix II, pp. 106-8 
2. The British troops captured some documents which indicated that the anti- 
British group in Najaf was in contact with Ottoman forces. 
pnd. 1061, Review of the Civil Administration..., o2. cit., p. 124 
s. Infra, PP 331-4o. 
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'Saiy3d Ahmed Behbahani: A well-known royalist ... dismissed 
by the constitutionalists. Very and openly pro-British, but 
probably mad 1.1 
This shows that those mujtahids who were pro-British were not few. 
However, the general trend among them was evidently hostile to the Administration. 
It also reveals the relationship between the Oudh Bequest and the support 
rendered to the Administration. It does not fail to disclose the real mutual 
sympathy between al Yazdi and the British Authorities. 
The third group of Shi'ah was the Sayids who claim descent from the 
Prophet Muhammad and thus enjoy a considerable respect among the Shi'ah. Some 
of the Sayids were allotted land by the Ottomans thus becoming cultivators, land- 
holders and pro-Turks. Such a situation was to bring them closely into touch with, 
and give them a respectable position among, the tribesmen. And they, in many ways, 
formed a link between the mujtahids and the tribesmen. 
Prominent political personalities among the Sayids were the following: 
'/Sayid/ Nur /al Yäsiri/: the most prosperous and respected of 
the Sadat in the district ... Owns large area of land /al Ibrähimiyah 
and al Mushkäb/ ... 
S. Husain Mugotar: Owns considerable land in the south of Ghammas 
... Age about 
34 ... Both he and Saiyid Hadi /his uncle/ were 
suspected of intriguing with 'Ajaimi al Sa'dun Lpro-Turk/ and 
interned in India in July 1918. 
S. Hadi Mugotar: of Shinafiyah, land-owning /very large properties/ 
,.. The 
Muqotar enjoyed the favour of the Ottoman Government and 
were actively helpful to the Turks until we established effective 
control over the Middle Euphrates in November 1917 ... his great 
influence in Shinafiyah was reported to be directed convertly against 
us ... He was 
implicated in all the Najaf disturbances. 
S. Muhsin Abu Tabikh: The largest landowner in Ghammas ... Age about 
36. Has considerable influence ... Pro-Turkish at heart, and was 
suspected of complicity in the plot to murder the P. O. 
's in the 
Shamiyah in February 1918. 
s. Hadi Zuwain: /about 40, head of his family%. Represented /British/ 
Government interests in Shamiyah before the Political Occupation of 
the District, but much given to intrigue ... Not to be trusted. 
S. 'Alwan al Saiyid 'Abbas: Age about 34. ... Has considerable land 
between al Fatlah and al Ibrahim on the left bank of al Mishkhab ... 
Saiyid Nur voices his thoughts. Not to be trusted. 
The same report gave some more 
information on the Shämiyah Sheikhs: 
yazdi was an Arab. He died on 30th April 1919. Isfahäni was of Persian 
origin, became 
Chief Mujtahid on 13th August 1920 after the death of Shiräzi. 
Ghitä', Jazä'iri and 
'Ulum were all Arabs. Jawähir, Käshäni and Behbehäni 
were of Persian origins. 
Asadullah and Kishmiri were of Indian origins. 
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*Mujbil al Fara*un: Head of the Fatlah tribe in the Mishkhab 
... he succeeded 
his-brother Mabdir, who died in September 1918 
... He 
/Mujbil7 was very useful to us immediately after the 
occupation. - 
'Abdul Wahid al Haji Sikah /sic? ... Cultivates a large area on 
the left bank of the Mishkafi from Abu Sukha5r to the Ibramim. 
Very able and more far-seeing than the average ... Emphatically 
the most powerful of the Fatlah and, next to 'Saiyid "Alwan, 
probably the greatest influence in Mishkhab. A man of strong 
personality ... 
Should be always carefully watched. 
Muhammad al *Abtan, Khaza*il: A man of considerable local 
influence, which was enhanced by a grant of Rs. 1,000/-P. m. from 
Government before we effectively occupied the country ... 
is 
definitely anti English, ... Imprisoned 23rd December'for general 
disobedience., The most powerful Shaikh in Shamiyah /; bout 407. 
Salman al *Abtan: Brother of above. He also used to draw an 
allowance of Rs. 1,000/-P. m. 
from Government, which has been 
discontinued ... Not to 
be trusted. 
Marzuq al *Awwad: Raise of the *Awabid ... with a strong hold over 
his tribe. Untrustworthy,... 
*Aiwan ai Ham Sa*dun: of ... the Bani Hasan shaikhly house. He 
controls the section of the Bani Hasan south of Kifil - those 
north follow his brother, 'Umrau ... In the . days of no 
Government ... he controlled affairs at Kufah ... "ý" 
The factors behind Shi'i hostility to the British rule could be divided 
into general and particular. The general elements would be divided into, socio- 
political and intellectual motives. 
The Shi"i areas were the hardest hit by 
the taxation and land policy of the Administration. This was coupled with the 
fact that such areas had enjoyed a period of no Government in addition to sub- 
sidies and allowances. 
The sudden shift to the reimposing of, a hard administrative 
control was to be resented. . 
The intellectual motive is easily found in the very nature of the Shi'i faith 
which 'was out. against all governments*; 
more so when the temporal Government was 
a Christian one. 
In spite of certain measures by the British to satisfy some of 
their demands, 
3. it should, be remembered that the Shi'ah had always distinguished 
between Sultan Ja it and Sultan Kafir, The latter was, to them, much worse. More- 
over, the Turkish rule 
since 1908 had shown comparatively more tolerance towards 
1. Mubdir al Far'un was politically oriented 
Sheikh. He was influenced by 
'Arab nationalism' through the, contacts of Sayid Talib. 
2. Ibid., PP. 110-111 
3. With the object of partially remedying some grievances, the British appointed 
some Shi*i 
jurists under the name if Niyäbat-al Ja'fariyah for the trial of 
cases of personal 
status between Shi'ah. F. 0.371/6369/E. 14013. Mesopotamia 
Judicial Department. 
Report on the Administration of Justice for the Year 
1920. Government Press, 
1921, Para 7. 
' fi 
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the Shi iah . 
Persian Shi'ah (in Iraq) had in their turn, their own good reasons to assume 
an anti-British stance. In fact al Shiräzi, Ismä'il al Sadr al Khälisi (both 
Arabs) and al Isfahäni had openly protested against the Anglo-Persian treaty and 
demanded its abolition. 
3 
The particular reasons which decided the Shi*i resentment of British Admin- 
istration could be found in two major events: the Najaf disturbances (1918) and 
the death of Sayid Kadim al Yazdi (1919). 
(i) The Political developments in Najaf since the War: It is important to examine 
the situation in Najaf against the background of two factors. Firsts the various 
socio-political forces 
in the area; the local sheikhs of'Najaf's four quarters; 
the mujtahids; the wealthy families of Najaf; the sayids; and the tribal sheikhs 
of the area. From a historical point of view one should distinguish between 
three distinctive stages;, that-is, 
from May 1915 to August 1917; from-August 
1917 until May 1918;, and'from the latter date up to June 1920. Each period' 
witnessed the rise and 
fall of different. political powers with different political 
alliances and opposition I., I 
By May 1915, the Najafi population led by its local shiekhs had finally. 
ejected the"Ottomans. 
From that time till August 1917 Najaf and the surrounding 
areas 'enjoyed' a period of autonomy. 
Power, inside Najaf, was placed in the 
hands of the four sheikhs, each representing, one quarter of Najaf. They were 
Sayid Mahdi b. Sayid Salmän 
(titular head of the Zuqurt section), Häji 'Atiyah 
Abu Kulal, Kim Subbi (Zuqurt) and HSji Salad b. Häji Rä¢i (head of Shumurt). 
4 
Among themselves they shared absolute power and concluded a 'constitution' and a 
'union' to organize the town. 
Together they held not only political power but they also acquired 'consider- 
able-wealth'. 
For instance, Häji "Atiyah had 'by spring of 1917, amassed very 
1. Kami1 al Jädirji, Min 
Awräq Kämi1 al Jädirji, (Beirut, 1971), pp. 84-7 
2. S. H. Longrigg, Iraq . _, p. 
96. 
3ý M. al Kh-alisi, Batal al 
Isläm, op. cit., un. p. manuscripts, pp. 120-2 
4. C. O. 696/1. Baghdad 
Admin. Report, 1917, p. 142 
S. C. O. 696/1. Admin. 
Report Shamiyah and Najaf 1918, p. 111 
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considerable`wealth*from municipal exactions, /änd7 ... the sums which he, 
in common with other leading sheikhs were receiving from /the British? for the 
maintenance of the resistance of'Najef to the control of the Turks'. 
1 
*The Mujtahids ... and such families as that of the Kiliddar, men 
of wealth and education, accepted the domination of the tribal 
sheikhs only because the alternative was the still more distaste- 
ful domination of the Turks; the merchant class suffered from their 
"2 actions .... 
Of those families who are of interest to this work were the following: 
'S. 'Abbas Kiliddar (Rufai'i'Family) ... The richest family in 
Najaf. He has done excellent service since the fall of Baghdad 
and is certainly prö-British ... 
S. Hadi Naqib al Ashraf ... In reality a great supporter of 
Government, but pitifully weak and vacillating and consequently 
useless when he is most needed ... 
Haii Muhsin Shallash - The richest financier and merchant in 
Najaf. He did invaluable work during the Blockade ... In 
political matters he is, however, unreliable ... 
*. 3 
It was not the British Administration's intentions, nor perhaps in its power, at 
an early date, to impose its authority over Najaf and the surrounding areas. 
4 
During the period of 'no government', the relations between Najaf rulers and the 
British Administration were highly cordial. A few months after May 1915, Najaf Is 
leaders were in correspondence with the British Authorities. 
5 
In early 1917, 
Häji "Atiyah sent a message to the British inviting them to 'advance on the 
Eurphrates and join his tribal forces". 
6 
Immediately after the conquest of 
Baghdad, the town sheikhs came in to see Sir Percy Cox and rendered to him their 
congratulations. 
7 
However, the British-Shi'ah amity did not last for long. In August 1917, a 
Government Agent'was sent to Najaf in the person of Namid 1hän who was from an 
influential Najafi family. It was suggested that at Yazdi was behind the choice 
1. F. 0.882/27/3171, Mesopotamia, Affairs in Nejef, p. 115 
2. Ibid. 
3. C. 0.696/1, Admin. Reports, Shamiyah and Najaf 1918, Appendix III, p. 108 
4. p. 0.882/27. Affairs in Najaf. 'Immediately after the conquest of Baghdad ... /fhe British/were not then in a position to substitute any other authority 
for that which they he four theikhs? exercised. p. 115 
5. Ibid. 
F. 0.882/26/Arab Bulletin, No. 41, February 1917 6. 
7. F. o. 882/27/Affairs 
in Nejef 
\I 
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1 
and'the' appointment. - The Administration was moving into a new 'stager which 
manifested itself in 
and Revenue staffs. 
2 
Kamuna of Karbala to 
liquidating the taub 
the appointment of regular Government Agents with Police 
In'Spetember 1917, the British Government exiled Fakhri 
India and deported Muhammad 'Ali Kamuna to Baghdad; 3 thus 
)nomy* of Karbala. In October 1917, Captain Balfour was 
appointed political officer, Shämiyah, and took up his headquarters in Kufah. 
The antagonism of the Najaf sheikhs was soon shown in the first week of 
November 1917. High prices, shortage of supplies coincided with the arrival of 
the Bedouin pro-British tribe of "Anizah and led to the first open breach of the 
peace. This resulted from the population violently repossessing grain sold to 
the tribesmen. Captain Balfour ordered the local sheikhs to recover the property 
taken from the 'Anizah within 15 days. 
4 
On the 20th November, at the expiration pda 
of the allotted period, VIji *Atiyah organized riots which led to the destruction 
of sarräi at Najaf, Kufah and Abu Sukhair. 
In January 1918, British troops and an airplane were fired at. More British 
troops were sent to confront the situation. This time and under local pressure, 
mainly by al Yazdi, the sheikhs gave way. They paid a fine and 'Aliyah left Najaf 
It is important to observe the political attitude taken by tribal leaders 
and mujtahids during these events: 
The sheikhs of the Beni Hasan, who are the most influential 
tribesmen round Kufah ... helped to quell the disorders. Neither 
here nor among the Fatlah, lower down the Euphrates, was there 
any evidence of a desire ... to take part against us ... '. 
As for the mujtahids and merchants of Najaf, it was reported: 
The Kaliddar gave material assistance to the P. O. during the 
riot..... while ... Yazdi complied at once with the request of 
the P. O. that he should act as mediator. On his advice Haji 
Atiyah and Kahdim Subbi asked and obtained pardon ... 
Seyiid Hadi el-Zuwaini, the leading man of Jaarah, ... had 
shown himself consistently pro-British ... '. 
5 
1. Ja'far al Khalili, Hakadha 'Ariftuhum, Vol. 1, (Baghdad, n. d. ), p. 47 
2. C. O. 696/1 Admin. Reports, Shamiyah and Najaf, 1918, p. 69 
3. pad. 1061, Review ..., op. cit., p. 115 
4. Capt. Balfour gave this order (Admin. Rpt. Najaf 1918, p. 69) although it was 
known that 'the stock of grain was already dangerously low'. Affairs-in 
Na ef p. 116 
5. F. O. 882/27, Affairs 
in Nejef, p. 118 
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However the submission was not complete: 
'Haji tAtiyah refused to visit the C. -in-C. at Baghdad, and 
both he and Kadhim Subbi maintained a truculent attitude 
towards. the P. O. The Government agent was as powerless as 
before and the religious and commercial communities suffered 
from; a-lack of security which was inevitable as long as"Nejef. 
lay at the mercy of the town sheikhs*. l. 
On the early morning of the 19th March, a number of Najfis disguised as Shabanah 
obtained admittance to *Atiyah"s khan (residence of Marshall) and, after disposing 
of the sentry, murdered Captain Marshall and severely wounded another officer who 
was with him. The blockade of the town was commenced in earnest by a brigade and 
severe conditions were proclaimed by the G. O. C. -in-Chief. 
2 
On the 17th April, Najaf surrendered and by the 4th May all the important 
persons named were arrested. A military court was assembled in Kufah. Thirteen 
persons were sentenced to death, but in the case of two: Muhammad 'Ali Bahr al 
'Ulum and Ibrähim Behbehäni the penalty was commuted by the G. O. C. -in-Chief to 
deportation 'in consideration of the plea put forward on behalf of the former 
by Saiyd Yazdi'. The death sentences were carried out at Kufah on the morning 
of May 30th3 Thus the sheikhs' power was put to an end and the British had 
established firm control over Najaf and Kufah. 
In the afternoon of the hanging: 
a meeting took place in the house of the Kilidar of Najaf ... 
it was attended by all /sic74 the Ulema ... Yazdi ... was rep- 
resented by his Secretary Mahmud Agha Hindi to whose initiative 
the ceremony was due. After an eloquent speech delivered by 
Haji Muhsin Shallash, 
s a sword of honour was presented to Capt. 
Balfour ... the meeting constituted a public acknowledgement 
on the part of the most influential men of the district, of 
their satisfaction ... '. ___ 
1. Ibid. ", p. 117; M. al Musawi, Al ßäj "Atiyah Abu Kulal, (Najaf, n. d. ) 
2. C. O. 696/1. Admin Reports, _ 
Na_; af and Shamiyah for 1918, p. 70 
3. They were Karim, Ahmed and Mu(isin Häji Salad. *Abbäs and 'A1wän 'Ali Rumäbi, 
Sa*id Mamloukal Häji Salad, Kim §ubbi, Mu}}sin Albu Chunaim, Häj Najim al 
Bagäl, Juri Niji and Maj!. d Haj De*aiybil. 122 persons were exiled, among them 
al Jaza'iri, six of 
Al Kulal and a large number of young intelligentsia. 
*A. R. Al Hassani, Thawrat al Najaf, (Saida, 1973), pp. 78,83-6 
4. Some of those who attended were: Sayid Hädi, Jawäd gilib al Jawähir, Sayid 
Mahdi al Salmin, Sayid Muhsin abu Tabikh, Sheikh 'Alwän al IJäj Sa'dun and 
others. 
5. Shailäsh said 'The sinful actors played their tragedy of sorrow at Najaf ... 
We particularly wish today to express our gratitude to our British Government., 
F. O. 371/3397/165202. Fornightly Report, No. 14, May 15-June ist 1918 
6. , bid.; A. T. Wilson, 'Clash ... ' OP. cit., p. 76 
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This ceremony, with its ruthless disregard for their executed former townsmen. 
reveals the real political tendencies of Najaf at that time'. The rising lacked 
the support of the majority of its population. Such a conclusion is confirmed 
by the memoirs of Ridi al Shabibi. It is highly indicative that Shabibi, an eye- 
witness to the events, did not allow any access to his papers until after his 
death (1966). It is suggested that throughout the blockade, Najafi Mujtahids and 
sections of the population had displayed signs of dissatisfaction with the rebels. L 
Yazdi exchanged letters with Wilson asking 'merciful Britain' to pardon the Najafis' 
Furthermore, Shabibi pointed out that Sayid Salman (sheikh of al Huwaish) 
assisted the British in reoccupying Najaf. ' The'arrest of the rebel leaders was 
systematically carried out by the Najafis'themselves. Shabibi'disclosed that 
Yazdi refused to assist some 
ö£ the implicated by declining' either to give them 
refuge or to offer his good services"to commute the death penalties. The attitude 
of the surrounding tribes was similar. " They did not help the movement3 but 
offered to assist the British "against the 
'rebels'. 4 Shabibi wrote that all 
witnesses, including Hamid Khan, refused to incriminate Bahr al "Ulüm. The sole 
voice who gave evidence against him was Shalläsh. 
5 
Would it not be highly sur- 
prising to knarr that by June 
1920, the tribes of Bani Hassan, Fetlah and men 
6 
like Shalläsh, Abu Tabikh, Zuwain, Mukuter and Sa*dun were in the forefront of 
7. 
the anti-British rising? Surprise will deepen when ones discovers that even 
the Arab nationalists of the area (Shabibi, Bajr, Shargi, 
oAbd 
al Mahdi and 
others) were not 
involved in the Najafi movement. 
8 
1. M. R. al Shabibi, Thawrat al Najaf slid al Isti'mär al Barfit nti 1917-191R, 
(Manuscript, n. d. ) 
2. Al'Arabs 9th April 1918 
3. R. al Shabibi. 
4.8.0.371/3397/110224,. Fortnightly Report, No. 10, March 15-April 1st 1920 
S. R. al Shabibi 
6. Mukuter intermediated with the Authorities to accept the surrender of 
#Atiyah aby Kulal. M. al Musawi, 02- cit., p. 27 
7. Zuwain and Mukuter joined'al arcs and the second led the rising in Diwäniyah. 
Shalläsh was 'elected' as 'governor' of Najaf and Abu Tabtkh Mutasarif of 
Karbala during the rising. Sa'dun led his tribe and Bäni Hassan and Fetlah 
were of the 
first tribes to revolt. 
S. After the Najaf 
incident, 13 were hanged and 122 were exiled. Not a single 
one of them was 
known to be an Arab nationalist. However, Iiädi and Hussein 
Mukuter were also deported soon afterward. 
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to dispel the confusion, two factors, social and political, might cast a 
light, on the situation. It should be remembered that it was in late 1918 and 
early 1919 that the. Administration embarked on its provocative measures of tax- 
ation and land settlement. Thus in summer 1918, the Mujtahids, wealthy families, 
tribal sheikhs were not directly affected by the British attempt, to consolidate 
its authority in the area. In' short, the May rising of 1918 was-isolated because 
other sections of the society did not envisage a British threat to their own 
interests. 
Politically speaking, it is most likely that it was the Referendum of 1918- 
1919 which had convinced the nationalists of the Administration opposition to 
Arab rule. Before that date most of, the Arab nationalists were cultivating hopes 
of a 
, 
British assistance toward an Arab independence. 
l 
Furthermore the Najaf 
movement was organized and led by a group of pro-Ottoman Islamist reformers. 
Such a group was, between 1912 to 1915, led by a1, Habubi and included the would-be 
2 
Arab nationalists. However %- 
1916, one assumes that the Arabists and the 
Islamists had parted company. They were to be re-united in 1920 under the new 
leadership of Shiräzi and his son Ridä, more especially when the nationalists 
lost hope in their British bet. 
It was reported: 
'The proceedings of the Military Court brought to light the fact 
that the Najaf riot ... was but part of a plot to murder all the 
/P. O. s7 in the neighbourhood -a plot which might easily have 
succeeded had not the Najafi commenced too soon*. 
3 
In fact an underground society called Jam'iat al Nahja al Islämiya (The Islamic 
Renaissance Society) was formed in Najaf 
in late 1917 with the aim of resisting 
the British Administration. Its leaders were Sayid Muhammad 'Ali Babr al 'Ulum, 
Sheikh Muhammad Jawad al Jaza'iri, Sheikh Muhammad 'Ali al Danshaqi and Sayid 
Ibrähim al Behbehäni (Mujtahids). Among its members were Häji Najam al Bagä1, 
Ahmed, Muhsin and KarTm I; 
äji Rädi, Kädim Subbi and'AbbäsAli al Ramahi (popular 
leaders). 'Abd al Razaq and Tumän 'Adwah (graduates). 
4 
I was assisted by 
1. See al'Arab 1917-1918 
2. In 1916, the Syrian hanging, 
Villa massacre and Hijaz rising took place. 
3. C. 0.696/1. 'Admin. Reports, Shamiyah and Najaf 1918, p. 70 
4. *A. R. al Bassani, ... al Najaf, on, cit., pp. 83-6 
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0 
the family of the latter to get hold of some of the society*s aims: 
'1. ... the 
formation of an "Islamic League", to achieve 
Islamic solidarity ... V 
2. To exert all efforts for the glory of Islam ... to 
adopt the Muhammadan Shar"a ... denounce all alien traditions V 
... and to 
imitate the civilized nations in its characters 
and politics in what is useful to Islam ... 
3 ... Support absolute independence of Islamic governments in 
general and of Iraq in particular ... 
4. The spiritual and material support of the Arab society /sic7 
if its principle is aimed at complete Arab independence .. 
_ - 
5. The protection of the rights of all non-Islamic sects (Millal)... * 
The movement=s isolationism enabled the Authorities to put a quick end to 
it. However the Administration had completely misunderstood the situation. It 
adopted the view that 'Events in Najaf, however, ' speedily brought to light the 
necessity for a greater control*. 
2 
The suppression of the "challenge* was con- 
sidered as 'an assertion of our right, our duty and our intention to govern ... 
The execution had a profound effect throughout Mesop3tamiat. 
3 
With such views in 
mind it was hardly surprising that the Administration, who moved from local 
autonomy under subsidised sheikhs to control through Government Agents, was. to 
establish its tthird stage - direct control through British Political Officers'. 
4 
That stage which started in mid 1918 was, furthermore, characterized by applying 
measures of taxation, land settlement and tribal policy described in previous 
chapters. This line introduced a great resentment among the tribes and sayids. 
Thus the anti-British tendency which was isolated up to mid-1918 started to gain 
momentum, until it 
imposed its full predominance by summer 1920. The areas of 
Shämiyah, Najaf, Kerbala were the centre of the 1920 rising. 
Certain points of particular reference to the area might be helpful for a 
better comprehension of the situation. By 1918 the Khazä*il were in a process 
of final disintegration. 
Some 50 years ago they were the undisputed authority 
of the Mid-Euphrates and entirely 
'absolved from revenue*. The Hillah channel 
began to decay, and the increased flow of water down the Hindiyah channel soon 
began to show its effects in a: 
1, personal communication. 
At j9, l,,,. ýi;, 
, la, Gý, Nºy ,;, N,; ý/ý , 
2. C. 0.696/1" Admin Reports, Shamiyah and Najaf 1918, p. 20 
3. A. T. Wilson, Clash ..., 2Z: -C--it-9 pp"74-6 
4. C. O. 696/1, Admin 
Reimorts, Shamiyah and Naiaf, 1918, p. 70 
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'tendency of'the Euphrates tribes to migrate from the Hillah 
and the upper Hindiyah to the Shamiyah. The Turks were not 
slow to seize this Heaven-sent opportunity to break the power 1 
of the Khaza*il by the introduction of alien and hostile tribes'. 
Another method to achieve similar ends was the Turkish allotment of lands to 
the Sayids class, 'there is no doubt that the majority /of Sayids' claims? were 
introduced by the Turks and their claims regarded favourably by the Ottoman 
Government *. 
2 
The sole result of Turkish efforts was the introduction of a laflge number 
of landed proprietors, Sheikhs or Sayids, enjoying almost complete local autonomy 
and 
'regarding with only too well-justified contempt the feeble 
attempts of corrupt officials to collect one per cent of the 
revenue demanded. The rapidly increasing properity of the 
Shamiyah, the distance'from Baghdad, and the Proximity of Najaf, 
as always a centre of intrigue and rebellion, all contributed 
towards a feeling of independence and confidence in their awn 
abilities which made the Shamiyah shaikhs both the terror and 3 
despair: of the Ottoman Government'. 
A combination of socio-economic, an3 geographical' circumstances were bound to 
reflect themselves in a, relatively, mature political awareness. It was in I 
1910-1912 that Fetlah Sheikhs supported Tälib's endeavour at an Aräb autonomy, 
4 
and at the outbreak of war the Shämiyah Sheikhs *were in communication with the 
Sharif of Mecca for the formation of an-independent-Arab Government#. 
5 
The Fetlah, the more politically aware tribe, was growing in power during 
the period of British occupation. The decay of the Khazä'il (led by Muhd. and 
Salmen al 'Abtän) was in process. The year 1919 'has shown a continuance of 
6 
this state of affairs*. That was for two reasons, the Fetlah tribesmen were 
very well handled 
by their sheikhs. And secondly, the Fetlah was a rice culti- 
vating tribe. #in these cases the authority of the Shaikhs over the cultivator 
1. Ibn f P. 66 
2. Ibid. 
3. It was also reported that 'The attempt to 
'collect the rice revenue was in- 
variably the prelude 
to quite extensive autumn manoeuvres on the part of 
several battalions, and 
the murder of the hated official was an agreeable 
I_" pastime'. 
4. Supra , 
S. C. O. 696/1" Admin. Reports, Shamiyah and Najaf 1918, p. 67 
6. C. O. 696/2. Admin. 
Reports, Shamiyah 1919, p. 1 
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is absolute ... The reason 
for this is ... the absolute necessity for organized 
labour and constant attention'. 
1 
Success in rice cultivation is obtained'only 
by the closest co-operation between employers and employee. 'This is fully 
appreciated by the tribesmen and they willingly put themselves under the control 
of their Shaikhs*. 
2 
The Bani Hassan were, if at alit -growers of wheat and barley,, which is less 
arduous, and discipline among them was in consequence far less strong. Bani 
Hassan were 'the poorest of the'poor cultivators and prefer the wandering life 
of cattle grazers to anything eise* .3 This was due to the fact that their lands 
were considerably above the level of the river and this precluded flow irrigation. 
The political officer warned that "Bani Hassan tribe has reached today /late 19197 
a stage of poverty and carelessness which if not checked now, must lead to very 
early disintegration and consequent lawlessness'. 
4 
It was also reported that 
fit was in vain to expect much help from *Alwan al Sa'dun /Sheikh ofýBani Hassan7. 
He preferred town existence at Kufah to living among his tribesmen'. 
5 
Subsequent 
development was to bring about all the far-sighted predictions of the political 
officer. 'Lawlessness' was to take over the leadership of the Bani Hassan, which 
was taken over by 'Umrän 
(anti-British). 
The first sign of tribal discontent was to show itself during the Referendum 
of 1918-1919, when some tribal sheikhs of the area voted for an independent Arab 
government. 
6 In early 1920, the British formed some Divisional Councils in Iraq. 
The first meeting of the Shämiyah Council was held on January 25th. Two days 
later *Abd al W ähid al Hiji Sikar took the opportunity of seeing Hamid Khän and 
propounded to him the 
following: 
'We have heard ... that a son of the Sharif is about to be appointed 
as king"of Iraq and, that the British will be replaced by an Arab 
Government ... and this being so we feel disinclined to pay any 
further revenue on our rice harvest'. 
1. C. O. 696/1. Admin. Reports, Shamiyah and Najaf 1918, p. 67 
2. C. O. 696/2. Admin. Reports, Shamiyah, 1919, p. 2. 
3. Ibid. 
4. Ibid. 
5. Ibid. 
6. Ste, pp. 294-7 545 
7. F. O. 371/5072. Memo 
No-C20 dated 5th February 1920. From P. O. Shamiyah to 
r _C. 
Baghdad. 
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It is clear that an 'Arab Government' meant to Sikar 'no taxation'. A few 
days later all members of the Council 
1 
tendered their resignation to the Political 
Officer of Shämiyah stating that "as our country Iraq*s future has not yet been 
decided ... therefore we cannot give any opinion 
before we know the future of 
our beloved Iraq'. The Political Officer-explained to the Civil Commissioner that 
'they took the view ... that any expression of opinion on their 
part as an official body would (a) be construed as indicating 
their desire for British Occupation, (b) strengthen the hold of 
the British Government upon the country ... In spite of the 
assurances of the past, the Notables of Shamiyah make little 
effort to screen their desire for an Arab Government, and this 
being so, their present attitude in the question of a Divisional 
Council seems not unreasonable". 
2 
This unanimous resignation coincided with Abu Timman's withdrawal of Baghdadfs 
Council-3 
(ii) The death of at Yazdi and the rise of at Shiräzi: Nafeesi's claim that at 
Yazdi "did much in secret to undermine British authorityt, 
4 is untrue and mis- 
leading. It is sufficient to recall the words of Gertrude Bell: 
'Nor will those among us who were participants in the drama /The 
Referendum? fail to remember the support which we, on our side, 
received from ... Saiyd Muhammad Kadhim Yazdi*. 
5 
In May 1918 it was reported that the Political Officer of Shämiyah visited Yazdi 
'On the third visit /28th April 19187 he complained bitterly of attempts made 
by some of the Ulema to draw 
him into an anti-British attitude'. 
6 
The report 
concluded that: 
'It is difficult to overestimate the value to us of /Yazdi's7 
unbroken support'. 
7 
1. Members of the Council were: 'Abbäs Killidär, Hädi Naclib al Ashräf, Muhsin 
Shaläsh, 'Abd al Rahim Bushri (Najaf), 111di al Zuwain (Ja'ärah), Muhsin abu 
Tabikh (Umm al Ba'rur), 'A1wan al Häji Sa'dun (Bani }jassan), 'Abd al WSkid 
Haji Sikar, 'Abädi al Hussein (Fetlah), Nur al Sayid 'Aziz, 'A1wän 'Abbäs 
(Shamiyah Sayids), Leftah Shamkhi (Ja'arah), Murzuq al 'Awäd ('Awäbid) and 
Salman al pähir (al Khazä'il). 
545 
2. Memo No. CZ20 
3. 'A. Bäzirkän, op. cit., p. 89 
4. A. F. Nafeesi, op. cit., p. 200 
5. F. 0.371/4150/5394. Memo No. S. 24. Self-Determination in Mes_ opotamia, dated 
22nd February 1919. 
6. F. 0.371/3397'21421. 
Fortnightly Report ending May ist 1918. The P. O. suspected 
jawad Sahib al Jawaher as the one pressurising al Yazdi. 
'. zb: 
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f 
Yazdi*sattitude is not widely discussed 'in Iraqi literature due, perhaps, 
to his sacredness. However there are many indications which show that it was as 
early as 1918; -that Iraqi leaders were-aware of such an attitude: In his unpub- 
lished papers Sheikh Muhammad al Khälisi wrote, that al Shiräzifs"departure from 
Samara to Karbala-was motivated by the proximity of the latter. town to the Euph- 
rates tribes where he could incite them into the anti-British drive. Furthermore 
it was in Karbalä'where Shiräzi could counter-balance Yazdits"influence. 
1 
In 
fact al Kha1isi considerdd the death of al Yazdi as an assistance to the inde- 
pendence movement. 
In late 1918 al aras party established contacts with Sayid Muhammad Bair. 
al *Ulum. 
3 The latter informed them that 'Najaf and the mid-Euphrates were use- 
less for the nationalist movement because of Yazdits attituie*. 
4 
It was agreed 
that Shiräzi might revive the 'nationalist spirit' if he decided to move to 
Karbala. During the same year Muhammad Ridä (son of Shiräzi) came to Baghdad 
where he established some contacts with such nationalists as Al Sadr, Timman 
and Bäzirkan. It was agreed between al Sadr, al Khälisi and Rid! that ShIräzi's 
presence in Karbala was essential 
for the growth of the anti-British movement 
s 
Once settled in Karbala, Rica was to form a group of Shiti intellectuals 
which included himself, al Jazä'iri, al Shahristäni, Sib al Jawähir, al 'Ulum 
and at Shabibi brothers. He established strong contacts with al aras through 
the efforts of Bägir al Shibibi and Ja*far abu Timman. The first of Shirazi's 
open moves was his previously-mentioned 
fetwa which foiled any pro-British re- 
-V 6 
sponses in Karbala during 
the Referendum. Furthermore, his fetwa was dis- 
tributed in thousands by the nationalists (al aras) all over Iraq.? In early 
1919 al Shiräzi sent al Shibibi to Hijaz and Syria with letters to Hussein and 
1. M. al Khalisi, Batal al Islam, op. cit., pp. 100-102 
2. M. al Khälisi, Kitäb 
fi Sabil Allah, (Unpublished Manuscript), Baghdad 
n. d., PP. 1-2 
3. 'Ulum and Jazä'iri return to Iraq from their exile (Muhamarah) after the 
Armistice. 
4.1 A. al Bäzirkan, op. ccit., p. 78 
ghälisi, Ba al .., op cit., p. 
104 
6. S, r. a. s. Pp. 
7. Al Bäzirkan, op. cit., pp. 79-80; Al Nassani, Al Thawra .... o cit., p. 35 
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1 
Faisal protesting against British rule. Ridä al Shabiäi 'a man of striking 
2 
personality, great eloquence and remarkable literary gift* had shown himself 
extremely friendly to the British after the occupation. In September 1918 he 
edited the Administration paper al 'Arab. However after a, few months he deserted 
his job and in-January 1919 he led an anti-British campaign and called for al 
istig1 1 al täm. 
3 
Immediately after the Referendum, al Haras sent Hassan Fahmi and Sabih Najib4 
(both ex-officers) to Syria with copies of Baghdad madba as. Sh r zi sent Ridä 
al Shabibi with letters to Hussein and. his sons Faisal and 'Ali. 
5 Shiräzi de- 
Glared to Faisal his support 
for 'the Arab league which is the essence of Islamic 
glory*. He called him to raise 
his voice in support of the Iraqi struggle for 
independence. The letter of Rid; (the elder son of Shiräzi) was more significant. 
lie wrote to 'Ali that he was praying 
for the survival of the Ilashimite crown which 
"is the essence of the life of the Arab nation and its existences. Rid; confirmed 
that: 
'Iraq like all other Arab countries had declared its loyalty 
(Mubäi'a) to your father. I may add that Iraq is more enthus- 
iastic for absolute independence. Iraq is more nationalistic 
and closer to Arab unity ... the Iraqis had suffered great 
difficulties and oppression because they elected one of your 
brothers ... I. 
Ridg requested 'Ali to render. his support to the Iraqi struggle against the 
6 Those two letters disclose how deep was the nationalist-Shili occupation. 
" 
alliance in terms of concepts, aims and organization. 
The group of Shi'i Mujtahids and intellectuals proved to be of an active 
and. effective character: 
*Anti-Government propaganda in this town dates back to about 
2 years ago when the present leading Mujtahid ... Shirazi, 
came to Karbala ... with his son ... Ridha. The latter ... 
attitude has 
been invariably hostile and uncompromising, no 
1. F. 0.371/5242/E. 5616. Allso Baghdad despatch No. 7594 March 23rd 1920. E. 3800. 
Also F. M. al Firton, op. cit., pp. 91-4 
2. F. 0.371/5243/E. 
10272 
3. Did- 
4. A. gäzirkän, op. cit., pp. 
86-7 
5. M. R. al Shabibi 
6. F. M. al Firvon, 
op. cit., PP, 91-5, both letters dated 7th R amädän 1337 
(May-June 1919) 
- 349 - 
'measure, however friendly, would have the least effect in' 
modifying his views. His father who is over 90 years old 
is only a tool in his hand ... '. 
l 
The death of al Yazdi on the 29th April 1919 was a , real blow to the British 
Administration because it left the field free to the influence of Shiräzi and 
his son. The Administration could not tolerate the activities of Ridä and decided 
to deport him and some of his followers to Persia. -" 
*Ridha has taken a prominent part in the anti-British propaganda ... It is largely owing to the intrigues of Ridha, that anti-British 
propaganda assumed dimensions which rendered advisable the 
deportation'. 2 
However such a decision aroused a wide protest among-the tribes. 
3 
Shiräzi- 
threatened to leave Iraq in indignation. 'Politicallconsequences' might have 
been alarming 'and it was finally decided /by the C. C. 7 towards the close of the 
year /19197 to make easy the decision of the Mirza to remain in Karbala by per- 
the return of the deportees'. 
4 
witting 
There was a clever move on the part of the Baghdadi nationalists and Islamists 
r-ý 
to convince Shirazi to settle in Karbala. He was to present the sort of leader- 
ship much needed in that area and he would make possible the reunion of'Shi'i 
nationalists and Islamists. This unity 
had suffered greatly after the death 
of Habubi and the acceptance at 
face value by the nationalists (more than Islamists 
of General Maude's 
äeclaration. Shzihristäni who, for a while, abstained from 
politics, was to accept Shirazi's 
leadership and renewed his contacts with both 
Islamic reformers (Jazä'iri, 'Ulum) and Arab nationalists (Shabibi). Shahristäni 
received a letter from the latter 
in which Shabibi promised to continue the 
'common' struggle until 'the Arab flag is raised over Iraq and a son of the- 
Sharif is installed as a king'. Shabibi pointed to the importance of 'more 
and stronger' organizational 
links with 'Baghdad*, and informed Shahristäni that 
some 'Baghdadi young ment will arrive soon 
to establish a branch in Najaf for the 
1. F. 0.371/5078. Baghdad Memo. No. 20760 covering Report by A. P. O. Karbala on ac- 
tivities of Anti-Government Party dated 14th July 1919. The C. C. accused Rida 
of working for the 
Bolshevik. The report accused him of inciting the tribes, 
forming a secret--society which was in contact with Baghdad*s nationalists. 
2. F. 0.371/6348/99. Admin. Report of the Hillah Division for the year 1919 
3. F. o. 371/5230E. 12038. Baghdad Memorandum Confidential S/724.9th July 1920 
4. F. 0.371/6348/99. Admin. Report, Hillah, 1919. Wilson', s letter to Shiraz; 9.8.191] 
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'Arab party*. He concluded his letter by`asking about-the Karbala mu ba w and 
offering his respect to Jazä'iri. 
1 
Further evidence of the organizational links was revealed in Shiräzi*s 
letter to abu Timman: " 
'Your Islamic movementr. in Baghdad has filled us with pleasure'... 
We join our voices with yours in shouting "we declare complete 
independence without foreign interference" ... You must also 
preserve the rights of Christians and Jews /änd7 ... 
foreigners 
... so that your enemy 
have no charge against your treatment of 
minorities'. 
The leaders of al aras were aware of the importance of the mid-Euphrates 
to their cause. They were also aware of the deterioration in the relations be- 
tween the leaders of that area and the Administration. Thus al aras exerted 
a tremendous effort to strengthen its links with those leaders. In Najaf, Ridä 
al Shabibi organized a political cell which included Muhammad Bäc1ir at Shabibi 
(editor of al Furät), Hussein and Said Kamäl al Din (teachers), Sa'd Sälih 
(teacher), Muhammad 'Abd at Hussein (editor of al Istigläl)ýMuhammad Ridg at 
Säfi (small merchant), 'Abd at Razzäq 'Adwah(teacher, deported in May 1919), 
Ahmed at Säfi and Muhammed Bägir al Hilli (poets). In Muntafiq Bägir at Shabibi 
recruited Sayid 'Abd al Mahdi 
(small Sheikh), 1Ali al Shargi (poet), 'Abd al Karim 
at Sabti and Muhammed Nussein Hayder 
(teachers). The Haras group in Iiliah. was 
formed of Khayri at Hindäwi (poet and A. P. O. ), Muhsin abu at Mahasin (poet ), 
R a*ouf al Amin (teacher) and Muhammad Mabdi al Basir. In Diyala it was composed 
of Sa'id Sara, Habib al 'Aydarousi, Mahmud al Mitwali, Maki al Urfali and 'Abd al 
Latif al F ärisi. Id Karbalä, the distinction between Islamists and nationalists 
was less clear: a group was 
formed there by al Shahristäni and included Ahmed 
(son of Khuräsäni), al Käshäni (moved to Baghdad), Mirza 'Abd al ; aussein (son of 
Shiräzi) and Sayid 'Abd al Wahäb (teacher). Sayid Hädi Zuwaln joined al tiaras 
and worked for 
its cause among the Sayid of Shamiyah and Najaf. Two tribal 
leaders were also to join: Kätital tAwädi (of tAfa. j and Daghärrah) and Marzuk 
1. M. R. al Shabibi, letter dated 21st Rabital Awal 1337 (26.12.1918) 
2. F. 0.371/5076. Mesopotamia Police. Abstract of Intellicence 5th June 1920 
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al "Awäd (Sheikh al 'Awäbid - between Hillah and Shamiyah). Zuwain, *Awädi and 
"Awäd were to form the link between ai aras and the tribal Sheikhs of the area. 
Shabibi played the same role between al aras and the mujtahids. 
l 
The Arab nationalists were active in utilizing the agrarian grievances and 
in giving a nationalist character to the tribal discontent. In April 1920, they 
achieved a significant political success by organizing ma ba as which were 
signed by most of the mid-Euphrates leaders. They recognized 'Abd Allah as king 
of a 'fully independent' Iraq. I have seen only one original madba a which was 
signed by nine leaders of Samawah and Rumaitheh. It was addressed to 'Abd Allah 
requesting his coming to Iraq and declaring absolute rejection of any w4L aiyah 
(mandate). 
2 The Administration reported this campaign of declaration. of loyalty 
to Abdullah as follows: 
*... They are all dated ... 
(April 12,1920)' 
... to assure the 
Sharif Abdullah that his loyal subjects are eagerly awaiting his 
arrival. They are signed by: (1) the chiefs and saiyids of the 
Shamiyah tribes, (2) ... the Samawah and Rumaithah tribes (Bani 
Huchaim), (3) the chiefs of the Muntafiq, (4) the chiefs and 
Saiyids of Najaf, Kufah and the Shamiyah, (5) Notables and tribal 
chiefs of Hillah. Every one of the signatories took a leading 
part in the subsequent rebellion with the exception of Khayyun 
al 'Ubaid /Muntafig7 and Salman al Dhahir /Khaza'il%'. 3 
Such madbata were of a serious significance. They demonstrated the strength 
of the links between different groups of Iraqi 'nationalists'; they were signed 
in April 1920, while the Iraqi Conference of Damascus was held in March of the 
same year. What was more 
important is that they amounted to a declaration of 
independence for Iraq on the part of the Mid-Euphrates tribes, mujtahids and 
intellectuals. The Administration was aware of the serious implications involved: 
*... it was understood in Kerbela that 15,000 liras had been 
received in Iraq /by Sheikh Said Nagshaband17 from the Arab 
Government for distribution amongst the tribes of Shamiyah, 
Daghara, Hindiyah, Kerbala, Ududah, Hukkan, Shatra, Samawab ... 
1. I collected and organized the above information from the papers of Khäli§" 
Shabibi and Sharqi; the works of Balir, Bäzirkän, Fir'on and Ijassani o. 
c; also A. R. al Hilläli, Al Sh'ir al Thä'ir (B. al Shabib (Baghdad, 
1965); 
r 
y. Izzidein, Khayri al Hindawi, (Cairo, 1965); M. 'A. Kamaluldien , 
Said alibi (Baghdad, 1949). 
2. prominent sheikhs who signed were Sha'län aby al Jun and Ghutha th al liarjän 
(it was they who started the rising of 1920). The ma ba a was undated. 
Hassan Sha'ban library at Najaf. 
3. p. p. 371/6350/116. Mesopotamia Intelligence. Report No. 6,31st January 1921. 
Letters were sent by Bac1, ir at Shabibi 'who was wacting as correspondent 
with the extreme 
Nationalist party in Iraq. ' 
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*Bakir al Shabibi, Shaikh Ali al Sharji /Shi*i intelle_ctuais7 
..., Umar 
Affendi and Yunis Affendi ibn Haji Khalaf /ex- 
Officers, Sunni? were met in Kerbala and said they had been 
touring Hillah and Musayyeb to inform the tribes of the Turko- 
Arab movement ... *. 
1 
Major Tyler, the Political Officer of Hillah, reported to Wilson that: 
'Two Madhbatas are said to have despatched from Kerbala ... 
If a favourable reply is received to the invitation to the 
Emir Abdullah, some of the leaders of the movement have 
determined to take action ... If we take no action ... some 
form of anti-British Government action may be anticipated 
... 
It is believed that it would be easier to break up the 
Diwaniyah ring, than the Shamiyah ... Hillah Sheikhs ... 
are nervous about the spread of possible disorder to their 
:2 own tribes ... . 
Those letters manifested the significant political change which had occurred 
in the area between May 1918 and April 1920. By April 1920 the nationalist-Shi'i 
*Ulemä' tribal sheikhs and Sayids alliance was more than an aspiration; it was 
a reality. During the Najaf disturbances, the anti-British group of Shi*i 'Ulemä', 
(Jaza'iri and "Ulum ) was isolated and ineffective. In early 1920, the bulk of 
the area was becoming part of the rising movement which took al Istigläl and 
Arab Government as its aims. Such a development and the contracting of that 
important alliance was made possible by the Administration*s own (blunders*, 
the death of al Yazdi, the influence of Shiräzi and his son Ridä and the growth 
of the nationalist movement 
inside Baghdad itself. All these factors formed 
the objective background 
favouring an alliance. The subsequent strengthening 
of such an alliance proved 
to be the backbone of the rising. 
1. F. 0.371/5074. Abstract of Intelligence dated March 27th 1920, No. 13 
2.1:. 0.371/5226/E. 7284. No. 2430-2614. Tuerij, May 14th, 1920 
I 
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CHAPTER XIV 
THE UPRISING OF 1920 
I. Prelude to the Rising 
(a) The Failure of the Moderate Trend among the Nationalists: By moderates I 
am referring to those who sought the establishment of an Arab Administration in 
Iraq,, but who accepted British-assistance or guidance and opposed, for reasons 
which will appear in due course, the use of violent methods, more especially when 
it involved the politicization of the tribes. Prominent exponents of this trend, 
inside Iraq, were the landed notables, the 'Ahd group (led by Nagshabandi)y Sulimär 
Faidi-and Tälib pasha of Basrah. This moderate trend failed completely. In the 
years 1919 to 1921, 
it was crushed between opposite poles; the Administration 
and the frustrated nationalists. Its 
failure was among the major factors behind 
the outbreak'of violence. 
The best illustration of the moderates* dilemma was represented by Sulimän 
F aidi. 1 In the 
first place and 'like so many of them' Faidi expressed his dislike 
of the word Wu4äiyah as 
the translation of Mandate and preferred Timä ah. lie 
developed his argument on the following lines. Since the British took Baghdad 
they had been talking about an Arab Government, but three years and more had 
elapsed and nothing materialized, 
*yet you proceed to draw up a scheme without 
2 
consulting anyone*. Faidi went on 
to show his fears of the developments: 
you cannot let things go on as at present. The Agitation is 
taking dangerous proportions. I very much 
fear open disturbance, 
not perhaps in Baghdad but in the provinces, 
for all the tribes 
are affected. ... 
I look upon the combination of religion and 
politics as especially dangerous 
for it is almost impossible ... 
to stand up against it. Though I dislike the Mauluds intensely 
I find myself obliged to go to them ... the 
boasted reconciliation 
of Sunnis with Shi'ahs 
is most distasteful to me and I should 
regard Shi*ah domination as an unthinkable 
disaster'. 3 
1. Fai¢i was interviewed by G. Bell who recorded the interview in a memorandum 
entitled 'Conversation with 
Sulaiman Faidhi'. Wilson sent a copy of it to 
London with the remark "This may be regarded as a fair exposition of the 
present moderate view which 
has develaped in the past week #. 
S. A. Box 303. Memo 17756, dated 14th June 1920. Also P. 0.371/5228/F. 8915 
2. Faidi was referring to 
the Bonham-Carter Committee, which included no Iraqis. 
3. i1eino. 17756. 
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Ahmed al Däoud was the President of Majlis 'Ulemä'`al Augäf. 'He joined 
the nationalist movement and became one-of its accepted leaders. 
' 
He played 
a prominent role'in the Mawlud movement. 
2 
'On the"11th August 1920, he was 
3 
arrested, exiled to Henjam ahd allowed to return in February 1921. 'Since 
his return'he had admitted freely to the High Commissioner ... 'that his reason 
for associating himself with the extreme Nationalist movement was mainly personal 
dissatisfaction /with the Administration7'. 
4 
He published'a note 'to all patriots 
throughout al 'Iraqi in which he called them to tavoid the harmful ignorance' and 
to' 'support-the good intentions of the `government*. 
5 
Däoud's declaration came at 
a"time when the nationalist movement was suffering a painful defeat; yet it was 
reported that 'He enjoys a poor reputation ... and his return appears to have 
produced little impression #. 
61 
In April 1920 it was reported: 
*... Government intended appointing an Advisory Committee of 8 
Muhamadans and 2 Jews ... Suwaidi was said to be advising the 
refusal of appointment, but /Nagshabandi7 proposed that all 
should accept and then make such demands on Government as would 
be refused whereupon they could resign*. 7 
Although-Nagshabandits argument was hardly 'moderate*, it was rejected by the 
bulk of the nationalists who favoured the more militant attitude, of Suwaidi. 
Furthermore it was reported that in July 1920 Nagshabandi had disassociated 
himself from certain acts of the nationalists and topenly condemned their policy'. 
He said that the nationalists had sent him two ma bates to sign. The first 
appointed certain Iraqis 
8 
as delegates of Iraq to proceed to Europe. The second 
was a protest against Government's suggestion of summoning a Councils of ex- 
Deputies to consider the form of election. Naqshabandi said that he refused both 
1. F. 0.371/5076. M. P. Abstract of Intelligence, No. 21, dated 22nd May 1920, 
para. 386. 
2. Ibid.; also M. P. A. I. No. 22, dated 29th May 1920 
3. F. O. 371/5081. M. O. A. I., No. 33, dated 14th August 1920, Para. 678 
4. F. 0.371/6350, Mesopotamia Intelligence Report No. 7, dated 14th February 1921 
5. al *Iräq, No. 224,23rd February 1921 
6. p. 0.371/6350. M. I. Report No. 8, dated Ist March 1921 
7. F. 0.371/5074. M. P. A,. I. No. 14,3rd April 1920 
8. Häshim Pasha al *Umari, ýNäji ai 
Suwaidi, MuDammad Rica al Shabibi, Yäsin 
al Häshimi, 
"Abd al Karim at Jaz$iri, and Rashid al Khoja. 
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and declared that 'they had been prepared by men who sought only their own 
interests and for this same cause were not shedding oceans of blood on the 
Euphrates'. 
1 
Moreover it was reported that there were growing indications 
of the rise of a moderate party amongst the local politicians 'probably centring 
round the Naqibs, the Haidaris, the Nayib /äl Nagshabandi7, the Zahawis, the 
Jamils etc. '. 
2 
On several occasions those families have evinced 'disgust' at 
the policy of the nationalist leaders and blamed them for the excesses on the 
Euphrates. The report concluded: 'If only this party could receive encouragement 
and find an outspoken champion to lead them, Yusuf al Suwaidi, Muhammad al Sadr 
and company might easily be deflated'. 
3 
In Mosul a similar development was taking place. The Political Officer 
reported that al *Ahd who in the past included among its members a considerable 
number of older and more influential Ashraf was getting more influenced by 
younger and more extreme nationalists. In July 1920, Mosul's population incited 
by the news and letters from Baghdad decided to elect its Mandubin 'Deputies' 
(vide infra). A list of forty was 'voted' upon and it included the names of many 
of the Ashraf 'some of whom were not slow to come to me /P. 0.7 to say that they 
had no foreknowledge of what was intended, that popular feeling was too strong 
for them to refuse to co-operate, but that they intended to use their influence 
4 
to break the movement up gradually'. 
All these moderate attitudes represented the declared or latent feelings 
of a considerable section of Iraqi nationalists. They were naturally stronger 
among pro-British and conservative Iraqis like the influential al Naqlb family 
of Baghdad. Major Balfour stated that 
he informed al Nag-lb that 'we had suggested 
deferring a decision on the Amirate for two years. /äl Nagib al Kayl7ani7 said 
four years not two ... He was very bitter about the Syrian attempt to force an 
5 
Amir on this country ... *. The Naqib informed Sir Percy Cox that it was not in 
P. O. 371/5078. Secret M. P. A. I. No. 29, dated 17th July 1920, Para. 561 
2. Ibid., Para. 566. 
3. Ibid. 
4. C. O. 696/3. Admin. Report of the Mosul Division for the year 1920, p. 3 
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the interest of Britain to withdraw, its troops from Iraq. 'At the same time, it 
was difficult for /al Naqib/ to understand how such mischievous talk was allowed 
to go on'. 
1 (He was referring to the press campaign in Great Britain. ) However, 
the Naqib did not openly advise Cox to impose censorship on the British Press or 
to close the British Parliament! 
(urzon's suggestion that the British needed to deal with an Iraqi Zaghlul 
presented a wise and practical view. It seems that the Administration in Iraq 
decided to 'finds an Iraqi Zaghlul in the person of Tä1ib Pasha al Naqib. 
Gertrude Bell, who argued that "Talib is entirely unscrupulous' pointed out 'but 
his interests and ours are the same*. 
2 Thus she suggested that 'We must make 
him and his like follow respectableýcoursesf. 
3 Montagu raised the possibility 
that: 
'Support of the pro-British nationalists be secured through not 
one but two possible leaders, Faisal and Talib and that possibly 
we may run both ... Talib as Governor of Basrah and Faisal as 
Arab king at Baghdadt. 4 
Tälib was quite willing to perform his role. His motives were: burning 
ambitions; the prevailing pro-British attitude of Basrah and his fear of popular 
agitation, fellähin rising and the Shiti role. Tälib returned to Basrah from his 
exile on the 8th February 1920. A 
few days later he was invited to Baghdad where 
he stayed for some days as the guest of A. T. Wilson. 
5 
The Civil Commissioner 
telegraphed that Tälib tis not a man who can be easily fitted into local rep- 
resentative institutions, but he appears to be well disposed and genuinely anxious 
to co-operate'. 
6 At the end of May, Wilson telegraphed that Taub was aspiring 
to be nothing less than Amir of Mesopotamia or at least president of the Council. 
Wilson added that Tälib was capable of filling the latter post but 'that he was 
such a rogue,, and so cordially 
hated, that his nomination would not be put 
forward by the Government'. 
7 
1. P. 0.371/6349/280. From H. C. Baghdad, dated 15th January 1921. 
2. G. Bell, Private Letters ... ý 
(Newcastle), letter dated July 26th 1920 
3. Ibid., Letter dated August 30th 1920 
4. F. O. 371/5229/E. 10440, dated 25th August 1920 
5. F. O. 371/5231/8.1454 
6. F. O. 371/52161. From C. C. Baghdad, No. 2481s dated 25th February 1920 
7. F. 0.371/5231/E. 546I 
hL 
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In late June, `Tälib professed-to the British his conviction that British 
Mandate and guidance were essential for the future progress of the country and 
"expressed-his readiness to support /British policy? in any way he could'. 
1 
Tälib was willing 
'to take the risk involved to his life by taking a leading part 
in local politics on the lines desired by us provided that we 
guarantee him personal protection and support for himself and, 
his sons somewhat on the same lines as the guarantee we have 
given to the Sheikh of Mohammerah, "accompanied, I gathered with 
some promise of financial support, as he is a man with practically 
no private means'. 
2 
Miss Bell pointed out that Tälib requested some money from her which was'duly given. 
Captain-I. N. 'Clayton had a long interview with Tälib: 
*/fälib7 said to me quite openly that he could run the country, 
but that he wished to do so at our request and not as elected 
by the people. His idea I think is that if put in by us we 
shall be forced to back him ... He said that in certain circum- 
stances :.. it might be necessary to separate Basrah from Baghdad 
and Mosul. ' 
This may be intended merely to show his loyalty to us in being 
prepared to go to any lengths ... or it may be prompted by some 
uncertainty as to his influence in the two northern Vilayet". 4 
T51ib explained his motives for supporting the British: 
'I was fully convinced that Mesopotamia with all its population 
was going towards its ruin /during the unrest of summer 19207 
if acting under the bad advice of the plotters ... I began 
my 
task by cutting all communications between the tribes and the 
towns, and I succeeded in convincing the latter that the plotters' 
bad advice could not but conduct to a bad end'. 5 
In September, 1920, Tälib addressed the Iraqi public in an open message: 
'When I came back to Dar al Salam, I unfortunately found it in 
a regrettable condition ... On the one hand a demand for inde- 
pendence and on the other looting of property ... I discussed 
the grave situation with the British Officials and found them 
willing to reach an understanding on several issues ... but when 
I discussed the situation with the leaders of the movement in 
Baghdad, I found them indifferent ... on the contrary they exerted 
all their efforts at incitement, mutiny and agitating the tribes 
towards disorder regardless of the grave consequences'. 6 
1. F. 0.371/5227/E. 7395 dated 29th June 1920 
2. F. 0.371/5228/E. 9368. From C. C. Baghdad, No. 8976, dated 25th February 1920 
3. G. Bell, Private Letters . _, (Newcastle), letter dated 30th August 
4. g. O. 371/5230//. 12461, dated 22nd August 1920 
5. H. St J. B. Philby Pape St. Antony's College, Oxford, DS. 79.8. T2, 
Letter dated ist January 1923, to S. of S. for Colonies 
6. al Sharq, No. 
18.7. Muharam 1339 (21st September 1920) 
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In late July 1920, T91ib had a long meeting with al Suwaidi which Tälib 
fully reported"to'the Authorities. Suwaidi was disappointed at the attitude 
of Basrah*s notables. The nationalists had twice written to Tilib without 
receiving a reply from him. The nationaists were willing to accept Tälibts 
leadership if he supported their cause (Tälib says). Suwaidi went on to inform 
Talib of the nationalists strength; Shi*ah and Sunnah are united and the tribes 
are under nationalist leadership. 'Kathir Zain /very good%. I am an Arab and 
a native of the Iraq. Explain to me your views'. Suwaidi replied 'No foreigners, 
no mandate, no interference from without'. Tälib informed the British that al 
Suwaidi relied upon Fuad al Daftari, Ja*far abu Timman and Sayid Muhammad al Sadr. 
Tälib put the following demands to Suwaidi as pre-conditions if he was to join 
the movement: 
'1. The head of the Iraq State must be an Iraqi, a Sharif of 
the best blood and family of the Iraq. 
2. A committee must be formed of reputable and honourable men. 
3. The Policy of political propaganda and incitement to 
rebellion to be dropped at once. 
4. The Ashraf of Baghdad and elsewhere who had not joined Yusuf 
Effendi's party to be invited to take part in the Committee'. ' 
Such, conditions confirmed Bell's impressions of Tälib: 'I never came across any- 
one whose world centred so completely in himself as in the case of Talib ... not 
a thought but of his own advancement. He was his own unique preoccupation'. 
2 
Needless to say all of Talib's conditions were refused. In October 1920, it 
was reported that 'the Nationalists are strongly opposed to Sayyid Talib becoming 
Prime Minister in the new Government and in favour of Yusuf al Suwaidi'. 
3 
It is 
clear that up to that time Suwaidi was retaining his extreme attitude towards the 
Administration even when it was headed by Sir Percy Cox. He wrote to a group of 
Iraqi nationalists including Yehya al Shäwi and Fetäh Pasha 'advising them not 
to interview the High Commissioner, nor assist him in any way ... All present 
agreed to follow 
Yusuf's advice and a letter was sent to him to that effect'. 
4 
1. F. 0.371/5230/2.11753, dated 28th July 1920 
2. G. Bell, Private Letters and Papers, -. 
t., letter dated 25th April 1921 
3.8.0.371/5082. S. M. P. Abstract of Intelligence, No. 42, Baghdad, 16th 
October 1920 
4. Ibid. 
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Tälib*s failure was reasonably explained by G. Bell: 
'The new people, /the nationalists? regard him (Talib) with 
suspicion, partly because they rightly suspect him of aiming 
at the position of authority which they want for themselves 
and partly because they know he is on very good terms with us 
and not likely to go for a free Arab Government, without a 
mandate'. 
l 
The failure of Tälib Pasha was admitted by the Civil Commissioner in a telegram 
2 
dated 29th July 1920, and confirmed by another telegram dated 17th August 1920.3 
However Tälib was not the only one who was alarmed at the turn which the 
nationalist movement was taking. His attitude was representative of the outlook 
and interests of a larger group. Miss Bell pointed out, on several occasions 
that even 'advanced nationalists' were interested in pacifying the tribes, 
4 
and 
5 
that anxiety was growing towards 'the terror of the tribes'. In the midst of 
the rising, she wrote: 
'... it makes me laugh to note the attitude of ... Baghdad 
notables - they all have estates on the Diyalah, who were 
ready enough to take a hand in the agitation at the beginning 
and now have no words bad enough for itt. 
6 
It is clear that the 'moderates' resented three aspects of the national 
movement: its alliance with the Shitah "Ulemä'; its agitation amongst the tribes 
and attempts to draw the tribes into politics; and finally its encouragement of 
violence. Such a threefold attitude was a threat to the 'moderates'' political 
outlook or land interests or 
both. 
Tälibts attitude was, nevertheless, dramatic. He was, after all, the founder 
of the Arab movement 
in Iraq. He was, perhaps, the first Iraqi politician to 
establish contacts with the tribes and to encourage their political involvement. 
In 1914, he preferred exile rather than cooperation with the British. However 
1920 had brought many changes. Basrah's conditions favoured the British; the 
leader was exhausted by struggle. Tälib threw aside his previous caution and 
1. G. Bell, Private Letters ..., Newcastle, letter dated 26th July 1920 
2. Sir A. T. Wilson, Private Letters and Papers, B. M. No. 52455, Vol. 1, From 
C. C. Baghdad to 1.0. No. 9180, dated 29th July 1920 
3. F. 0.371/5229/E. 10109. From C. C. Baghdad to 1.0. No. 9006,17th August 1920 
4. Lady Bell (ed), op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 493, letter dated 20th July 1920 
5. Ibý_, p. 494, letter dated 2nd August 1920 
6. G. Bell, Private Letters ..., (Newcastle), letter dated 30th August 1920 
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rendered an unreserved support to the British, *I served G. Britain in my life 
and property at a time when all people were fighting against it. I stood with 
Government at a time when everyone else were demanding Istig111 al Täm ... ý, 
1 
Tälib wrote to Philby. During 1920-1921, T91ib accepted to be the striking 
arm in opposing the nationalist movement and in curbing, as Minister of Interior, 
2 
its activities and leaders. Nevertheless, he was to lose again. By alienating 
himself from the nationalist, he undermined his own position. After the big 
lesson of the rising, the British were looking for an 'Iraqi Zaghiul* who could 
calm down the situation. They did not need an 'admirer'. His re-exile was in 
fact a mercy bullet; a tragic end to a stormy and 'unscrupulous' political life. 
The failure of the moderate trend to 'made a headway' raises the question 
as to the factors which allowed the 'extreme' line to go unchecked and "undeflated'. 
The objective conditions were at the service of the *radicalt line. The 
Civil Commissioner's reluctance to bring about any satisfactory changes; the 
land question; the taxation policy; and the jobless Iraqi intelligentsia were 
all assets to the rising nationalist movement. The extremists were eager to 
take advantage of the objective conditions springing from the shortcomings of, 
the Administration. In fact, during 1919-1920 the Iraqi nationalists exerted 
a tremendous effort to bring about the downfall of the British Administration. 
3 
At the outset the nationalists' aspirations were reasonable and well within 
the promises given by thelAllies and the British themselves. Their demands were 
those of General Maude, President Wilson and the Anglo-French Declaration. In 
this way Wilson and the Iraqi pro-British must have been left undefendable. In 
a highly interesting note, Miss Bell wrote: 
'The movement in this country is one aspect of a very strong 
nationalist sentiment ... and has gained immensely in strength 
and definition from the very principles in defense of which we 
fought ... We are 
in presence of a sentiment the roots of which 
1. Philby's Papers. Letter (in Arabic) dated 7.4th November 1921 
2. Tälib as M. of I. warned 'those who create secret parties or hold secret 40 meetings or spread 
false rumours ... will be punished severely'. a1'Iräq, 
24th February 1921. He closed al Istigläl paper and arrested several ö 
its writers, Basar, al Badri and Qassim al 'Alawi. 
3. Even a 'moderate' and a life long friend of Tälib like FaL¢i was to desert 
him because of his 'compromising' attitude with the British. 
S. Fasdi, op. citt", pp. 33,244-5,253,262-4 
hkl 
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'go further and deeper and touch so to speak the roots of our 
own action in the greatest trial which we as a nation have 
known. " 
However, Miss Bell's argument leaves no doubt-that the nationalists' approach 
had won the first round, Wilson himself addmitted it: 
'Why, we ask should /the rising7 have occurred? ... The end 
of the Nineteenth Century witneesed the revival of Nationalism 
in Europe and Asia -a re-action of the man in the field and the 
street from the conception and existence of great Empires ... 
Critics of Nationalism as a constructive policy were silenced 
... Nationalism 
held the field, and every official utterance of 
the Allies, and of the Allied Nations' chosen leaders, emphasized 
this as the basis of future policy ... f. 
2 
(b) The Nationalists' effort to achieve National Unity: The second move taken 
by the nationalists was their attempt to establish a national unity. Such a 
unity was to be twofold: Moslems with non-Moslems and Shi'ah with Sunnah. In 
this respect, the Iraqi nationalists embarked on a procedure of a novelty unheard 
of in the recent history of Iraq. The previously-mentioned Shirazi letter was 
an advice in that direction. Then came the ? unprecedented spectacle' when the 
Baghdadi Christians were practicing some of their religious rituals. 
3b, 
'A 
deputation of Mohammedans /composed, of abu Timman, al D udp al Bäzirkän and 
others? assembled a 
band of 'enlightened' young Sunni and Shiah who threw flowers 
and scented water on the procession as 
it passed, and shouted 'Long lire the 
Glory of our Lord the Christ ... Long live our brothers the Christians.. Long 
live the Iraqi Union. Long live the patriotic Union'. The Christians including 
priests replied *Lond live our 
brothers the Muhammadans. Long live the Arabs'. 
The Moslems entered the Church and stayed to the end of, the procession. The 
Intelligence report concluded: 
There was a good deal of sentimental talk over this unprecedented 
spectacle and many said that thanks were due to the British for 
thus unwillingly being the cause of such a union*. 4 
Some few days earlier a 'Ma wlud' was held on the 31st May at Sheikh Sandel 
mosque under the patronage of al 
Suwaldi. The speeches and a ä'id (poems) 'were 
1. G. Bell, Priv to lettersr. _, (Newcastle), Note dated July 1920. See 
Appendix 111. 
2, S. A. Box 303. Speech by the A. C. C. at Railway Directorate Dinner, 20th 
September 1920. It was his 'farewell, speech'to Iraq. 
3. +Ard al jassad. 
(Corpus Christi) 
4 1:. 0.371/5076. M. P. Abstract of Intelligence, No. 23, dated 5th June 1920, 
- 362 - 
4 
as usual, inflammatory in tone and almost entirely political'. Mulla''Uthmän 
called for the unity of Moslems, Christians and Jews 
for the independence of 
Iraq. 
l 
Intelligence reported, on May 29th, leaflets and messages addressed 
to Jews and Christians asserting the unity, and brotherhood of all Iraqi sects 
and called them in the name of the one 
fatherland and the one destiny for unity 
with Moslems to achieve Iraq's 
independence. 
2 
Similar leaflets and calls were 
taking place in Mosul. 
3 
Those attempts were not without effect. 
*The Syrian and Chaldean Archbishops of Baghdad together with 
Latin Chaldean and Armenian priests and notables proceeded to 
Kadhimain on the 18th June 1920, to congratulate the Ulema - 
Sayyid Muhammad Al Sadr and others /on the occasion of 'Id al Fitr% 
A Jewish deputation headed by the Chief Rabbi also' waited upon the 
'Ulema'' .4 
It was also reported: 
'There is evidence that the letters from the Muhammadans addressed 
to Jews and Christians have pleased the two latter immensely. 
Many declare their intentions of supporting the Muhammadans in 
their demand'. 
5 
The nationalists had thus averted any sectarian conflict which might have dis- 
credited their struggle 
internally or internationally. On more than one impor- 
tant occasion the Jews and Christians were to show support for the line advocated 
by the nationalists as will be shown later. It is evident that the period which 
elapsed between the Referendum of 
1918-1919 and summer 1920 had witnessed an 
important change in the attitude of the minorities in the direction favourable 
to the independence movement. 
The first symptom of Shi'ah-Sunnah rapproachment had occurred in summer 1919 
when the Sunnah attended, 
in large numbers, the religious meetings (fätibah) 
which were held 
in memory of the decreased Shi'i Mujtahid Sayid at Yazdi. 
6 
In May 1920 and due to an 
initiative by al gras an unprecedented event was 
to take place, a combination 'of two completely different ceremonies was to be 
1. Ibid.,. Para. 421 
2. Ibid., M. P. A. I. No. 22, dated 29th May 1920, Para. 418 
3. C. O. 696/3. Admin. Report of Mosul Division for the Year 1920, p. 2 
4. F. O. 371/5077. M. P., 
A. I. No. 24, dated 19th June 1920, Para. 484 
5. p. O., 371/50760 M. P. 
A. I. No. 22, dated 29th May 1920, Para. 428 
6. Al Basir, op. cit., pp. 
189-190. Also A. T. Wilson, op. cit., p. 253 
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held, 'the Shi"i'ta'ziyah (to commemorate the martyrdom of'Hussein) and the mawlud 
(to celebrate the birth of the Prophet). There was no doubt that such a , step 
was motivated by political reasons; 
' 
it was reported that: 
'On Friday last before a crowd of workshippers the °Mawlud" 
was read by Mulla Uthman and the "Ta'ziyah" by Shaikh Muhammad 
Mehdi al Basir al Hilli, both Shia and Sunni taking part. 
Such a thing has never before occurred in Islam. People who 
objected were silenced and told that all must combine as long 
as the common enemy - Britain - is before them'. 2 
From that time and until the Government had officially banned the mawluds (on 
August 14th), such meetings went on increasing their attendance and displaying 
an unparallelled Shi*ah-Sunnah unity. 
The political advantages for the nationalist cause gained by such meetings 
are clear enough. 'It is reported that ... Ahmed /31 D7oud7, Ja*far. abu Tumman 
and Ali Bazirgan resolved that Mawluds must be held at least twice a week in 
3 
order to keep grip on the people'. Miss Bell pointed out that by this 'un- 
exampled event*9 the nationalists 'have adopted a line difficult in itself to 
combat*. 
4 Wilson wrote that: 
'The, -priesthood of Karbala, Najaf and Kadhimain were, with notable 
exception, frankly hostile ... The allied themselves to the nation- 
alist movement ... and lent the weight of their authority to argu- 
ments which would be understood by the most ignorantt. 5 
It was also reported that: 
'It is diffiuclt to say how long the two /Sunni and Shia) will 
run together ... Political matters are now discussed everywhere 
and by everyone and with little reserve. They have gained 
confidence by this union ... and criticise Government with far 
greater license than before. The great object of these 'Mawluds' 
is to reach the lower classes and excite them to take an interest 
in political affairs. It is from this class that danger threatens'. 6 
(c) The 'Election' of Mandubin: In late May the nationalists were convinced 
that the time was ripe to step up their campaign by electing a committee to 
represent the people and to put 
forward, openly and officially, the cause of 
1. Shiräzi and Khäliýsi issued Fetwas encouraging the Shi'ah to pray at 
Sunni Mosques. Interview with Hädi al Khäligi. 
2. F. O. 371/5076. M. P. A. I. No. 21, dated 22nd May 1920, Para. 388 
3. P. 0.371/5078. M. P. A. I. No. 29, dated 17th July 1920, Para. 564 
4. G. Bell, Private Letters and Papers, (Newcastle), dated Ist June 1920 
5. A. T. Wilson, op. cit., p. 253 
6. F. 0.371/5076, Police 
Intelligence Report, No. 21, dated 22nd May 19201 
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independence to the authorities. Thus a large mawlud (7th Ramadän, 26th May, 1920) 
which ended in a violent clash with the police, 
' 
elected the following people 
as mandubin to represent the 'nation's cause'. They were: al Suwaidi, al Sadr, 
al Däoud, abu Timman, al Bazirkän, Ahmed al Dähir, abu al Qässim al Käshini, 
Rif"at al Jädirji, 'Abd al Rahman al Haiydari, Sa*id Nagshabandi 'Abd al Wahab 
r 
al Nä'ib, Fu'äd al Daftari, HaJ Yäsin al Khudairi, Muhammad Multafa al Khalil 
and 'Abd at Karim Sayid Hayder. 
2 
The first five were to form an executive 
committee for the delegation. 
3 
In fact they were considered by the Administration 
as the ringleaders of the nationalist movement in Baghdad. 
4 
The deputies met and wrote a letter to the Civil Commissioner requesting 
an interview. They declared themselves to him as the deputies of Baghdad and 
5 
Kädimaln. Wilson agreed to meet them but in"order to counter their claim he 
extended the invitation to some other 20 Baghdadi notables of whose support he 
was assured. 
6 According to the private papers of al Jädirji, a Jewish employee 
at the office of the Military Governor of Baghdad volunteered to divulge the news 
8 
to Kämil. 
7 Soon it was known by Suwaid1. The nationalists held a meeting and 
Suwaidi argued that 'We must write to the tribal chiefs and townspeople asking 
9 
them to be ready to revolt if our rights are denied us'. To foil Wilson's plan 
of dividing Iraqi opinion 
it was decided to call the other notables to a meeting. 
The gathering was held in at Jädirji*s house. The nationalists urged the other 
invited notables to a unified stance in front of Wilson. They formulated their 
F. O. 371/5076. M. P., A. I. No. 22,29th May 1920 
2. They were 8 Sunni and 7 Shiah. Hähir (man of letters), Käshäni (Shi*i 
mujtahid, Persian, close to Shirazi), Jädirji (70, landed notable, head 
of Baghdad*s municipality during Turkish era), Haiydari and Khudairi (both 
of rich and known families, very moderate), Khalil (tiaras), "Hayder (of 
a religious family). 
' 
3. al Bagir, op. cit., p. 156 
4.1.0.371/5078. M. P., A. I. No. 29, dated 17th July 1920, Para. 569 
5, al Hassani, op. cit., p. 64. Their letter was dated 28th May 1920 
6. They were: Mahmoud and Daoud al Kayläni, 'Abd al Majid al Shäwi, 'Abd al 
Qädir al Khudairi, Muhammad Hassan al Jawhir, Sheikh Shukir §älih al Milli, 
'Ali al Allusi, Khisru Quimijian, Sasoun Hisgail, _'Azra 
Dantäi, Yahuda Zalouf, 
Mahmoud Shabendir, Mahmoud al Atragji, Jatfar *Atifah, Jamil al Zahäwi, tAbd 
al Karim Jalabi, Mahmoud al Istirabadi, 'Abd al Hussein Jalabi. 
7, private papers of Kämil al Jädirji. 
8. F. 0.371/5076. 
M. R., A. I. dated 5th June 1920, Para. 421 
9. Ibid. 
i 
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demands which were rather moderate and thus won the support of other notables. 
' 
That was a painful blow to Wilson*s plans and an important political victory 
to the nationalists. Next day Säsoun Hisgail, the prominent Jewish leader, 
visited al Suwaidi and agreed with him to present a unified stance in front 
of the Civil Comissioner. 
2 
The meeting took place in the Government saräi on June 2nd. A large 
demonstration had gathered around the sarai and greeted the mandubin with 
3 
shouts demanding al Istigläl. Wilson opened the proceedings by a long speech 
which was read by Hussein Afnan: 
"... /H. M. G. 7 desire to set up a National Government in this 
Country ... 
-the delay that has occurred ... is due to causes 
beyond our control ... It is my duty ... to warn you that any 
further incitements to violence and any appeal to prejudice 
will be met by rigorous action ... I will now turn to the 
question of the future form of government ... I may tell you 
that, broadly speaking, the lines on which we have been pro- 
ceeding are as follows: We desire to establish Council of 
State under an Arab president, to hold office until the question 
of the final constitution of Mesopotamia has been submittel 
to the Legislative Assembly which we propose to call ... '. 
Suwaidi, on behalf of the delegation, presented the demands: 
21. Establishment of an Iraqi Assembly to represent the 
country and decide upon the future Government of Iraq. 
2. Freedom of Press. 
3. The Lifting of restrictions on postal and telegraphic 
communications within the country and with the outside 
world'. 
5 ,r 
Sadr asserted the peaceful nature of the movement which 'did not contradict the 
promises of the Allies*. Suwaidi argued that, their demands were in harmony with 
what Wilson himself had said. "But why 
is the delay in forming the National 
Governmentf asked Suwaidi and warned that 'the nation's patience is running out'. 
The "pro-Britisht 
faction supported the nationalists' argument and no ogposition 
6 
was voiced. 
The Civil Commissioner advised them: 
1. Jädirji's Papers. The meeting was on 30th May. 
2. F. O. 371/5076. M. P., A. I. dated 5th June 1920, Para. 422. 
3. Ibid., Para. 448 
4. F. O. 371/5228/5093, dated 2nd June 1920; al Iraq No. 3,3rd June 1920 
5. al Basir, op. cit., p. 
170. Also A. Wilson, op. Cit., p. 257 
6. alNos. 3 and 
4, dated 3rd and 4th June, 1920. Also al Basir, pp. 
169-172 
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'not to be misled by appearances. Mesopotamia'has been under 
an alien Government for 200 years, and with the best will in 
the world an indigenous'National Government cannot be set up 
at once. The process must be gradual or disaster is certain. ' 
The meeting could not hide the profound differences of the two sides. The 
nationalists' aim was the immediate establishment of a national assembly to 
decide the future government of Iraq. Wilson's attitude was the indefinite 
delay of such a step. ' In essence he was fully opposed to the mere idea of 
such an assembly: 
'for it was no secret that the intention of the delegates was 
to arrange for a declaration by the Convention of the independance 
of Iraq, followed by the rejection of the British Mandate ... *. 
2 
In fact what Wilson really wanted was: 
'Under provisional constitution Government would be carried on by 
Council of State and a legislative Assembly. Council of State (1) 
to be the principal executive authority and a second chamber of 
legislature. (2) To consist of, say, 11 members and president, 
all nominated by the High Commissioner. (3) President to be an 
Arab of good status and prestige. (4) The constitution should 
not specify relative numbers of British and Arab members (it can 
in practice). At first there would be English majority, for 
example, six to five. (5) The High Commissioner to have power 
over the ruling decisions of Council of State*. 
3 
As a . last attempt 
to handle the situation, ' Wilson, on 12th July, ` declared: 
*/H. M. G. / has authorized the Acting Civil Commissioner to invite 
the leading representatives of various localities to co-operate 
with the Civil Administtation in framing proposals under which 
election to the General Assembly will, in due course, be held, 
and in making the necessary arrangements for electoral areas, the 
preliminary to the register of electors and other matters prelim- 
inary to the election of the General Assembly. In as much as there 
are at present in Iraq individuals who were the representatives of 
Iraq in the Turkish Senate or the Turkish Chamber of Deputies ... 
all those ex-S-enators. and'ex-Deputies have been invited by the 
Civil Commissioner for the above mentioned purpose ...: 
4 
Wilson's aims were clear and in Gertrude Bell's words 'For the extremists have 
seen the ground cut under 
their feet by the formation of a moderate constitutional 
party round the committee of ex-deputies and 
they have no card left by an appeal 
to the mob*,. 
5 
1. F. 0.371/5228/5093; al 
ýIräq, 3rd June 1920 
2. A. T. Wilson, op. cit., p. 257 
3. F"0.371/5226/E. 3982. From C. C. Baghdad, No. 5112, dated 27th April, 1920 
4. Cmd. 1061, op. cit., p"142; a1Iräq, 12th July 1920 
S. Lady Bell (ed), off., p. 
495, letter dated 16th August 1920 
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In fact Wilson's step caused *a certain split in the ranks of Iraqi 
leaders. The invitation to this 'Committee' was distributed on the 10th Jaily 
and was published in the local press on the 12th. The 'extreme' nationalists 
opposed it immediately, Suwaidi argued: 
*1. The ex-delegates were elected for a period of two years 
only, which has long since elapsed. They have therefore 
no standing now. 
2. The ex-delegates were all C. U. P. men who proved themselves 
traitors to the country., 
3. Some of them are pure Turk, pushed in by Turkish influence. 
4. The Turkish rules for the election of Deputies are still in 
print and can be adapted by Government with the assistance 
of the Nationalist Deputation. 
5. Most of these ex-Deputies are now Government officials or 
pro-Government and are now favoured by the people and there- 
fore would not elect suitable substitutes for those Deputies 
who are absent or who have diedt. 
1 
Furthermore, they called some of-the ex-deputies (Tälib, al Shiwi, Faidi 
and others) to a meeting with the purpose of foiling Wilson*s attempt. Suwaidi 
and Sadr argued that the acceptance of, this committee was a betrayal of the 
'armed revolution' which the Iraqi people were waging. The others were of the 
opinion that the 'nation's demands' could only be fulfilled through an elected 
legislative assembly who alone could decide the future form of government and 
negotiate with the British. The absence of such a committee could only *help 
the English delays*. 
2 Faidi met abu Timman, Hassan Rid! and 'Abd Allah Thuniyän. 
He warned them that the success of the 'armed revolution# was not guaranteed; 
its failure would bring about the worst consequences. The 'Committee' was the 
best chance for the nationalists, argued. Faidi, to unite their ranks and confront 
the British with their demands. If the British rejected such demands, they 
would be exposed and 
the 'revolution' would be more effective. However, the 
3 
two sides failed to reach an agreement. Nagshabandi also was opposed on this 
issue to SuwaidiIs policy of boycotting the 'Committeet. 
4 
1.8.0.371/5078. M. P., A. I. No. 29,17th July 1920, Para. 567 
2. M. S. al 'Daftari Papers. 
3. S. Faidi, op. cit., pp. 246-57 
4. F. O. 371/5078/ M. P., A. I. ' , No. 29,17th July 1920, Para. 566 
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The - 'Cotmnittee of ex-Deputies' held its, first, meeting on the`6th August, 
1 
1920. Some 17 notables attended that meeting and elected Tä1ib as a president 
and co-opted 19 Iraqis to replace those who died or were absent. 
2 Apart from 
3 nationalists (Sadr, Suwaidi and abu Timman), the rest accepted the invitation 
and attended the, 'Committee's' second meeting. 
3 
The' nationalists who , saw- the, inception of this Committee as a challenge to 
the twill of-the nation who elected'them' threatened death to those who accepted 
4 
its membership: 
The nationalists ! appealed to°the masses*. Violent,, mawluds and huge demon- 
strations broke out in Baghdad. Since the first of July the rising was taking 
over the Euphrates and news of serious British setbacks was reaching Baghdad. 
Karbala, Najaf, Shämiyah and Mosul had 'elected' their Mandubin. Several 
arrests, detentions-and a killing was the Administration's response to Baghdad's 
mawluds. Intelligence` reports indicated a nationalist plan to allow tribes to 
enter Baghdad, Police stations in Kädimain 'were to be seized and utilized'. 
5 
Thus on August'lith, "the Civil Commissioner ordered the arrest of SuwaTdi, 
Sadr, Timman, Bäzirkän and Däoud. 
6 
The Authorities prohibited mawluds or any 
other form of political gathering. 
7 Of the five leaders only Däoud was arrested, 
all others made good their escape over neighbouring houses "with the connivance 
of their owners*. At the 
house of Suwaidi fire was exchanged 'numerous arrests 
were made'8 and 'before 
the Military Court 6 of those were condemned to death'. 
9 
1. Prominent among them were Fuuäd al Daftari, Muräd Sulimän (brother of Ilikmet 
and Shawkat Pasha, leader of the Iraqi C. U. P. ), Dr. Simi Suliman, al Zahäwi 
Säsoun Hisgail, Tälib. 
2. Prominent among them were, Suwaidi, Sadr, abu Timman, Däoud al Nagib, 
Muzähim'al Bäjhji, Näji Shawkat. 
3. S. Fai4i, op. cit., p. 254 
4. F. 0.371/5081. M. P., A. I. No. 33,14th August 1920. Para. 682; they were 
'Abd al Jabär al Khayat, Abd al Majd al Shawi, Daftari and al Naqlb. 
S. F. O. 371/5081 M. P., A. I. No. 33,14th August 1920, Paras. 667,681" 
6, Ibid., Para 678 
al'Iräq, No. 63,13th August 1920 7. 
_-s 
8. M. P., ABI No. 33, Para. 678 
a1IIräq, No. 70,21st August 1920, they were shot on 17th August 9. 
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Majid Kanav'a founder member of Baras 
1 
, was hanged on 25th September. In 
the following' week most 'of Baghdad*s mandtibin and- nationalist leaders were 
2 
either arrested, exiled or escaped to the Euphrates'area. It Was a serious 
blow to the Tmovementt but by no means fatal. 
Those Mawluds'had little to do with the birth of the Prophet or the "marty- 
dom' of his grandson. They were 
intended and organized for political ends; to 
enhance Shi*i-Sunni unity and to agitate the public-to demand independence. From 
early May-to mid-August they were held regularly every evening. They were organ- 
ized by Haras of-whom the authorities identified 4'prominent organizers; Timman, 
Däoud, 
_Bäzirkän'and'_Basir, 
but were attended by a large number of Shill and Sunni 
alike., On several occasions they ended in violent clashes with the police; 
several arrests were made-and one death was reported. The Mawwlluds also took place 
in Mosul and the Ta*ziyah in Karbala and Najaf. In each meeting slogans were 
uttered 
against the Mandate and the 'Committee of ex-Deputies', after its formation, 
Ir : 
*long live 'Abd Allah', Shirczi and full Arab independence' also dominated. 3 
'Isa 'Abd al 9 dir, an Administration employee was the first to be arrested 
because of an *inflamatory* poem in which he pointed out that the Iraqis were 
humiiitated because they were unjustifiably divided into religious sects and 
he called for unit s 
"` P' l".. ý.. l4.. 1ý ýýýt . äVý ý--1. ; J,,, ä, ß ý; i: ý}ýC; 
'Jawähri advocated Moslem-Christian unity for the revival of the Arabs. 
5 
i. Hassani, o ti., p. 57 
2. Among those arrested were: 'Arif Suwaidi, al Khalil (Mandeb), Nuri Petib, 
Jädirji, Daftari and his son Mahmud, Ja1äl Bäbän and others. P. 0.371/5080, 
M. p., A. I., No. 35,28th August 1920, Para 698. 
3. F. 0.371/5076-5081, M. P., A. I. No. 20, dated 15th May to No. 33, dated 21st 
_.. .. August, 
1920 
M. tA; Kemal al Din, Al Thawra ..., op. cit., pp. 342-3 
. 5. MGM; al Jawähiri, 
Diwan al Jawähiri, Vol. 2, (Saida, 1967), p. 189 
i.. 
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Basir. 's, poems in the Mawluds were-, a renewed expression- of- the Arab intelligentsia's 
diylemma.., ., On the, 
30th, May he, hailed 'science' which endowed the West and might' 
revive the East.,. In a sad tune, he, expressed his disappointment with the West 
who "betrayed'., ýits civilization and principles and-revealed its oppressive essence, 
and revealed-that the aim of awluds was-to incite', the people to'rise: 
l,; 
C' `ý 
(3 1; 
4- ES:. ý iw"rio. ý. 
I' 
Basir accused the West of ingratitude because it gained its civilized tvirtuest 
from the Arabs but did not 'liberate'them'. 
2 
(d) The olitical and Organizational links between the Nationalists and the. 
3 
Shi'i and Tribal Leaders of the Mid-Euphrates: For almost a decade'Iragi`nation- 
alists of, the large towns had been gradually becoming aware of the necessity'of0- 
closer links with the, Iraqi tribes-while socio-political conditions and 'relative' 
spread of education made some tribal leaders aware that their agrarian *problems'. ' 
were becoming part, of overall national politics. - Thus the first' signs of co-" 
ordination occurred during 
1910-1914,. when Tä1ib established contacts with some 
leaders of the mid-Euphrates. . Käti' al 'Awädi (sheikh), and Sat 
Ed Kemal al Din 
(teacher) considered the 1920 movement as a continuation of that which started 
earlier. by Tälib.. Al 
Shahristäni argued that the 'movement' started with the 
demand; of a_constitutional rule foraPersia and Turkey. ý 'When the Turks'began 
to. oppress, the Arabs, we had to defend Arab rights#. 
4 
In 1914, the Shämiyah ° 
sheikhs contacted the Sherif 
Hussein and expressed their desire for an independent 
5 
Arab state. , 
The period between 1914*to 1918 was a time of'uncertainty. "After 
that date the British, extended their. direct rule over the area and applied their 
policy., of taxation and 
land settlement. Such a policy helped the widespread 
M. A. Kemal al Din, op. cit., p. 328 
2. R. Bali, Al Adab, al 'Asri fi al! Iräg al 'Arabi (Cairo, 1923), Vol. 2, p. 96 
30 This part has drawn largely on the works of Bas-r, pir'on, Hassani and, 
y sirs, listed in bibliography. 
4. M. al Pir'on, op. c_ . 
Vol. 2, pp. 557-8,567-89 553-4. Letters from 'Awädi,, 
Kemai al DiA and gnin dmin 
Rpthrshämiyäh 
and Naiaf, 1918, p. 67 e_ c. 0.696/1, 
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resentment and renewed tendency to identify with the nationalists. In early 
1919, the Referendum disclosed the existence of 'nationalist! feelings among theta 
tribes 6f Rumaithah, Samäwah, Kufah, Shämiyah and Najaf. In February 1919, al 
Uaras was formed"in Baghdad and through the efforts of its Shi*i members, it was 
able' to establish political cells in nearly every town of the area. Those cells 
included 
r 
young men of intellect and dedication. Some of them had, social influence. 
It seems"that-this area had a weak spot for poets: *Abd al Matalib al Hi11i. 
organized tribal contacts=for Tälib-before the war, and after, that it was al 
Shabibi brothers, Basir, abu al Mahäsin, Sharqi, Najafi, Sa'd Sä1ih and Bägir, al 
Hills who led the new nationalist wave. Maras was also able to gain the direct 
support'of some tribal leaders (*Awädi and 'Awäd) and influential Sayids like 
Zuwain. 
'Ulum contacted Baghdad in mid-1918 and explained the situation to Sadr, 
Khälisis, and abu 
mrný'. ° It was decided that Shiräzi's aid would be important, 
if he'moved: to Karbalä; which he did. Shiräzi and Ridi's arrival gave the'move- 
ment' a strong backing. -However, Shiräzi's influence was to weaken the ! nationalist' 
character of the,, movement and to stamp 
it with Islamic and anti-British features. - 
Nationalists and, Islamists agreed on a common programme which could be summed up 
in 'the complete independence of Iraq and a son of Hussein as its constitutional 
king'. This common platform allowed a 
'Unity to, the extent of eradicating the 
dividing line, as", for instance, happened in Karbalä. 
: In January-February 1920, all the members of the Shämiyah-Najaf Council re- 
signed their posts and made-it clear 
that they wanted a final decision on Iraq*s 
independence. ) At the same time 'Abd al Ghani Kubba and abu Timman tendered their 
resig'nation' from 'the Baghdad Council. This 
indicated an advance since the Refer- 
enduni-in bringing 
together the -= political tactics of the various sections of the 
movemext. The collective resignation 
disclosed that the movement was involving, 
a larger numberrof the area's leaders. 
In March 1920, the Iraqi Conference of Damascus declared the independence of 
Iraq. - A, iarge'number of mu 
ba as were signed by 'most' of the leaders of the area 
supporting the Damascus proclamation. The declaration was sent to HLjaz and 
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Syria by April 1920. 
On the first of Sha'ban 1338 (20th April 1920) a very large meeting was held 
in Najaf. It included 'Ulum, Jazä'iri, Jawähir (mujtahids), Awädi; Sikar, 
Muhammad 'Abt n, 'Alwin Uij Sa'dun, 
iAwäd, Sha*län al . 
Jum, * Sulmin al pähir, laftah 
Shamkhi, Wadi al Atiya, Mujbil al Far'un (tribal sheikhs), Sayid Nur, Mukawtr, 
Zuwain, abu Tabikh, 'Alwin al Yisiri (Sayids) and Shalläsh (Najaf). They decided 
to send Zuwain and Shalläsh to discuss the political situation in Baghdad, and on 
the 22nd April a large meeting was held in Baghdad. Apart from the Euphrates 
delegates, it was attended by Suwaidi, Sadr, Naqshabandi, Bäzirkän, abu Timman, 
Rif*at Jädirji, al Däoud, al Nitib, al Daftari, B. Shabibi, Bäbän, Sädiq Hibba, 
2 
Sädiq al Sharibanli. They agreed to, coordinate their efforts and to intensify 
their activities. The Baghdadi nationalists decided to send abu Timman to study 
the situation on the Euphrates. He arrived on the first day of May and held a 
meeting with the Euphrades leaders mentioned above, and others including Sha'län 
abu al Jun and Ghathith al Harijän. 
On the 3rd May, Timman accompanied by a number of Shämiya) Najaf and Rumaltheh 
leaders held a 'very secret meeting' in Karbala over which Shträzi himself presided. 
They informed him of their common aims and future plans. Shiräzi blessed their 
alliance and its aims, 
but he insisted on peaceful methods. They assured him that 
this was their intention but pointed out that 'revolution' might prove to be a 
necessity. Shiräzi was reluctant 
to approve: 'the British are strong, Iraqi lives 
are dear and law and order are 
important*. The leaders assured him of their unity, 
potential, and ability 
to preserve order. Confronted with such persistence, he 
replied 'If those are your 
intensions and promises, then may God be on your side'. 
3 
This meeting was highly significant; 
it was the official ratification of the 
nationalist-Shiti-tribal alliance. 
To strengthen the organizational links, Bäcjlr 
al Shabibi was appointed as correspondent 
between Shiräzi and 'Baghdad', RaDum al 
Välimi (sheikh) was assigned 
to be the link between Shiräzi and Rumaitheh (abu 
at Jun and Harjin). 
11. Henceforward I will refer to. these as leaders of Euphrates. 
2. Henceforward I will refer 
to these as the Nationalists. 
3. iassani, ý"ý Pg"95-7. In this meting several groups were represented, the 
nationa}fists 
rom Ba hdad and Karbala, the Sayids, the Mujtahids of Najaf and 
Karbala, the tribal sheikhs of Bani Hassan, Fetlah, Rumartheh and Samäwah. 
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Ön May 9th a large meeting of nationalists, assembled in-Baghdad, in which abu 
Timman reported the'outcome, of his visit and assured the nationalists of Shi*i- 
tribal. support. The, meeting decided to step up the agitation and to organize 
Mawluds. These were attended by some of the Euphrates leaders. 
i 
These meetings 
were soon imitated in Karbalä, Hillah, Najaf and Mosul. On the 26th May a large 
Maw lud at Hayder Khammah 'elected' the 15 Manudhin to represent Baghdad and 
Käcimain. A letter was sent by abu Timman, and behalf of the Mandubin, to Shiräzi 
informing him of the development and requesting wide support. Shirä4i-came openly 
to support the Mandubin and wrote several letters to tribal sheikhs: 
'Your Moslem bretheren in Baghdad, Khadhimain, Najaf, Karbala ... 
have agreed and united and arranged peaceful demonstrations asking 
their legal rights as regards the independence of Iraq ... it is 
now'the duty of every Moslem to unite ... every district and place 
should sent their demands to .... Baghdad*. 
2 
The effect of this support was profound; on the 4th June, Karbalä''elected' 
its Mandubin. " They were 'Abd at Hussein (al'Shiräzi), Muhammad at Khälisi, 
Muhammad 'Ali Bahr al *Ulum, Sadr at Din al Mäzindräni, (mujtahid), 'Abd al Wahab 
at Wahb, Mu1sin abu al Mahäsin 
(tiaras) and 'Umar Häj. *Alwän (sheikh). The ma ba a 
was signed 'by 95 persons, ' 
including Shirazi. (dated 16th Raman 1338,4th June 
1020). 
3 On the'6th June, Najaf and Shämiyah 'elected' their Man_ udbin. They-were 
Jawäd al. Jawähir, "'Abd al Karim al Jazä'iri (mujtahids), 'Abd al Rid! al Rädl 
_r 
Shallash 
+ (merchants), -Nur and *Alwan "Abbäs (Sayids). The ma ba a was signed by 
120 notables including ai'Isfahäni "(dated 
18th Raman 1338,6th June 1920). 4 
Both maba as of Karbalfand Najaf assigned the Mandubin 'to represent us before 
the Government'of occupation-:... to demand the-independence of Iraq with no .,, 
foreign intervention . '.. to form an Arab state led by a 
Moslem and Arab con- 
. stitutional', king' 
r 'The Mandubin of Najaf met on the 8th June and drafted a memorandum to the 
Civil Commissioner; they asked 
to meet him to discuss the demands of tall-.,, 
people of Najaf and-Shämiyah'. 
1. `F. O. 371/5076. M. P., 'A. I., No. 21,22nd May 1920, Para. 386. 
2. -F: 0.371/5229/ß. 
10430. Copy of, letter ýto Haji Mukhif (dated 10 Ramadan 29 May). 
3. Khä1i$i: Papers. Copy of 
the_ ma ba a.. 
at U. Sha"bän Library original copy ý1 y in Najaf. 
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t 
'First- The, establishment of an Iraqi Assembly,, elected by, 
the people, to meet in Baghdad with the task of forming an 
Arab Government, completely independent of any foreign in- 
fluence and headed by a Moslem Arab king. 
Second - the lifting of all restrictions on the communication' 
of the Iraqi Arab people with other nations. 
Third - Freedom of Press, meetings and parties all over Iraq. I 
The memorandum was signed by the six Mandubin. In Karbala a similar madba a 
was sent to the Civil Commissioner through the Political Officer. 
2 
Rahum a1. "ýalimi left immediately for Rumaitheh. He met its tribal leaders, 
prominent among them al Jun and Harjin, and acquainted them with the decision of 
Najaf and Karbalä'Mandubin. He handed them the previously mentioned letter of 
Shirazi calling on Iraqis to elect their representatives. The leaders of' 
Rumaitheh took a significant step; they wrote a ma 4ba a to the six Mandubin of 
Najaf and Shamiyah requesting them to represent Rumaitheh also: 
'We the undersigned, Leaders of Rumaitheh, chief of its tribes 
'and' representative of-its public. opinion ... entrusted you to 
deputy us in front of the Government of Occupation, in demanding 
-the achievement of-the 
absolute independence of the-country and 
/the rejection] of any form of foreign intervention ... We are 
prepared-to-süpportý'you in every possible way ... 1.3 
. Wilson who, most 
likely, thought that a reply would amount, to a dangerous 
official recognition, -did not-answer. During the period between 8th June and 
the-30th, the Mandubin of Najaf, Shamiyah and Karbala persisted in futile attempts 
to meet the, Civil Commissioner., In Najaf -Shamiyah, : the. Political Officer met the 
Mann several times but told them that 'it was beyond his authority to discuss 
such, import ant 
questions'. - 
On June 20th. a large-gathering in Hi11ah was, preparing, to 'elect' itsýMandubin. 
The; Assistant Political. Officer sent his deputy, Khayri al Hindäwi, to order the 
crowd-to disperse...,. 
Once there, Hindäwi, excited the public by-reciting some of 
his-own`militant -and nationalistic poetry. He called for Mosleat, christian and 
Jewish unity. He informed the crowd that the British had broken their promises. 
Pir"on, OP. -Cit., pp. 111-5. Compre it with Baghdad's demands, P. 3GS., 
2. Original copy at Said K m1l al Din Library at Karbala.,, 
3ý original , 
Copy at H. Sha'ban. library'at -Najaf. 
4. gir'on gives a detailed account of these frustrating negotiations, pp. 1-9-17, 
166-71. 
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Only 'violence' argued Hindäwi, could bring about independence and a 'son of 
1 
Hussein' to Iraq. 
The authorities were losing patience at the continual demonstrations- mawluds 
and public attack on the Government. On June 21st, Hindäwi, Ra'ouf al Amin 
(ringleader of Haras) and others were arrested in Hillah and deported to Hinjam. 
Next day, troops arrived at Karbalä and its Political Officer made it clear to 
Shirazi that he intended to restore law and order and arrest all 'villains'. 
Shir äzi wrote back protesting that the P. O. had, on several occasions, declined 
to visit him or see the Karbalä'Mandubin. Nevertheless,, Shiräzi re-invited the 
P. O. and warned him that if he used force against 'the country9s demands#, then 
the P. O. 'and his like will bear the responsibility of bloodshed'. 
2 
Instead of accepting the *invitation", the Political Officer ordered the 
s 
arrest of 12 persons from Karbala 
including Ri4ä al Shiräzi, Shahristäni, 'Ulum 
and 'Umar "Alwän. All of them - except Shahristäni because of his illness - were 
deported. The arrest and deporation of Ridä and others raised a storm of political 
protest; meetings were 
held, petitions were raised and demonstrations continued 
stronger than before. The 
leaders of Shämiyah sent a petition (dated 28th June) 
to the P. O. requesting 
people will not depart 
nationalists wrote to 
On June 29th, the 
the immediate release of Rid! and his brothers 'so that 
from peaceful demands to something elset. 
3 
Karbala's 
>hiräzi consoling him and asking for his instructions. 4 
leaders of Shämiyah-Najaf sent an important message to the 
Baghdadi Mandubin. They 
informed them of the arrests and that the authorities 
were using force against 
'peaceful people demanding their independeae'. The 
letter recognized the Baghdad Mandubin as the 'deputies and representatives 
of the nation'. 
The letter insinuated that violence was the only way to 
1. "p. al Khägäni, Shu'rä' al Ghiri, Vol. 7, (Najaf, 1955), pp. 173-93. 
ýºý.,,, ý., :. -Vull-v . r. ,j 
ýýý,: 
j 
" 
ý; L. -ý. ý; ýý. ýw-ý: i-ýý -ý: ý- -lý. 
1,1,,;, 
j- `"-Výrr, ý, 1, 
'r' uýliý (, 'sue 
"t---P 
4" ýý.. ý, ýsr: ýr. lr= 
2. M. 'A. Kemä1 at Din, 
Al Thawra ai ira9iya at Kubra, (Baghdad, 1971) , pp. 241-3 
3 Bassani, op. cit., p. 
110 
4, Pir'on, oDý=t"º 
p"174. 
. Sa'd $11ih. 
Signed by Said and Hussein Kemal at Din, Shabibi, 
at Sifi, 
L 
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achieve Iraq's independence. 
l 
The same leaders sent a similar message to the tribal sheikhs of Rumalthes 
informing them of Ridi's arrest and requesting their solidarity for a 'peace- 
ful campaign' to secure his release and Iraq's independence. If that 'failed 
2 
, then 'al 
Sayfu A daq min al Kutubi'. On the same day, Major Daly of Diwäniyah` 
ordered the arrest of abu al Jun which was carried out by Lieut. Hyatt. On 
receiving the news, - Har jän led al : Dawälim section to Banc, Hu jaim and freed abu 
al Jun by force. The uprising had started. 
II The Characters and Features of the Uprising 
as 
The actual events of the uprising; its military details and accompanying 
political events have been the subject of a wide range of research and writing. 
It is the character of the uprising which is still an open question and a focus 
of intellectual and historical interest. I propose therefore to give a short 
account of the uprising, emphasising the points which could help to explain its 
nature more fully. Secondly, I will summarise the views of several writers on 
the uprising. The discussion will be concluded by my own view of its character. 
(a) A Summary of the Events of the Uprising: The detention of Sha*län abu al Jun 
and'his subsequent release was the straw which broke the camel*s back. This 
arrest was claimed to be the result of a dispute over an agricultural loan. 
3 
However there are official indications which suggest that such an action was 
politically motivated. 
'On the 2nd July tribes near Rumaithah, who have for some time 
past been. incited by agitators 
from Najaf to rebellion, attacked 
the Government building at Rumaithah, killed Arab guard, and 
forcibly released Sheikh, who had been imprisoned with my approval 
on previous day for inciting his people to rebelt. 
4 
Churchill fully accepted such a notion and gave 
it as an official explanation to 
the House of Commons, and added that 
'the rising appears to be local in character'. 
5 
The first attack on Rumaithah by al Dawälim was to free their Sheikh. But the 
Bäzirkan, off., pp"120-1 
2. " Fir'on,. on - cit., pp. 
181-3 
3. P"W. Ireland, oft., p. 266 
4. p. O. 371/5227/E. 7826. From C. C. Baghdad, dated 4th July, 1920 No. 8042, to I. O. 
s, ' Ibid., E. 8279, dated 
13th July 1920. Reply to Mr. Ormsby-Gore. 
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next day they"started to attack the railroad around Samäwah, 'Rümaithah` nd al 
Khidir. On Ju1y'1st« 2nd and'3rd the additional Brit rish troöps'which were sent 
proved insufficie'nt. `ýOn July 4th the 
tribes besieged Rumaithah garrison. On July 
7th a major British attack to release the garrison was successfully *repulsed by 
the tribes. Thus the' gä`rrisön was completely isolated and 'the'tribes were able to 
cüt the railroad north and 'south'-Of Rumäithah. A few days `later 
tthe Samäwah 
tribes declared Jihäd, attacked British trains, cut the railroads and besieged 
the town itself which was not relieved by the British until October 14th. 
It seems clear that the 'spark of the'uprising`was a) politically motivated 
`and b) not strictly local. Fürthermore, it occurred before any fetwa'was issued. 
The sheikhs of Shämiyah-Najaf 
were still in the course of discussion when the news 
of Rumaitheh-Samäwäh was broken to them. They were divided and thus hesitant. 
The most important sheikhs of Khäzä'il`(Salmän and Muhammad al *Ablän), Fatlah 
(Mizhir al Far'un)+Mand Bani Hassan ('Alwän Häj Satdun) proposed more negotiations 
with the British. The 'lesser' sheikhs like Sikar (Fetlah), *Umrin Häj Satdun 
(Banc'N assan) and the sheikhs of small 
tribal sections like "Awäd (', Awibid-Fetlah), 
al Gh57zi'(al`Jaräh-Hassan), 
`'a1 'Atiyah '(Humydät-Fetlah), Samäwi (Khafäjaf-'Fetlah'), 
Jallu1 (Fetlahi al Hindiyah)'pressured 
for a quick and violent action. The Sayids 
on%the whole, were militant, 
`more especially Mukawter, Nur and Zuwain. They put 
'strong pressure on'the Shämiyah-Najaf tribes. 
2 
The Shi'i Mujtahids were also 
hesitant 'and confused. ' On the 25th June'Isfahäni telegraphed Wilson protesting 
against the arrests and assuring him that the movement was peaceful. But Isfahäni 
`pointed out that the Goverhment*s measure would lead to worse consequences and 
3 
requested Wilson to 
intervene and calm the situation. According to Iraqi writers, 
Wilson's reply was typical of his character, gentle but over-paternal; he described 
the Iraqis as lacking education and vulnerable to bad advice; he defended the 
pri 2nd November they surrendered to the Government, but were immediately 
granted a full pardon and released. a1hIräq _ 6th November 1920. Sikar 
was described by the 
Administration as 'Leader of rebel forces', alIraq 
9th November. " 
This information was gathered from a 'thorough reading of Pir'on, - o p. cit., 
pp. 205-7,. 252-7,266-73; 
Hassani, op. cit., pp. 113,143-52 and Yässiri, op.. 
cit., pp"186-193,196-200,208,218-9. 
3.1 äni, 2j: -EL", 
pp. 106-7 
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I 
arrest and promised nothing. = On the 8th July, Isfahäni wrote. two, letters. 
The first. was addressed to Shämiyah and Rumaitheh leaders., He explicitly 
stated that clashes 'were against, the common goodt,. he asked them to, stop 
hostilities and adopt peaceful , methods*. 
2 
His second-letter was addressed to 
Wilson in which he assured, him of, friendship, with the 'Great Government*. How- 
ever he: 
defended the leaders of Rumaitheh and"Karbalä'and; asked, Wilson, for 
the second, time, to relax his measures. 
3 
,. i Er Lt_ 
Shiräzi, appointed Shahristäni and Khurässäni to go , to Baghdad to explain, 
to Wilson the, peaceful, character of the movement and;, to urge more, restraint. They 
were unable, to_ see-Wilson and returned to Karbala. ., Shirzai issued a fetwa 
ailowing,. the Iraqis to use 'defensive force' against the Government. 
5 
He was, 
angry, at the; hesitence of Shämiyah tribes. to defend the Rumaltheh tribes. 
6 
By: the, 10th July more small tribes and sheikhs were taking military. action 
against the. Administration. -.. In many-tribes there occurred clashes over this 
issue and sometimes., they assumed, violent character. For instance, Sikar and 
+Umran Häj, Satdun took over the leadership of the Fetlah and Bani Hassan re-,, 
spectively and Sa'dun al Rasan and Käti' al 'Awädi killed the pro-British pre- 
dominant sheikh *Ulwan, al Juhäli"and took over the leadership of 'Afaj. and 
Daghärah tribes. In Hillah several clashes between-different factions of one 
7 
tribe or confederation were caused by the same issue. 
On July 7th a meeting took place in the Mudif of Marzuq al 'Awäd and was 
attended by Nur and 
*Alwin-al Yäsiri, Muhsin abu Tabikh, 'Abd al W; Oid, Sikar, 
Mujbel al Far*oun (Fetlah), *Alwin al Häj Sa'dun (Banc Hassan), Salmän al Dähir, 
1. Ibid., pp. 107-8, dated'2nd July. 
2. Copy at H. Shatban Library (Najaf), dated 21 Shawal. 1338. 
3. Hassani, o cit., pp. 109-10 
4, mid., p. 116; Letter 
from Sharistäni to {iassani. 
5; Ibid., pp, 105-6. It is 
important to observe that not a single important 
mujtahid in Najaf or 
Karbala supported this F etwa. 
Yassiri, o. cit., p. 193 
7. For instance, Shukhair al Haymus 
led an inter-tribal coup in Albu Sultan 
against "Adai-al Jeryan, 
its paramount sheikh. (1) The smaller sections of 
Fetlah like Ibrahim, albu Jässim, albu Musa, Kurfit, TufaTi, Khaf9a took 
over from al Khazätil. 
(ii) Similar action took place in Afaj. 9iii) 
, (i) Fir'on, op cit., pp. 267-75 
(ii) Hassani, op. cit., pp. 148-52 
(iii) Fir*on, o t", pp. 255-6 
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Mul1ammad al ! Abtän (al Khaza*il). T'he; British were represented=by Captain Mann 
of;, Shämiyah.. They. submitted to him their demands which were, al Isticläl al Tam 
for Iraq, . the-termination of, 
fighting around Rumaithah, the evacuation of all 
British military and political Officers from the Euphrateseand the-release of 
all detaineesain, Hillah and Karbala, especially of Mirza Rid! a1, Shiräzi. 
1' 
On July 11th Jihäd-was declared in al Mishkhäb. Bani Ijassan led by 'Umran 
moved towards Kufah and the Shämiyah*s Fetlah attacked Kifil and started to move 
2, 
towards Hillah. ., The 
latter, part of July witnessed the most violent operations 
with - considerable setbacks 
to the British. 
. 
Troops were sent from Diwäniyah to 
release the, Rumaithah garrison.., On-July 18th and in an area called al *ArdIät 
the. tribes led, by abu Jun engaged the advancing troops., After severe fighting 
with considerable, losses on both sides Rumalthah was occupied on July 20th. 
3. 
However, it was clear, that the tribal resistance was so stiff that -the British 
decided to. evacuate the town on the day after its occupation. Their-retreat 
was+made"extremely difficult by continuous raids by the tribes. 
4 
; ", 
The Civil Commissioner explained his persistence in sending columns to, that 
area: 
'Troops at Rumaithah have suffered heavy casualties and detachment 
sent in relief has suffered severely ... Situation in Shamiyah 
division is delicate and it is feared that control of Middle Euphrates 
will be lost unless a substantial success can be obtained at Rumaithah'. 
5 
Major Young minuted: 
'This telegram should be read in conjunction with Baghdad telegram 
No. 7825 of the 28th June-in which A. Wilson reported that "revenue 
is coming in regularly and situation is now once more practically 
normal on the Mid-Euphrates".. Colonel Gordon Walker tells toe that 
the Rumaithah trouble arose entirely out of the refusal of tribal 
elements to pay revenue in. that districtf. 
f 
On July 23rd the British despatched a large and strong relief column to 
reoccupy Kifii. 
The force moved from'Villah and was confronted in an area 
called al Rustamiah 
by, the insurgent tribes. They were composed of Fetlah al 
1. Al Yäsiri, op. cit., pp. 193-6; Uassani, op. cit., PP. 115-7 
2; Ib, 
ý , PP " 
144-5 ' 
3,, ' al *Ir- No. 45,23rd 
July 1920 
4.1 Irä , No. 
47,26th July 1920 
Ste g; 0.371%5227/E. 8268. __From 
C. C. Baghdad to I. 0. ß dated 8th July 19200 No. 5370 
6 .' IIbbid . 
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Hindiyah (Jallub), al Jabour, albu Sultan (both led by Haimus) and al tAwäbid 
(*Awäd). The tribes led by Sikar scored a 'substantial success' over the British 
forces of whom only half were able to return to Hillah. The retreat, according 
to Wilson, 'cost us 180 killed, 60 wounded, and about 160 were taken prisoners, 
with heavy loss of transport-vehicles and animals, They were not ill-treated 
in captivity, and of the 79 British prisoners only 1 died in Arab hands'. 
1 
The, Arabs' good treatment of prisoners of war was confirmed by General Haldane 
himself in a telegram to the War Office. 
2 
Haldane wrote: 'This unfortunate 
affair, could not have occurred at a more inopportune moment'. 
3 
Miss Bell 
described the psychological aspect of the defeat: 'Another episode like that 
of the Manchester would 
bring the Tigris tribes out immediately below Baghdad'. 
4 
`This incident was bound to generate grave consequences. By discrediting 
the-'British power, practically the whole of the Mid-Euphrates rose. Subsequently 
the British had to evacuate Musaiyib and the Hindiyah Barrage. A withdrawal of 
British troops from Diwäniyah to Hillah was deemed necessary. On 6th August, 
Karbala declared Jihad and was evacuated by the British. An Arab Administration 
was' established with Sayid MuDsin abu Tablkh as Mutasarrif. 
5 
In early August 
Sayid Hädi Mukawter and his folloers were able to impose their power in al Khidir, 
6 
Gharäf and Shatrah. When the British evacuated Karbala the Mandubin took over 
its, administration. A committee for that purpose was formed of Khurissäni, 
Käshäni, son of Shiräzi and Shahristäni. In September some Baghdadis arrived 
and Bäzirkän raised 
the Arab flag (of Hijaz) over Karbala.? 
On the 13th August Wilson reported attacks on British Officials in Tal'afar, 
Arbil', 'Ramädi and the evacuation of Officials from Qalfat Sikar, Hai and Shatrah. 
$Situation at Samawah threatening %8 In mid August, the army reoccupied Musaiyb 
A. T. Wilson, op. cit., p. 279 
2ý F. O. 371/5079. From G. O. C. Baghdad to W. O., dated 21st September 1920, No. 6056. 
3, ' Sir Aylmer Haldane, op. --Cit.,, p. 96 
. 4. ----'Lady Bell 
(ed), op. cit., Vol-II, p. 494 
S. Firton, 2Z: ý", pp. 
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6. Hassani, o t", pp"117-20 
7, Bäzirkän, op cit", pp"156r 
191-4 
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(12th) and Hindiyah (13th). But on the 8th August the uprising had begun in 
Diyä1ä Divi3ion. The first initiative was taken by al Karkhiyah tribe and 
albu Hayäza*(1ed by Muhammad abu Khushaim) who raided Mahrut Revenue office, 
but it soon expanded to the whole Division. On the 12th August Diltäwah was 
evacuated and the next day Ba*qubah was relinquished by British troops. The 
two tribes were agitated by Nagshabandi who, in-fact, belonged to the second 
tribe. In Ba"qubah an Arab Administration was formed and led by Sa*id Sarah, 
Habib al "Aydarousi, Mahmoud Metwali(Häkim) and Amin Zaki (all were members 
of Harass Zaki was an ex-Officer). Another ex-officer, Hussein 'Ali, was 
appointed in charge of the police and he raised the Arab flag there. 
1 
On the 13th August Shahrabän was captured by the insurgent tribes. A 
provisional Arab Government was set up. Qizil Ribit and Khänagin fell on the 
14th August to the Kurdish Dilo tribe. On the 26th August Kifri (in Kirkuk 
Division) fell to the tribes. In Mandali a local government was formed but 
it took over the control of the town in a bloodless manner. The rising in 
Diyäla was of special importance because it meant a further pressure on 
Baghdad and the cutting of communications with Persia. 
i 
The Civil Commissioner reported the further outbreaks at BaI qubah, Kifri 
and Kirkuk. 
2 He considered evacuation of Mosul 'may shortly become necessary. 
3 
Revolution is no longer political but anarchic*. This telegram was considered 
by the higher authorities in London as tthe most serious we have yet received 
... especially 
as regards the evacuation of Mosul, now, apparently again a 
possibility*. 
4 Tilley minuted the following: 
'The possibility of associating some Arab leader at once with 
the Government might be considered, even without waiting for 
Sir Percy Cox; but he must be somebody from within Mesopotamia 
not called in 
from outside'. 
On the 18th August, Wilson reported the killings of Shahrabän. 
6 
Next day 
he reported that: 
1. Bar, o cit., pp. 
234-40; Bäzirkän, op. cit., PP. 172-3; Hassani, op. 
cit. 2 pp"174-80 
2. P 0.371/5229/3s. 
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3. ', Ibid. 
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19th August 
5. Ib` 
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'Women and children are leaving Kirkuk on August 19th. Arrangements 
have been made for evacuation when necessary, of Arbil, Sulaimani 
and Kirkuk. Ana /in Dulaim_% has been evacuated and British will 
probably have to 
leave Hit shortlyt. 
l 
The situation was considered so serious that British banks were suggesting 
2 
burning their Indian currency. 
The, Political officer of Diyäla wrote: 
Me whole of the agitation came from Baghdad where ... Sadr and 
... Suwaidi made 
this promise their special province ... Among 
the Sunnis al Suwaidi had a considerable reputation, which he 
had gained during Turkish times by his vigorous opposition to 
Turkish oppression, while al Sadr made a religious appeal to 
the Shi'ah ... '. 
3 
The. 'agitation' was directed at the two prominent 'moderate' sheikhs Habib al 
Khaiyzirän of the *Azzah tribe and Hamid al Hassan of Bani Tamim. The Political 
Officer went on to describe the situation in the following way: 
*Ba*qubah has always been anti-British; Shahrabah had a small 
but influential clique of seditionists who had been for some 
time in touch with the Baghdad extremists, while Deltawah with 
its preponderance of Shi*ahs was from the beginning completely 
under the influence of Muhammad al Sadr. In Mandali the position 
was somewhat different ... the revolt 
in Mandali was purely the 
work of the townspeople while the tribes remained absolutely 
aloof. In consequence there was no looting; the temporary Govern- 
ment, which was set up, took over charge 
in orderly fashion 
giving receipts 
for the Treasury money, and there were none of 
the disgraceful incidents, which marked the rising in other 
districts. t4 
Sarah Tappah fell to the tribes on the 
15th August. Tuz Khirmätu fell three 
days later. 'Kirkuk, on and 
from 17th was nervous and inclined to panict. 
5 
kifri town was occupied by the tribes on the 26th August. The Political Officer 
of Kirkuk (Major Longrigg) recorded 
the following causes: 
t(a) ... our military weakness ... 
(b). Months of vigorous propaganda supervened on this realisation. 
It came from different sources 
(Asia Minor, Baghdad, Syria), and 
in different interests; but it united, strongly and persuasively 
to the simple tribal intelligence, upon certain main lines. 
Muslims were everywhere and victoriously uniting, and driving 
the Kafir from "Iraq; to 
join the glorious rising was a religious 
duty. 
1. F. 0.371/5228/E. 
10109. From C. C. Baghdad, No. 9990, dated 19th August 1920 
2. p. O. 371/5078. 
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" '(c). /Tribal solidarity/ 
The British gave, Diyäla. a priority in the . 'pacification' process. -On, the 27th 
August a, British force occupied Ba*qubah. , Another force assisted by loyal 
tribes re-established the Adminstrat ion*s control over Kifri on the 18th-August. 
The: "British re-occupied 
gizil Ribät on the 6th September. and Shahrabän was re- 
taken two days later. ,. ýDiltiwahts resistance: -faded by the124th September, ' 
while Mandali, provisional. Government 
2 
continued as late 'as the'20th November. 
However it should be. noticed, that the, first- object was to re-open the'line =t-' 
from Baghdad to'the Persian frontier. * The British column devoted itself-primarily 
to this and only secondarily to the 'chastisement' of the'tribes. It was reported: 
-i *Further operations ... are necessary and are in progress on 
the left bank. On the right bank we depend on the *Azzah 
whose Shaikh Habib /ä1 Khayzerän7 had the good sense to quit 
the insurgent cause early on favourable terms. For the time 
being he has been appointed A. P. O. Daltawah with the former 
A. P. O. as his adviser*. 
In July 1920 the Political Officer of SamarraFreported tribal restlessnes, 
*I am sure that but for the'efforts of Yusuf al Suwaidi and Saiyid Muhammad 
Sadr .... no 
trouble-would have been experienced in the Southern part of the 
Division'. 
4 The tribes of Sämarrä demanded the following: 
'(a) An Arab Government to be established in Samarra ... 
(b) That all-Political and Civil Officials and Staff 
should be handed over ... 
(c) All Government property in Samarra should be handed f ý^ 5 
over to them /the attackers%'. 
In the Dulaim Division previous to the rising the British had already 
in 1919 had toi face raidingefrom Syria - by Iraqi officers helped by 'Aeaidät 
tribesm ... British withdrawal 
from albu Kamll took place in May 1920 and 
shortage of troops 
led to evacuation of Anah on the 5th August. 
6 
A few days 
later Lt. Col. Leachman, Political Officer of Dulaim, was killed at Khän Nuqtah 
2. Ibid., ppr6-7 - 
2ýe ''Government' was led by certain 11M Agha, an adherent of Tälib Pasha. 'He 
seems to have easily perverted the moderate Nationalism which he heard preached 
by Sayid Talib, into the most extreme form'. C. O. 696/3. "Admin Report, Diyalah, 
1920, Appendix E. P. il" 31323/3 
3. ' 5 303, Memo. Secret, No. - -dated 
10th November 1920, E. B. Howell, 
Lieut. Col., P. S. to H. C. for Mesopotamia, p. 4 
4. C. O. 696/3. Admin Report, Samarra Division, 1920, p. 1 
5. Ibi ", p"2 
6; C. O. 696/3. Admin. 
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by Däri b. Dähir, whose sonsrSalmän and°Khamis were-implicated. This led, to 
practically -a, general rising of the Zoba*. 'For about a fortnight after this, 
affairs were very critical ... The detachments, of troops at Fellujah and Ramada 
were surrounded and-for awhile to some extent beleagureredt. 
l IAli 
al Sulimän 
chief sheikh of the Dulaim Confederation was obliged to leave the, Dulaim. 
2 
However after several military engagements, continued aerial bombardment of 
Däri*s place and strong assistance-from 'Ali Suliman and"Mahruth al Hadhäl 
(Sheikh of *Anizah) the'; situation eased. But in 'Xnah and from a point about 
10-miles above Hit; 'chaos continued to reign supreme%.. 
3 
It was - acknowledged 
by the British that. 'It is not easy to overestimate-our obligation towards, Ali 
al, Sulaiman*. 
4 
Mosul did not take, an active part in the rising. . 
'The'absence of co-operation between the various anti-British 
elements is also noteworthy ... The Syrian movement /äl 'Ahd7 
failed, at the last moment to obtain any assistance from the Turks, 
while the rebellion in Southern Iraq produced extraordinarily 
little excitement here. The tribes possibly with the lesson of Tal 
*Afar fresh in their memories, gave no particular trouble during 
that critical time ... while in Mosul itself the response to order 
from Baghdad which manifested itself in the election of the forty 
came too late to embarrass us seriously'. 
5 
In fact the comparative tranquility of Mosul made possible the transfer of troops 
6 
from that region to the Euphrates. It was pointed out that 'But for this 
entirely fortuitous support 
/from the Assyrians? it is probable that the whole 
of Mosul Division would 
have been swamped in the wave of anarchy*. 
T 
In Sulaimäniyah no open outbreak was reported. This was attributed to 'the 
recollections of 
last yearts events /the failure of Sheikh Mahmoud's rising%, 
a good harvest and the vigorous administration of Major Soane*. 
8 
On the 1st 
September the Surils of tAgrah (Mosul) occupied Batasin in Arbil. The British 
had to evacuate Räwanduz which consequently was occupied by the Surji. 'The 
1. S. A. 303, Memo of E. B. Howell, op. cit., p. 5 
2. - Ibid.; - on Qäri see 
'A. H. *Alawji and 'A. Hijiya, Sheikh Däri (Baghdad, 1968) 
C. 0.696/3. Admin. Report, Dulaim 1920, p. 2 
4. S. A. Memo of E. B. Howell, p. 5 
5. fc. O. 696/3. Admin. Report, Mosul Division 1920, p. 3 
6. Memo of H. B. Howell, p. 
1 
, 7. . mid., p. 
2 
8. Iý d9 p" 4 
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period from the °1st-September to the 14th, when troops arrived In Arbil, and 
the Surchi were defeated by the Assyrians, was highly critical in Arbil tow n'. 
1 
The major arena'of the'rising was on the Mid-Euphrates. " The British suffered 
another setback when on the 12th August they had to evacuate Qaltat Sikar under 
strong 'tribal pressure. This had an'immediate effect 'upon `'the temper of the 
Lover Gharäf. Tribal movement into Shatrah was noticed, *Sayid Abdul Mahdi 
/tiaras/' and Shaikh Mahan Khairullah were the moving spirits and they succeeded 
in getting the sworn'support of the Qalat Sikar tribes for their plot'. 
2 
Their 
aim was to march on Näsiriyah. Their success would have been assured as the 
garrison of Näsiriyah consisted only of a company or two of native infantry. 
However Kihaiyun foiled this attempt. He pledged his support only when Näsiriyah 
should have fallen. His decision resulted in` the Shatrah'tribes taking 'up a= 
neutral attitude'for. 'snme-days. However the A. P. O. ceased to have any authority 
and was virtually a prisoner in his own house. He (Bertram Thomas) wrote: ' 
'Khaiyun, - still my constant adviser, 'ýto1d `me that so long 
as I remained in Shatrah the flag should be respected and 
the tribes would now move avainst Nasiriyah. It was there- 
fore worth while to hand on'. 3 
However, on the 25th August, matters were brought to a climax by the arrival 
of Mirza Muhammad al Shiräzi. 
'This man had been moving down the Charaf preaching 
Jihad. The whole town rose to greet him*. The Assistant political officer' 
had to leave Shatrah and that was made possible under the protection `of Khaiyun. 
4 
The, importance of Khaiyunts attitude was not only in his protection of the 
British Officers"in Shatrah'but also 'in his persistent refusal to attack Nisiriyah. 
In fact the Civil Commissioner had instructed the evacuation of Näsiriyah; on 
the 2nd September he telegraphed: 
'It has been necessary for A. P. o. to leave Suq owing-'to spread of 
Jehad, and it will probably he necessary to evacuate Samarra 
shortly. /C. C. in C. 
% 
... intends to evacuate Nasiriyah as soon'" 
as he has 
extricated detachment ... and will concentrate all his 
forces on the Tigris'. 
5 
1. Ibid., p. 3 
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Suq al Shuyukh was evacuated on the 1st September. The causes of the 
rebellion in Suq were stated to 
be: 
*(a) a desire to escape payment of the 1920 rice revenue. 
(b) A natural desire to escape from Government ... 
'(d) Tribal policy imposed for, very largely, military 
reasons and carried beyond its logical conclusions. 
(e) A loose political agitation from the centres of Shi*ah 
obscurantism, which served as the excuse to set the match 
to the fires. 
' 
The Civil Commissioner reported on the 27th August: 
'Inability of our armed forces to obtain a striking military 
success at any point is encouraging our enemies ... Latest 
-ý example 
is at Shatrah where active preaching of Jehad by 
emissaries from Najaf and Karbala backed by letters of new 
chief Mujtahid /al Igfahäni7 has at last roused tribesmen ... 
/Khayun7 found himself unable to check rising spread of 
Fanaticism amongst his tribesmen*. 
2 
Three days later Wilson reported 'trend of events is having unfavourable effect 
3 
in Hanauar Lake and on lower Euphrates'. When Qaltat Sikar feil, the leaders 
of-the area held a meeting and concluded al 
Musifi convention which included: 
! 1.; The demand of complete independence of Iraq and the 
election of 'Abd Allah as king. 
2., The protection of useful Government institutions ... 
3. Obedience of the Mujtahids ... 
; 5. The 
formation of a local committee in each area under their 
control or even its affairs. 
Among those who signed it were Muhän Khair Allah, 'Abd al Mahdi, Khayun al 'Ubid 
and others. 
4 
After the Shamiyah tribes had succeeded in defending Kif il and inflicting 
the 'Manchester' defeat on the British, they decided to move to Hillah. On 
the 27th July Tuwairij was occupied by Bani Hassan and on the 27th anä 28th 
there were minor attacks on 
Uillah. On the 30th July a big attack (estimated 
to be by 10,000) took place against Villah. The attackers were composed of t 
ganiijassany Fetlah and other Shämiyah tribes. The British were able to defend 
Hiilah and repulse the 
tribes. 'From the house when they realised that it had 
failed their cause began to decline. From this moment, though the leaders 
stood fast, the 
lesser men began to think of surrender ... *. 
5 
1" C. O. 696/4. Admin. Report of Suq al Shuyukh District, 1921, p. 1 
2. F. O. 37115229/B. 
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The fiercest fighting took place in the Samäwah district. The movement 
there was led by abu al Jun, Ghithith al Harjän and Sayid Hädi Mukawter (of 
Shinafiyah). The British had to evacuate al Khidir on the 13th August. On 
the 28th August the tribes captured a defence vessel on the Euphrates, with 
all on board. On the 3rd September a British force attempted to evacuate 
Samiwah but was completely annihilated by the tribes. This was the third 
unsuccessful attempt. On the 22nd September a plane was shot down. A few 
days later the crew of the D. V. 'Greenfly' were forced to surrender to the 
tribes. 
After the. British counter-offensive Samäwah was reached by a relief column 
I 
on the 14th October. Two days earlier Tuwairij was occupied. Immediately 
Karbala surrendered and Musaiyib followed suit. Kifil was occupied on the 
14th October but the strong British colum was still facing considerable 
opposition. Kufah was entered on 
the 17th and the garrison relieved after 
92 days siege. This precipitated the surrender of Najaf. 
' 
Thus by mid October the collapse of the tribal rising was evident. It 
was in early August 
1920 when the Civil Commissioner informed the India Office 
2 
'that a state of war exists throughout Mesopotamia*. It was not until 
February 1920 that General Haldane was able to 
inform the War Office that 
military operations 
had ceased. 
3 
After the elapse of a year a British official analysed the causes of 
the outbreak. In the first place he pointed to the existence of a 'dual 
authority' situation 
in the Iraqi countryside. 'So lightly does Government 
rest on armed tribesmen, 
and so insecure are its foundations ... /-that7 the 
slightest weakening of 
Government is at once detected$. 
4 In conditions of 
this character it was hardly advisable 
to impose high taxation. 'The non- 
payment of taxation 
is popular amongst the people of all nations; it becomes 
Ibid. 
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almost a recreation where the tax-payer is the commander of an Army'. 
He went on to elaborate on the attempt to 'arrest' the socio-political 
developments, 'there can be little doubt that the paramount shaikh if left 
to his own devices, quickly loses his paramountcy'. He argued that 'Tribes- 
men ... object 
to the imposition of autocratic rule'. More especially 'by 
one who is, in most cases their enemy and, in nearly all, covets some portion 
of their land'. 
2 It is clear that the policy of restoring the power of the 
sheikh was opposed to the interests of the tribes; 
it runs contrary to the 
evolution of political institutions and cannot 
be successful, in the long run. 
'It has often been the proud boast of the British in Mesopotamia 
that, where the Turks divided up the tribes and kept them in 
perpetual warfare as the easiest means of controlling them, the 
British restored their cohesion and the patriarchal rule of their 
shaikhs. 
This rule was so patriarchal ... that it was one of the causesjof 
the rebellion. Patriarchs may have their place in the desert, but 
they are out of place amongst rice and date exporters'. 
3 
(a) The Character of the Uprising: Because of its importance, impact and 
novelty, the Iraqi uprising 
has provoked various interpretations of its motives, 
forces and nature. The head of the British Adminitration, at the time of the 
events, maintained 
that it was a chaotic insurrection by anarchist tribes in- 
cited by Hashimite agents and 
fanatic 'ulemä'. 4 Wilson's view, being one- 
sided, was bound 
to fall into self-contradictory arguments. On the 28th June 
he admitted some agrarian 
dissatisfaction, but hastened to assert 'we must look 
... not 
to political changes for which there is no demand ... but to adequate 
5 
land settlement ... and wise ... 
taxation*. Shatrah*s Political Officer wrote: 
t... disquiet is broadly speaking, agrarian and not primarily 
political. Nationalist activities 
there have been, and no one 
would underrate their seriousness, 
but ... The political minded 
made up of ... town 
intelligentsia, is ... five per cent of the 
-population. In the tribes Nationalism is unknown ... The root 
cause of unrest is objection to taxation*. 
6 
1. Ibid" 
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Nevertheless, a month later Wilson wrote 'I do not think'rebels have any agrarian 
grievances ... Were there any such grievances, area of disturbance would not be 
limited as now to Shia'district within reach of Najaf and Karbala') 
This superficial separation of politics from economics, nationalism from 
taxation and land policy, is also clear in the writings of Iraqi Arab nationalists. 
Basir, Hassani and Fir'on consider the tribal sheikhs as ardent nationalists who 
sought nothing but 
the independence of Iraq. 
2 
Only, Bäzirkin raised the importance 
of the 'economic'' factor. ' He'gave the credit of 'pure' nationalism to the Baghdadis 
and contemptuously referred to the tribal contribution as motivated by land and 
taxation problems and agitated by the 'Ulema'. 
3 
The essential defect which dominates most of the above-mentioned views is 
the unjustified separation between agrarian grievances and nationalism. - It is 
my opinion that the rising was a primitive but genuine expression of nationalism. 
I have tried to show how deeply-rooted and justified were those grievances which 
the British occupation served to bring to a head. I suggested that without such 
agrarian grievances, the tribes would not have been so profoundly affected by the 
nationalist or religious appeals. Nevertheless, it is equally true that such 
hardships were, thanks to the British, taking an embryonic national structure 
and, consequently, expression. The changes in the socio-economic structure and 
the spread of education and communication were gradually bringing the country 
together and integrating the tribes into the society of Iraq. The successful, 
but counter productive, centralization policy of the British accelerated the 
process of integration. 
The Administration's taxation law and tribal policies 
produced wide resentment which was 
directed-against the central Authority. Thus 
different Iraqi tribes were to co-ordinate their efforts, by-pass the inter- 
tribal conflict, and strike collectively against the Administration. Furthermore, 
they allied themselves with other 
forces who were striving for the liquidation 
of the British 
Administration, namely the nationalists and some Mujtahids. 
1. F. 0.371/5228/E. 
9849, dated July (29? )'1920 
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I have tried to show that the nationalist-Shi'i-tribal alliance was genuine 
and effective. Most of the tribes had adopted the nationalists' aims of inde- 
pendence and a Hashimite king. The organizational and military links among the 
tribes were in evidence 
1 
and between tribes, nationalists and mujtahids were not 
loose, or meaningless. The actual fighting was the most tribal aspect of the up- 
rising. Nevertheless, all British and Indian 'war prisoners' were handed over to 
2 
the Arab Administration of Najaf. Moreover no less than 15 ex-officers had left 
their towns and joined the fighting on the Euphrates and in Diyäla. 
3 
They were 
either sent by Uarasp volunteered individually or were living in the areas of the 
outbreak. Furthermore, the direct role of Suwaidi and Sadr in Diyäla and Samarra 
was pointed out by the Authorities. In Karbala and Najaf the Mandubin assumed 
authority once the British had withdrawn. In Ba'qubah, Mandali and Khälis the 
town nationalists formed a provisional 
'government'. The tribes who attacked 
4 
Hillah were accompanied by Jaza iri, Käshäni and Shahristani. Two newspapers 
were allowed by the 
'local authorities' to be published in the area; al Isticläl 
and al Furat, both of which were edited 
by Arab nationalists (Mulammad 'Abd al 
l 
Hussein and B. al Shabibi). Both papers expressed not only Arab nationalist 
feelings but also a considerable understanding of the conflict in the British 
policy and the development 
in the area. Shabibi attacked the French invasion 
of Syria, and the British tacit approval, as an attempt to prevent Iraqi-Syrian 
unity. 
5 On the 30th July a leaflet issued in Najaf by Shabibi 'demanded' of every 
1. For instance the 
'º Rumaitheh-Samäwah links with the Najaf-Shämiyah tribes. 
The attack on {iillah was a coordinated between several tribes who previously 
were on bad terms. Up to 1918 the conflict was unresolved over land between 
Fetlah, Abrihim, Himidat, al 'Awibid and Khafäjah and other tribes. Yäsiri, 
op. cit., pp. 69-72. In 1920 all those tribes and others together attacked itillah, 
y. Karkush al Hilli, Tärikh al Ijillah, (Najaf,. =965), Pp. -75-6 
2. Shelläsh was responsible for the prisoners. Letter from Ilfahäni to Shalläsh. 
al Furät No. 5,2nd Muharam 1339 (16th September 1920). 
3. I was able to count the following: Shäkir Matimoud, Hussein 'Alwän, 'Abd al 
Rahmau Khadir, Fuad al Madfa'i, Zaki Amin, TAM al Jaddah, Jamil gabt n, 
Mahmoud Rgmiz, Taha al Badri, Sämi and Anwar al Na9shali, Ismä'I1 l, i i Agha, 
Shäkir al araghouli, Mahmoud Sämi, Sa 
id H i, Ibrahim Mahdi, 'Arif Ijikmot, 
Däoud al Akan ki, Rashid Shibläwi, Vussein Awni, Ibrahim Adham. F. 0.371/ 
5080-1. M. P., A. I. No. 33-7, dated 14th August to 14th September 1920; B zirkän, 
010. cit., pp. 
152,158,174; Balir, op. cit., P. 242, Hassani, op. cit., p. 132, 
Fir' ens op. cit., pp. 136,238 
4, Yäsiri, op_ ", p. 
218 
5, a t, No. 
1,21st Dhe Qa'da 1338 (21st August 1920) 
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tribal leader to 'educate' his tribesmen that the uprising was for al Istigläl, 
that Government property should be preserved and inter-tribal hatreds overcome. 
Faisal al Mughair (the leader of Fa h uprising) was in correpsondence with 
Suwaidi and Shahristäni. 
2 
Nevertheless, the 'primitive' form of nationalism was equally clear., The 
Fellab-in never became members of a unified 'army of liberation'. One is often 
left with the impression that the tribal leaders were contented with the local 
independence of their areas; no serious attempt was, made to attack, for instance, 
Baghdad. 
3 
The tribes lacked a well organized coordination. Furthermore, the 
possible satisfaction by the British of the agrarian complaints was a major 
factor behind the hesitation and double-faced attitude of large numbers of sheikhs. 
Some of them refused to take part (Dähir, Khazä'il, 
'Adäy 
al Jariyän-albu Sultan), 
others involved half-heartedly 
(al 'Abtän, Khayun) and some concluded their 
separate peace with the 
Administration (Khayzerän). In short one could say that 
the underdeveloped socio-economic conditions of Iraq were bound to produce 
politically only a primitive nationalist 
'revolution'. 
There is another interpretation of the uprising. Nafeesi emphasised the 
Shi'i character of it and to stress his point, he quotes Hogarth who argued that 
the rising 'was mainly a Shiite affair, organized from Najaf and Karbala'. 
4 
This argument reminds us of Wilson's views. However, it was Elie Kedourie who 
developed such a notion to its extreme: 
'There was perhaps another factor which helped to make possible a 
momentary alliance between Shi'ah and Sunnis. When the prospect of 
independence appeared, the Shi'ah leaders hoped to be the masters 
of the country, and agreed to ally themselves to the Sunni who, as 
a minority, the Shi'as must have calculated, would never have the 
upper hand in an independent Mesopotamian state'. 
5 
Moreover, Kedourie interprets the revolt as Shi'i-inspired and dominated 
Separatist movement 
to wrest power from the Sunnis, both Ottoman and Arab. 
1. In V. Sha'bän Library, Najaf. 
2. F. 0.371-/5081. M. P., 
A. I. No. 33,14th August 1920 (Suwaidi); M. 'A. Kamäl 
al Din, o_Pcit", pp. 254-5 
(Letter from Shahristäni). 
3. Nevertheless it might 
have been the British force, the failure of the 
Hillah attack, Khayun reluctant to attack Näsiriyah, Khayzirän's hesitance 
and failure at 
Falujah are the real reasons. 
4. A. F. al Nafeesi, op. cit., p. 247 
E. Kedourie, England ..., op. cit., p. 190. Compare this to Kedourie's 5ý 
-rgument quoted 
in page ý&. 
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Therefore it was not only a regional happening, but also a sectarian one, 
aiming, according to Kedourie, for the establishment of a theocratic Shi"i 
state independent from the rest of Iraq. 
Kedourie's argument is self contradictory, undocumented and, moreover, 
ill founded on two levels; reality and intellectual interpretation. It is 
positively clear that the so-called 'Shi'i Jehad' was directed against the 
British Administration, and not against the Iraqi Sunnah of whom a large section 
1P 
was taking part in the same 'Jehad'. The Shi*i-Sunni alliance, during that 
period, reached a peak of strength and harmony. Both were preaching a wider 
national unity to embrace the Iraqi Christians and Jews. Among the nationalist 
leadership ( aras), it is even inaccurate to refer to an alliance. It was a 
unity of 'enlightened' nationalists which lasted even after the elapse of the 
uprising and its aftermath. 
2 
There is no evidence to support the claimed Shi'i Ocalculation' for an 
independent state. Abundant data indicates the opposite. Iraqi Shi'ah who 
took part in the uprising, whether tribes or mujtahids, were persistent in 
their demand for a united Iraq and a Hashimite king. 
The usage of the term Shi'ah is, to some extent, an unjustified over- 
generalization. The Shitah, like most other groupspis not an indivisible 
community. The Iraqi Shi"ah has 
been divided, in this work, into nationalists 
(considered as an organic part of Iraqi nationalists), tribes and fellähin, 
Sayids (of Shämiyah and Mishkhäb), notables and merchants, and mujtahids. It 
seems most likely that to 
Wilson, Hogarth and Nafeesi the term referred mainly 
to 
the mujtahids. Kedourie does not define his use of the term. 
It iss of course, idle to underestimate the moral power of 'ulemä' amongst 
tribesmen; that the tribes do pay attention to their divines, who were in- 
strumental in the agitation, 
is an established fact. Nevertheless, it is safe 
1. E. Kedourie, 'Reflexions sur 1*histoire du Royaume d'Irak (1921-1958)', 
Orient, No-11 (1959), pp. 55-79. Cited by A. Vinogridov, 'The 1920 Revolt 
in Iraq Reconsidered: the Role of Tribes in National Politics, International 
Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 3, No. 2, April 1972, pp. 123-139 
2. After the rising two nationalist parties were formed; at Watani and at 
Nahda. Both included Sunni and Shi'i members alike. Basir, op. cit., 
pp. 404-30 
- 393 - 
to say that such incitement cannot assume an effective influence unless the 
ground is prepared by the existence of actual grievances. It has been suggested 
that peasants socio-political and agrarian conditions make it difficult for 
them to pass from passive recognition of wrongs to political participation in 
setting them right. 
1 
To suggest that the massive uprising of the Iraqi fell hin 
was solely due` to religious fetwa or nationalist propaganda2 is, to say the 
least, a myopic view. 
3 
Moreover, a review of the political development in Iraq between 1914 to 
1921 would not fail to give 'the mujtahids* role its right and unexaggerated 
dimension. It would also expose the shallow'view considering the Shi'ah as 
I 
a monolithic group. In 1914 nearly all the *ulemä' called for an anti-British 
Jehad; the tribes responded but with obvious mental reservation and practical 
s 
reluctance. In 1915-1916, Najaf, Karbalä and Uillah 'population' was rising` 
against the Turks whereas some of 
the Shi*i mujtahids and intelligentsia were 
expressing regret at 
the downfall of the Ottomans. In May 1918, Najaf disturb- 
ances were carried against 
the will of the chief Mujtahid (Yazdi). Jazä'iri 
and 'Ullum enthusiasm did not convince 
the contented tribes to move against the 
Administration. In late 1918, the leaders of Shämiyah-Najaf 'voted', during 
the Referendum, for an independent Iraq. This was done without the approval of 
yazdi and, almost, against his 
indicative silence. The uprising began in 
Rumaitheh-Samäwah before Shiräzi*s 
fetwa was issued and in neglect of his 
persistent advice of 
an orderly and peaceful demand for independence. Shiräzits 
*defensive force' 
ffetwa and his pressure on the leaders of Shämiyah-Najaf 'not 
to allow Rumaitheh 
to sink alone' had, apparently, no strong impact on "Ab%än, 
'Alwan al Sa*dun', Khayun and others. It 'influenced' other tribal leaders of 
different socio-political conditions and views. 
T. Shanin (ed), op. cit., pp. 14-15; E. R. Wolf, *0n Peasant Rebellions', 
op. cit., pp. 
1-2 
2. G. Bell wrote 
'It was this /nationalist7 propaganda which was the sole and 
only cause of 
the stirring up of revolt heret. G. Bell, Private Papers ..., 
Newcastle, letter dated 30th January 1921. 
3. 
Major young wrote *I do not agree with Colonel Wilson that political changes 
will not provide 
the remedy. Colonel Gordon Walker, of Basrah, tells me that 
our repressive 
taxation, with no corresponding benefits given, is exceedingly 
unpoPular-with 
the Arab tribes ... t. F. 0.371/5227/ß. 7725. Minute by 
Hý young. on a telegram No. 7825, from C. C. Baghdad, 28th June 1920. 
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Shiräzi died on the 13th August, his son Ridä and al 'Ulum were exiled before 
that. Yet the movement went on uninterrupted. 
Shiräzi was succeeded by Isfahäni who publicly condemned violence and did 
not support Shiräzi*s fetwa to Jehad. On the 27th August he received an open 
letter from the Civil Commissioner which varied between threats and offers of 
peace. 
I 
Jaza'iri, Jawähir, Rädi and Isfahäni favoured negotiating peace. 
2 
The nationalists (led by Shabibi) and the tribes led by Sikar, were advocating 
rejection of Wilson*s offer and wrote several articles to that end. Isfahäni, 
under public pressure, wrote back to Wilson bitterly criticizing his Admin- 
istration and its deeds. He concluded his letter by refusing negotiation. 
3 
In the end it was the newly arrived British troops who tconvincedt the tribes 
to surrender their arms and not Isfahäni*s dedication to peace. 
The prominent Mujtahids who worked for the uprising had, with the exception 
of Sadr, more often than not 
displayed *Ottomanist" tendencies. This fact 
contradicts the view that their movement was sectarian. Thus it is fair to 
conlcude that Kedourie's assumptions are arbitrary and that many other accepted 
views on the rising should 
be reconsidered. 
This work has referred to the distinguished role of the Iraqi Shi'i 
intelligentsia in the rise of Arab nationalism and the independence movement. 
It has been argued that such a role was made possible by a combination of 
their ethnic structure (Arabs but minority within Ottomanism) and their intellectual 
heritage (reason and tolerance). But it does not follow that the 'special roles 
should indicate a 
desire to a special state. Together with a rising elite 
of Sunnah and 
Christians, the Shi'ah intelligentsia were inspired by a vision 
of a united, 
independent state in which science and social progress could 
flourish. One could hardly expect that sectarianism would vanish miraculously 
in a society like Iraq of 
1920. But those nationalists found in Islam a useful 
1. a1lIrägv*No. 77,31st 
August 1920 
2. Ijassani, op- "e p"125 
3. Fir*on, o. cit., pp. 
358-9 
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and common umbrella, more especially when the British occupation had assisted 
in suppressing the growing distinction between Islam and nationalism. - The 
Islam of *the 1920 nationalists was, however, a political and not a-theocratic 
one. Furthermore, it was,, virtually, an 'Afghanist" Islam which advocated 
unity with Christians and Jews. 
1 
Muhammad Habib al *Ubaydi, summed up the 
intellectual combination of several trends interacting within the movement 
in an interesting poem. He swore by the Bible and gurän that Iraq would never 
accept the Mandate. For 'Abd 
Allah the richest blood was shed, 'We did not 
betray the Turks but for the sake of independence #. Although he advocated 
Moslem unity, he affirried that the Shi*ah would never accept Mandate. 
2 
j=. j 9 i`'°' L$ "-J' u---ý... J.. X11 u .! 1. ý. ý. _. " 
ýJ% MI L 
L,, ý, 1, l: ý ý '- ý ýý, ý: s L" ý; _. r. ýý; s ý-ý , ý' 
aA. ae; Lam,,, _, 
ý YP; -0 
Different writers gave various accounts concerning the sociäi nature of 
the uprising. 'Most Iraqi Marxists attributed a large role to the 'Iraqi 
bourgeoisie'. This work contends that such a view has no strong basis3 and 
suggests that the movement was 
basically led by the town intelligentsia and 
the tribes. r Kotalov, a Russian Marxist, argued that the rising was of the poor 
fei11n against taxation, landlords and British rule. 
4 
Others saw it as a 
movement led by 
the landed notables. If Kotalov meant that the poor peasants 
were the most affected 
by the events, then it is a self-evident argument. If 
he was, as is morepossible, attributing 
the leadership of the rising to them, 
then his assumptions are, in great need of proof. There is no evidence to 
1. During the rising it was suggested to release the Indian Moslems who were 
captured by the tribes. 
tAdwah opposed that arguing that the movement was 
nationalist and not 
Islamic. It seems that his opinion convinced the 
leaders of Najaf; Indians (88) and British (79) soldiers were released 
together. - They were well treated. 
(ii 
(i) Papers of *Abd al Razaq 'Adwah in his family house (Hillah) 
(ii) ai Ira , No. 121,22nd'October 1920 
2. I. al Wä'ili, Al Shi*r al1Irägi 
ft Thawrat al tAshrin, (Baghdad, 1960), pp. 73-7 
3. Spa' PP"al, 
2-&' 
4. L. Kotalov, Thawrat al 
"Ashrin al Wataniya al Tahurriya ft aloIra . Arabic. 
. 'trans. 
A. W. "Karam (Baghdad, 1971). Originally a Ph. D. thesis, Moscow, 1958 
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suggest that the poor felläbin had by-passed their leaders of small sheikhs, 
saräkil or leaders of subdivisions. The only group of landed notables who 
allied themselves to the'uprising were the Sayids. To most other landed 
notables the uprising was more often than not directed against their claims 
and represented a strong social challenge to their interests. 
'In the Muntafiq Division 'the events of the /prising/ have 
resulted in driving every landlord into support of B. Government. 
Not only the Sa*dun, but merchants of the town who have invested 
their money in garden property and agricultural land have seen 
themselves dispossessed, to a lesser or greater extent, by the 
tribes in the name of Independence or Jihad. ... It is the cry 
of independence not that of Arab Government, which has made 
special appeal to the smaller shaikhs, the heads of sections. 
To them it holds out the hope of throwing off the yoke of the 
paramount shaikhs of the tribe, through whom administration has 
been conducted, and of dropping the burden of rent and taxation ... ý. 
Such a balanced evaluation finds ample evidence in the actual events of the 
uprising. 
Massive and powerful British troops were finally able to put an end to 
the uprising. Haldane proudly declared that his troops had 'taught the tribes- 
men what it meant to cross swords with the British Empire'. 
2 
Cox arrived in 
Basrah on October Ist and Baghdad on the 11th. On October 23rd Abd al Rahman 
al Nagib headed the 
first Iraqi Government which included Tälib, at *Askari, 
Hisqail and others. 
3 
. 
Nevertheless it was obvious that the situation was far from being durable. 
The nationalist newspaper al Istigläl wrote: 
'Lloyd George has declared that Sir Percy Cox was given wide 
latitude, this implies that the policy of A. B. 7 in Iraq is 
not yet decided. Iraqi nation must thereföre 
not hesitate to 4 
put forward her demands'. 
A few days later, al Istigläl argued that: 
'Nothing material has changed; the nation wants a general amnesty, 
return of deportees, the repatriation of officers detained in 
Syria and elsewhere, and a great change in the Administration 
/replacement of Foreigners by Iraqis7. Arabic even is not yet 
the official language. ' 
1. p. 0.371/6348/54. Intelligence Report No. 4,31st December 1921, Para. 19-20. 
2. A. Haldane, A Soldier*s ..., op. cit., p. 383 
3. They were Mugtafa Allusi, *Izzat Pasha (Kirkuk), Mu! ammad Tabtäba'i (Karbalaft), 
'Abd al Latif Mandil (Basrah), Mu1ammad Fa4ii (Mosul). Another 12 notables 
and sheikhs were appointed as 
Ministers without portfolios. 
4. Al tiglä1 No, 
17, December 1st 1920 
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It predicted another outbreak if 'no remedy is given'. 
' 
Al Istigläl 
carried on its campaign and suggested that: 
'Nothing in the. nature, of a national government yet exists, 
nor is there any proof that the British Government has altered 
a policy which was contrary to the wishes of the people. But 
the nationalists will win ... Iraqis must in the end gain a 
victory for the cause of nationalism'. 2 
Hamdi Bäjhji published a disclaimer in which he declared that he twould on no 
account take any appointment under the provisional Government#. 
3 
The British 
Authorities explained his attitude as follows: 
It "reflects that of the Young Arab Party to which he belongs, 
although he cannot be said to be among the most unreasonable. 
... 
he does not regard the present Government as standing for 
a national institution nor will he give it his allegiance ... 
Even Rashid Beg al Khojah /iutassarrif of Baghdad7 has expressed 
a private disbelief in the sincerity of British Intentions'. 
The report went on to conclude that 'Nothing but the development of Arab 
Administration can allay these doubts*. 
4 
In fact the most 'nationalist' aspect of the 1920 uprising lay in the 
explanation by the British, 
both in Iraq and England, of its forces and aims. 
It was through this interpretation that a remedy was to be devised and 
implemented. Nevertheless, the British had attributed an exaggerated 
influence to the group which, in fact, had the minimum impact on the 
'Euphrates rising' namely the Iraqi officers of al`Ahd. The essence of the 
new British policy was 
the adoption of Major Dickson's advice; the appoint- 
went 'to political posts only men of moderate views' and the suppression 
, of the agents of the insurrection if or when found'. 
5 
1. Ibid., No-18p 5th December 
1920 
2. Ibid., No. 33,19th 
January 1920 
3. Ibid., 30th January 
1921 
4. g. p. 371/6350/116. Mesopotamia 
Intelligence, No. 6,31st January 1920 
5.11 R kson"s 
Papers. Oxford, D. 77, Box 2A, File IV, p. 18,1921 
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CHAPTERXV 
THE BRITISH-'MODERATE' NATIONALIST SOLUTION 
Preface 
In late 1914, A. T. Wilson wrote: 
'I should like it accounced that Mesopotamia was to be annexed 
to India as a colony for India and Indians, that the Government 
of India would administer it and gradually bring under culti- 
vation its vast unpopulated desert plains, peopling them with 
the martial races of the Punjab'. l 
Subsequent developments and events had proved that such a desire was never 
to be realised. It is beyond doubt that one of the prime reasons behind the 
failure of the annexation policies was the stiff resistance which the Iraqi 
nationalists had shown. G. Bell admitted that: 
'No-one, not even /H. M. G_/, would have thought of giving 
the Arabs such a free hand as we shall now give them - as 
a result of the rebellion'. 
2 
A. S. Klieman argued that: 
'... it can be said that the uprising was indeed revolutionary, 
because of its impact on the British policymaking apparatus'. 3 
The rising cost the British 906 killed, 2,476 missing and 671 wounded. 
4 
To suppress it they had to 
inflict upon the Iraqis some 8200 casualties. 
5 
it 
cost the British Treasury much more than 
the Hijazi movement. Furthermore, 
in Britain itself the most strenuous demand for evacuation came with the rising 
and the mounting 
burden on the British. 'People began to wonder ... whether 
Mesopotamia was worth such an outlay'. 
6 
Thus there are adequate proofs to indicate that the rising had largely 
contributed to 
the alteration of British policy. Nevertheless, it is equally 
1. I. O. L/P and 's/IO, 3136/14, No. 4717/14. A letter from A. Wilson to Col. C. E. 
Yates, M. P. 28 November 1914. Cited by H. A. Nakib, op. cit., p. 75, also 
H. Young, OP- cit., p. 40 
2.0. Bell, private Letters and Papers (Newcastle), letter dated September 19,1920 
3. A. S. Klieman, Foundations of British Policy in the Arab World: the Cairo 
Conference of 1921, p. 59 
4. F. O. 371/5231/E. 13302, dated 
25 October 1920. 
5. F. 0.371/5081, dated 
16 November 1920. 
6. E, Moor, Britain's ..., 
op. cit., p. 61 
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true that the movement had suffered atotal military defeat. Had the British 
aim-been wholeheartedly annexationist, they were capable of enforcing it. 
However, -there is much evidence that annexation was not the strategic British 
aim: 
'I cannot'say, in, regard to Mesopotamia that there are primary, 
direct, strategic British interests involved ... our policy in 
Mesopotamia'is to reduce our committments and to extract ourselves 
from our burdens while at the same time honourably discharging 
our obligations and building up a strong and effective Arab govern- 
ment which will be the friend of Britain .1 
Churchill's ärgusent was partially confirmed by a Memorandum of the War Office, 
in which it was asserted that: 
"5, ... It is. not 
for any military reason that we are there [in 
Mesopotamia/ ... 
6. The idea of maintaining troops in Mesopotamia or Persia 
for-the defence of India is radically unsound, and has never 
been contemplated by /H. M. G_/'. 
2 
Britain's War Aims 
Arguments of this sort must immediately bring into question{the. motives 
behind the British occupation of Iraq and-the British suppression of the rising. 
There were a variety=oß ideas and outlooks existing among the British. , Iraq 
as, 'tar as the British strategic interests were concerned, was not a single and 
indivisible unit. The south of Iraq (Basrah and its surroundings) was of 
vital importance to the British. 
Whereas the northern part of Iraq (Baghdad 
and Mosul) had no strategic 
interest for the Empire. Such division of Iraq 
had been clear in the British mind since 1898.3 The southern halt of Iraq 
'formed part of the Persian Gulf' sphere of interest, in which Britain's diplomacy 
had for two centuries built'upsa^unique, positionr... trade interests, ocean 
navigation, a strategic route 
to India were all involved'. 4 It was not sur- 
prising that Britain regarded 
'the concession by any power of a part upon the 
5 
persian Gulf to 
Russia /or Germany/ as international provocation to-war'. 6 
Parliamentary Debates, H. C. Vol. 143, p. 276, dated June 14,1921' 
2. F. 0.371/5232/E. 
15721. Memo by the S. of S. for War dated 10th December 1920 
3ý G. P. Gooch and H. W. 
V. Temperley (eds), op. cit., Voll, p. 8 
4. S. H. Longrigg, Iraq ..., op. cit., p. 3 
g. Parliamentary 
Debates2 H. L. 5th Series, March 1911, Vol. 7, pp. 583587-9; 
H. C. 2 5th 
Series, 1911, Vol. 21, PP. 241-2. 
g, G. E. Kirk, o, cit., pp. 
88-9 
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In fact it `was suggested that the occupation of the southern part of Iraq was 
planned years before`it happened. 
l ý "i ý 
'Towards the'close of September 1914, it became'evident"wrote Lloyd George, 
'that Turkey was likely to join the enemy powers. This made it at¢once important 
to take steps for safeguarding the oil supplies in the Persian Gulf which was 
ýI 
h 
owned by the LA. 'P. O. C_/, ... as'means of ensuring supplies of oil fuel for the 
Navy'. 
2 In the early part 'of `1914, the oil pipeline (in Arabistan) had been 
doubled and the refineries at Abadan had been greatly increased. 3 It was 
obvious that these refineries could easily be reached by Turkish troops from 
IIasrah. x 'Furthermöre the Government of India wanted to"prevent eastward . pene- 
tratiön'by German"agents, and to protect the friendly Sheikhs of Kuwaitýänd 
Mohammarah. 
4 
-`ý ýý 1 'ý ' 'ti ý ,r 
Thus it could be 
concluded that the original' British object was not the 
occupation of Iraq so much as the guarantee of the British interests'in the 
Gulf and, perhaps, Basrah. This indicates that the basic aim of British 
strategy could be achieved by a friendly power ruling Iraq'which would guarantee 
the essential interests of the Empire. Such a power need not be provided by 
direct British rule. But, in '1914, when Wilson made the point, quoted at the 
beginning of this'chapter, there were ambitions for the colonization or annex- 
ation of 
'Iraq, 'and 'these grew stronger after its occupation became a'fact. 
Whereas the occupation of Basrah was, 'evidently an agreed-upon plan, the 
further advance of British troops north 
to Baghdad and Mosul aas a controversialr 
issue amongst British policy-makers. -, In. -fact, 'Lloyd George considered the 
pursuit of the campaign as 
'a side issue' which was 'to be withdrawn'. 
5 
Any 
accurate reading of 
the Campaign in Mesopotamia 1914-1918 would not fail to 
confirm the above conclusion. 
In November 1914, Cox telegraphed the Viceroy 
of India 
suggesting the taking over of Baghdad. 
s 
The Viceroy sent Cox's telegram 
1. p. W. Ireland, -op. cit., p. 22; S. H. Longrigg, Iraq..., op. cit., p. 77. 
2. Lloyd George, War Memories, op. cit., p. 803 
3. N. A. ' Foster, The Making of Modern Iraq, (Norman, 1935), p. 37'= 
4. E. Monrog Britain's Moment ..., op. cit., p. 25; A. Foster, op. cit., p. 38 
5. Lloyd George, War Memories, op. cit., p. 802. 
6. Brig-General F. J. Moberly, History of the Great War Based on Official Documen 
e am i in Meso 
tamia 19141918 4 vols. (HMSO 1923-27), Vol. 1, p. 134 s r ovem er 1,914 
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to the Secretary-of-State for India and added that he was of the opinion that 
the ultimate strategic value of Baghdad was doubtful', ' even success would 
result in our general strategical position being weakened rather than strengthened'. 
In August 1915, Sir John Nixon (who had assumed command of the Mesopotamian 
Expedition on April 9th) suggested an-advance to Baghdad as the best. way of 
counteracting unrest -in, Persia. In September 1915, Lord Hardings-; wrote to Mr. 
Chamberlain pointing out the great effect in the East which the capture of Baghdad 
by the,. British should have. 
2 
Nevertheless General Barrow (at the India0itice) 
advocated. a policy of caution and-prompt orders to General Nixon not, to advance. 
3 
On October 4th, Chamberlain wired officially to India ' there is no object in 
continuing thepursuit-,:.. 
'. 
4 
On October 6th, Hardinge-wired privately to 
Chamberlain pointing out the ease with which Baghdad could be. occupied, and arguing: 
... 
from a political point of view, capture of Baghdad would 
create an. immense impression in the Middle East, especially in 
Persia, Afghanistan and on our frontier and would counteract un- 
fortunate impression created by want of success in Dardanelles. 
It would isolate German parties in Persia, probably produce 
pacifying effect in-that country and frustrate German-plan of, 
raising Afghanistan and the tribes, while impression throughout 
Arabia would be striking. In India effect would be undoubtedly, 
good' "5 
Without going into further details, it was reasons of the above character? 
which eventually, but not without 
difficulties, convinced the higher Authorities 
to agree to the occupation of Baghdad and beyond. However, the 'persuasive' 
arguments revealed that 
the occupation was considered for external reasons 
rather than intended to protect or establish any direct interest in Iraq proper. 
1. Ibid.., pp. 135-6.9 dated 25th November, 1914 
2. I_ d., Vol. II, pp. 3-4 
3. Ibid., PP. 7-8 
4. Ibid., P. 8 
5. Ibid., PP. 15-16 
6. II .0 pp. 
16717,450 
7. General Barrow wrote the appreciation of the campaign against Basrah. 
Ibid., Vo1. I, p. 88. However General Barrow himself opposed the occupation 
of Baghdad. 
Ibid., , Vol. 
II, p. 28. 'Lord Kitchener did not altogether concur in °the 
telegram sent to Lord Hardinge ... He was not in favour of anything but 
a raid on Baghdad ... 
'. In fact W. Churchill,, then First Lord of the 
Admiralty, was opposed even to the occupation of Basrah. 
Ibid., Vol. I, p. 82 
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Lord Curzon pointed out that: 
'When we originally despatched a force to Basrah, we had no 
intention of holding Mesopotamia Permanently. We had been 
gradually drawn on to Baghdad and ... The Cabinet were anxious 
to reduce the financial1 and military commitments2 of /ii. M. Gs/ 
as far as possible'. 
Nonetheless, when Baghdad was occupied in 1917, a new political reality 
was created. This was bound to bring to the surface the conflicting views 
amongst British policy-makers. The first symptom came with Maude's Declaration 
with its rosy promises of an impending Arab Government. 
4 
Once Baghdad was 
occupied,, the British Government had made its position very clear indeed: 
'/H. M. G_/ issued instruction that the existing administrative 
machinery was to be preserved as far as possible, substituting 
Arab for Turkish spirit and personnel, and that every effort 
should be made to induce local representative men to come forward 
and participate in the Civil Administration, British co-operation 
being limited as far as possible to advisory functions". 5 
Nevertheless, none of those and further instructions and proclamations 
were put into actual practice. Sir 
Arnold Wilson was the British man on the 
spot and it was made clear 
(vide previous Champters) that he carried out the 
policy which he desired and saw fit. 
Such a conclusion is not an attempt to 
6 
victimize Wilson as a scapegoat. 
After all, the British Government had allowed 
a subordinate to implement a policy which ran counter to its wishes. This en- 
courages the notion that without the rising of 1920, the "Wilsonian" line might 
well have had a chance of enforcing 
its scheme or a modified version of it. 
There is no necessity to elaborate on a subject which touches upon the 
internal dynamics of the British Policy. But it is interesting to note Lawrence's 
views on the issue: 
1. The Mesopotamian Campaign cost Britain £200 million. Parliamentary 
Debates H. C. Vol. 151 (1922), p. 1546 
2. British war casualties were 92.501. F. J. Moberly, 2. p. cit., Vol. IVO p. 331 
3. F. 0.371/5068. Minutes of meeting held at F. O. on April 13th 1920, of 
Inter-Departmental Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs. 
4. Supra, p. 316 
5. F. J. Moberly, op. cit", 
V01-III, p. 254 
6. A. Wilson wrote to 
A. Hirtzel: 'I do not believe that anything I have done, 
or could have done, would 
have substantially changed the march of events ... 
If H. M. G. wish to utilize my services as a scapegoat or Aunt Sally I should 
not attempt to avoid 
such a fate ... , Sir A. T. Wilson, Private Papers, 
B. M. No. 52444, Vol. 
I, draft letter. 
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A 
'It is the old story of leaving everything to the man on the 
spot ... It is rare to get an intelligible telegram of instructions 
from the Government. And today the position is even worse ... : 
The Government cannot do anything and the newspapers cannot 
do anything ... Until you get the right man there we shall go 
on fighting advanced opinion everywhere in Mesopotamia'. l 
Lord Curzon left no doubt that Wilson was the supreme Authority in Iraqi 
affairs. 'Curzon 
pointed out., that: 
'... there had been. two schools of thought, all the way through, ;.; 
the first of which Colonel Wilson was the most notable exponent, 
was the school of direct British Administration. The second ... 
was the National State school'. 
2 
Curzon went on: 
<, 
'Colonel Wilson, being a man of great energy and power, had, in 
virtue of his official position, succeeded in bringing his view 3 into force, and /ii. M. G_/ had been more or less obliged to acquiesce'. 
In late 1919, the Foreign Office sent a despatch to Sir Percy Cox who was 
in Tehran, the Foreign Office argued that the existing administration 'is rigid, 
costly, and hampering to 
development either of civil administration or whatever 
form of native Government is decided in future'. 
4 
The Foreign Office went on 
to assert that: 
'Meanwhile the system of civil administration ... appears neither 
. to 
fulfil joint declaration of November 1918, nor to satisfy, local. 
aspiration, nor to proceed with sufficient rapidity. It is a system 
of British Government advised by Arabs, 
(and this only to a small 
extent) rather than of Arab Government advised by British ... 
Already this system is subjected to severe criticism from many 
quarters ... Feisal ... His officers ... a number of local leagues 
and societies are agitating in similar direction. Finally we 
receive very disquieting reports from some of our own officials5 
who witness with growing anxiety the existing trend of administration. 
6 
, Cox's reply was indicative: 
'I agree that existing system of Administration does not fulfil 
in all respects either letter or spirit of Anglo-French declar- 
ation ... I always 
doubted whether that declaration provided 
practical basis for Administration of Mesopotamia'.? 
1, Daily Herald, 'Ferment for Freedom; Colonel Lawrence On Eastern Problom', 
dated 9 August 1920. 
2 F. 0.371/5068. Minutes of meeting held at F. O. of the I. D. C. M. E. A. dated 
13 April 1920. 
3, Ibid. 
4, F. 0.371/4185/152286. 
From F. O. to Sir Percy Cox, dated 14th November 1919. 
5. This'might be a reference 
to the 'private' letters of Gertrude Bell. " 
J. Marlowe, OP. cit., pp. 202-7 
8. p. O. 371/4185/152286, 
From C. O. to Cox, dated 14th November 1919 
7, Ibid., 157324. 
From Percy Cox to F. O. dated November 23rd 1919 
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Thus Wilson went on to carry out his own policies in Iraq,, but'he was 
unable to silence the , 
'rising tide of criticism' represented by the British 
Press and echoed in Parliament. 
The Attitude of British 'Public Opinion' 
Such a tide of disapproval with the Mesopotamian policy was the product 
of the post-War conditions'which, nourished the emergence of two trends; the 
'economists' who demanded 
än urgent and drastic reduction of the Empire's 
expenses; and the 
'liberal's' who advocated a policy of self determination 
to be granted to the subordinated nations. Both trends were highly critical 
of the policy carried out, 
in Iraq and voiced their protests against it. 
The news of the rising was to make the beginning of a wide campaign in 
the British, Press. Lawrence claimed that 
'Practically the whole of the re- 
sponsible opinion 
in England is against our present policy in Mesopotamia. 
Lloyd George and other Ministers are against it. Almost 
"all the newspapers 
1 
are against it'. 
In August 1920 The Times demanded 'first, `a statement upon 
the present position of 
the rising in"Mesopotamia; secondly, an'explanation 
of the causes of 
the rising; and thirdly, a clear and frank declaration of 
future policy in Mesopotamia 
2 
It went on to argue that: 
` 'Mesopotamia will not "pay" in a thousand years. Mr. Buckley, 
of the, EgyPtian Irrigation 
Department, has shown that if 
£31,000,000 are spent on irrigation, and three million acres 
are brought under cultivation, 
the gross revenue of Mesopotamia 
(excluding the oil) may reach £10,000,000 - in "fifty years time". 
To achieve this object the almost unsuperable labour difficulties 
must first be overcome ... 
Our object should be to get away our 
troopsas, soon as we can ... 
'. 
The 'economist' article of The Times was an attempt to show the futility 
4 
of Iraq as a profitable 
acquisition. Three days later The Times assumed 
a liberal stance and argued: 
1, The Daily Herald, 
dated 9 August 1920 
ey 
==, dated 
16 August 1920 
2. 
3.. Ibid. 
4. A. B. Buckley, Mesopotamia as a 
Country for Future Development, (Cairo 
1919). This book cast away some of the 
'optimistic' prospects concerning 
Mesopotamia which was encouraged by Sir W. Willcocks's, Irrigation of 
Mesonotamia 
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'By no -straining- of - wordscan--the participants in-the rising be 
called rebels ... That they should take such a course is not 
very surprising., The civil authorities in Mesopotamia ... 
have sought to set up an elaborate administration such as the 
country will not require. -for the next fifty years. They have 
inflicted upon these backward lands hundreds of excessively- 
paid officials ... -They have imposed taxation enormously in 
excess of the average incidence of taxation in India, although 
Mesopotamia ... is notoriously impoverished ... They are 
endeavouring to back up their policy by maintaining in 
Mesopotamia troops now equal in-numbers to nearly-half the. 
strength of the standing Army of India, British and Indian troops 
combined, in the years preceding the Great War .... Need we look 
farther for the origins of the revolt? '. 1 
The Times went on to show the alarming consequences of the Mesopotamian policy 
on Britain itself: 
'We are approaching critical times in our own land. La great 
increase, of unemployment, and a further rise of prices/ due in 
part to the huge and wasteful squandering by the Government 
in, distant lands ... With such a prospect ahead, the determin-,. - 
ation of the Cabinet to incur a vast outlay in fighting Arabs 2 
who reject us and our Organic Laws, seems to us almost insane'. 
Such a notion was confirmed by Sir Stanley Reed (Editor of The Times of 
India); he wrote to Wilson 'there is only one thing to be done, to get out of 
every inch of territory, save the Basrah Vilayet, as soon as it can be done '. 
3 
f 
Reed went to the extent of suggesting that 'To hold the country by force of 
Arms is merely to precipitate a Soviet Government in the United Kingdom and a 
swaraj ä dministration-in India'. 
4 
The most open and notable exponent-oß an Arab Administration in Iraq was 
Lawrence who proposed the significant notion that the "tribal 'disorder' was an 
organic part of the nationalist movement: 
'A few weeks ago the chief of our. administration in Baghdad asked 
to receive some Arab notables who wanted to urge their case for 
partial autonomy the Mandubin/. He packed the delegation with 
some nominees of his own, and 
in replying, told them that it would 
be-long before they were fit for responsibility. Brave words - 
but the burden of them has been heavy on the Manchestermen this 
week at Hillah'. 
5 
I 
10` s, dated 19 August 1920 
2. Ibid. 
3. A. T. Wilson, Private Papers, B. M. No. 52457, Vol. 3, dated Bombay, September 
16th 1920 
4. Ibid. 
5, e Observer, dated 
8 August 1920 Th 
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In a detailed interview, Lawrence elaborated his views at length. In 
the first place he asserted the importance of Nationalism: 'Muhammadans and 
Copts are working side by side for nationalism ... the old quarrels between 
1 
Sunni and Shiah are being forgotten'.. Lawrence summed up his solution to 
the problem: 
'Clear them out /British Officials/ and fill their. places with 
educated Arabs - of whom there is no lack - and the problem will 
solve itself. It is our avowed policy to set up an Arab Govern- 
ment in Mesopotamia, and it is only reasonable that Arabs should 
do the work ...,. 
2 
on July 12th, the Daily Mail published a long article in which the writer (Lovat 
Fraser) argued that 'There is nothing in all our history to compare with our 
3 
folly in Mesopotamia'. 
The dominating trend in the British Press leaves no doubt as to the 
direction of the British 'public opinion' towards the Iraqi question. The 
strength of such a trend lay in its representation of the fact that Britain's 
strategic interests in Iraq did not necessitate its direct presence. Further- 
more, such a trend was consistently echoed in Parliament, 
4 
and in fact it re- 
flected ideas and views which were official: 
'Wickham Steed of The Times is attackiag. ma personally partly'_ 
violently. I wonder who is putting him up to it. The %F. 0_/ 
I presume. Not that I care in the least, but the virulence of 
their attack upon a permanent official is somewhat unusual'. 5 
We are already aware of Lord Curzon's attitude; it is interesting to find 
that Mr. Montagu was no less eager to settle the Iraqi problem on the lines of 
an Arab Government even without a Mandate. On April 13th 1920, and in an Inter- 
Departmental Conference, Montagu Said that Wilson recommended that the people 
should not be consulted. 
'He 'Montagu/'did not agree with this himself. What 
he wished us to say was that our intention was to set up a national Government 
in an Arab State, thus silencing the suspicious'. Montagu went on to point out 
The Daily Herald, dated 9 August 1920.4 ^ 
vii' 
2. Ibid. 
3. The Daily Mail, dated 12 July 1920. See Appendix V. 
4. The parliamentary 
Debates, H. C., 5th Series (HMSO 1920), Vol. 127, pp. 644-5, 
662,712,. V01.130, pp. 1468,1991, Vol. 132, pp. 959-60, Vol. 133, pp. 1091-2,1528. 
5. A. T. Wilson, 
Private Papers, B. M. No. 52455, Vol. 1, letter to A. Hirtzel, 
26 July 1920 
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'he would welcome anything which would'cancel the idea of a mandate, which was 
already regarded -as' an" indignity. He would much prefer to see an independent 
State set up in 'Mesopotamia with which H. M. G. could enter into treaty relations 
on the lines of the Anglo Persian Agreement. Lord Curzon said that 'He was 
himself anxious to get rid of mandates altogether'. 
l 
Moreover, the impact of the British Press and Parliamentary' debates was 
strongly felt in Iraq itself. They had fed the nationalists' drive against 
the local Administration; in the most effective way. 'Articles in the English 
papers were greeted by the extremists as evidence that the mandate was as in- 
acceptable in London as in Baghdad'. 
2 
Furthermore, Wilson pointed out that 
certain people3 'make it their business to convey to extremists in detail all 
references in the English Press tnfavourable to Local and Imperial policy of 
notably articles from The Times 
And the debates in H. C. / which are 
freely referred to by extremists in their public speeches and conversations'. 
4 
The Three Alternatives 
This brings into question the real or essential aims of 'Britain' in Iraq; 
in other words, what did the British policy want to establish in Iraq? In early 
1918, Hirtzel argued'that 'Annexation (of Basrah) is presumably now out of the 
question,, or even the veiled annexation contemplated in the ZSykes-Picot/ agree- 
ment. The Arab facade of which the 
Committee s talked must be something more 
At the same time Hirtzel asserted that 'It is clear that than a facade At 
6 
somehow or other we must retain predominating influence in Mesopotamia ... '.? 
1. F. 0.371/5068, Minutes of meeting of I. D. C. M. E. A. dated 13 April 1920. 
2. A. T. Wilson, Clash ... j op. cit., p. 255 
3. 
-Wilson 
was referring to the 'United States Consul and /the Standard Oil 
Company's representative in Baghdad'. 
C. C. telegrams No 7321 dated 17th June 1920; no. 7779, dated 26th June 1920 
included an intercepted letter from W. H. Gallaher (representative of S. O. C. ); 
A. T. Wilson, Private Papers, B. M. No. 52458, Vo1.4. No. 9339.3.9.20 
These accusations 
suwer 19independently, t/ 
confirmed by the W. O. memo NQ. l2l/3/1576 
(M. 1.2)., 
4. F. O. 371/5228/E. 9849. From C. C. Baghdad, datod 15 August 1920 
5. On March 19th 1917, the Cabinet formed The Mesopotamian Administrative 
Committee' to discuss the political future of Iraq. F. O. 371/3051/68626 
6. Cab. /2? /23. 
A memo, by Sir A. Hirtzel 'Future of Mesopotamia' dated 
4z January 
11th 1918 
7, Ibid. 
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Two years läter-in February 1920; Hirtzel wrote privately to Wilson: 
'Have you ever considered the possibility of having to clear 
out? It is a possibility which'is. slowly becoming a proba- 
bility. ... What we want 
is some modicum of Arab institutions 
which we can safely leave while pulling the strings ourselves, 
something-which won't cost very much, something that Labour can 
swallow consistently with their principles, but in which our 
influence and political and economic interests will be secure. 
... It 
is time for cutting down all ambitions, for reducing all 
responsibilities to the narrowest limits. We stall come to 
grief if we try anything else'. 
' 
_ 
To Wilson's frame of reference there were only two alternatives: the British 
'must either govern or go'. 
2 
On June, 9th 1920 Wilson was aware that 'a centre 
party does not at present exist, with the result that extremists have the stage 
to themselves'. He urged his Government to allow him to declare his consti- 
utional reforms and agree to send a deputation to London. This was supposed 
to enable him to feel 
'strong enough to take drastic action against the small 
gang of leading irreconcilables, whose 
increasing influence constitutes a public 
danger '. 
3 
On the same day he sent another telegram in which he made his position 
very clear. Wilson argued: 
'... Last r'eoruary i warneu uovernmenti tinati wo must hold what 
we then had with the troops then in the country, or clear out, 
and that there was no middle course ... Wo cannot give effect 
to mandate without risk of disaster, unless we are prepared to 
maintain for the next two years at least as many troops in the 
country, as we may have, -and in _a 
state considerably more efficient 
than they are now ... 
/We must/ regain possession of Dair-az-Zor 
up to Rakka inclusive ... we cannot maintain our position as 
mandatory by a policy of conciliation of extremists ... We must 
be prepared, regardless of League of Nations, to go very slowly 
with constitutional or democratic institutions ... If [II. M. GL/ 
: regard such a policy 
as impracticable or beyond our strength 
(as well they may), I submit they would better to face the 
alternative ... and evacuate Mesopotamia ... it is my conviction 
that half measures will end in disasters ... 
', 
young " minuted that Wilson was stating that 
'there are only two alternatives 
before us; either to hold 
Mesopotamia by force; or to withdraw altogether. 
He went on to' point out 
that: 
1. Cited by J. Marlowe,, op. cit., pp. 
182-3. Italics mine. 
2., A. T. 'Wilson, Private 
Papers, B. M. No. 52455, Vol. 1, telegram dated 29 July 
1920, No. 9180 
3. F. 0.371/5227/E. 
6509. From C. C. Baghdad, dated 9 June 1920, No. 6976. 
4ý , bid., From 
C. C. Baghdad, dated 9 June 1920, No. 6948 
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'/Wilson/ makes no mention whatever of the third alternative 
which has always been the policy of /H. M. G_/ namely to remain main 
in Mesopotamia with the goodwill of the people. The reason for 
this is not far to seek. It is because he knows that we cannot 
obtain the goodwill of the people without instituting a predom- 
inantly Arab Government, and this I am perfectly certain Colonel 
Wilson will use every effort to prevent'. 
1 
In an Inter-Departmental meeting, which was held with the first news of 
the rising emanating from Baghdad, it was clearly revealed the considerable 
weakness of Wilson's views among British policy makers. Curzon argued that 
'It was a great pity that Colonel Wilson had been left so long in Mesopotamia'. 
The meeting was convinced that the removal of Wilson was a necessity. The 
obvious alternative was Percy Cox because as Montagu put it 'All Wilson's 
officers were as Wilsonian as he was'. 
2 
However, Curzon went to the extent " 
of arguing: 
'We are not quite sure that(Cox/ knew what our policy was to 
be. It appeared ... that 
2-Cox/ was rather more Wilsonian in 
his outlook than we were ... There was a fear that Sir Percy 
Cox .: might adopt a more 
Wilsonian attitude than we wished 
him to'. 
Curzon outlined the opinion of 'which we felt sure that the Conference concurred'. 
to be 'that we should continue the middle course of retaining our position' in the 
country with the good will of 
the people'. 
3 
Marlowe gave the following reasons for the resentment caused by Wilson's 
line to the higher Authorities: 
'LWilson/ was continually confronting them either with a demand 
for a clear-cut decision or with a fait accompli, or with a4 
demand for a choice between two over-simplified alternatives'. 
I would like to add 
that Wilson's alternatives were resented basically because 
they were in violation of 
the line desired by 'Whitehall'. 
The Impact of the Uprising 
The original limitations of the rising coupled with its military defeat were 
1. Ibid., dated 16 June 
1920, Italics mine. 
2. Corbett and Hirtzel pointed out 
that Sir Edgar Bonham Carter 'was a 
lineral-minded man'. 
3. F. 0.371/5226/4811. 
Minutes of I. D. C. E., 27 June 1920. 
4. J. Marlowe, op, cit., 
pp. 256-7 
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factors in reducing its impact. to a mere influence on the British policy.. In 
this respect the rising could be credited with bringing the whole Iraqi question 
into focus and eliminated-the: possibility of further delay. The rising precipitated 
the advent of anew policy. Such; a policy was bound to be largely influenced by 
the interpretation (whether accurate or imaginary) given by the policy makers 
for the causes oßß and forces behind, the rising. Furthermore the rising 
damaged beyond repair the possibility of 'govern by force', and left only two 
alternativeS; ý_ evacuation or-predominant British influence with the consent of 
the Iraqis. 
Once the issue of evacuation was put on the agenda, the British firms and 
financial interests were to exercise a counter pressure. On July 28th 1920, the 
Baghdad Chamber of Commerce sent a message to the Civil, Commissioner expressing 
'satisfaction at decision of H. M. G. to accopt, mandate', urging that 'British 
forces be retained' and deprecating attaching 'too much importance to present 
troubles with tribes' and that 'tribal risings will cease, when, Arabs realise 
that firm and settled government will secure them'. 
' 
On July 30th 1920 a 
British Company asked 'for assurance that it is not the intention of }i. M. G. to 
2 
withdraw from Mesopotamia'. Next day another Company sought a similar assurance. 
3 
On December 29th 19202 the India Office received a protest from Baghdad Chamber 
4 
of Commerce 'against evacuation of Mesopotamia'. The impact of such a pressure 
was clearly shown in Cox's telegram 
in which he suggested. that 'leading Commercial 
and Financial houses 
interested in Mesopotamia should be consulted as to the 
direction and extent to which their cooperation in future administration of 
Mesopotamia may be expected'. 
5 
Wilson pointed out that British capital 'Sunk' in Iraq at the end of 1919 
was estimated to be £16 million. In addition to the 'capitalized value of the 
oil fields may be 
taken as £50.000.000 at a low valuation. Other minerals ... 
F. O. 371/5228/E. 9413. Baghdad telegram transmitting message from Baghdad 
Chamber of Commerce. 
2. Ibid., E. 10061 
-3. Ibid., 
E. 10062 
4. F. O. 371/6349/218. From Sir Percy Cox to I. O. 
5. Ibid. 162/2451. From 
H. C. Baghdad, dated 16th Fobruary 1921 
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are known to exist'in`Kurdistan'. Wilson went on'to'assert that 'imports! have 
`trebled since"1913-and "'now' stand' at'£16,000,000' of Which £10 million is from 
Britain: ' Wilson concluded'that 'Any diminution in the authority of Government 
t;.. would involve' widespread disasterýto British and`local'trade interests'. 
' 
In'March. 1920 the Prime' Minister replied to Mr. Asquith that 'Mosul'.. '. has rich 
oil deposits. Iraq should be dealt with as one unit'. 
2 
Thesenarguments were counter-balanced by the'large'Mesopotamian expenditure 
which was'a"heavy burden on the British Treasury:, 'Furthermore, the question of 
evacuation was ofra'wider dimension. It was hardly°practical and formed a threat 
to'the more serious aspects of the 'British 'imperial strategy in the area. -, On 
April 10th 1920, 'Miss-Bell predicted that 'we'reý'on the edge of a-pretty con- 
siderable, Arab'nationalist demonstration' and asserted 'with which I'm a good 
Ideal in sympathy': Nevertheless she argued that 'If - Mesopotamia goes, Persia 
3 
inevitably and then India'. goes 
On December'lOth, 1920, the Secretary of State for War argued in a"memorandum: 
'From the strategical point of view the only justification for ," "= 
the maintenance of military forces in Mesopotamia is ... to keep 
control of the Persian Gulf and toiprotect the Anglo-Persian 
Oilfields, which were, and are vital to the navy'. 4 
Thus 
it was requested to withdraw British troops to Basrah 'as soon as possible'. 
5 
General Haldane informed the High Commissioner that: 
I It 
'The Army Council have intimated that by the 31st March 1921, 
they expect that'the whole of the reinforcement amounting to 
20 battalions,:.. which at my request were sent ... at the time 6 
of the outbreak,... will be re-embarked for India or-elsewhere'. 
This suggests that the War Office was not totally aware of the political 
implications and consequences of its views or demands .= The Secretary of State 
for India circulated a note to the Cabinet pointing out that withdrawal to Basrah 
1. F. O. 882/24. From C. 
C. Baghdad to 1.0- 15th November 1919. Appendix XI. 
2. The Parliamentary Debates, H. C. op. 
it., Vol. 127, P. 662 Italics mine. 
3; -Lady Bell, 
(ed. ), op. cit., p. 486 
4. F. 0.371/5232/E. 15721, Italics mine. 
5. F. 0.371/6348/244. From 
W. O. to 1.0. No. 87318,23rd December 1920 
6. P. 0.371/6349/227. From Gen. Haldane to H. C. No. 0/2088/50,6th November 1920 
. ý,., 
-"ý '° 
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would mean abandoning Mandate and urging consideration of the matter in this -,, 
light. Furthermore, he pointed out that in case of evacuation, then Basrah 
would need at least a British division 
for protection. However there was no 
guarantee against a Turkish or Bolshevik advance in the rest of Iraq. " , In 
such a case one British division would not be sufficient for 
the defence of 
Basra .1 
On November 6th 1920, General Haldane made it amply clear that"The 
question of the reduction of 
the garrison ... is not only closely bound up 
with that of disarmament, 
but with the creation of an Arab Army'. 
2 
This 
confirms the opinion 
that the British evacutation of Iraq was closely bound 
up with the creation of an 
Arab Administration and Army to fill the vacuum and 
prevent the occupation of 
Iraq by 'seven devils'. Such a notion was confirmed 
by Cox's telegram of November, 
12th in which he referred to the question of 
the mandate and its responsibilities, 
the importance of locally recruited 
force and concluded that evacuation 
for the time being was impracticable. 
3 
On 
November 15th 1920, Haldane telegraphed 
the War Office stating that he cannot R 
recommend reduction 
in regular garrison pending 'replacement by local troops. 
4 
Do not propose to take any action 
pending decision as to future policy in Iraq'. 
Long after the events, Sir Percy Cox summarised the situation in the 
following words: 
'... it was clear that the rising must be suppressed before any 
other course of action was possible and 
the question at issue 
was whether after the restoration of law and order, we should 
cut our losses, abandon the Mandate and evacuate the country, 
or immediately set up a national Government ... to my mind 
evacuation was unthinkable; 
it would mean the abandonment of 
the mandate and of the seven or eight millions worth of capital 
assets which we had 
in the country; the complete violation 
of all the promises we 
had made to the Arabs ... As to whether 
the alternative policy of establishing forthwith a national 
Government had a reasonable chance of success, I replied that 
without being 
too confident, I thought it had and that the 
risk at any rate worth 
taking if regarded the only alternative 
to evacuation'. 
5 
1. F. 0.371/6348/244. Note circulated 
to Cabinet by S. of S. for India, dated 
24th December 1920. 
2. F. 0.371/6349/227. From 
Haldane to H. C. No. 0/2088/50. Italics mine. 
3. Ibid. From H. C. 
Baghdad No S. D. 89, to G. O. C. in C. M. E. F., dated 12th November 1920 
4 Lbid., From G. 
Headquarters, M. E. F. Baghdad to S. W. 0.15th November 1920 
5. Percy Cox, 'Tribute 
to Gertrude Bell', in Lady Bell (ed), Letters ..., 
o cit., pp"526-7. 
Italics mine. 
I 
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In fact when Coxrbecamesaware of the demand to withdraw troops to Basrahl 
he forwarded his opinion which was 'if we cannot hold Baghdad. and Mosul Wilayets, 
we must refuse =mandate altogether; - and ... hold only ... -Basrah under full 
2 
British administration'.. Cox was-not, however, really convinced of the latter 
part of his argument. ý. Hebelieved in-(indeed strived-for) the indivisibility of 
I 
Iraq. 'There-is, remember, no defensible frontier between Mosul'and Baghdad, 'and 
if-the Turks take Baghdad will they not aim-at-taking Basra too? ', 
3ythus, 
Cox 
argued his case to the British. Government. ý: On the wider issue of evacuation, 
cox-pointed to the problems involved:, -,. '.. '. The Persian oilfields will again - 
be. threatened; thosetof Iraq, of which there is a good evidence, will be in, 
hostile hands;, our promising trade with Iraq will suffer ... '. 
4 
If the policy of 'govern by force' meant intolerable expenses, defiance of 
British and Iraqi public opinion, then the alternative of 'evacuation' involved 
the unjustifiable sacrifice of British interests and prestige. Thus a middle 
course which could guarantee 
the interests, ' and at the same time cut the expend- 
iture was evisaged as the best'solution. To choose Churchill's words, 'Faisal 
"S 
offers hope of best and cheapest solution', and indeed it was. 
6 
This view of 
the preservation of British interests coupled with reduction in expenditure, ýand 
tho, coronation of Faisal was also supported by Cox. 
7 
But why should Faisal rep- 
resent such a 
'fortune'? This was linked to the way. that British policy makers 
had interpreted, the causes of, and forces bohind. the discontent of the Iraqis. 
On August. 5th Wilson sent a long telegram, in which he attributed the move- 
ment to-'steady inflow of propaganda 
from Syria and ... Turkey supported by ample 
8 
funds!, - " He. went on 
tb-emphasise the importance of external factors coupled 
1, x. 0.371/6349/222. 
W. O. to Haldane, No. 87319,3rd December 1920. 
2.,, Ibid. H. C., no. 148S, 2nd January 1920 
3. P. Graves, The Life of Sir Percy Cox, op. cit., p. 324 
4. Ibid. 
5. F. 0.371/6350. Churchill to'P. M., Cairo, 21st March 1921. 
6. British expenditure in Iraq was reduced to less than £8 million in 1922-1923 
and. to less than £6 million 
in 1923-1924. It was £32 million in 1920-1921. 
7. p. 0.371/6349/222. H. C. 2nd January 1921, No. 148S 
B. F. 0.371/5228/E. 9849. 
C. C. Baghdad, 5th August 1920, No. 9450. 
I 
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with British military weakness as the most essential elements behind the, outbreak 
of violence. In a second telegram he admitted certain internal factors related 
to, his Administration. But he continued to hold the belief that-external 
agitation was, mainly responsible for, the, occurrence, of the events. 
', 
_. 
On August : 26th, " Montagu -circulated a secret 'Note'. , He pointed out that . 
I 
as a-result of Lawrence's letters-to The Times., 'general opinion' was left with 
the impression that the British 'are fighting against Nationalists who are 
demanding only a form of Government that shall be reasonably independent and 
British-advised'. - Montagu flatly stated that the object of his 'Memorandum 
' 
/is/ to suggest that the cause of the outbreak is to be sought outside Mesopo- 
tamia'. He went on-to suggest that: .. n 
'We have therefore to recognise that we are fighting against 
unknown enemy ... (a) It has long been recognised that the Arab 
party can, be roughly divided into two sections: (1) the sane 
extremists who desire independence under British control; and 
(2) the ultra-extremists, who desire-to see the abolition of 
European control ... (b) These ultra-extremists command the 
sympathy of .... the Bolsheviks, the Indian anarchists, and the 
Kemalists. Mustapha Kemal is now openly Bolshevik ... the 
representatives of the Standard Oil in Baghdad ... Whether 
independent movements or separate manifestations of a single 
conspiracy, they are at least allied'. 
In spite of this 'ultra-conspiratorial' analysis, Montagu was to reach a 
'sane' conclusion. 'The only means whereby we can combat the ultra-extremists' 
he argued, 'is by securing-the support of the pro-British nationalists'. Thus 
he suggested that 'all energies should be directed on ... preparing a nationalist 
party which will ... 
be ready to assume the government, under British advice'. 
3 
On September 14th, Major N. N. E. Bray (Special Intelligence Officer attached 
to the political-Department of-the India Office) submitted his 'very secret' 
'Mesopotamia. Preliminary Report-on Causes of Unrest'. He commenced his 
report by arguing: 
'It is to the educated classes ... that we look for political 
trouble or peace ... Among them for years has grown up an Arab 
Nationalist spirit ... Independence is with them something very 
real ... this party 
having legitimate aims for which many of 
them had sacrificed a good deal, were as a political party 
capable of producting a serious pan-Arab agitation and so causing 
considerable unrest'. 
4 
F. 0.371/5229/E. 10109., 
From C. C. Baghdad, 12th August,, 1920, No. 9700. 
2. F. 0.371/5229/E. 
10440. 'Note on the Causes of the Outbreak in Mesopotamia'. 
Ibid. 
. 371/5230/E. 
12339 
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Nevertheless, Major Bray was inclined to see the Iraqi unrest as part of a 
universal 'conspiracy 'organized through various societies., and directed by 
outside"'influence`through'the medium of Berlin and Moscow ..: The situation 
is further complicated with Italian, French and Bolshevist intrigues'. 
' 
In IOctober 1920, the General 'Staff 'of 'the War Office submitted its report 
'Cause of the outbreak "in Mesopotamia' in which it argued that the Iraqi rising 
was but part of 'the malign influence of Moscow*. 
2 
- ">1 
Such opinions were bound to be challenged by other Officials. Clayton 
wrote 'In my opinion external influences and "subversive propaganda seldom 
incite orientals (especially the peasantry) to extreme action on an extended 
scale, "unless the ground is prepared by the existence of grievances'. Clayton 
suggested a 'nationalist party to take Over the government subject to British 
advice and controlt'. 
3 
, 
On July 15th, ýMajor Young expressed the opinion that Nuri and Ja'far were 
'almost our'last hope'. 
4 Three days later, he wrote a memorandum in which he 
suggested, amongst other things, 
' the removal of Wilson, the despatch of Nuri 
and Ja'far to Iraq'and the proclamation that Britain would approve any ruler 
S 
chosen by a legislative assembly. 
Furthermore, Major Young was to dispute 
. Major 
Bray's analysis. He attributed the unrest of Iraqi 'Nationalists who 
were discontented with our administration; who 
had lost all hope of gaining 
the independence ... and who 
influenced the ignorant tribesmen by appealing 
to sentiments which we did not and shall not ever share with them'. 
6 
Young 
conicuded that: 
'If, as Major Bray argues, ... our mistakes have only been 
contributory, *the prospect is'not a hopeful one for the futures 
and ... we should 
clear out of'Mesppotamia altogether. If, on 
the other hand ... it is our own mistakes which really caused 
the trouble ... we 
have only to correct our mistake3 ... t67 
1. Ind. 
2. W. 0.33/969 
3. F. 0.371/5229//. 10440, dated 26th August 1920 
4. F. 0.371/5036 
5. p. 0.371/5228, dated 
18th July 1920 
6. F. O. 371/5230/B. 12339, Major Young minute dated 12th October 1920 
7. Ibid 
,ý ., 
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Another challenge to Brayts assumptions came from Cornwallis (then 
Director-of the'Arab Bureau). Cornwallis did not altogether dismiss-the-Iraqi 
nationalists', external connections, but was of the opinion that a change of 
British policy towards the establishment, of an Arab independence would bring 
an end to such alarming connections. - Cornwallis was convinced that. 'the Arabs 
know perfectly well that they must obtain help from outside and at heart they-, - 
would prefer to obtain it 
from us than-from the Turks or Germans or-Bolsheviks'. 
' 
However, Major Bray persisted in his argument and submitted. a second report 
with more elaboration on the 
tuniversal conspiracy' to undermine British: influence. 
Bray suggested. some,, counter-measures to 
foil this plot. Of high significance, 
he argued: ' '' I 
fAs regard Mesopotamia itself the vital point is to separate Pan- 
Arab from the Turkish Nationalist elements. As a direct means of 
doing this it would be well worth considering the practicability 
of ... 
/this7 throu5h the medium of the El 'Ahd Society which is 
in heart anti Turk. 
Cornwallis commented-that: 
'The Pan-Arab party in Mesopotamia is ... sincere and ardent, in 
its desire for independence ... The majority of this party favour 
development under: British control, they have been persuaded that 
the independence they hoped for was being denied them. If we can 
enlighten them as to our honesty of purpose there would-appear to 
be good grounds for hoping we might detach them from the National- 
ist-Bolshevik control'. 
3 
Major , Young' in a, strongly-worded comment wrote: . 
+.,. I believe that peace cannot-be permanently restored unless 
this society 
Al "Ahd_] is-on our side but would point out that 
the society, 
which I -believe is the moving power of the patriotic 
movement 'in Mesopotamia, 
is fighting-for an ideal and that until 
this ideal is satisfied to an extent which will content its mod- 
erate members, there 
is not possibility of enlisting its whole- 
hearted support. 
A nation which, according to a recent report 
from Baghdad, has 
suffered at least 
8,000 casualties in a few months and is still 
unsubdued, is not going to 
be convinced of our honesty of purpose, _ 
by words,. 
4 
Ibid., -K. Cornwallis minute 
dated 10th October 1920 
2... F. O. 371/5231/E. 
12966. Report No. l1, on Causes-of Unrest in Mesopotamia' 
by Major N. N. Bray,. Special Intelligence Officer Attached to P. Dept., 
1.0. 
3, Ibid. Minute 
dated 22nd October 1920 
4. Ibid. 
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Faisal-as an, Alternative 
In 1921, Philby- told. Faisal that his chances, of being'king of Iraq were 
extremely slender if he was to base' his campaign- on the 
fýct that he was the 
accepted nominee of, the British Government. Philby advised Faisal to seek the 
support of the people as the champion of their complete 
independence. ' Such 
an argument reveals an idealist vision which did not grasp the realities of the 
Iraqi situation nor the motives and ends of the British Policy. Had Faisal been 
. s, ... #. ., -. 2 
the candidate of 'absolute independence', the British would never have allowed 
him the Iraqi throne. Had he been a mere British puppet, as it *is often implied, 
he would also have had no chance of gaining the throne. Faisal's policy which, 
t1 
,x 
promised the safeguarding of a predominant 
British influence and the establish- 
ment of an Arab administration was 
the only accepted and possible formula at 
that period. 
What the British really wanted was the establishment of a new order which 
could retain two purposes: a predominent 
British influence, and yet a drastic 
reduction in their Mesopotamian expenditure. 
The second aim of this difficult 
equation implied the necessity of satisfying 
the bulk of the population and the 
nationalist element 
in particular. The arguments of Lawrence, Bell and Young 
have convinced the Authorities that the rising was a nationalist model: 
'It was this /nationalist% propaganda which was the sole and only cause of the 
stirring up or revolt 
here. - For the primary movers were actuated 
by the pure spirit of nationalism. It is true they had to add to 
it pan-Islamism before they could stir the mass, true again that 
the tribes would not have come out but for the hope of loot, and 
the prospect of paying no taxes; none of these passions and - -- 
prejudices would have been mobilized 
if the Nationalists had not 
'3 called them to arms. 
According to än understanding of this character, 
'the satisfaction of the Iraqi 
nationalist was 
deemed a necessity. Thus, Faisal who combined the roles of a 
British ally and an arab nationalist could 
be considered as, the perfect solution. 
In August 1920, ' the British Government, in its instructions to the newly-' ' 
E. Monroe, Philby ..., op. cit., p. 110 
2. Al Khälisi issued a 
Fetwa bearing a similar tendency. Al 1rä1,16th July 
1921.68 Ma¢bata out of 157 of Baghdad elected Faisal on the condition of 
'absolute independence . F. 0.371/6352. Intelligence Report No. 19,15th 
August, 1921. 
3, G. Bell, Private 
Letters and Papers, (Newcastle), 30th January 1920.14 ý""º`Yýýý' 
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appointed High Commissioner (Sir Percy Cox), raised the idea of Faisal becoming 
Amir of Iraq. However, such a possibility was clearly conditioned by: 
'(i) a spontaneous demand for Faisal is forthcoming from a 
sufficiently represented body of public opinion ... 
(ii) Sherif Faisal-is preparld in principle to accept Great 
Britain as Mandatory Power*. 
The second condition implied the formation of an Arab Government with 'British 
assistance being rendered in each case by a Secretary who will be an employee 
of the Arab Government*. Important reservations were put concerning Defence J 
Foreign Affairs and Finance. 
2 
Faisal was acquainted with the conditions and 
he promised to do all he could 'to make his part of the /plan? work'. 
3 
It was in July 1920 that Wilson suggested the possibility of offering Faisal 
the Amirate of Iraq. Wilson argued 'no local candidate will be successful In 
obtaining sufficient local support*. Moreover, Wilson asserted that Faisal 
'can scarcely fail to realise that foreign assistance is vital to the continued 
existence of an Arab State *. 
4 A fortnight later, Wilson informed the India 
office that a Sharifian Amir enjoyed the support of Müntafiq notables and 
'Leaders' of Baghdad, Najaf and Karba1 
5 
rM 
In early July 1920, Haldane informed the War Office of the 'seriousness' 
of the situation and requested more troops. 
6 
Hardinge did not consider that 
as a 'suitable remedy'. Instead he suggested that 'a clearer indication of 
our own intentions' and the prompt 
despatch to Baghdad of Cornwallis. Ja9far 
and Nuri might allay the spreading unrest. 
7 
Young was of a similar opinion., 
He' pointed out the 
futility of a military solution and added to Hardinge's 
proposals 'to get' 
into touch with the intriguers from Syria' and to declare -t 
1. F. 0.371/5229/5140. Appointment of Sir P. Cox as H. C.: Instructions of H. M. G. 
dated 28th August 1920,1.0. 
2. Ibid. 
3. F. 0.371/6350/E. 4509. Allenby to Curzon, No. 240, Cairo 15th April 1921 
4, p. 0.141/444/12215. C. C. Baghdad to S. S. of India, No. 9249, dated 31st July 1920 
5. Ibid., No. 9752,13th August 1920 
6. F. 0.371/5227/B. 8071. From G. O. C. Mesopotamia to W. O. Nos. X9349 and X9359, 
dated 7th July 1920 
7. Ibid., From Hardinge 
to Curzon, No. 39, dated 10th July 1920 
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the British willingness to accept any Arab ruler chosen by the Legislative''' 
Assembly*. 
1,, 
'Other British officials were-of a different view: 1 d'. , 
* =the only course--open to us is to fight it out. Any large 
political concessions, such as the installation of an Arab Amir, 
before order is restored ... would be looked upon `... as an. 
admission of defeat. The Extremists would regard it as a triumph 
... and the Moderates would see 
in it a failure on our part'. 2 
It was logical that Tilley and-Hardinge would not 'approve such a'notion. 
3 
However, Curzon accepted it but only partially. He informed the'Prime'Minister' 
that Churchill ý and'himself 'have no doubt' about necessity' of- sending more troops 
'but whole question must be faced immediately'. 
4 
Thus this suggestive telegram 
had considered-the military suppression, of the rising as'a step which should 
be followed by a political and durable solution. 
In July 1920, Cox wrote to Churchill that British Government could not 
consent to an indefinite continuation of the,. present arrangement which 'involves 
too great a burden'. He dismissed the idea of a republic, 'a Turkish prince, or 
the separation of Basrah. 'Cox suggested the nomination of Faisal. After stressing 
the importance of the Anglo-Hashimite cooperation, which Faisal' believed in, Cox 
argued that: 
tFrom'reports that have been received from Mesopotamia' during'` 
past year, both at time of recent rising and since, it appears 
that this is solution desired by a preponderant body of opinion 
in Iraq. '5 
Later in the year, Cox re-emphasised his view and asked his Government to give 
a 'lead' to the Iraqis. He affirmed 
that 'a great majority are in favour of ... 
6 
a-Sherif'. 
In ear1y. 1921, the evacuation of Mosul and Baghdad was still being demanded 
7 
by the War Office. Cox expressed the opinion that a large reduction in forces 
1. F. 0.371/5228/E. 8483. British Policy in Mesopotamia, Major Young, pp. 1,13 
2. F. O. 371/5229/E. 10458. Minute by C. M. Patrick, dated 23rd August 1920 
3. Ibid. 
4. F. O. 371/5227/E. 8474. F. O. to P. M. No. 64,15th July'1920 
5. F. O. 371/6351/6831. No. 171, dated 9th July 1920 
6. g. O. 371/6349/215. H. C. to S. C. 
for C. No. 123S, 26th December 1920 
7. p. O. 371/6349/222. W. O. to H: C. No. 87319,30th December 19201' 
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0 
was possible-'subsequent to electionFor establishment of Faisal ... as ruler''. 
' 
The Government .. was keen that such -a step should be in response to a! forthcoming 
demand from Iraqi. pub; licopinion. Such an attitude was imperative so as not- 
to provoke France or other candidates, and to comply with the League of Nations. 
However, Cox-warned his Government that hiding tour own wishes' might-well re- 
suit in a victory to'the 'extremists' and it might end with 'a vote for No 
Mandate*. .. Thus, -Cox, suggested 
that acceptance of the 'mandate should be published 
at once, and Faisal_...; should send telegram to /Nuri, Ja'far, Tälib and at 
Nagib7* declaring his nomination. 
2 
Another development made the nomination of Faisal all-the more urgent. 
The Turkish candidateto-wthe- Iraqi, throne 
3 
was, to the, displeasure"of the., 
British, 
4 
gaining more ground. . This was related to the. delay of Faisal's 
coronation..: Some-tribal Sheikhs were of 
the opinion that they would desert 
the Turks if there was to be a real Arab Government and 4f, Faisal was coming. 
'Otherwise=they would stick-to-Turks in case British should deceive them'. 
S 
A tendency towards a Turkish prince was taking place mainly among ex-Turkish 
officers and officials6 who 
did not join the Hijaz movement.? However, it was 
appealing to the Sunni community who were afraid of 
being swamped by. the Shi*ah. 
8 
'The Sharif -isrknown to take a very liberal view on the Shiah question ... it 
is for this reason that. one of his sons is their /Shi'ah7 chosen candidate'. 
9 
The pro-Turkish party decided also to support 
'Abd al Rahman al_Nagib. 
10__The 
1. Ibid., IFrom H. C. Mesopotamia, 2nd January 1920, No. 1485 
2. Ibid. 
3. C. 0.370/13/8843ý'Note on Mesopotamia: Question of a Turkish Ruler', 15th 
February'1921, by P. Dept. 1.0. The Candidate was Burhan al Din. 
4. Cox *regarded the proposal as dangerous!. 
F. 0.371/6349/13. From H. C., 
13th February 1921, No. 363S 
S. F. 0.371/6351/6560. -Cox to Churchill, 
1st June 1921,. No. 152 
6. F. 0.371/6350/116. Mesop. Intelligence, 
No. 6,31st January 1921 
7. F. 0.371/6349. Mesop. Intelligence, No. 1,15th November 1920 
S. Lady Bell, (ed), op. cit., Vol. 
2, p. 585,22nd January 1921. 
9. F. 0.371/6350/116. Mesopotamia 
Intelligence Report, No. 6,31st January 1921 
10. F. 0.371/6351/6185. Intelligence Report No. 10-11,4th April 1921 
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latter in his fear of the nationalists, Faisal and a Shi'i takeover, was 
making public"his Ottomanist tendencies. 
1 
Rusäfi, who represented the nation- 
alists with"pro-Ottoman inclinations, was brought from Jerusalem2 and lauhched 
an anti-Faisal campaign. 
3 
The British Authorities were getting nervous about such a development. 
Cox warned Churchill 
4 
and Bell wrote 'If we 'hesitate- the tide of public opinion 
5 
may turn overwhelmingly to the Turks'. Curzon wrote: 
*. It is necessary therefore to begin as soon as possible to 
work for-Arab independence of a kind which will lead to division 
between Turks and Arabs and unity between, Arabs and British'. 
This kind of independence was also desired by the nationalists of the 1920 
rising. Suwaidi, Sadr, 
Yäsiri, Bäzirkän, abu Tabikh, Mukuter and abu Timman 
had all joined Faisal. The pro-Hashimite movement inside Iraq was well 
organized and effective. 
7 
The-Cairo Conference was held in March 1921. The 'principal question 
to be considered was the necessity of a large reduction in military expend- 
iture'. 
8 Such'an aim was, according to the conference, organically linked 
to the coronation of Faisal. Churchill had 'no doubt' that 'Faisal offers 
far away best chance of saving our money'. 
9 
To cut the 'incredible waste now 
10 
proceeding in 
Mesopotamia', Churchill suggested a plan which in its final 
stage will result 
in the drastic cut of the British garrison in Iraq. He went 
1. M. S" al Daftari Papers. 
2. K. -al Jädir 
ji, Papers . ;,. 
3. A1'Iräq, 5th May 1921; Al Sharq, 7th 
October 1920 
4. p. 0.371/6349/13, dated 
13th February 1921, No. 3635 
5. Lady Bell, OOp, cit", Vol. 2, p. 
585 
6. F. 0.371/5229/10440, _dated. 
llth September 1920 
i. Niji'and Nuri were most active. It was reported 'the Sharifian Party 
have won. the support of the Mujtahidin who would turn the scale on the 
Euphrates, whose opinion is already opposed to Talib'. Intelligence 
Report'l0-11. Also al Istiglal, 17th November 1920,17th December 1920, 
a1'Iräq, 11,12 and 
23rd May 1921, and 14th June 1921; Di la, 10 and 
11th August 1921- 
8. F. O. 371/635'/6185niIntelligence 
Report No. 11,15th April 1921. 'A 
preliminary 
9. F. 0.406/46/5408. Churchill 
to Prime Miniters, 14th March 1921 
10. ILid. 
I 
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to argue 'of course ... political conditions involve Feisal solution for 
Iraq'. 
1 
Churchill clarified his point: 
'Situation is complicated by variety of claimant to throne, 
several of whom are quite impossible, and none of whom 
affords a prospect of suitable Arab Government capable of 
relieving our military commitments*. 
2 
Cox agreed and pointed out that *Faisalts previous experience during the war 
placed him in the best position for raising an Army quickly*. 
3 
Churchill argued 
that a strong argument in favour of Sharifian policy* was intended to serve 
Britain in other Arab areas. 
4 
Miss Bell agreed and pointed out that 'the 
only pan-Arab propaganda which was at all likely to make headway was the 
Sharifian propaganda. It was much better to turn this to our own use than 
5 
to leave it as a potential enemy*. Such an estimation of Faisal's political 
capabilities was confirmed by Balfour who wrote: 
*... If however /Faisal7 is not put in Haddod practically told me 
in so many words that Faisal, his family and party would do all 
they could to make trouble for us throughout the Middle East ... 
Their position in Mecca would make this only too easy. Taking 
it all around it does look rather as if Faisal were indicated 
for the job. We undoubtedly owe him something - he will be a 
great bore if he remains a disappointed man'. 
It was as early as February 1920 that the War Office had suggested the 
following advantages of 'Faisal's appointment to Irak': 
'(i) Enhancement of the Good name of Great Britain. (ii) Religious 
acceptability both to Shi'ahs and Sunnis. (iii) Accustomed to 
British methods of administration. (iv) Hostility to Bolshevism. 
(v) Probable cessation of Hussein's intrigue with Mustapha Kemal 
... 
(vi) Steadying effect on the Middle East'.? 
It was a complicated combination of this understanding; of Britain's 
own interests and of 
the dedicated struggle of the Iraqi independence move- 
went, that the road was paved 
for the establishment of an Iraqi rindependent' 
1. Ibid., Churchill to Prime Minister, 16th March 1921 
2. Ibid., Churchill to Prime Minister, 18th March 1921 
3. Air 5/829. Minutes of Cairo Conference. Appendix 6- Mesopotamia: 
political. 1st Meeting of the Political Committee, 12th March 1921, p. 40 
4. Ibid. 
5: Ibid., p. 41 
6. S. A. Durham, Box 
303. Note by F. C. C. Balfour in Autumn 1920. 
W. O. 33/988- The February 
kin dom of Mesopotamia. Memo by General Staff, 
War office, 
lY 120 
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kingdom. Such a solution was to satisfy some moderate nationalists and 
at the same time to retain a predominant British influence. Gertrude 
Bell summed up an aspect. of irony involved in such a solution when she wrote 
'First we imprison them for saying they want Abdullah and then we encourage 
them to ask for Faisal'. Between the two attitudes there was the Iraqi 
rising of 1920. Whatever 
this movement might be considered, it remains 
a turning point in the whole 
history of contemporary Iraq. 
J' 
1, Lady Bell (ed)., op. cit., Vol. 
2, p. 595, dated 8th May 1921 
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% APPEND IX1 
(1) 
GERTRUDE BELL INTERVIEW WITH KING FAISAL 
On Jan. 14 1 had two hours talk with Sidi Faisal -I think I have 
now come nearer to the very centre of his mind. I began by telling him 
that Yasin Pasha had dined with me the night before and that I was much 
attracted by him butHfeeling that I 
was very far from understanding him. 
The King replied that he himself had never felt that he had any real knowledge 
of him. He had joined the Arab cause after the occupation of Syria and 
had at 'once ousted Ja'far from the command of the Army. At that time the 
Arab Army was a very real factor. The tribal elements had been in being 
for several years and were almost regulars, it was also very well found in 
nlanitions and other equipment. 
Almost immediately after the Armistice Sidi 
Faisal had himself gone to Europe. When he returned after an interval of 
eight or nine months 
the original army no longer existed. Yasin had dis- 
banded it on the plea that he would create a wholly new organisation. The 
equipment also had 
disappeared, but of the new organisation there was no 
sign. Yasin was absorbed 
in politics entirely engaged in combating the 
French menace persuaded that the Arab State, would never put up a disciplined 
force 
1 
to resist the French and that it must therefore rely on irregular bands 
to harass the French at every possible point. These he was occupied in 
creating at the same time 
delivering exasperating pinpricks at the French 
bE 
which Sidi Faisal was powerless 
to prevent. It was quite trueic, 'tas I had 
said that he was at 
the bottom of the hostilities against us at Dair. Sidi 
Faisal was once more 
in Europe and heard the news with despair. The 
negotiations with 
the French were going badly, America had dropped out of 
the picture, he had no 
friend in the world but the British Government and 
there were his men making war against the 
British on the Euphrates. 
_ 
When 
he came back to Syria 
in the early Spring of 1920 he expostulated with Yasin 
1, Gertrude Bell letters and papers, University of Newcastle upon Tyne 
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who replied that the Euphrates business had got out of hand against his will. 
He had understood that we were on the point of evacuating Dair and had sent 
Ramadhan elShallash to Raqqah (he being a native of those parts) with orders 
that when we left he was to take over. Ramadhan had at once set himself 
up as O. C. Euphrates and occupied Dair while we were still in possession. 
I explained how the order for evacuation had come from the War 
Office a month earlier how the telegram was undecipherable and had been three 
times repeated with such delay that we had not understood the order until 
Ramadhan el Shallash had made his move. Sidi Faisal said that he could not 
understand how the Arabs were aware of the projected evacuation before we 
in Iraq had got the order clearly, but if I remember rightly the news had 
come to Syria via Egypt. 
Sidi Faisal returned to Syria in Jan. and went to Aleppo intending 
to go himself to Dair and clear up the matter but the tension with the French 
was so acute that he was obliged to return to 
Damascus. lie found it impossible 
to restrain the Iraq Officers. On the one hand A. T. Wilson had so strongly 
opposed their return to their own country that except by stealth thoy could 
not go back on the other the Syrians were exhibiting a jealous hatrod of 
them which prevented them from finding a livelihood in Syria. 
"Are we who fought for the Arab cause" they exclaimed "to die of 
hunger? " 
The sole alternative was to fight their way back to the Iraq and they proceeded 
to do sog who can blame them? 
Turning to wider aspects of the Arab question, Sidi Faisal said 
that the Arab cause was lost when America withdrew her interest in it. When 
he came to London after the Armistice in his first interview with Lloyd George 
the latter said to him that 
it was impossible for the British Government to 
disapprove the ardent 
desire of France for the Syrian Mandate but America 
0 
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could do- it. - He, advised him to hitch his chariot to the star of President 
Wilson at that time blazing in the political=firmament, and there'was little 
doubt that by this means Syria would be dragged out of the morass. Faisal 
followed his, advice to the letter. During the whole time that he-was in 
Paris during-1919-he concentrated. his efforts on the American delegation. 
I said that I had done the same during the month that I had been 
there and had found the delegation wholly sympathetic, unfortunately it had 
no hold on public opinion in America. 
had had with him in John's studio. 
I reminded him of the last talk I 
I had told him that I believed that 
no power on earth would make France relinquish the Syrian Mandate. He had 
received this opinion with surprise and dismay. I had gone straight from 
this interview to lunch with Mr. Balfour and after lunch when the other 
guests had left had related my conversation with Faisal and reiterated my 
conviction regarding the attitude of the French. Mr. Balfour, character- 
istically had told me that while I was not to imagine that he was speaking 
officially, he could assure me 
in a purely private capacity that he was in 
agreement with me. Thereupon I begged him to clear Faisal's mind of illusions; 
if it was certain, as I thought that he would never oppose French ambitions, 
Faisul should be clearly and officially informed so that he might shape his 
course accordingly. ý Mr. Balfour thereupon summoned Ian Malcolm and said 
"Ian. -will you make a note; of what she says so 
that I may not forget to 
acquaint Lloyd George .- 
Ian producing an exquisite notebook from an impeccable 
pocket had, made the 
desired entry - and I feeling that Ian's notebook was_ 
the epitome of all culs 
de sac, had left Paris a"day or two later. 
Faisal then referred to Lord Allenbury's irruption with the Paris 
conference which occurred while 
I was there. The principle of an international 
enquiry with the wishes 
of the Syrian people had been imposed by him, the 
British, Italian and American delegates had been at once appointed why had 
it never materialised? 
I heard the answer to this question. The French 
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had met the proposition in the simplest manner: they had never appointed 
delegates. . The 
British, Italian and American representatives had lingered 
on for months finally the Americans had gone alone and their report had 
never seen the light of day. Faisal interposed that when the American 
delegates (Mr., Crain and his colleague) had arrived in Syria he had telegraphed 
to Lord Allenby and asked him whether they should be considered as an official 
and responsible delegation. Lord 
Allenby had replied emphatically in the 
affirmative and-the Syrians had acted accordingly. 
I replied that Lord 
Allenby had all. along been actuated by the 
'politicians. His scheme of an 
international enquiry was still born if it had taken place (and the French 
had frustrated it from the outset) it would have been productive of no result. 
The British and American Delegates would certainly have given a true report 
of the feelings of the 
Syrian people but the French would have suborned 
the Italian representatives to subscribe to a report in the contrary sense. 
The result would have been a 
draw - and the French would have carried on. 
That was my conviction. I added that in my opinion there were scarcely 
words strong enough 
to express my sense of our responsibility for the Syrian 
disaster. 
FaisQl then said: "This is how I viewed the Arab question. I 
thought we must begin with the Hijaz. 
A firm alliance between the British 
Government and the Hijaz was my cornerstone - upon which I intended to build 
up an alliance between myself 
in Syria and you. I Put the Iraq aside. 
0 
Whatever A. T. Wilson might do I was assured that the policy of your Government 
was to set up a 
National Government in the Iraq -I was content to wait., 
My father destroyed my 
hope that the radiating point should be the Hijaz; 
to this day he has not ratified 
the treaty with you; you deserted me in 
Syria - it is therefore 
incumbent upon me to form a new scheme. You must 
remember that 
I stood and I stand, entirely alone. I have never had the 
support of my 
father or my brother 'Abdullah'. They were both bitterly 
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jealous of the' position' which the successful issue of the Arab campaign had 
given mein Syria: "When I was summoned to Europe after the Armistice, I 
was-so conscious-of their'feelings towards me that I begged my father to 
sendýmy brother Abdullah to Paris instead of myself. He refused but it 
was not because'I'had the confidence of my family. I have never had it. 
Do 'you realise why it-was that in March 1920 I encouraged the handful of 
Iraqis in Syria to nominate my brother Abdullah King of the Iraq? I knew 
that, the whole business was laughable, but I gave it my countenance in order 
to"appease my"own brother. He is as you know older than I am -I wanted 
to give him a status 'in' the Arab world in order to disarm his hostility. 
He, and my father never cared to accuse me of working solely in my own 
personal interest'. ""' What did it matter to me whether I or another were King 
of Syria? My task was to obliterate family dissensions and therefore I 
encouraged the nomination of my brother Abdullah to the Iraq. I knew that 
it was absurd; I received the sharpest rebuke from Lord Curzon; But I 
believed and until 1921 I believed that your policy with regard to Arab 
aspirations was that they were inseparably connected with the Sharifian family. 
My father, as I 
'have 
said, has disconnected the Hijaz; Transjordania is 
nothing -I must form a new 
Arab ideal. Where shall I begin? 
I replied: "You must begin with the Iraq we are pledged to the 
establishment of"a'Native Government here, if the people consent to accept 
our help in'the comparatively easy conditions which we impose. The Iraq, 
not-the Hijaz is the radiating point, and 
it is better so, because the Iraq 
has its eyes fixed on development on modern lines whereas the Hijaz is a 
state'and moreover an arid 
desert. Both economic and spiritual development 
are therefore barred. 
The King c mtinued: "I must tell you exactly how I saw the Arab 
question. 
I tried first to get a hearing for the Syrian people - you knew 
what their wishes were. 
My father's unreasonableness was always my greatest 
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difficulty while I was in Paris in 1919 he was continually urging me to 
force the Allies to fulfil their promises to the Arabs. I did not even 
know what the prdmises were -I had never seen the correspondence with'MacMahon. 
But in any case to force the Allies was out of the question. What power 
had I? what wealth? I could only reason and negotiate. That was what 
I did. I contined to do so when I was left face to face with the French. 
I was persuaded that sooner or later a rupture must come - they were bent 
on it. My sole idea was to postpone it sufficiently to give me time to 
consolidate Arab institutions in Syria. Then if I Yell I should have some- 
thing behind me which they would find it difficult to obliterate. But I 
was not given time; my hand was forced by my own followers and when I went 
everything disappeared with me". 
As he spoke I had a picture of what that time must have been like. 
Sidi Faisal, with his high ideals, his fair conception of the Arab cause 
which he alone represented and defended - acutely, too acutely, sensitive 
to sympathy or political antagonism trying to hold his own against the covert 
hostility of the French and the ardent folly of his own adherents; harassed 
by his family, deserted by the British Government in which he had placed 
implicit reliance without one single person near him from whom he could seek 
affectionate and impartial guidance - what chance had he of finding an issue 
to a situation which was almost insoluble. The part we played in the drama 
was one which with anyone 
less generous than he should have earned for us 
permanent distrust, and 
if now we are called upon to show him infinite 
patience and forebearance, we may reckon these attributes as but an inadequate 
recognition of our previous shortcomings - we 
betrayed him and he has not 
only forgiven the 
betrayal but has continued to trust us. It is a great 
deal more than we deserve. 
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APPENDIXýI1 (l) 
The Carlton Hotel, 
LONDON. S. W. 1 
5th April, 1920 
My dear Major Young, 
At your request I am stating what, in my opinion, were the causes 
that brought into being the Mesopotamian Congress with its declarations and 
decisions. This statement has no pretensions to contain more than a 
hurried sketch of the facts of the situation that presented themselves 
to me and a few remarks and suggestions arising from them. 
Soon after the Armistice'Turkish propaganda became very active,,, 
in the northern part of the country, and its emissaries, taking advantage.,, 
of, the vexed conditions arising 
from the unpopular military administration, 
succeeded by accusations against the British in influencing a small section 
of the people, alienating 
their sympathies and ranging them once more on 
their side. At some places it attained such dimensions as to give to some 
P3 
of the British officials on the spot the wrong impression that there was 
a strong responsible party 
in the Arab countries desirous of reinstating 
the Turk. The people were certainly very much excited over the rumours 
disseminated broadcast that, after all the sacrifices made, Mesopotamia 
along with Syria was 
to be partitioned and colonised. Agitators were not 
S low to assert, with seeming 
justification, that it would be preferable to 
have maintained even such a malignant authority as the Turk had over the 
country in order 
to safeguard its unity and such national rights as were 
conceded under 
the old regime. 
...... 
In 1918 I presented to the British Government, through the medium 
1ý F. O. 371/5226/E2719 
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of Colonel Cornwallis, then D. P. O. at Damascus, a long memorandum on the 
state of the country setting forth at that time my views of the causes of 
unrest and venturing a few recommendations for the amelioration of the 
conditions. I said the minds of the people of Mesopotamia were greatly 
disturbed by the adoption on the part of the military administration of ways 
and means ill adapted to the conditions obtaining there from centuries, and 
that, in my opinion, the only remedy for restoring public confidence, 
successfully combatting the nefarious outside influences and bridging the 
gulf that I felt was widening between the British Officials and the population 
- objects which I had much at heart - was the immediate creation of a national 
civil administration under the supervision of the Occupation. is too, well 
knew how the Turks would benefit from such conditions as prevailed then and 
unfortunately still to a large extent prevail now. From previous experience 
I was sure that the Turks meant the country no good or they would not have, 
before the war, persecuted and condemned every Arab patriot who, like myself, 
had to seek safety in concealment and flight. 
I sincerely regret that nothing was done on those lines and matters 
were allowed to drift. In consequence a 
few unscrupulous individuals, 
always ready to serve 
their ends at the expense of the public, took advantage 
of the general discontent 
to misrepresent the causes and by insinuations 
succeeded in ingratiating 
themselves with a considerable number of high 
officials and in securing a very 
large share of the public offices. The 
actions of those officials were, 
in all cases, supported by this class 
regardless of 
their bad effects on the general interest. It is significant 
to note that many of 
the most respected and competent notables who were 
invited to take office refused to serve under an authority founded on 
principles 
(that is military) at variance with their own and invariably 
asked for the 
formation of a national civil administration as a condition 
of their support. 
Their warnings against the danger of the continuance 
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of the-system were' not-, heeded. , Accusations- were preferred against some 
of them who ultimately were exiled the country. 
From such a situation as held then and still holds now none but 
enemies could reap benefit. This they were not slow to realise and 
succeeded beyond their hopes in seeing troubles break out in certain parts 
particularly in the north in the neighbourhood of Mosul and Deir-ez-zour. 
The majority of the members of the Mesopotamian Congress is made 
of those who fought by the side of the British against the common enemy and 
is as strongly opposed to=the prolongation-of, any misunderstandings and' It 
differences between the people of Irak and-their allies'as to the"resumption 
of any understanding and co-operation with the Turks. In their eagerness 
to avert more incidents-and stem the current of disaffection the Congress 
was unanimous in their conviction that the means most' effectual for that, 
purpose was to conform 
to the. wishes of the people which are in perfect' 
harmony with the intentions and promises of the British Government. They 
declared the independence of Mesopotamia, fully confident that their action 
will be received with approval and encouragement. 
I am not a member of this Congress, but I am intimately acquainted 
with the majority of 
its members, among whom I an satisfied there is not 
one who holds any unfriendly views of our allies, the British, or will lend 
themselves to create embarrassments 
for them in dealing with the Irakians. 
On the contrary, they are one and all imbued with the spirit of comradeship 
with the British and are most anxious to continue on the path of loyalty 
and collaboration with 
them, and, in a special manner, they are determined 
to put an end to all the motives that may tend to renew the connection-with 
the Turks. 
The Mesopotamia Congress was formed in the following way: The 
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notables of Mosul- and, Baghdad by powers of attorney and a considerable 
number of the tribal*chiefs=by special letters which are now in the archives 
of the Congress; authorised six persons at Damascus to act in their-name 
and in-their behalf-in-all matters relating to the determination of the 
future of the country with insistence on independence. The following are 
the six deputies: - 
H. R. H. Emir Faisal; Jaafar Pasha El-Askari, leader of the Arab 
Army with the E. E. F.; Naji Sowaidi; Muloud Pasha Mukhlis; El-Ilashimi; 
and Colonel Ali Jaudat. 
Also the Arab, national, committees in Mesopotamia established like 
other numerous committees in every Arab country in pre-war times for the 
purpose of defending the rights of the Arabs against Turkish encroachments 
(it was these committees who, decreed the Arab uprising against Turkey in 
1915), authorised a few Irakians in Syria and sent, other"agents from among 
their numbers in Mosul, Baghdad and Nejef to represent them at the Congress. 
No representatives attended from Basra as there was no time to 
wait for their arrival 
from such a distant centre. 
It is my conviction, and I do not hold such extreme views on the 
Arab question as to cloud my reading of the signs of the times, from direct 
experience in Mesopotamia 
before, the war, constant contact, with the majority 
of Irakians arriving lately in Syria and private correspondence from reliable 
sources in Irak, that 
the Congress as-composed completely and indubitably 
represented the views and aspirations of 
the Overwhelming majority of the 
inhabitants. 
The severity of the military administration in Mesopotamia has 
so far prevented 
the manifestation of the people's desires on. the question 
of their future and 
to the casual observer who only skims the surface with 
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unpenetrating eyes the national sentiment does not clearly appear as a 
factor. But there is a strong latent sentiment dearly cherished in every 
breast and a determination that nothing short of a national administration 
of an independent character will be willingly accepted. 
In the course of the next few days I hope to place in your hands 
the original text of the declaration made by the Congress. Now only a 
brief summary of its contents can be given. 
1. Independence was declared as the right of the Mesopotamians 
as an allied people capable of managing their own affairs. 
2. Emir Abdullah, second son of His Majesty King Hussein, a 
strong anti-Turk and the 
leader of the Army against the Turks in the Iiijaz, 
was proclaimed King of 
Mesopotamia. 
3. No rigid barriers, political or economical, can be allowed 
to be raised between Mesopotamia and Syria. 
As regards the rights of the Irakians to independence, no remarks 
are necessary to make 
it any clearer, and the Proclamation of Emir Abdullah 
as King is, in my opinion, a 
justice done to the patriotic and religious 
sentiments of the whole people 
in town and country. The sunnis will gladly 
hail him, the son of the Prophet, as ruler and 
king, and the Shiahs will 
be greatly gratified to 
become subjects of a true descendant of their chief 
Imam All Ibn Abi Taleb. 
This for them is a historical event that will 
range as the consummation 
of the long deferred hopes. 
A slight diversion may be allowed here to say a few words about 
the assembly of the notables of 
Mesopotamia held in Baghdad in 1918 for 
recording the wishes 
of the country regarding its future government. The 
absence of unanimity 
about the subject is not held by those who are well 
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acquainted with the thoughts of the pepole and the conditions under which 
the Assembly was summoned as a proof of disunion. These men were practically 
taken by surprise and had no opportunity to discuss the subject at large 
before the question was put to them. It is now asserted on sure ground 
that the same notables would give a great majority assent to an independent 
monarchy under Emir Abdullah. 
Mosul is an integral part of Mesopotamia and must, in Mesopotamia's 
interest, continue to be so under one and the same independent national 
administration. Otherwise 
it will declare for Syria and share its fortunes. 
The following reasons may be mentioned for maintaining the widest 
open door between Syria and Mesopotamia: 
(a) Both countries, in addition to their being inhabited by one 
people, have one and 
the same enemy beyond their northern frontiers, and 
it is imperative that their system of defence in that quarter be unified 
in order to safeguard their vital interests against the common peril of 
invasion. 
(b) A considerable number of tribes regularly migrate and re- 
migrate from one country 
to the other in certain periods every year. For 
them there is, and from time immemorial there was, no 
frontiers between the 
two areas. 
(c) The community of a very large part of their economical interests 
dependent on transportation 
by the existing and future railways, and the 
joint use of the Euphrates River preclude the raising of any commercial 
barriers between Syria and 
Mesopotamia. Mesopotamia's access to the 
Mediterranean lies through 
Syria. 
The Government of the country, it is understood, will be a monarchy 
of a constitutional 
character with representative institutions for the towns 
and settled parts. 
For the tribal areas a special administration will be 
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set up and-one-of itsv-primary objects will be to encourage the tribes to 
settle down permanently on the land and become cultivators so that in'the' 
not very far future the change from a wandering to a sedentary life will 
have been completedcas'to allow the extension of the representative, system 
to all parts of the country. ir. 
For the purpose of arranging this and other matters between Syria 
and Mesopotamia and to consult on questions of common interest politically 
as well as economically a mixed commission appointed from year to year will 
be found necessary. But with the Hijaz no political co-operation is con- 
templated. Arrangements will, however, have to be made with regard to the 
Pilgrimage question and religious establishments belonging to the Mecca and 
Medinah shrines. 
With regard to the Kurdish minority to the North-East of Mosul, 
who are Sunni Moslems by religion and a large part of whom use the Arabic 
as well as their native language, it is not expected that they will object 
to becoming subjects of a Sunni Moslem King. Moreover, their economical 
interests are essentially involved with those of Mosul and Baghdad. And, 
as in the case of the 
Arab tribal area, it will be desirable to provide them 
with a special administration. 
.... 00 
There is not, as far as I know, any denial of, or antagonism to 
Britain's interests in Mesopotamia and all seem to be agreed that they should 
be safeguarded. The quality and extent of the collaboration that will be 
maintained with 
Britain is sure to be decided by friendly agreement between 
the British and the National Government of Mesopotamia. 
As regards the Persian Gulf, I am not acquainted with the views 
of the British Government on 
its defence. But if there is still any necessity 
,4 
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for them to pursue a well defined policy on this question I venture to 
suggest the appointment of a military Anglo-Arab Commission for dealing with 
it. 
In conclusion I take the liberty once more to suggest that an 
Anglo-Arab Commission be immediately appointed to visit Mesopotamia and 
study on the spot the urgent needs of the country and to institute a 
National Administration within the Occupation, so that as soon as the future 
is determined and the army begins to retire the administration will be in 
readiness to take over the 
Government and assume full responsibility. This, 
in my humble opinion, 
is the best cure for the present ills caused by mutual 
suspicions and misunderstandings. 
Yours faithfully, 
Nuury 
Said 
-, 4 
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APPENDIX III 
NUMBER OF IRAQI STUDENTS (BOYS), SCHOOLS AND POAJLATICN IN 19191 
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Dair al Zor 121 2 6 6 1 135 60,000 
Dulaim 260 2 5 262 -250,000 
Samarra 167 31 4 37,000 
Nillab 97 371 3 6 471 173,000 
Diwaniyah 69 214 , 
15 2 288 200,000 
Shaniiyah & 
Najaf 166 2 166 190,000 
Baghdad 639 168 ? 2 1 8 810 250,000 
Ba'qubah 185 138 5 323 55,000 
Khanigin 88 10 61 3 159 38,000 
Kut al Amarah 77 234:. 23. 11 6 4 342 106,000 
Amarah 82 99 28 12 48 3 269 300,000 
Muntafiq 52 124 11 3 14 3 204 327,000 
IIasrah 367 39 71 2 4 415 114,000 
Kirkuk 256 37 5 5 4 303 92,000 
Sulaimaniyah- 102 4 2 106 155,000 
Mosul & 
Arbil 728 34 175 325 5 21 251 228 65 19 1,778 545,000 
Qurnah 18 60 1 78 50,000 
TOTAL 3,308 1,725 330 341 7 22 251 234 32 62 5 76 6,317 3,288,000 
1, C. 0.696.2. Department of Education, Administration Report 1919, p. 8 
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APPENDIX IV1 
A. The names of those who were elected and signed the 'nationalist' 
petition in Baghdad with' some details given on them by the British 
Administration 
1. Sheikh Sa'id Na9shabandi. Sunni. Mudarris (teacher) at 'Admiyah. Well- 
known man. 
2. Saiyd Ibrähim al Räwi. Sunni. Well-known man. Not at heart anti-British. 
3. Ahmed Shawäf. Sunni. Fairly well known man. Bigoted Moslem. 
4. 'Abdal Karim al Saiyd Haider. Wakil (agent) of Saiyd Isml'il al Sadar 
who is a very important Mujtahid of Khäd_hemain. Signed the anti-British 
madhbata (petition) under pressure. His Wakil necessarily followed his 
lead. Shi'i. 
5. 'Abdal Rahman pasha Haideri. 'Sunni. Head of one of the leading families 
of Baghdad. Five of his houses have been requisitioned for billets. 
i 
6. 'Abdal, Wahäb al Näib. Sunni. Brother of No. 1. Man of importance. 
Judge of Peace Court. Much esteemed as a teacher of Moslem Law. 
7. Jewäd al MuýlAwi: Shi'i. Auctioneer. Scarcely known. 
g, Aimed al Dhäher al Häji. Shi'i. A minor 'Alim. 
9. Saiyd Ismä'i1'al Wä'dh. Sunni. Active member of C. U. P. 
10. 'Abdallah al Shäwi. Sunni. Junior member of a good Baghdad family. 
President of the Court of Appeal at Khadhemain under the Turks. 
11. Mahdi Khaseki. Shi'i. Contractor. 
12, T5hir b Muhammad SalTm. Sunni. Unknown man. 
13. Kädhim al 11iji Däwd. Shi'i. Uncle of No. 35. No importance. 
14. Suliman al Sennawi. Sunni. Clerk of the gidhi in the Shari'a Court. 
15. Saiyd Muhammad JUussein Milläwi. Shi'i. Small merchant. 
16.4Abdallah Salim al Haideri. Sunni. 
A relative of No. 5, was Nagib of 
Kerbela under the Turks. (? ) 
17.1Abdal Wahib al Saiyd Haider. 
Shi'i. Small merchant. 
18. Mulla Qlsim. Sunni. Was Mudarris and member of the Wa9f Committee under 
the Turks. Fanatical Moslem. His father has a leather shop in the Bazaar. 
19. Saiyd Hussein al Saiyd 
'Isa. Shi'i, Small merchant and landowner. 
1F. p. 882/23/MES/19/6, 
'Self Determination in Mesopotamia', Baghdad, 22nd 
February 1919, Appendix II Analysis of signatories of the combined Sunni 
and Shi'ah petition, pp. 
45-50. 
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20,1Abdal Amiral Saiyd Haider. Shi'i. Small merchant. 
21. Haji'Ahdal Hussein Kubba. Shi'i. A member of a well-known family. 
22. Ahmed Charchafichi. Shi'i. Merchant. Family is well known. 
23. Saiyd 'Adäi al Saiyd Jawiher. Shi'i. Small merchant. 
25. Muzähem b Muhammad Nuri Pasha. Sunni. He was living in Hillah and was 
regarded by the P. O. (Hillah) as objectionable and constrained''to'live 
in Baghdad. 
26. Khä. lid al Shäbender. Sunni. Related to Haji Ali Alusi. 
27. D_häfir al Zahäwi. Sunni. Belongs to one of the leading families in 
which his uncle, Jamil (see Appendix C) is the best known member. 
Landlord. ' Was intimidated by the son of Abdal Wahab (6) and induced 
to sign. 
28. Ahmed Munir. Sunni. Katib in the 'Adhimiyah mosque. 
29. Muhammad SäliI Bachahchi. Sunni. Belongs to one of the leading 
families, of which Musa Bachahchi (C) is the best known member. Was a 
member of the Court of First Instance under the Turks. 
30. Saiyd Abdal Ridhä al. Saiyd Yehyä. Shi'i. Merchant. 
31. Muhammad al Mustafa al Khalaf. Sunni. 
32. Näji 'Abdal Ghani Kubba. Shi'i. One of the leading Shi'ah in Baghdad. ' 
33. Ja'far abu Timman al Häji Däwd. Shi'i. One of the leading Shi'ah 
merchants of Baghdad. Is on Municipal and educational Committees. 
34. 'Abdal Ha9i. ' Sunni. Mutawalli (caretaker) of the 'Adhimiyah mosque. 
Friendly to Europeans ... followed the stream. 
35. Muhammad b. Sultän Aghä. Sunni. Small landowner Mudir in the Revenue 
Department. 
36. Muhammad Arfeli. Sunni. Landowner. Well known family. 
37. Hamid b 
'Abdal Ridhä. Shi'i. 
38. Hamid b Häji Hussein. Shi'i. 
39. Muhammad Rshid al Saiyd 'Isa. Shi'i. Small landowner. 
40. Saiyd 'Ali al Saiyd Hussein Shekara. Shi'i. Small merchant. 
41. 'Abd al Latif al Mudallal. Sunni. Owns a bath. 
42. Saiyd Muhammad al Saiyd Muhsin. Shi'i. Small merchant. 
43. Darwish 'Ali Haider. Shi'i. Small merchant. 
44. Hussein al Häji 'Aläwi. Shi'i. Small merchant. 
45. HMji 'Abdal Hussein al Bahräni. Shi'i. Small merchant. 
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46. 'Ali al Bäzirkän. Sunni. His father was a Qawam in the Commercial 
Court. Ex-member of C. U. P. 
47. Hamdi Bächahchi. Sunni. Junior member of well-known family. 
"Agitator and intriguer". 
B. The Sunni counter-petition (Unelected and pro-British) 
Qässim Pasha )Chudairi. Runs the Khudairi firm. The biggest Mohammadan 
merchant in Baghdad. 
2. Mohammad Näji Khudairi. Big merchant. 
3. Mula Mustafa al Häji Ibrähim. Merchant. 
4. Häji Khalil al Häji Ibrähim. Merchant. 
5. Ibrähim Aimeda1 Suwaidi. Merchant of the distinguished Suwaidi family 
of which its head is Yusuf al Suwaidi. 
6. Ahmed al Shutab. Merchant. 
7. 'Abdal Jebbär Ghuläm. Head of the Mukhtars of Baghdad. Not one of the 
Ashraf but an influential man in his own walk of life. 
8. Muhammad b $äji Shehäb. Merchant. 
9. 'Ali al Hussein. Sheikh of the granary owners of Baghdad. 
10. Saiyd Muflafa Berzanji. Member of the famous Kurdish family of Saiyds. 
His father is Imam in the Mosque of Abdul Qadir Kailäni. 
C. Counter petition of Sunni Ashraf (Pro-British) 
1. 'Abdal Rahman Jamil ZrLdah. Head of the house. Very wealthy landowner. 
2. Fäkher al Din Jamil Zädah. Very wealthy landowner. 
3. Jamil Sedcji Zehäwi. Best known man in the influential Zehawi family. 
Ex-Deputy for Baghdad and the most distinguished man of letters in 
Mesopotamia. Free thinker. 
4. 'Abdal Majid ShAwi. Head of the Shäwi family and of high reputation. 
Held official positions under the Turks and served under us (British) 
on the Wagf Committee. 
5. Musa Chalabi Bächahchi. Most prominent member of his house. Very 
wealthy landlord. Held high official Positions under the Turks but 
resigned after the constitution. Hates and fears the C. U. P. 
6. Pälih Villi. Head of his family. Held high office under the Turks. 
Member of the Liberal Committee. Was government agent under British 
administration. Representative of the Direction of the Wa9f Committee. 
7. 'Abdal Karim Chalabi. 
Wealthy family. Heald office under the Turks and 
employed by 
the British in the education department. His son was 
banished by the 
Turks to Constantinople. 
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APPENDIX M. 
Circulated by the Secretary of State for India 
SECRET 
MESOPOTAMIAN ADMINISTRATION 
Memorandum by Secretary of State for India 
There are two points connected with the administration of Mesopotamia 
which have bulked very largely in recent discussions, and on which I wish to 
offer a few remarks. One is the cost of the army, the other the so-called 
'Indianisation" of the administration. 
(1) We are all agreed that the cost of the Army is excessive. The 
point with which I want to deal is the suggestion that the army of occupation, 
if the area to be occupied is not reduced, must cost what it costs now. The 
present strength (including the troops in North-West Persia) is two divisions, 
five infantry brigades, and one cavalry brigade. Successive Commanders-in- 
Chief have estimated that, if all went well, a reduction to. one division, 
plus one cavalry and one 
infantry brigade, or even less, would eventually be 
possible. But 
in the meantime the fighting value of the larger force is, 1 
am informed, no greater than that of the smaller one. Many battalions are 
being used to guard Turkish prisoners and Assyrian refugees. All regiments 
are more or less below strength - when 
it was necessary to reinforce the force 
in North-Jest Persia a few weeks ago the two battalions sent up numbered only 
300 men each - owing to the demands on them 
for administrative services. All 
this is abnormal, and, it is to be hoped, temporary; money is being spent for 
which no military return 
is being received, and which it will no longer be 
necessary to spend when 
the administration settles down. Again, the admin- 
istrative services, which are not really military in their nature, not only 
use up troops, 
but are in themselves enormously costly. The General Officer 
Commanding thinks it necessary to maintain a huge Inland Water Transport 
Department. The wage 
bill alone of this Department is over 200,0001. a month 
1. p. o. 371/5228 
/5093 
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and Lord Inchcape, in his report to the Minister of Munitions,, 'wrote that, 
from what he had heard, the fleet being retained by the military administration 
"is much, in excess of what, might be. considered a reasonable reserve .... if 
the fleet were disposed of, a very expensive establishment could be demobilised. " 
I more than suspect that-the whole of the military administration, is 
run on a similarly lavish scale. "It 
is a sin and a shame, " writes a very. 
competent. observer privately to a 
friend, "that money should be, wasted in the 
"way that it is here., Practically nothing is-being done to build permanent, 
"or temporary, quarters for people of less consideration, but practically any- 
"body can get a car when he likes to go six miles to the Sporting Club and 
"back. The streets are still crowded at all times of the day with motor 
"vehicles containing officers with their wives. Reductions are being effected 
" in the strength of units, but these swollen administrative staffs, living 
''under conditions far more luxurious than they will ever see again, even if 
"they go to Simla or Delhi, remain. We have an effective strength of about 
"a division and a quarter, which 
is divided up for the purpose of administration 
"into two divisions, and two lines of communication areas - all of them with 
large staffs, with an enormous General 
Headquarters on top. " These conditions 
will be aggravated 
if -the desire of 
the Imperial General Staff (which the 
General Officer Commanding 
has not asked for) to send three more brigades 
from-India is persisted in;., and At is conditions, like these that are making 
our rule unpopular with 
the people, whose habits are disturbed and whose houses 
are occupied by 
the military. I receive constant representations on this 
subject. Again, 
the; hill station which has been established in, Persian 
territory - and to which 
the General Officer Commanding and the whole of the, 
Headquarters Staff and 
heads of departments withdrew on the outbreak of 
trouble in the Mosul vilayet. 
last month, leaving only a Lieutenant-Colonel 
to. represent., them at. 
Baghdad, the seat of government - is an example of what 
I believe to be wholly unnecessary expenditure. At all events it has caused 
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very unfavourable comments in Baghdad, and Sir A. Wilson tells me that he has 
had to use his 'influence to dissuade the Chamber of Commerce from making a 
public protest' against what they consider to be extravagant and wasteful 
. fir. rs n.., -. - '.: r7 
expenditure in this and other respects. 
I am most anxious, to support the Secretary of State for War in his 
desire to reduce the expenditure and the army, but before it is decided that,,. 
the former cannot be reduced without reducing or withdrawing the latter,, 
suggest that a searching enquiry should be instituted into present methods of 
military expenditure. ,_, 
(2) I am not quite sure what "Indianisation' is intended to mean. 
But I take it to mean that a direct administration has been set up on the 
model of India, and even manned by Indians - that we are, in fact governing 
Mesopotamia as though it were an Indian province. And the argument is that 
this involves a-costly administration, which involves heavy taxation, which 
in turn brings in'its train the unrest of which Mesopotamia is now supposed 
tobe*the scene. Ergo, get rid of Sir A. T. Wilson and peace and contentment 
will reign once more. Now 
for the facts. 
With the progress of our victorious armies the existing Turkish 
administration disappeared. Though not a 
bad system on paper, it was entirely 
inefficient in practice. . 
Nevertheless it had given to the dwellers. in towns 
some semblance of 
Civilisation. There were law courts, from which there was 
any appeal to Constantinople; and 
there was an electoral system under which 
not only municipalities were worked, 
but members were sent to the Turkish 
parliament. The Iraq was, 
in fact, a part - like any other - of the Ottoman 
Empire. But all this collapsed, because the higher officials were exclusively 
Turks and fled, and the minor Arab officials - who either were Turkish in 
sympathies or, were not sure 
that, the, Turk would not return - also disappeared. 
It was necessary,. to replace the machinery by something else for two reasons. 
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First, because we could not give the inhabitants, of whom weyosed as the 
liberators,,, a worse administration than they had endured before. Second, 
because it would, have been impossible to conduct a campaign in a country 
given over to, chaos - security was necessary on the lines of communications, 
and, the army had as far as-possible to feed itself. I mention these points 
because, obvious though, they are, they are often forgotten. But to create 
a new administration there existed practically no material but what we brought 
with us - and'that consisted mainly of British officers from India and Indian 
subordinates. Every effort has been made to get off iciäls'from Egypt and'' 
theSoudan - the Judicial Secretary and the Director- ofEducation come"from',, ' 
the former: but there was no large reserve to draw upI onexcept in India. 
Nevertheless the Turkish system has been maintained in its main features -` 
except that of inefficiency. It would not be surprising if men, whose ädmin- 
istrative experience had been Indian tended to work to an Indian model and to 
an Indian standard - and I am 
willing to' admit that we have gone 'further in'- 
the direction of efficiency than the Arab State is likely to want to go. But 
when that admission" is made 
it must be remembered that it is largely for 
military purposes that this expensive administration was'created'and that 
this degree of efficiency has been maintained. The great expinsion'in the 
'cultivated area, for example, which in turn necessitated an extention of-t, 
irrigation, was undertaken at army expense in 'response to an urgent appeal 
frän`home to make the army self-supporting. Again, a feature of the present 
year'is to transfer to 
the civil administration of expensive departments` 
hitherto organised by and 
for the military authorities, such as railways, 
ports, docks, river navigation. Departments Which exist solely for the 
benefit of the inhabitants by no means attain the same standard. Education, 
for example, is notoriously behindhand. Though Arabic is the language of 
the schools, and for the 
first time since the Turkish conquest the Shiah 
of the population is getting its due share it has been ý i majority possible 
to satisfy the demand, 
because-the supply of Arab schoolmasters is wholly, 
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insufficient. Technical education -in -Baghdad is at a standstill because the 
military are occupying the only possible. buildings, -and the'prolonged and 
persistent efforts of the Civil Commissioner have failed to dislodge them. 
Facts like these caused a Syrian nationalist paper recently to remark in all a 
earnest that the Mesopotamians -did not appreciate the blessings, of Turkish, ` 
rule until they had lost them. '° 
But, it is said, your administration is absurdly costly compared 
with that of the Turks because "it has 450 British executive officers running 
"it, and not a single responsible Mespopotamian. In Turkish days 70 per cent 
"of the executive civil service was local" (Mr. T. E. Lawrence, Times, 23rd 
July). I cannot say what percentage of the total is represented by the 450 
British, though I doubt whether it is as much as 30. But it must be pointed 
out that the Turks did not employ 
"a single responsible Mesopotamian. " The 
Turkish subordinate executive service too was almost exclusively Sunni, }while t 
the majority of the people are 
Shiah. It was easier for a foreign Moslem 
Power. to impose -a Sunni domination than 
for ourselves; and theýresulthas 
been. that most of the Sunni employees of the Turks who have remained or, returned, 
are, unemployable, while 
the Shiahs, who had no training in or tradition of 
public life in Turkish 
times, are not yet generally capable, or are unwilling, 
to come forward to take their places. 
Where the material has been available 
it has been used to the utmost. In the Judicial Department, for example, 
out of 100 officials six 
are British and 82 Arab, and for the first time for 
centuries justice 
is being administered in the Arabic tongue, and the courts 
are following 
the law and customs with which the people are familiar. In 
this connection 
it may be noted that Mr. Lawrence's statement that the admin- 
istration generally is conducted 
in English is untrue. There is hardly a 
British officer on the executive staff who 
is not qualified in colloquial 
Arabic . 
r 's 
F -, 
The revenue of Mesopotamia was collected last year at a cost of 16 
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per - cent - not excessive, seeing 
that in India, after three quarters of a 
century of settled government, the cost was 13 per cent. No figures are 
available for a comparison with Turkish times, but it is clear 'that the Turkish 
system must have been exceedingly costly. No less than six different depart- 
ments, with separate establishments, independently collected revenue and re- 
mitted it to Constantinople. Moreover, almost all branches of-revenue were 
farmed -a system which 
is notoriously uneconomical to the State and burden- 
some to the taxpayer. It 
is, therefore, perhaps not surprising that until 
the'last two years before the war there was a deficit in the Mesopotamian 
budget. 
At all events, it is said, the Turks took much less out of the people 
than you are taking; the Turkish revenue was 21 millions, and you are taking 
six. No figures of Turkish revenue are available here, and I am unable to 
trace the 21 millions to any higher authority than the Daily Mail. The revenue 
budgeted for in the current year is about 41 millions (at 2s. to the rupee). 
of this sum 21 millions are 
furnished by customs, the rates being the same as 
under the Turks, and all other 
heads of revenue combine to make a little over 
two millions. 
In 1919-20 the corresponding figures (at the same rate of exchange) 
were: - Total revenue 
4,142,000 1., customs 2,202,000 1.9 remaining heads 
1,940,000 1. The land revenue in 
1919-20 yielded 1,508,000 1., for 1920-21 
the estimate is 1,581,000 
1. Mr. Ormsby Gore, in his admirable speech in 
the House of Commons 
debate, sought to make the point that the revenue had 
jumped from a little over 
1,000,000 i. In 1918-19 to 5,000,000 1. in 1919-20; 
but he had failed to notice that 
his figures for 1918-19 were for Baghdad only, 
while those 
for 1919-20 were for Baghdad, Basra and Mosul. Can it reason- 
ably be said 
that a taxation revenue of 2,000,000 1. is excessive for the whole 
of Mesopotamia? 
We are told that it is larger than the Turks' revenue, and 
that is probably true - 
but the explanation is simple. Fi rst, the area 
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, under. cultivation is, now some 15 per cent or 20 per cent- greater than `it was 
in Turkish -times: 1 Second, ''the price of grain is 'something "like "300 'per cent 
higher than it was , before the war. ' In point of fact, 'the Turkish land 'revenue 
assessments have almost' everywhere been reduced. " In the Hillah division, "' 
for, example, the, Turkish demand was as much as '60 per cent of the gross produce 
on ; some classes of -land: we have reduced it to 30 per cent or even 25 percent, 
with a rebate of 3 per cent,, for' prompt payment. It is true that' in' certain 
areas taxation- and control- are being imposed on tribes which have never' sub- 
mitted, to either. Over-the Shamiyehýdivision, -for'example, where the recent 
trouble has, been, the Turks had exercised no control for 10 years before'the 
war. " But our rate'of-taxation 
has always been tempered to the degree of' 
control exercised, and 
it is noteworthy that>the Muntafiks division - from' 
which in the * early, days no revenue whatever was collected, ' and' on which' a 
demand, was made only last year - has not' joined in the' recent outbreakand 
that, in: the Amarah division such confidence and contentment prevaLl'that the'' 
tribesmen have, voluntarily surrendered 24,000 rifles. The Arab-likes taxation 
as, little as anyone else, 
but there is no evidence that excessive taxation 
is one of the, contributory, causes of 
the present unrest. 
I grant your administration, says Mr. Lawrence: "We had to set up 
"a war-time administration. 
We had no choice; but that was two years ago, 
" and we have not yet changed to peace conditions. Indeed, there are yet no 
"signs of change. " For that, at 
least, I admit no responsibility either for 
myself or for Sir 
Arnold Wilson. Mr. Lawrence perhaps forgets that juridically 
the position is the same as 
it was two years ago. Mesopotamia is still Turkish 
territory, and as such 
is still administered, under international law, by the 
army of occupation. 
It is önly two months ago that the mandate was granted 
to use Technically, therefore, our attitude has been correct. That it has 
been in the highest degree 
inexpedient no one can doubt. More than once since 
1917. the Civil Commissioner had pressed for the despatch of a Commission to 
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examine political conditions on the spot; and for at least a year past it 
has. Fbeen perfectly evident that 
it was essential to make a move in fulfilment 
of, the pledges given by His Majesty*s Government. In November last year the 
India Office put forward a draft sketch of an Arab Government, and urged that 
an immediate announcement should be made. Though Lord Curzon in his telegram 
to-Sir P. Cox of 14th November agreed - "We are strongly of opinion that some- 
thing must be said without delay" - it was not until 4th May this year that a 
formula was arrived at. This was not for lack of reminders on the part of 
the India Office. On 15th December we had proposed to the Foreign office to 
authorise an announcement but by 19th February no reply had been received, 
and eventually the first step was taken by Sir A. Wilson himself. He had 
appointed, on his own motion, a committee - presided over by a judicial officer 
of the Egyptian Service - to 
draw up a constitution; at the end of April he 
telegraphed a summary of their recommendations; and he pressed for permission 
to announce, before Ramazan 
(when tempers become excited by fasting), that His 
Majesty's Government provisionally approved them and instructed him to commun- 
icate them to the leading inhabitants with a view to giving effect to them in 
the autumn; the India office did their best, 
but Sir A. Wilson received no 
instructions until the 7th June. In addition to this delay, further delay 
has been imposed upon his active proposals. Though a late convert to the 
policy of an Arab 
Government, he has shown himself anxious energetically to 
pursue the policy which 
he has been authorised to announce. Accordingly he 
proposed to receive 
Jaafar Pasha from Syria, and to invite a number of Mesopotamian 
officers of whose natural 
impatience to take a share in the government Mr. 
Lawrence reminds us 
in the Timte to come to Baghdad for Consultation regarding 
the preliminary arrangements. 
But, at the wish of the Foreign Office, he was 
immediately restrained, and action of that kind - so important at the present 
stage - is being 
held up. 
In conclusion, since Sir A. Wilson's administration has suddenly 
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become the object of hostile - and in my opinion wholly unmerited - criticism, 
I will 'quote from a telegram which I sent 
to him as recently as 7th June# 
with Lord Curzon's' concurrence : 
'- "His Majesty's Government take this oppor- 
"tunity of conveying to you their most cordial and grateful acknowledgments 
"of the high ability and unflagging 'zeal with which'during the past 21 years 
"you have devoted yourself with such markedly successful results 'to -your 
"difficult and laborious task. " Nemo repente fit deterrimus! 
23rd July 1920 E. S. M. 
a 
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; ý.. -APPENDIX VI1 :, 
THE. FVTURE OF MESOPOTAMIA , 
9. (Note by Sir, Percy Cox) V 
l. a"-Before-dealing with lesser issues I should like to state the 
position as I understand, it to be at present, to make sure that I start from 
the, right' premises. 
(i) In the, proclamation which we issued on, our arrival at. Baghdad we ,"... 
announced to the people,: and, in" the Press,, to the world at large, 
that we came as-friends and not as conquerors, to emancipate the,.,. 
inhabitants of the country from the oppressive rule of, the Turks, 
and to assist_them -to work out 
their destiny on more auspicious ý.. 
lines. Incidentally we invited them to come forward and take 
part in the administration. - 
}(ii) in-the announcement'of policy made 
by His Majesty's Government in 
'the telegram of 29th March 1917, 
from the Secretary of State for 
India' to the Viceroy, it was stated that, whereas it was contemplated 
that the=Basrah Vilayet (as then defined) should "remain, permanently 
under, British administration" and annexation was definitely,. indicated, 
the, Baghdad Vilayet, on the other hand, was to be formed into an 
Arab State or Province under British, protection, in everything 
but, name. * 
2,, During the year that has since elapsed the general. situation has 
undergone considerable 
development, an important feature of which has been. the,. 
entry, of-America 
into the war,, and in the latter connection certain fundamental 
principles have-been enunciated 
for which America in. particular and the other 
Allies in general are considered to be, fighting. Of'these principles the one 
, which 
particularly concerns us at the moment requires, that =the peoples of the 
. countries 
interested or affected should be allowed to determine"theirovn form 
of, Government-1 
Recently the Prime Minister has publicly stated that the 
1ý 8.0.371/3387 
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destinies of Palestine, Mesopotamia, &c will be decided at the Peace Conference. 
J gather'Ahat'it is, now proposed to deliberate as to what, particular 
steps- or 'line °ofýaction'are advisable'in order to square our working policy 
withtthe above°principle'and 'announcements, in case we should have to adhere- 
to them'in spite, of the fact that Germany has, not, respected them in dealing 
with-conquered territoryýin Russia. . ý- . 
,ý4. 
I assume that, if at the end of the war we find ourselves, 'in a 
sufficiently-strong, position, and in effective administrative control,, we 
should still hope to annex the Basrah Vilayet and exercise-a veiled-protectorate 
over, the Baghdad, Vilayet; but 
it is recognised that the question-of annexation 
has`become exceedingly difficult vis-a-vis the President -of the United: States, 
w ho`will presumably'exercise the most potent-influence at the Peace Conference. 
Our original proposals must consequently 
be regarded as a counsel of, perfection, 
and we must -be -prepared to accept something less. At any-rate, however; we 
have: the- strongest grounds, in view ofýour assurances to the inhabitants and 
the millions 'of . money-we 
have sunk-in making the Port, 'for standing out for 
the annexation of'Basrah and 
from thence to the sea, with a-small block of 
territory necessary, to round off the enclave. As regards the rest of the 
occupied territories, 
'the -essential aim must be to effect the complete elim- 
ination of Turkish suzerainty, and it is assumed that we-shall leave no stone 
unturned to achieve that end, only 
tolerating its retention in the last resort. 
5. In any case we must set our faces against the admissionaof the 
slightest-Turkish element or participation 
in the administration. In this 
connection, I should mention 
that when I was in CairoýIt was suggested that, 
as°events were shaping, 
'we might be obliged to decide to come to some compromise 
with`Turkey"at any moment; 
I also'learnt there of Sherif Faisai"s secret over- 
tures!! to the Turks; ' and'when asked my opinion I expressed the view that if, in 
the'last resort we were compelled to come to some compromise with Turkey I did 
not consider thatýthe 
retention of nominal Turkish suzerainty need be'considered 
altogether incompatible with 
the realisation of our practical aims, "always° 
provided thatthe country 
were safeguarded against the least control or inter- 
- 453 - 
ference by Turkey in the administration. As cases in point we have-the 
-precedent of Egypt and the more pertinent one of 
Koweit. The fact is that 
the bulk of the people of the country are not concerned with, abstract theories 
or niceties of international principle; 
for example, as long as the Shaikh of 
Koweit feels assured that-his interests are under our practical: protection, and 
are safe in our hands, he does not trouble 
his head as to whether in-the distance 
Turkish suzerainty exists or not. I think the position would be the same in 
the case of the inhabitants of Iraq, where nine-tenths of them, are altogether 
inarticulate, and all they are concerned with is the manner of their, treatment 
by the Government actually in control of Baghdad. As regards the remaining 
. 
tenth, who are capable of understanding the real 
issues, they would, -of course, 
not be-comp letely reassured 
(supposing that the fiction of Turkish-suzerainty 
were being maintained) unless 
they were absolutely safeguarded against-the 
participation of. Turkey 
in the administration. I assume, - therefore, that we 
are on common ground 
in considering that if the Turks were - to be - allowed to' 
retain the suzerainty of 
Mesopotamia (minus Basrah) they must, at any rate, be 
completely eliminated 
from the administration, and that it must be our-mission 
to ensure . that 
Iraq obtains the administration which the country needs and 
which her future 
demands. There must be no Turkish Commissioner and no; Turkish 
flag. -. A special 
flag must be devised. iý r. 
8 
6. -Alluding 
for a moment to the question of relative status,, as- 
between the Basrah and Baghdad 
Vilayets respectively, it is my very definite 
opinion that a 
homogeneous administration in all practical aspects, is not in 
any way incompatible with a 
technical difference of political status, and that 
it. is essential in the 
interests of the country that the administration of both 
Vilayets should be uniform, that of 
the Basrah Vilayet being brought into line 
with, Baghdad 
in due course. r ,. 
7. In considering - the precise form -of - the administration there are 
several. alternatives 
to be, weighed in the balance, and attached to-each alter- 
native; -are, subsidiary 
difficulties with need consideration. For the-moment 
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we will- consider the Baghdad Vilayet only, on the, hypothesis that Basrah .- 
Vilayet can be made to conform to it at a convenient 'juncture. 
-: :. 8. The question of the "Arab 
facade" offers no insurmountable 
difficulties: to my mind. ' The essential problem is the determination of 
statusýto be assigned to the province of Iraq. It is agreed that'the admin- 
istration should be under British guidance, and, the more complete the British, 
control can be, the better for the country. In fact, unless it is assured 
the country has no future, -for itxwould'be impossible to get money for its 
development unless investors are satisfied . 
that their interests are fully 
safeguarded, a condition which cannot be assured except under protective 
British supervision. ' How is that supervision to be achieved? The most satis- 
factory solution would seemýto be government by a High Commissioner assisted by 
a Council., formed partly of the Heads of the most important Departments of State, 
and partly of representative non-official members from among the inhabitants. 
But the foreign relations of such a government must obviously lie in British 
hands, and it would thus be practically a British protectorate. 
9. If such an arrangement, could be achieved and recognised by the 
Powers, well and good;, but if not, then 'the 
existence of a titular native 
ruler would become a necessity. I do not think 
it would be impossible to 
find one, -but the difficulty is that 
if the administration were given such 
a form it might be difficult 
for it to avoid being hampered by capitulations, 
and the right to-consular representation 
by Foreign Powers; the former con- 
tingency.. being one which we should obviously do our utmost to escape. 
,; ý 10. If it is decided=that we . should have a nominal headpiece to 
the administration to conduct his own-foreign affairs under British guidance, 
I: think' as I have, said above, that, 
it would be possible to find a local 
candidate, and I cannot see 
the. least Justification or necessity for intro- 
ducing`one of the 
family of the. Sherif of Mecca to play this r31e. I have 
always ventured 
to deplore the-fact that the discussion of the future of Iraq 
with the Sherif, as one 
of the pawns in the negotiations with him, was ever 
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permitted. I have also expressed my views plainly on the political and practical 
objections to recognising-him as King of-Arabia and Sovereign of a group of 
Confederate States. In my opinion a more reasonable solution would be that 
hexshöuld remain King of Hejaz, ani, if desired, have his own representative 
w it hý'F oreign Powers, while"the foreign relations of the Iraq State, and of 
the, other`confederate Arab Potentates or States, 'should lie in our hands. For 
the Arab Ruler of the Iraq'State'a title might be devised conveying something 
less than King, e. g. Sultan or'Hakim (Ruler), and all the Confederate Rulers 
would', undoubtedly pay appropriate deference to 
King Hussein as Sherif of the 
Holy Plaes'in the Hejaz. If 
considered essential in view of their commitments 
to the Sherif9 His Majesty's Government might even 
'decide to guarantee the' payment 
to, him of'an annual subsidy in some 
form from the revenues of Iraq, as recog- 
nition of his services 
to the cause of Arab independence during the war; " or, 
as. a religious contribution 
towards the upkeep of the Holy Places. 
..: "= OBSERVATIONS 
ON THE MORE DETAILED ISSUES 
11. Can any Arab authority, dynastic'' or representative, be discovered 
that 'wi114command the necessary moral sanction 
in the country as a whole? What 
weight `does King 
Hussein or his family carry with the' local Arabs? 
In my opinion we -have the Naqib of Baghdad and his family a dynastic 
element which would carry 
the necessary moral sanction, in the Baghdad Vilayet 
undoubtedly, and, 
in my opinion, in 'Iraq as'a whole. I believe they could be 
br6ught'to identify themselves with British 
interests. The present'Nagibhim- 
self possesses a very great prestige and influence not only in Mesopotamia but 
among`the-Mohammedan s 
of India, 'an3 I feel sure his selection as Head of the 
State would be regarded as 
an appropriate'solution# and be received with favour 
throughout India as well as 
Mesopotamia. The Naqib considers himself superior, 
in- purity of descent and nobility, 
' to the Sherif, and no less important, and the 
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introduction of a relative to the Sherif of Mecca as Head of the State of 
Iraq would, in my opinion, be greatly misunderstood and resented by the Naqib 
and his family, and thus tend to alienate our most potent element of influence 
over the Arabs of Iraq. King Hussein and his 
family carry no weight in Iraq, 
where only the most distant interest 
is taken in him. In the early days of 
the Sherif*s entry into the lists, when the question of giving him military 
help was being discussed, the General Officer Commanding, Mesopotamia, was 
asked by the War Office whether the 
failure or collapse of the Sherif would 
prejudice our military or political 
interests in Mesopotamia. We replied 
after deliberate consideration that the 
inhabitants had not been at all moved 
by his successes, and would, in our opinion, regard his failure with complete 
indifference. 
12. What materials exist for setting up a Local Administration or 
Administrations of a suitable character? 
There is adequate Arab or local material available or in the making 
for the subordinate services of the administration. The difficulty we are 
confronted with at present, and must 
be for some time to come, is to find 
individuals suitable for higher posts in the administration, e. g. Mutessarifs, 
Qaimagams, such as would be filled in the Indian administration by gazetted 
officers - Deputy 
Commissioners, Assistant Commissioners. The reason is that 
under the Turkish regime almost all 
these posts were filled by pure Turks; 
these have been eliminated, and 
there is at present no one to fill their place. 
Wherever we have tried ex-officers of 
the late Administration they have almost 
invariably proved unsatisfactory; 
they are in fact saturated with the evil 
traditions of the regime 
in which they have been brought up and trained. Until 
we can create 
this element, enlisting as far as we are able the assistance of 
the Egyptian and 
Soudan Administrations, we must rely mainly on young British 
officers. 
I may mention here that whereas r have done my utmost to employ 
experimentally any 
inhabitants of the country at all likely to be suitable, 
this laudable endeavour 
finds no favour with the local inhabitants concerned. 
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I"am continually appealed to by them not to place the conduct of their affairs 
in the hands"of ex-officials of the late regime, even though they be Arabs, of 
the country, on ý the, ground that they have all been born and bred in a vicious 
school of corruption, and cannot rise above the evil traditions, of the past. 
The-population, from the'cultivator to the well-to-do merchant orslandowner, 
infinitely, prefers tobe handled by a British officer, who"of'course employs 
Arab subordinates. 
13. ' 'Iýfully realise the importance of finding or, creating a type 
suitable for`-employment in the superior posts, ' but the fact is%that it doesty 
not, at present, exist. - In the more subordinate posts our personnel is almost 
entirely, indigenous ., ". Where other elements, Indian or! English,. are employed 
it is almost entirely in-the. purely clerical or -technicalbranches of the-Head- 
quarter Administration, ''e. g., clerical and cypher branches, English branch of 
Government Press, '&c. The following is a rough analysis of"employees in'the 
Baghdad Vilayet: - ý'-,.. .°t, 1-1 .. -, 
Arab, Armenian, Christian, Jew, ex-employees of the late 
Government taken over by us 210 
Newly sanctioned by us: - , 
Mohammedans of Iraq 17 
Domiciled Persians of Iraq . 16 
Jews of Iraq 60 
Christians, Syrians, Chaldeans 132 
Egyptians 3 
Indian Christians 19 
British-born Europeans 35 
(Government offices, Government'Press, &c. ) 
14. The highest type of official corresponding to those who function 
as Heads of Departments and 
Ministers of State does not exist in Mesopotamia; 
they will have, to. be imported. 
15. To What extent, is the Administration based on, Indian models- 
and to at extent'is 
British supervision indispensable? . - 
:4 
Except in that the "Iraq. Occupied Territories" Code of Law applied 
in Basrah'is based'on English and Indian Law (just as the Soudan Code is) the 
administration. 
is"not in any way based on Indian models. 'We have taken over 
the structure'of the Turkish administrative system-as we found it, substituting 
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British officers for Mutessarifs, Qaimaqams, &c., but for the present designating 
them Political Officers and Assistant Political Officers, while, in the posts 
which, under the Turks, would have been filled by an-official, of the status 
of Mudir, we have been able to employ natives of, the country, subject to the 
exception that wherever British garrisons or, troops are located it is, essential, 
owing. to the difficulty of the language question, and-the fact that the local 
product cannot be left to deal with our troops, to use British officers,, and 
we thus require more of them now than will 
be necessary. in the permanent. admin- 
istration after the troops have left. -. But apart from that, as I have explained 
above, until we can produce the necessary type of superior Arab official more 
extensive and close supervision 
by British officers will continue to be necessary. 
16. In my opinion, with the unavoidable exception=of the military 
_ , 
rfgime of the Military 
Governors in the large towns, the. adminiatration as 
carried on in Basrah and 
Baghdad Vilayets is that to which the people, both <-,. 
urban and rural, have 
been accustomed, except that the, element ofrcorruption 
is greatly reduced. 
11 a 
17. The branches of the administration in which we are necessarily 
most backward, and 
in regard to which our hands are in a- great measure tied 
during the military occupation by military considerations and exigencies, are ., 
the Civil Judicial and Civil Medical. 
18. 
. 
As regards the former, Mr. Bonham Carter, the Judicial Officer, 
who was lately appointed 
from Egypt, has. only been with me a short time,. but ;,, 
is, now getting into the saddle. 
I have submitted to the India office a copy 
of proposals 
for a temporary judicial system for the Baghdad Vilayet formulated 
by him in consultation with me. It seems tome just what is required., Mean- 
while, such local 
law and justice as has been essential has been, administered 
by. my district political 
Officers with simple civil and criminal powers granted 
them by the General Officer 
Commanding-in-Chief on my recommendation., As a 
matter of 
fact, outside the large towns we have been little troubled with civil 
and commercial suits, 
incapable of adjustment by compromise through the good 
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offices-of the local Political Officer. 
; ýg 
19. As regards the Civil Medical branch. - We are almost ready for 
the separation of the Civil Medical work from that of the Army Medical, and 
just before I left I raised the question with the Director of Medical Services 
as,, to whether the time had not now come for creating a Civil Medical Depart- 
ment with a separate--personnel, though still to be under-his general-super- 
vision. It is under-lively consideration. A similar separation has recently 
been effected in -the -Department of Civil Posts, but 'in these matters we are, 
so dependent on the military organisations 
that we have, to"defer, to their views 
to a great extent as to when developments are! 
feasible. },. 
20. 
_ 
The extent, and the period, for which British and Indian Troops 
will be required after the War 
is-a difficult question for me to answer with- 
out discussion with-the military authorities,. and 
depends so much on the position 
in which we are. -left 
at the end of the war. In peace times the Turks employed 
about . 
20., 000 regulars of all arms, and 3,000 gendarmerie for, the maintenance of 
security and order intthe 
Baghdad and Basrah Vilayets. I should say that, for 
a peace establishment 
for internal security only, we should require for some 
time after the. war to keep a division 
in Mesopotamia with one British regiment 
to a Brigade as at, present constituted, and about the same number of gendarmerie, 
exclusive of 1,000 civil police 
for the towns. In the course of-time we should 
hope _to replace 
the Indian troops by Arabs, organised on the lines of the 
Egyptian Army,, buttit must necessarily take some years. I am not of -the opinion 
that, any Indian, police will 
be required, except small leavens-to begin with 
to.. form a nucleus 
for the training of the, indigenous product. I hope -that - 
Ln_, 
"this 
field we shall be able to give. employment to the Arab ex-Officer of 
the Turkish Army, otherwise 
this class will be a difficult and malcontent 
element to deal with. 
.... S- :. 
21. The directions in which we can most usefully direct our energies 
with a view 
to Popularising our Administration are Irrigation, Education, and 
ýY, µt w ',. 
} E "ý 1 
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Civil Medical. In all these departments we are alive to the importance of 
speedy progress and are doing our utmost compatible with existing conditions 
and with'the°material at our disposal. 
22. "The elements that we most need to encourage are: 'Firstly, the 
Jewish community in Baghdad. In this connection I recommend that Dr. Weizman 
be induced, if possible, to pay a visit or send a reliable representative to 
Baghdad to influence the Jewish community in favour of the British connection. 
Secondly, the Arab notables and nobility among the townspeople of Baghdad and 
Basrah. They are a somewhat impecunious and backward element, but one which 
it`is very necessary to encourage and take into our counsels as far as possible. 
Thirdly, the wealthy landlord element, both Arab and Jew, and the important 
Shaikhs of the settled tribes. If it becomes a question of obtaining public 
expression of 
feeling in favour of British control it can be done; but I 
think the subject would have to be handled cautiously. The intelligent 
inhabitants of Iraq at the back of their minds are possessed by the appre- 
hension that Mesopotamia may conceivably be restored to the Turks at the Peace 
Conference, and as long as this nightmare 
is present with them we should merely 
emphasize it by asking 
them which Government they would prefer. By doing so 
we should be clearly putting 
them in a very unfair position because they know 
well that if they elect 
for British control and if nevertheless the Turks were 
ultimately to return, all 
those who had declared for us would receive short 
shrift. It will 
be understood that the rural population of Iraq as a whole 
is quite inarticulate and can 
hardly be consulted. As regards the elements 
who do count, e- g- 
the Jews and other denominational communities in the large 
towns, they could without 
doubt be squared in some form to give expression to 
the sentiments that we 
desire. But we must consider and decide what is to 
be regarded as constituting 
the representative public opinion which we have 
to consult. 
23. Steps to be taken to consolidate Commercial Influence In 
Mes= amia. 
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II 
The great initial difficulty here is the absence of commercial 
transport and general scarcity of tonnage-and accommodation, and last, but 
not least, the uncertainty of the future. It is difficult to encourage 
private enterprise when accommodation for agencies is not available. Sites 
and land cannot`be sold, and machinery cannot be imported. 
j We ire most anxious to encourage trade generally, but to announce 
that trade to Baghdad is open is tö suggest that commercial tonnage both by 
sea=and by'river is available and not liable to be requisitioned. Another 
difficülty'is that, owing to' the' importance of preventing supplies reaching 
the enemy from the markets of Iraq, we have'not only to maintain an external 
blockade cordon, but have also to limit exports inland from Basrah to the 
minimum requirements,, of the towns and communities 
inside occupied territory. 
rH 
This in itself interferes greatly with the natural flow of trade, yet we can 
only relax our safeguards with great caution. As a matter of fact, there 
has quite recently been some easing of the blockade. 
P. Z. Cox, Major-General 
Civil Commissioner, Baghdad. 
LONDON 
22nd April 1918 
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c ..: APPENDIX'VI I1 A5"ý, 
THE" WAR -MONGERS 
"Sack. The -Lot! " 
by Lovat Fraser 
The position in this country today is absolutely without precedent. 
We have on the one hand a Government who still live in a war atmosphere and 
spend vast sums on war-like purposes while simultaneously imposing heavy fresh 
taxation for what they are pleased to call "reconstruction". On the other 
hand we have a nation groaning under the weight of the burdens imposed upon 
it,, but apparently unable to check the Government*s mad. prodigality with the 
national finances. 
I,, suggest that to some extent. the business community have themselves 
to thank for the plight in which they are placed. I am aware that various 
important business associations have made representations to the Government, 
p 
f. 
inr, 
most of which have been 
flouted. But taken in bulk the business men lack 
cohesion. 
They are. angered and alarmed. . They see the dangers which lie ahead. 
But they are-either dazed by_, the bamboozling speeches, of Ministers or they 
cannotforganise the, collective, energy . 
required, to, make their influence4elt. 
When I, inquired the other, day about opinion in. the City, the. answer I received 
was: : "Anxious 
but . apathetic.. 
Men are . 
immersed in their own affairs, and seem 
unable, to conceive an effective 
remedy. They are constantly hoping that con- 
ditions will improve". If 
the City of London is really apathetic, then Heaven 
help the country; because unless something is done to bridle the Government 
we shall be carried over 
the precipice. 
There are two directionsin which public expenditure can and must 
be, curtailed. -G, one-is the 
immense expansion of our bureaucratic system of, 
administration. ' 
The other is the enormous liabilities we are, incurring 
through the Governments 
insane policy in the Middle Bast. I turn once more 
1, Dail Mails July 
12,1920 
I 
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to the question of Mesopotamia because -I am 
firmly convinced that, if, we stop 
pouring money into that fatal land we shall have plugged up the hole which 
causes the biggest single drain upon our attenuated resources. ný I 
Business men are being misled about Mesopotamia. They hear stories 
. of-the fallow cornlands, of 
the potential supplies of cotton, of the oilfields 
which are reputed to 
be inexhaustible. They do not realise that the labour 
problem in Mesopotamia 
is incapable of solution on the scale required for large 
results. They da not perceive 
that many years must pass before any substantial 
yield can be expected, and 
that meanwhile Mesopotamia must be ringed round with 
defences at an incalculable price. They do not know that every bale of cotton 
will have cost this country 
its weight in gold and that the oil will be'as 
expensive as champagne of 
the! Chamberlain brand. - 
Nobody seems to have noticed Sir Donald Maclean's point that in the 
two years from April 1,1919, 
Mesopotamia will have cost this country little 
short of £60,000,000. 
He was quoting the Government figures, which are mis- 
If he had said £100,000,000 he would have been nearer the mark. 
.4, 
***** 
There is nothing in all our history to compare with our folly in 
Mesopotamia. Mr.. Lloyd George put 
the population at 2,000,000. Lord Curzon 
said the official 
figure was; 2,850,000.1 have learned to mistrust all official 
figures from Mesopotamia, but am willing to put the population, men, women and 
children, at'. 3,000,000. 
What sort of administration have we foisted upon these unfortunate 
and impecunious people? 
That ingeneous bull of Bashan, Commander Kenworthy, 
asked Mr. Montagu 
the other day how many members of the Indian Civil Service 
were employed 
in Mesopotamia, and was told six. The answer was no doubt 
strictly accurate, 
for the Indian Civil Service is a corps d'elite, and barely 
numbers 1,000 all 
told; but the impression left was entirely misleading. " 
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There are at present employed in Mesopotamia in civil tasks 454 
British officials, "almost all of them military and almost all of them 
British". The figures are Lord Curzon"s and the comment is Lord Islington's. 
Their salaries range from £540 to £3,360 annually. There are sixty civil 
officers in Mesopotamia today receiving salaries of £1,200 and upwards, pre- 
sumably exclusive of the "allowances" which bulk so largely in Eastern pay- 
rolls. Such a record leaves even Sir Eric Geddes standing at the starting- 
post. No wonder so many officers write 
letters to the newspapers trying to 
prove that Mesopotamia 
is indeed a blessed word. These statistics, be it 
noted, do not include the 
host of clerks and other native subordinates. 
These salaries are paid by the Arabs we promised to "emancipate", 
and we are asked to believe that they clamour 
for more "benefits" at their 
own expense. If they do they are utterly unlike any Arabs I have ever met 
or heard of, for the true 
Arab is impatient of any form of settled govern- 
ment. I am inclined to suspect 
that these wonderful Arab requests for more 
"administration" emanate from people who are growing rich out of the tens of 
millions spent upon 
the troops. 
The "Budget" of Mesopotamia for 1919-20 showed a revenue of £5950090009 
equivalent to nearly 
£2 per head of the-22pulation. In an Oriental country 
such taxation is almost unheard of. 
In Great Britain, which was once so rich, 
our whole pre-war 
taxation was only £3 10s. lOd. per head. The Turks nominally 
collected from all sources of 
revenue in Mesopotamia In 1905 a sum of close 
upon £3,000,000, out of which 
they paid for their garrison. Some new taxes 
were then imposed, which 
brought the nominal revenue in 1907 to £3,732,000. 
These figures do not 
include the gross revenue for the vilayet of Mosul, which 
amounted in 
1907 to £200,000; but in all cases only a portion of these sums 
was collected. 
The Turks chastised the people with whips; it has been reserved to 
y 
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us-, to provide the scorpions. The Mesopotamian "Budget" for the present year 
shows an estimated surplus of £1,000,000. " Why are we extorting a million 
more than is required. 
* *- -*°* "* 
The total export trade of Mesopotamia before the war averaged, 
roughly, about £1,500,000, and the import trade stood at about the same figure. 
The exports'of Mosul, which are *separately returned, amounted to £230,000, and 
Mosul*s imports of European products to £160,000. These statistics relate 
to. a few years before the war, but if you doyble them, where is the profit when 
the, British 'taxpayer is spending anything up to £50,000,000 a year in providing 
troops-for the country. -We are keeping 80,000 troops in Mesopotamia, andhave 
jüst'sent more to"Persia. Our active Air Force in Mesopotamia consists of 90 
officers and 620 other ranks, one officer 
to each seven men! 
Lord Milner quotes the case of Egypt, and says-that thirty-years" 
ago, everybody' thought` the country was going 
to be "a bürden and a failure": + 
note Egypt a`burden today? 
The British taxpayer is called'upon to find 
this year £7; 543 000 for 'troops 
in_Egypt, in addition to £6,430,000 for` 
Palestine and these figures are based on the vague assumption that the garrison 
will be reduced 
by one half. Yet Lord Milner declares that "today Egypt is 
one of the most prosperous countries 
in the world". If that be true, why is 
this impoverished' land called upon to pay over 
£7,000,000 fo: so prosperous a 
country? 
And is not our administration of Egypt a confessed failure? Lord 
Milner spent half the winter there 
trying to put things right. And what was 
one of the main causes of 
all the trouble? Precisely the same as in Mesopo- 
tamia - the multiplication of 
British officials at high salaries, instead of 
alto in¢ the people 
to develop indigenous forms of rule. 
There is one answer to all the nonsense talked about Mesopotamia by 
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our war-mongering. Ministers, and it was given by Lord Crewe, who said bluntly, 
"We simply cannot afford it". Lord Milner said that "our great war in Europe 
has ended for a year and a half, but war in the East has not ended yet". it 
will never end while we are governed by a War Ministry which thinks in -terms 
of war, spends on the war scale,. is utterly heedless of finance, and imagines 
shadow Empires in desolate and, empty lands. 
Lord Curzon says there is little hope of raising an Arab force in 
yýfr 
Mesopotamia. He "regretfully informed their lordships" that they had hardly 
found a single Arab capable of holding Government office or any importance; 
to which I may add that "they" never will find one while there are 454 gazetted 
British officers in Mesopotamian civil employ. He was emphatic in his deter- 
urination to keep a substantial 
British force in North-fest Persia. 
The conclusion is that we have got to keep on pouring vast sums into 
these-Eastern lands for evermore. Why do not our business men concentrate- 
upon this issue, instead of 
bleating about the Excess Profits Duty and being 
hectored in reply by Mr. Chamberlain? Lord Milner says the war is not-yet 
ended. ' Very well. - 
The only way to_end it is to adopt the late Lord Fisher's 
remedy. ("Sack'the 
Lot! ") We should end'it then soon enough. 
s 
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APPENDIX VI II1 
NOTE BY"MISS GERTRUDE BELL 
1. We must bear in mind that the movement in this country is one aspect 
of a very strong nationalist sentiment which existed in embryo before the war 
and has gained immensely in strength and definition from the very principles 
in defense of which we fought. For we declared, and as I believe with truth, 
that we fought for national existence, not our own merely but that of weaker 
peoples who were unable 
to defend themselves. It is therefore vain to 
attribute what we see here to any special pronouncement on the part of the 
Allies, still more to the machination of any individual or group of individuals. 
We are in presence of a sentiment 
the roots of which go further and deeper 
and touch so to speak 
the roots of our own action in the greatest trial which 
we as a nation 
have known. If I am right in this view it would be obviously 
absurd to attempt to check 
developments in Mesopotamia by proceeding against 
any particular, leader or 
leaders. Even if we could take measures which 
would temporarily 
induce silence, we could not crush a universal sentiment 
and fresh exponents would arise. 
2. Nor have we in reality any desire to crush it. The British nation 
does not wish to be charged 
indefinitely with the responsibility and expense 
of holding and administering a reluctant 
Mesopotamia. We are perfectly 
genuine when we say that our role is, in our view, confined to that of guardian 
responsible for the peaceful 
development of the country till it can walk alone. 
3e It is clear that we cannot play this part unless we make ourselves 
acceptable. 
We have witnessed the failure of the French in Syria where they 
were not acceptable. 
My belief is that the Syrian question will find solution 
only when the 
French throw their hand in, which they are bound to do sooner 
or later for the reason 
that, even more than ourselves they have neither men 
nor money to 
deal with the opposite alternative. I believe very firmly that 
private Letters and Papers of Gertrude Bell, University of Newcastle 
upon Tyne. 
Note dated July 1920. 
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we-can `make ourselves acceptable. Our political ideals in the East are 
fundamentally different 'from those ofýthe French and our methods are 
different 'from any which the French have exhibited in Syria,, at any rate. 
I'n "spite 'of=-the ong`de'lay in fulfilling our promises which has somewhat 
exasperated public opinion, there is at bottom a belief among the Arabs 
that we'do not mean to play them false, and there is also a great deal of 
trust and friendship between individual Arabs and Englishmen. 
4; " But''if, as I anticipate! 
'fthe French give up the Syrian adventure, 
we shall need all the natural assets we possess to induce 
'Mesopotamia to 
accept`ythetrol and guidance 'of, which she stands in need. 'We can, I con 
think, by means of patient 
and sober (and also sympathetic) demonstration, 
convince ourpeople that 
whether or not Syria can stand alone at once, then 
case of Mesopotamia is different. In' Syria, for example the wild tribe 
lie 'on the borders, while 
'the" interior of the country is mostly settled, here 
we`have nomadic 'and semi-nomadic peoples almost every where in our midst. 
Orderly' Gový'rnmeflt was far better'undersAtood in 
Turkish" times in Syria than 
inMesopotamia; here they have much to learn. 
5'. "_` ''` Ido 
nöt think that during the last 8 months speak of the period 
inwh ich I'have'been'present 
since my return from England we have made the 
most of our 
advantage. 
(a) We have done little or nothing to show that we intended to fulfil 
the"promises'made at'home. 
Municipal Councils without responsibility, 
Divisional'"councils equally without responsibility 
were not sufficient and 
have''as a matter' of 
fact made no impression on the public. This is what 
theyireally 
mean"when they complain of 'the continuance of Military admin - 
istration. : 
'They are not thinking of the autocratic authority of the soldiers 
but of that of the politicals. 
We have made no attempt to understand the Syrian position; we have 
not tried 
to enter into direct relations with Faisal or the Damascus Govern- 
ment; we have 
lumped together all the wild propaganda on the Euphrates as 
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Sharif ian, without. discriminating between what was done by order or against 
the! orders of Damascus and-we have not encouraged the desire of Mesopotamian 
officers of intelligence and capacity to return to this country though they 
have repeatedly expressed their desire to do so. We feared that when they 
getIback we should have no job to offer-them. Nor should weg under the 
system which we have been pursuing, - but the fault-lay with the system. If 
we had brought them back and 
found employment for them, their presence here 
would have been a final and conclusive answer to the Dair propaganda. 
6. We have now to tide over a period of 4 months before our promises 
are put into execution. 
It will not be easy. So far as possible we should 
be busy with making preparations, always in consultation with the people them- 
selves. Such matters as 
the electoral basis, I suggest might be discussed. 
I trust that some of the Mesopotamians in Syria will be invited to return . 
such iss I understand, the 
intention. But when they come they must be set 
to work, their hands must not 
be left idle. Ja'far Pasha might begin to 
work out wider developments of 
the Levies for instance, i. e. the scheme of an 
Arab Army. Above all they must be treated sympathetically and placed on the 
footing of friends and equals and this applies as much to our local leaders. 
Every thing now depends on the spirit 
in which they are handled. 
7. That being so, I suggest that 
if we could enlist the services of 
some of the British officers who were working 
in Syria it would be very helpful. 
I saw a remarkable spirit of 
friendship and co-operation between them and the 
Arab leaders. This is the atmosphere we want. We already have Captain 
Clayton, Captain Wadman and above all Colonel Brayne who has now returned 
to India, are the men whose names occur to me 
in addition. 
$. our sole object, I take 
it, is to pass through this difficult period 
successfully without open 
dessensions, which leave lasting sores. I am 
convinced that 
it can be done. None, or very few of the men who are now out 
against us are villains. 
Saiyid Mhd. Sadr is an intelligent and at bottom 
I 
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a sensible man. Yusuf Suwaidi has repeatedly assured me that Mesopotamia 
needs foreign guidance. Their present attitude is due to exasperation and 
it is my belief that they are already beginning to see that they have been 
very foolish. If they want to go to England, by all means let them. It 
will give us the necessary. _breathing space. But we must use it, I repeat 
to regain the confidence which to some extent we have lost. 
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APPENDIXIX 
NAMES OF IRAQI TOWNS THAT EMERGED IN THE 
SECOND HALF OF THE 19th CENTURY 
" ýr 
al tAmärah 
'A li al Gharbi 
Qa1*at Säaih 
al Mahmoudiyah 
al Kut 
al Hindiyah 
al Ramädi 
al Näsiriyah 
al Suwaiyrah 
1861 
1864 
1868 
18 68 
1869 
1870 
1870 
1870 
1872 
Qal'at Sukar 
al Shalrah 
Abu Sukhair 
al Rifä'i 
al Shämiyah 
1873 
1873 
1875 
1893 
1879 
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APPENDIX X 
No. 34436 -; 
OFFICE OF THE CIVIL COMMISSIONER 
75719 
BAGHDAD. THE 15th NOVEMBER 1919. 
From: - - 
Bt. Lieut. Colonel. A. T. Wilson, C. S. I. C. M. G. C. I. B. D. S. O. 
,.., 
Acting Civil Commissioner in Mesopotamia. 
Baghdad. 
: -.. To 
,., The 
Secretary, of State for India, 
India Office. Whitehall. London. S. W. l. 
Sir, 
have the honour to enclose herewith an interesting and valuable 
note by miss G. L. Bell. 
C. B. E. entitled "Syria in 1919". 
A'few comments thereon in so far as it directly affects these 
territories are perhaps called 
for from me. 
2. Fx The fundamental assumption throughout this note and, I should 
add, throughout recent official correspondence which has reached me from 
London, is that an Arab State 
in Mesopotamia and elsewhere within a short 
period of years 
is a possibility, and that the recognition or creation of 
a, logical scheme of Government on 
these lines, in supercession of those on 
which we are na. working 
in Mesopotamia would be practicable and popular, 
in other words, the assumption 
is that the Ahglo-French Declaration of 
November 8th 1918 represents a practical 
line of policy to pursue In the 
near 
future. 
3 My observations in this country and elsewhere have forced me to 
the conviction that 
this assumption is erroneous, and though I am aware that 
1.. F. 0.882J24 
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in holding this view I differ from authorities and observers both at home 
and abroad who possess a breadth of vision and a wealth of experience to 
which I can lay no claim., I venture, probably for the last time., in my 
present capacity, to lay before H. M. ls Government the considerations which 
have led me to this conclusion. 
4.1 believe it to be impossible in these days to create a new 
sovereign Mohammedan State by diplomatic or Administrative means out of 
the remnants of the Turkish Empire. 
5. On local grounds because r believe the sentiments of the majority 
of Mohammedans in this country to be hostile to any practical interpretations 
of such a conception that we can devise. The warlike Kurds in Mesopotamia 
who number nearly half a million will never accept an Arab ruler and they 
are potentially a powerful disruptive force. The Shiahs of Mesopotamia, 
who number about 1 3/4 millions, will accept no form of Arab Government based 
upon Sunni domination, & no form of Arab Government has yet been envisaged, 
except the Divisional and Provincial councils provisionally approved and now 
in process of formation, which would not involve a practical mobopoly of 
per by Sunnis. As 
far as I know the Young Baghdadi party in Syria does 
not include amongst its members a single Shiah. 
The Shiah Community would be reluctant to see the Turks return 
but a Turkish Administration would have less difficulty in asserting itself 
in the provinces than an Arab Government: the tradition of the past 200 years 
and the prestige of the Sultanate and Caliphate are still strong. 
6. If an Arab Government were constituted by degree of the League of 
Nations or by other extraneous authority, and maintained for a period by 
our arms and our money, 
it is my belief that the Arab public at large would 
; after a very few years actively 
favour the return of the Turks to the 
continuance of an amateur 
Arab Government. The Jewish and Christian 
Communities who number about 200,000 but have an influence disproportionate 
to their numbers would probably adopt a similar attitude: such a demand 
-. 474 - 
would be most difficult to combat and might spread to practically the whole 
of the former Turkish Empire. It is not improbable that the British 
commercial communities in Mesopotamia would lend such a movement their 
support,, in their own immediate interests. 
7. ' Three quarters of the population of this country are tribes 
people with no previous tradition of obedience to any Government except 
that of Constantinople and with an almost 
instinctive hostility to Arab 
**Effendis" in positions of authority: this hostility has been repeatedly 
demonstrated during the past 2 years in Mesopotamia. 
I therefore regard the creation of an Arab Government on the lines 
advocated by Yasin Pasha and Naji Bey as inconsistent with effective British 
A-lministration or indeed with effective control of any sort. For some 
years to come the appointment of 
Arab Governors or high officials except of 
an advisory capacity would 
involve the rapid decay of authority, law and 
order, followed 
by anarchy, and disorder, and the movement once started 
would not be checked: 
fanaticism not nationalism would become the ruling 
motive. Our 
financial stability depends on our ability to collect taxes, 
and if revenue paying 
districts do not accept the Government that we set up 
we shall at once 
be bankrupt. We must therefore go slowly. Effective 
British Administration is vital to the continued existence of Mesopotamia 
as an independent state or administrative entity. 
8. The disruptive forces at work all over the world are not less active 
in the Middle East than elsewhere: 
if we raise numbers of the Sharifian 
family to prominence in the Arab countries we shall have before long to support 
them by force of arms against a 
formidable group of dissentients, in Saud, 
Bin Rashid, The Imam, The Idrisi, and other 
Arabian potentates will never 
recognise their supremacy 
and within a few years will be in active oppositions 
nor can the Sharifian 
family reckon on popular or democratic support. 
To sum up, I believe that any form of Administration that we adopt 
based upon the conception of an 
Arab state is bound within a few years to 
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result, in the retrocession of a considerable part, if not the whole of 
Mesopotamia, to the one Islamic Power which still commands general respect 
viz; Turkeys, unlesa: we are prepared to utilize our armed forces to support 
an ineffective and unpopular indigenous, administration against its internal 
t 
and- external enemies. 
10.? a The probable 'effect of 
the: creation of, an Arab State on Persia also 
merits consideration. - The 
fresh responsibilities which we have recently 
assumed in Persia depend`in my view 
for their successful initiation and 
execution upon the. existence of an effective British Administration in 
Mesopotamia. 3f 
11. To revert-to the all important Kurdish question, which fi11s much 
of; -our- local 
horizon at present. 
-It is very noticeable 
that Turkish propaganda during the past 12 
months has been little 
in evidence amongst the Arab elements of Mesopotamia 
S. ý7 
but has been exceedingly active amongst the Kurds, who number approximately 
from one third to one"rquarter of the total population of the 3 Wilayats. 
The repatriation of-Christians,, the repeated announcements of 
European Statemen; regarding an Armenian State, the action of European 
Powers at Smyrna and elsewhere are all subjects which Turkey has not failed 
to turn-to our disadvantage. 
The fresh graves of 5 Political Officers 
scattered along 
the Northern Border of the Mosul Wilayet testify to the 
success of this-propaganda, 
nor, ýhave we yet seen its full development. 
12. d The atmosphere 
of resentment thus created has been favourable to 
the spread of Turkish pan Islamic doctrines against which we have no effective 
antidote: our promises 
to, Armenians, the arrests of Kurds by British Military 
officers in Syria, 
Aintab, Urfa and elsewhere, Greek aggression in Smyrna, 
these are facts which our qualified assurances to Kurds do not go far to- 
counterbalance. 
More recently the, behaviour of French troops in Syria, and 
elsewhere and: 
the pro-Armenian attitude of United Statest representatives, 
have tended to harden popular. 
feeling against us as'the representatives of 
I 
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'an -Anti-Moslem League. rc", 
In this atmosphere it is difficult if not impossible to create the 
fringe of autonomous Kurdish -States which has been authorised,, and indeed 
until the Northern Boundary of Mesopotamia has been decided one it is 
c 
difficult if not-impossible to give. the, local Chiefs such assurances as 
will justify them in throwing in their lot with us., -n,, 
13:. Our financial stake in this country is now so great that we are, 
it seems to me, committed, in our own national interests, to a degree of 
responsibility in relation to 
its affairs which must inevitably conflict 
sharply with. the early creation even 
in name of an Arab Administration. - 
;, "_ British capital sunk 
in, this country at the end of 1919 may be 
estimated as follows: - - 
Miscellaneous Assets including Port (Hewett*s Million. 
report) to be transferred to Civil Administration) 2 
Railway. (excluding assets of Baghdad Railways)... g} 
Road to Kazbin .................................. - 
} 
British Commercial capital at present locked up 
in country (Shipping, banks and trade)........... 5 
The above estimate takes no account of military expenditure. 
14. The capitalized value of the oil fields may be taken as £50,000,000 
at a low valuation. 
Other minerals, coal, copper, iron etc. are known to 
exist in Kurdistan"(Stilaimaniyah 
region). - 
15. " Imports uncertainty and shipping difficulties, notwithstanding 
have trebled since 1913 and now stand at £16,000,000 per annum of which 
£10,000,000 is from the U. K. Shortage of shipping and high freights have 
prevented the growth of 
exports which stand for the last 12 months at - 
£9,000,000. -. 
- 
These-figures include transit trade. 
16. At the present moment there are in Mesopotamia about'200 British 
0fficialsof Civil cAdminist ration, of whom 60- 
have '. their families with 'them (excluding Railways and-other 
quasi military Depts). 
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120 British born subjects belonging to British commercial firms of whom 
about 40 have their families with them. 
200 British born subjects in subordinate positions in the Civil Admin- 
istration (excluding Railways and other quasi military Depts. ) 
80 ditto. with Commercial Firms. 
50 European Foreign subjects. 
4000 to 5000 Indians drawing over Rs. 200 in the employ of the Civil Admin.. 
istration or of British firms or in business on their own account or in the 
employ of native firms. 
This excludes Labour Corps personnel. 
The presence of this large body of British and Foreign subjects 
in the country involves H. M. G. and its representative on the spot in great 
responsibilities and cannot be without effect upon the attitude to be adopted 
towards constitutional experiments. 
17. ' The currency of this country consists of Indian Currency Notes to 
the value of about 20 crores of rupees and current rupees and small coin 'to 
the value of about 7 crores together with about £4*0002000 in Turkish gold 
which is scarcely in circulation. 
The reserve of coin which is held in Mesopotamia against the local 
current Indian Currency Notes 
is about j crore of rupees a figure considerably 
below the safe minimum. 
Any diminution in the authority of Government would shake the local ' 
financial edifice to its foundations and would involve widespread disaster 
to British and local trade interests. 
18.1 readily recognise that there are many other factors besides 
those referred to above requiring the consideration of His Majesty*s Government, 
many of which are necessarily 
beyond my purview. 
I have nevertheless ventured to. place the foregoing local aspects 
of the question 
before Government in the hope that it may yet be possible 
for H. M. G. not to commit itself to a policy which must in the practically 
unanimous opinion of 
its Officers in this country and of the local public 
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operate disastrously to the, interests of this-Country. 
19. I believe that the Divisional and Provincial Councils provisionally 
s#antioned and now in process of formation, if allowed to develop and assisted 
to assume a due share of local responsibility will 
in a comparatively short 
space of time give the public at large that measure of participation and 
control of their' local destinies which is necessary, to ensure stability of 
the administration, and will serve as a training ground for the development 
of administrative talent which may 
fit the people of these countries 
ultimately to control their own destinies. Many years will not elapse 
before the people of this Country will be at least as well equipped as the 
people of Egypt or India now are 
for Western forms of Government, ' but, for, 
the present the population 
is so deeply divided by racial and religious 
cleavages, and the 
Shiah majority after 200 years of Sunni domination are so 
little accustomed to hold high Office that any attempt to introduce institutions 
on the lines desired 
by the advanced Sunni Politicians of Syria would involve 
the concentration of power 
in the hands of a few persons whose ambitions and 
methods would rapidly 
bring about the collapse of organized Government. 
20. Finally if I may be permitted to make a personal reference, I beg 
leave toiassure Government that 
by birth, by training and by temperament, 1 
am in sympathy with a 
democratic as opposed to a bureaucratic conception of 
Government, and if I 
find myself unable to advocate the immediate introduction 
of a logical scheme of 
Arab Government into Mesopotamia it is because I believe 
that the results would 
be the antithesis of a democratic Government and that 
the creation and maintenance at 
this stage öf an indigenous Arab Government 
is inconsistent with the changes which we are now endeavouring to introduce 
into the G. of India and Egypt, changes 
the necessity for which I fully recog- 
nise and with which 
I am broadly speaking in sympathy. 
I have. sent a copy of this letter with enclosures to the G. of India. 
I have the honour to bei Sir, 
Your most obedient Servant. 
(sgd) A. T. Wilson 
Lieut-Colonel, I. A. 
Acting Civil Commissioner in Mesopotamia 
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